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Abstract 
The principal question this study aims to answer is why and how a left-of-centre government 
not hobbled by heavy external leverage, with developmental state precedents, potentially 
positive macroeconomic fundamentals, and well-developed alternative policies for housing 
and urban reconstruction came to settle on a conservative housing policy founded on 
‘precepts of the pre-democratic period’. Arguably, this policy is even more conservative than 
World Bank strictures and paradigms, whose advice the incoming democratic government 
‘normally ignored’ and ‘tacitly rejected’. The study, which spans the period from the early 
1990s to 2007, commences from the premise that housing is an expression and component of 
a society’s wider development agenda and is bound up with daily routines of the ordering and 
institutionalisation of social existence and social reproduction. It proposes an answer that 
resides in the mechanics and modalities of post-apartheid state construction and its associated 
techniques and technologies of societal penetration and regime legitimisation. The vagaries 
and vicissitudes of post-Cold War statecraft, the weight of history and legacy, strategic 
blundering, and the absence of a cognitive map and compass to guide post-apartheid 
statecraft, collectively contribute to past and present defects and deformities of our two 
decade-old developmentalism, writ large in our human settlements. Alternatives to the 
technocratic market developmentalism of our current housing praxis spotlight empowering 
shelter outcomes but were bastardised. This is not unrelated to the toxicity of mixing 
conservative governmentalities (neoliberal macroeconomic precepts, modernist planning 
orientations, supply-side citizenship and technocratic projections of state) with ‘ambiguated’ 
counter-governmentalities (self-empowerment, self-responsibilisation, the aestheticisation of 
poverty and heroic narratives about the poor). Underscored in the study is the contention that 
state developmentalism and civil society developmentalism rise and fall together, pivoting on 
(savvy) reconnection of economics and politics (the vertical axis of governance) and state and 
society (the horizontal axis). Without robust reconfiguration and recalibration of axes, the  
revamped or, more appropriately, reconditioned housing policy – Breaking New Ground – 
struggles to navigate the limitations of the First Decade settlement state shelter delivery 
regime and the Second Decade’s (weak) developmental state etho-politics. The prospects for 
success are contingent on structurally rewiring inherited and contemporary contacts and 
circuits of power, influence and money in order to tilt resource and institutional balances in 
favour of the poor. Present pasts and present futures, both here and abroad, offer resources 
for more transformative statecraft and sustainable human settlements, but only if we are 
prepared to challenge the underlying economic and political interests that to date have, and 
continue to,  preclude such policies. History, experience and contemporary record show there 
are alternatives – another possible and necessary world – via small and large steps, 
millimetres and centimetres, trial and error.  
  
 iii 
 
Opsomming 
Die hoof vraag wat hierdie studie probeer beantwoord is hoekom en hoe dit gekom het dat ŉ 
links-van-die-middel regering wat nie gekniehalter was deur gewigtige, eksterne invloede 
nie; en met ontwikkelingstaat presedente [of voorbeelde]; potensieel positiewe makro-
ekonomiese grondbeginsels, en goed ontwikkelde alternatiewe beleide vir behuising en 
stedelike herontwikkeling, gevestig [of vasgesteek] het op ŉ konserwatiewe behuisingbeleid, 
gegrond op ‘voorskrifte van die voor-demokratiese tydperk’. Die beleid is, aanvegbaar, selfs 
meer konserwatief as ongunstige Wêreld Bank voorskrifte en paradigmas, wie se advies die 
inkomende demokratiese regering oënskynlik geïgnoreer en stilswyend verwerp het. Die 
studie, wat strek oor die periode vanaf die vroeë 1990s tot 2007, begin met die aanname dat 
behuising ŉ uitdrukking en komponent van ŉ gemeenskap se wyer ontwikkelingsagenda is, 
en saamgebind is met die daaglikse roetine van die ordening en institusionalisering van 
maatskaplike bestaan en maatskaplike reproduksie. ŉ Antwoord word voorgestel wat berus 
op die meganika en modaliteite van na-apartheid staatskonstruksie en die meegaande 
tegnieke en tegnologieë van sosiale penetrasie en regeringstelsel legitimering. Die giere en 
wisselvallighede van Na-Koue Oorlog staatkunde, die gewig van geskiedenis en 
nalatingskap, strategiese foute en die afwesigheid van ŉ bewuste kaart en kompas om na-
apartheid staatkunde te lei, het gesamentlik bygedra tot die vorige en teenwoordige gebreke 
en misvormings van ons twee dekade-oue ontwikkelings-isme (‘developmentalism’), groot 
geskryf in ons menslike nedersettings. Alternatiewe tot die tegnokratiese mark 
ontwikkelings-isme (‘developmentalism’), van ons huidige behuisingspraktyk, plaas die 
kollig op bemagtigende skuiling uitkomstes, maar was verbaster. Dit is nie onverwant aan die 
giftigheid van die meng van konserwatiewe goewermentaliteite (‘governmentalities’) 
(neoliberale makro-ekonomiese voorskrifte, modernistiese beplannings orientasies, verskaf-
kant burgerskap en tegnokratiese projeksies van staat) met teenstrydige teen-
goewermentaliteite (‘governmentalities’) (self-bemagtiging, self-verantwoordlikheid (‘self-
responsibility’), die estetifikasie (aestheticisation’) van armoede en heldhaftige vertellings 
omtrent die armes). Onderstreep in die studie is die bewering dat staatsontwikkelings-isme 
(‘developmentalism’) en siviele gemeenskapsontwikkelings-isme (‘developmentalism’) saam 
klim en val, en wat roteer om (kundige) herkonneksie van die ekonomie en politiek (die 
vertikale as van regeerkunde) en staat en gemeenskap (die horisontale as). Sonder robuuste 
herkonfigurasie en herkalibrering van die asse, sukkel die opgedateerde, of amper her-
kondisioneerde behuisingsbeleid – Breaking New Ground – om die limiete van die Eerste 
Dekade nedersetting staat skuiling leweringstelsel en die Tweede Dekade se (swak) 
ontwikkelende staat eto-politiek, te navigeer. Die verwagtinge vir sukses is gebaseer op 
strukturele herbedrading van oorgeërfde en eietydse kontakte en stroombane van mag, 
invloed en geld, op so ŉ wyse dat hulpbronne en institusionele balans ten gunste van die 
armes gekantel word. Teenwoordige verledes en teenwoordige toekomste, beide hier en 
oorsee, bied hulpbronne vir meer transformerende staatkunde en volhoubare menslike 
nedersettings, maar slegs indien ons bereid is om die onderliggende ekonomies en politiese 
belange uit te daag, wat tot op datum en nog steeds voortgaan om sodanige beleide te 
verhinder. Geskiedenis, ondervinding en eietydse rekords, moet wakker bly vir alternatiewe – 
ŉ ander moontlike en noodsaaklike wêreld – via klein en groot stappe, millimeters en 
sentimeters, tref of fouteer. 
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Introduction 
The post-apartheid government is committed to a humanistic development agenda and 
programme premised on substantive and restorative social justice and expansive citizenship 
within a participatory democratic framework. These unambiguous commitments are 
enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) and inscribed 
in macro-development programmes and sectoral policies.1
The shelter policy and programme of the First and Second Decade of Democracy affirms and 
entrenches this agenda. The policy is squarely linked to poverty alleviation and progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights. The policy architecture skilfully cements and builds 
further on numerous components including an acknowledgement of the heterogeneity of the 
poor and sensitivity towards the vulnerable; multi-sectoriality at project, policy and 
institutional levels; participation, partnership and devolution; municipalisation; and 
intervention at a city scale (Fiori et al., 2000).  
  
The achievements of the programme with reference to the material realisation of the aims of 
social justice, citizenship, reductions in shelter poverty and the restoration of human dignity 
is nothing short of remarkable. In the first decade alone, state-assisted housing investment of 
some R29.5bn provided 1.6 million housing opportunities and afforded 500 000 families 
secure title to old public housing stock. Whilst the cost to government of the latter was 
approximately R3.6bn, the replacement cost of this stock (or value to occupants) is estimated 
to be R24bn. From 1994 to 2003/04, over R48bn of housing assets were transferred to 
citizens, with 49% of all approved subsidies allocated to women. A total of over six million 
citizens received subsidised housing between 1994 and 2003 (Presidency, 2003a:25; 
Department of Housing [DOH], 2004a).  
This delivery record is recognised by the international development community, most 
notably, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements – as ‘one of the most significant 
contributions of the process of settling people in secure tenure’ in ‘the history of humanity’s 
delivery of housing’, according to Ahmedi Vawda, ex-Deputy Director-General of the 
Department of Housing (Vawda, 2003).  
But the record of this country that only recently joined the global community of democratic 
states is blemished, as can be seen by robust critiques of the quality, location and 
sustainability of these housing projects. Despite government’s stated commitment to establish 
viable, socially and economically integrated communities, situated in areas allowing 
convenient access to economic opportunities as well as health, educational and social 
amenities (RSA, 1994), dwellings continue to be poorly designed; environmentally unsound; 
expensive to maintain; and low-income settlements are locationally peripheralised and 
therefore spatially marginalised. The living environment and dwellings are not conducive to 
aesthetic or environmental sustainability; are grossly deficient in essential community 
                                                 
1 According to the former Judge President of the Constitutional Court, Arthur Chaskalson, dignity, equality, 
freedom and democracy – the founding values of the Constitution – must inform all aspects of law and practice 
(Chaskalson, 2001). 
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services; and place great burdens on the resources of the country,2
Numerous senior government officials echoed this criticism of the housing programme and 
projects during the very early years of implementation. The ex-Premier of Gauteng, Tokyo 
Sexwale, criticised the housing plan as only being able to produce ‘corrugated iron shacks’ 
(Sunday Times, 10 July 1994). Housing Minister Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, Joe Slovo’s 
successor, raised concerns about the housing programme during her first few months of 
office. She referred to Slovo’s policy as ‘toilets in the veld’ (cited in Sunday Times, 16 July 
1995). When the very same Minister trumpeted the achievements of the housing policy for 
providing tenure security to between 4.5 and 5 million people over the period 1994 to early 
2000 – ‘a level unsurpassed anywhere in the world’ (Minister of Housing, 2001a) - President 
Thabo Mbeki, a month later, frankly remarked that despite a massive programme of 
investment and work towards the integration of communities, ‘all we have done is expand 
those black ghettos’ (Sunday Independent, 3 June 2001). In September 2004, more than three 
years after this scathing indictment of the housing programme, the President said that ‘there 
is an urgent need to transform the apartheid landscape’, which ‘[w]ith few exceptions 
remains unchanged’. ‘New housing developments’, he remarked, ‘are generally located on 
the outskirts of towns and cities’ (President Mbeki, 2004b).  
 the cities and, most 
crucially, the poor inhabitants of the houses.  
Since the latter part of 1999, the Department of Housing has been intensively scrutinising the 
policy and has introduced many significant ‘re-orientations’ intended to complement and 
supplement existing strategic thrusts. The realigned housing strategy/plan entitled ‘Breaking 
New Ground’: A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human 
Settlements (DOH, 2004a – referred to in this text as the strategy, Comprehensive Plan, Plan 
or BNG) re-energises government’s commitment to the creation of well-managed human 
settlements wherein economic growth and social development are in balance with 
environmental priorities (taking the ‘carrying capacity of the natural systems’ into account), 
resulting in sustainable development, wealth creation, poverty alleviation and equity.  
The realigned housing strategy and plan – and the associated programmes and initiatives – 
aspire to address a series of problems and challenges, chief among them being poor 
integration at settlement level and city scale; the withdrawal of private sector developers from 
the housing programme; deficiencies in the emerging contractor programme; the general 
shortage of housing sector capacity and expertise (especially, but not exclusively, at local 
government level), combined with an unwillingness by many municipalities to fulfil their 
housing mandate. Compounding the above are high land costs in advantageous locations; the 
urbanisation of poverty and diminished household size; the stubborn growth and proliferation 
of informal settlements; effecting delivery at scale; and the reluctance of the financial sector 
to contribute in a meaningful and sustained manner to improving the shelter conditions of 
low-income households through the extension of credit and mortgage financing. In the 
BNG’s sights are also measures to address the continued red-lining activities of financial 
institutions (i.e. preventing housing investment and sales in most inner-city areas and 
traditional black townships by withholding finance) and arresting the skewed growth of the 
housing markets which delivered massive windfalls to 30% of the population (property price 
appreciation) against the backdrop of stagnation in marginalised areas (DOH, 2003a; 2004a).  
                                                 
2 High transport subsidies and stretched operating budgets, for example. 
 3 
 
Whether the new strategy will deliver on the goals of integrated and sustainable human 
settlement development is dependent on a host of factors. Internal to the state, these include 
securing the necessary finance for the funding of BNG; building the capacity/capability of 
institutions charged with the implementation of the plan (especially at local government 
level); and revising and redesigning the regulatory framework so that it is more empowering 
and democratically responsive. Overhauling the institutional architecture undergirding 
diverse programmes, and the plan, in general, and addressing the very deep seated principal-
agency problems traversing the most senior echelons of power, in especially the national 
Department of Housing, present added obstacles.  
The spine of this thesis is that although the realigned BNG strategy and plan is eminently 
better geared to deliver more sustainable outcomes, sustainable human settlement 
development is hamstrung by more intractable problems related to the nature of the state, its 
form, function, orientation and relational fields.  
Problem Statement  
Betwixt the magical realism of the splendid words of the most progressive Constitution in the 
world (Ahluwalia, 2001) and the grand pronouncements of our ‘refolutionary’3 (Farhi, 
2003:31) public sector elite, lies a reality – especially in the shelter sector – of continuing 
injustice, continuing oppression, continuing marginalisation, continuing exclusion, and 
continuing harshness (adapted from Higgs & Smith, 2000). There is indeed something 
profoundly awry with our transformation project when the humanity of the ‘hitherto 
excluded’4 majority is daily denied and their dignity routinely, systematically and 
systemically violated. Although this condition – ‘disjunctive democratisation’5
…does not alter the necessity to ‘change the world’, nor does it alter the fact that 
development is about changing the world, with all the pitfalls that it involves, 
including the legacy of social engineering and Enlightenment confidence tricks 
(Pieterse, 2000:187). 
 – is not 
uncommon to most parts of the developing (and developed) world, what is notable in our 
post-apartheid reconstruction context is our continuing and abiding faith in the transformative 
capacities of the state and planning when everywhere else this meets with distrust, 
disillusionment and dismissal. Across the ideological spectrum – post-developmentalists, 
anti-developmentalists and neoliberals – the ambition to ‘change the world’ through more 
government and more planning is met with cynicism laced with charges of authoritarianism 
and social engineering. Yet all this, remarks the eminent development studies expert, Jan-
Nederveen Pieterse,  
                                                 
3 A portmanteau word made up of ‘reformist’ and ‘revolutionary’. 
4 A catchall term to collectively describe the diversity of disadvantaged groupings. 
5 Democratisation, asserts Holston (2002:330–1), is ‘disjunctive’ – it comprises processes in the 
‘institutionalisation, performance, and meaning of citizenship that are always uneven, unbalanced and 
heterogeneous’. Two types of democratic disjunction are prevalent: uneven citizenships and discrepancies 
between form and substance  
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Market fundamentalism and (the icy grip of) right-wing politics present us with a veritable 
arsenal of strategems and techniques to effect ‘change’. Fortunately, these have been slated 
by government as inappropriate for meeting our needs and development priorities. In his 
address to the National Assembly on the occasion of his budget vote, President Mbeki 
unequivocally endorsed a ‘left’ project. Quoting the public intellectual, William Hutton, he 
said: 
Western democracies have been characterised by one broad family of ideas that might 
be called left – a belief in the social, reduction in inequality, the provision of public 
services, the principle that workers should be treated as assets rather than 
commodities, regulation of enterprise, rehabilitation of criminals, tolerance and a 
respect for minorities – and another broad family of ideas that might be called right: 
an honouring of our inherited institutional fabric, a respect for order, a belief that 
private property rights and profit are essential to the operation of the market economy, 
a suspicion of worker rights, faith in the remedial value of punitive justice and the 
distrust of the new (President Mbeki, 2004a).  
The President elaborated further:  
[T]here can be no doubt about where we stand with regard to this great divide. It is to 
pursue the goals contained in the “broad family of ideas that might be called the left” 
that we seek to build the system of governance. The obligations of the democratic 
state to the masses of our people do not allow that we should join those who 
“celebrate individualism and denigrate the state”. We would never succeed to 
eradicate the legacy of colonialism and apartheid if we joined the campaign to portray 
“the social, the collective and the public realm...as the enemies of prosperity and 
individual autonomy...opposed to the moral basis of society, grounded as it should be 
(in terms of right wing ideology) in the absolute responsibility of individuals to 
shoulder their burdens and exercise their rights alone”. This is precisely what we 
meant when we said in the May State of the Nation Address that: “The advances we 
must record demand that we ensure that the public sector discharges its 
responsibilities to our people as a critical player in the process of the growth, 
reconstruction and development of our country” (Ibid).  
Predating the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994) and the 
deliberations and policy work of the Reconstruction and Development Ministry, the 
government’s belief in the transformative capacity of the state came to coalesce and 
crystallise around the notion of the ‘developmental state’. Again, Thabo Mbeki’s words in his 
address at the Development Planning Summit (hosted by the Intergovernmental Forum) are 
illuminating:  
Our fundamental challenge…is to construct a truly developmental state. International 
experience demonstrates that government driven by a vision and measured by results 
is far more effective than a rule-governed state. In addition government which is 
empowered at all levels and which is able to ensure the active participation of citizens 
in decision making is critical. Finally government must be enterprising. If our efforts 
are constrained by the extensive systems of rules we have inherited we will achieve 
nothing. We must replace any unnecessary regulations with clear objectives and 
performance measures. Thus the fundamental role of our vision…is to unleash the 
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creativity of our people, in government and throughout South African society (Deputy 
President Mbeki, 1995).  
So the components of the ‘left’ project and the agenda of the developmental state (when 
reading official statements from 1995 and beyond (discussed extensively below)) are 
ostensibly about a vision-driven, enterprising and empowered performance-oriented 
government; active citizen participation; and reducing inequality and poverty.  
But herein lies the rub which accounts not insignificantly for our poor development 
performance in key sectors. It will be demonstrated that the envisaged state is not even a 
shadow of the assertive social transformation state,6 the archetype being the developmental 
state. When South Africa’s shelter policy is critically interrogated, the state’s form, function 
and orientation is more akin to that of the liberal market consensus state.7
The White Paper on Housing (RSA, 1994) enshrines and affirms the values of the service 
delivery state. In retrospect, the seven key thrusts of the White Paper
 This liberal market 
consensus state settles on a social formation, privileging the provision of law and order, 
protection of property rights (defined by strong contract enforcement and low appropriation 
risk), correcting market failures (in particular, delivering democratically decided-upon public 
goods efficiently) and effecting limited welfare-type redistributions (M Khan, 2004). This 
service delivery state executes its mandate via a series of ‘good governance’ reforms 
encompassing decentralisation, subcontracting to NGOs (amongst others), encouraging civil 
society participation, government rightsizing, and fighting corruption. These measures 
collectively function to destroy the state’s capacity to create and generate bad rents. More 
fundamentally though, they reduce the capacity of the state to intervene in general which 
‘fatally damages the possibility of creating a developmental transformation state’ (Ibid:188).  
8
                                                 
6 A market shaping interventionist state, or social transformation state (described shortly) , is one located 
midway between a parametric (framework) and dirigist state.   
 together constitute a 
7 Liberalism has numerous meanings and ‘many different orientations have chosen to call themselves liberal’ 
(Raico, 1992:391, original emphasis). The ‘most authentic and characteristic form of liberalism’ has concerned 
itself with ‘expansion of the free functioning of civil society’ – partly in response to monarchism and absolutism 
– and the ‘restriction of state activity’ (Ibid). The liberal philosophy is best captured in the slogans ‘laissez faire’ 
(free market), ‘laissez passer’ (free trade), and ‘le monde va de lui-meme (“the world goes by itself”)’ 
(Ibid:392–3, original emphasis). The classical liberal state - [n]owhere...consistently realised’ (Ibid) – was 
premised on the notion of competition being the natural order of things and the market producing optimal results 
with respect to demand, supply and distribution. In the period 1945 to 1975, the liberal state regime, 
undergirded by Keynesianism and regulated by the Breton Woods arrangements institutions was termed 
‘embedded liberalism’, i.e. the sanctioning of market allocation in the economy but guided by political 
processes so as to avert international conflict, maintain demand, and effect a more equitable distribution of 
growth (see Ruggie, 1982). With the demise of the Breton Woods arrangements, embedded liberalism was 
eclipsed by the neoliberal regime with its emphasis on privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation and 
internationalisation (unpacked below). Leaving aside the differences in the evolution of the liberal regime, the 
liberal state can arguably be portrayed as one, which to a greater or lesser extent works with the existing grain of 
history, institutions and social forces, namely, it ‘settles’ on a social formation with its many inequalities and 
skewed distribution of power. The democratic deficit in these societies – ranging from no voice and access to 
power for the dis/unorganised poor and/or whose access and voice is routinely and frequently confined to 
carefully state orchestrated and managed participative formats/forums – functions to contain and defuse any 
potential opposition to the (minimalist) redistributive programme of the liberal market state. 
8 Stabilising the housing market; supporting the housing process for a people-driven process; mobilising housing 
credit and savings; rationalising institutional capacities within a sustainable institutional framework; facilitating 
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minimalist programme for transforming housing and shelter conditions; the White Paper is 
more the product of a political compromise9 with business groups and old Urban Foundation-
aligned consultants being very prominent in the deliberations of the National Housing Forum 
(NHF) that produced the policy (Rust, 1997). These powerful consultants were ‘adamant that 
no other kind of subsidy programme [old IDT type]10
The disjuncture between intention and outcome – the multi-braided explanation of which 
comprises a critical component of this study and could perhaps count as a novel contribution 
to present scholarship – is a function, like everywhere else, of interrelated factors including 
history, societal context, institutional form and structure, organisational capabilities and 
capacities, the location of the programme/project in the broader economic and political 
programme, and development thinking/ philosophies. More pointedly, it is the contention of 
this study that the minimalist programme of the service delivery state is the root cause of 
poor developmental performance. This coupled to a ‘transformation narrative’, stressing, 
amongst others, non-conflictual social relations (Wolpe, 1995; Leroke, 1996) and/or buzzy/ 
fuzzy left-leaning-(dis)empowering rhetoric (see Pieterse, forthcoming (b)) in both the 
negotiation of programmes and projects to address uneven development and drive social 
change, tends to undermine/displace focus on inequality and poverty and strategies to reduce 
or eradicate these (Ibid).  
 was possible’ and it was ‘adopted with 
relatively little questioning’ (Gilbert, 2002a:1920). Other evidence also suggests that while 
the housing policy conformed quite closely to the World Bank’s list of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’, 
particularly in the areas of formal finance delivery and the subsidy programme’, it was, 
arguably, more conservative than the World Bank’s approach (see Jones & Datta, 2000).  
Is it any small wonder then why our transformation project has to date been unable to tilt 
resource and institutional balances in favour of the poor, especially at local level? Already in 
1998, critical urbanists were arguing that our ‘participative governance’ regime – premised 
on a ‘neoliberal’ ‘model of community’ – a grouping of empowered individuals who voice 
their opinions, offer their expertise and take responsibility for their actions – excludes the 
poor, the marginalised, the uneducated and the ‘illegal’, with resources being channelled 
towards those with the voice to claim them (Bremner, 1998:53). Five years later, a review of 
the centrepiece of our development planning edifice – local government integrated 
development plans (IDPs) – confirmed that the voices of ‘especially the poor’ were being 
crowded out of the planning process and their participation ‘not necessarily lead[ing] to pro-
poor outcomes’ (Handingham, 2003:11). Thus, in common with the majority of strategic 
bargaining models, our participative governance regime does not transform the preferences, 
especially those of the elite. Instead, it produces development agreements or protocols that 
codify and further entrench the existing (im)balance of power. This outcome is not surprising 
given that the service delivery state – as informed by the new political economy of the 
liberals – adopts an interest-group competition (pluralist) view of politics wherein ‘less 
politics means better economics’ (Grindle, 1991:48), i.e. ‘limiting the extent to which politics 
                                                                                                                                                       
the speedy release of land; and co-ordinating development by facilitating co-ordinated and integrated action by 
the public and private sector.  
9 ‘The National Housing Forum was more concerned with establishing some kind of compromise than with 
sorting out the optimal housing plan; some claim it did not even try’ (Gilbert, 2002a:1928). 
10 The Independent Development Trust, notorious for building ‘toilets in the veld’.  
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can intrude in the workings of the economy limits the extent to which state intervention and 
regulation can overwhelm the efficiency of economic interactions’ (Ibid:58).  
In short, our inability to meaningfully transform our inherited patterns of underdevelopment 
is most fundamentally the result of our adherence to a liberal market consensus model that 
permits only a status quo-bolstering state with minimum market shaping powers in which 
political contestation is limited because of the damaging rent-seeking11 behaviour it induces 
and resultant market distortions.12
The question before us is: was an alternative to the existing shelter programme articulated 
and demonstrated? Quite early in the formulation and elaboration of the housing policy, 
ideologues from the post-development school with deep links to community-based 
organisations (CBOs) and very sceptical of the future state’s commitment to the poor came to 
articulate an ‘alternative’ to the slowly emerging policy. The advocates of the People’s 
Housing Process (PHP) – comprising the Homeless People’s Federation (a network of 
CBOs), People’s Dialogue (an NGO) and community-managed revolving loan funds  – 
referred to hereafter as the Homeless People’s Alliance (HPA) – championed an ‘alternative’ 
housing delivery approach revolving around people-centred and controlled development, i.e. 
fostering self-reliant and self-replicable social development practices. What is indeed 
remarkable about the HPA’s housing interventions is that it outperformed developer-built 
subsidised housing in size, cost and quality; it built and strengthened communities; generated 
 In less technical terms, politics and politicking – that in the 
liberal market consensus guise is nothing more than rent-seeking maximisation – is a 
‘spanner in the economic works’, a ‘negative factor in attempting to get the policies right’ 
(Grindle, 1991:45, 44). This renders the task of explaining the need and potential for 
economic and development policy reform extremely difficult thus limiting the applicability of 
pro-poor policy-relevant advice. Carried to its logical conclusion, and when combined with 
the view of the state as being primarily predatory (if it veers from the narrow mandate of the 
liberal market state), it constitutes a ‘trap’ (Ibid:44) for those striving to effect change in 
existing policies and institutional arrangements. The outcomes and results of the adoption of 
the liberal market perspective – writ large in our policies/programmes and filtered through 
local socio-political dynamics – are plain to see in our post-apartheid RDP housing estates 
and socio-economic topography.  
                                                 
11 Capturing the revenue/ proceeds arising from price distortions and physical controls caused by (excessive) 
government intervention, e.g. licences, quotas, interest rate ceilings, exchange controls, tariffs, and subsidies.  
12 This perspective/view of the state was pushed to its extreme in the 1980s. Commonly associated with 
Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, the Bush administrations, the Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment 
Programmes of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (respectively), the Globalisation/Washington/ 
Third Way Consensus, the neoliberal regime extolled the norms of the free market as espoused by classical 
liberalism, typified by slogans of ‘rolling back the state’ and (wholesale) marketisation. In its idealised version, 
the state is demonised – state failure is pervasive; and its interventions distort and subvert the efficiency of the 
self-regulating/self-correcting market. The state is viewed as passive and pluralistic with all interest groups 
being equally empowered to access its largesse. In real world practice, neoliberalism departs from classical 
liberalism to the extent that competition is not the ‘natural’ state; market outcomes do not always produce 
optimal results (particularly under monopoly conditions); and state intervention is required to supply a plethora 
of public goods and manage negative externalities. These caveats aside, what is important to note are the many 
pragmatic modifications to this neoliberal regime, which has over time come to be associated with the 
subsidisation of corporations, upward redistribution of incomes/public services/assets to the wealthy (away from 
labouring classes), and the maximisation of shareholder value at the expense of and detriment to the wider 
society (see Baker, 2006). 
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employment and skills acquisition; and succeeded in empowering the most marginalised 
segments of the population (women, those living in backyards, shacks and hostels) (BRCS, 
2003). This rosy picture of the HPA’s developmental outcomes is not uncontested.  
The benefits of the PHP were recognised by the government quite early in the 
implementation of the original supply-side, state-facilitated and private sector driven housing 
programme. After government was exposed to the HPA model, it was appropriated by the 
state in 1998 and, in subsequent years, became an important pillar of the official housing 
programme.  
The appropriation of the HPA model marked an important policy shift as for the first time an 
officially-sanctioned programme created space for civil society and their partners to 
participate in housing processes and production. On the other hand, it was also a tactical 
manoeuvre by the state given the ringing endorsement of the HPA model for its sustainability 
(in contrast to the mainstream model) and its self-help empowerment component by the 
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, the United Nations Development Programme 
and the United States Agency for International Development (Huchzermeyer, 2001)  
Although the adoption of the HPA model by the state was widely celebrated as an important 
victory for those committed to people-centred development (Wilson & Lowery, 2003), 
serious concerns were voiced about the efficacy and viability of the state’s PHP approach 
within a broader policy framework that remained stubbornly wedded to neo-liberal 
macroeconomic precepts, modernist planning orientations and the technocratic projections of 
the state (Rust, 2002). Moreover, given that liberal governments everywhere model their 
interventions on forms of regulation, expectations and values already operational in civil 
society – with significant modifications (Dean, 2002) – the state’s PHP model struggled to 
strike a balance between its emphasis on ‘sweat equity’, individualism and cost reduction (on 
the one hand), and the PHP’s emphasis on collective beneficiary planning, decision-making 
and more organic productive housing delivery (Development Works, 2002; BRCS, 2003). 
Not surprisingly, the state’s PHP model – the policy, implementation and institutional 
infrastructure – was (and still is) perceived (in circles outside the state) to be weak, 
contradictory, underdeveloped, and systematically biased against it (BRCS, 2003). These 
criticisms have not gone unnoticed by the state. The BNG notes:  
Housing authorities at all levels are moving in the direction of increased use of the 
People’s Housing Process (PHP). On the one hand, PHP is promoted as it provides 
residents a greater choice over the use of their subsidy. This generates positive 
housing outcomes, increased beneficiary input, and greatly enhances beneficiary 
commitment to these outcomes.[13
                                                 
13 The main benefits arise from citizens being able to make and exercise choice over the housing process. This 
ensures the conversion of the subsidy into maximum output, and that housing ‘citizenship’ is ‘cemented from 
inclusion in human settlement development decision making’ (DOH, 2004a:18).  
] Thus, the PHP achieves its two main goals of 
‘more for less’ and improved beneficiary commitment to housing outcomes by 
increased productivity through ‘intellectual equity’ (not primarily cost reduction 
through ‘sweat equity’), and by increasing beneficiary ‘ownership’ through the 
exercise of considered choice (not by forcing beneficiaries to provide free labour). 
Other participants view PHP as primarily a vehicle for the mobilisation of sweat 
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equity as an alternative to existing beneficiary contributions. This ‘sweat equity’ 
approach to the PHP tends to undermine the key benefits of the approach. The current 
approach toward the PHP is thus inherently contradictory (DOH, 2004a:17–8).  
At a more foundational level, though, those who devised and championed the PHP, and were 
instrumental in the appropriation of the model by government, not only misread the workings 
and functioning of the state – especially the modifications it would effect – but their 
‘alternative’ was also, perhaps unwittingly, neoliberal.14
If the official shelter programme and the ‘alternative’ (presented above) offer the poor very 
little with respect to changing the terms of trade between recognition and redistribution, the 
Second Decade of Freedom presents tantalising prospects for improving the shelter and living 
conditions of the poor. This is connected in part to a more assertive state committed to 
addressing imbalances in the entire residential housing market and programmes targeted at 
spatial restructuring and socio-economic integration (DOH, 2004a). This is bolstered by a 
realisation at the most senior level of the executive that ‘if all indicators [development 
performance and societal trends] were to continue along the same trajectory, especially in 
respect of the dynamic of economic inclusion and exclusion, we could soon reach a point 
where the negatives start to overwhelm the positives. This could precipitate a vicious cycle of 
decline in all spheres’ (Presidency, 2003a:102). Various government pronouncements, once 
again, cast a spotlight on the meaning, identity and materiality of the transformation project. 
It is perhaps for this reason that, in his second term of office, President Mbeki, and his 
Cabinet, appeared more determined to push the frontiers of transformation in a deliberative 
manner. This is evidenced in (for example) the programmatic re-orientations of the 
restructuring of state assets; tough and concerted action against monopolies and the abuse of 
market power; the ambitious Expanded Public Works Programmes; the (hinted at) 
reintroduction of prescribed assets;
 Although grounded in an activist 
frame, with its emphasis on solidarity, mutuality, political mobilisation and deepening 
democracy, the ‘alternative’ reproduced liberal and authoritarian rationalities of rule, which 
ran alongside the HPA’s mobilisation and institutional engagement strategy. This failed to 
change the terms of trade between the state and the poor.  
15 targeted interventions in the Second Economy; the 
reinvigorated commitment to national spatial planning (with a city focus); the rolling out and 
expansion of the social security net to vulnerable segments of the population (children and 
youth); accelerating the pace of transformation in the judiciary; further regulation of 
medicine dispensing and pricing; and strengthening the capacity of local government to meet 
its constitutional obligations (particularly baseline service provision).16
In 2005, the ‘January 8
  
th
                                                 
14 Referenced here to, amongst others, the works of Rose and Miller (1992); Rose (1996, 1999); Dean (2002); 
Flint (2003); and Roy (2006).  
 Statement’ of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) – an 
outline of the party’s political programme for the year ahead, serving an important symbolic 
function of consolidation (Cape Times, 12 January 2005) - spoke directly to many of these 
15 During apartheid, pension funds were compelled to invest a certain proportion of their assets in government 
and parastatal stocks. 
16 There is a great deal more that could have motivated this somewhat ‘Polanyian-turn’ (Polyani, 2001, as 
discussed in Menocal, 2004).  
 10 
 
issues with one commentator remarking that it ‘reflects a move by leading members [of the 
party]…to swing the party back to the left, not only in its rhetoric but in its policy’ (Rob 
Amato in Sunday Independent, 16 January 2005). Of note in the Statement is that the 
‘democratic state must take the lead [emphasis added] in the transformation of the economy 
away from the fetters of the past, which constrain growth and development’ (ANC, 2005:4). 
Government also held a view – detailed in the Ten Year Review (Presidency, 2003a) – that 
the state should exercise greater leadership beyond the realms of areas under its direct 
control; elaborate a framework to improve the performance of both formal and informal 
institutions of the state; provide a vision and coherence to activities of civil society; and 
address the functioning of the state in its broadest possible institutional definition. ‘Working 
together with all sectors of society and through the developmental state’ (ANC, 2005:5), the 
state in the Second Decade of Freedom is one that can be characterised as guiding 
transformation through a combination of leadership and social control – a form of embedded 
autonomy (Evans, 1995) rather than consensual autonomy and inclusive embeddedness 
(White, 2002); a core (but not uncontested) feature of the contemporary developmental state.  
The significance of pushing the frontiers of transformation in a deliberative manner through 
leadership and social control is that government’s commitment to enhancing the power of the 
state17 now appears to span both institutional and political reform (not the case before). This 
is the hallmark of the social transformation state versus the liberal market consensus model. 
The social transformation state also focuses on service delivery but to ensure rapid change, 
the state effects relatively massive interventions in property rights systems (land reform, 
seizures and redistribution for example); creates, manages and removes (rather than simply 
minimising and abolishing) growth-generating rents;18 executes significant resource 
transfers; and presides over an effective institutional enforcement regime that suppresses or 
accommodates interests opposed to transformation (M Khan, 2004; Mustapha, 2006). 
Examples of this type of state include the United Kingdom, United States of America, 
Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands and Switzerland in the early stages of their 
industrialisation (Chang, 2002) and continuing (in a milder form) into the post-war 
Keynesian/social democratic period; the high growth Asian states including Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and more recently, China and India; and 
also now in Latin America with Venezuela and Brazil (amongst others) under the leadership 
of centre-left governments.19
Unlike the liberal market consensus state wherein enforcement is fixated on matters of anti-
corruption and judicial reform (which are not unimportant), the enforcement capacity of the 
social transformation state is one that revolves around a combined package of institutional 
reform and political restructuring of organised power blocs. Put differently, institutional 
capacity building in the social transformation state proceeds in parallel with political 
  
                                                 
17 To accelerate service delivery, pursue an integrated housing plan, improve services in the health sector, 
expand access to education and social grants, redress economic imbalances, and deepen the democratisation and 
responsiveness of institutions (local government and the judiciary being key institutions) (ANC, 2005). 
18 There are a variety of rents including information, licensing, and access to natural resources.  
19 The Latin American experiments are underway and it is perhaps too early to make authoritative statements 
about their transformative horizons, capabilities and capacities. It can however safely be said that they seem to 
be increasingly veering towards a variant of the social transformation state in both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms 
(Grabowski, 1994). This is further elaborated upon in the Conclusion.  
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interventions aimed at restructuring the distribution of political and organisational power with 
a view to encouraging the construction of productive coalitions to support the reforms of the 
transformation state.  
 
In the housing sector, the evolving Comprehensive Plan is an ambitious attempt to:  
• Intervene in property rights (delinking of land from the subsidy; stimulation of the 
social housing sector along diverse tenure tracks; preferential procurement; land 
expropriation at market value; mortgage lending disclosure);  
• Create and manage growth-generating rents (tax incentives for inner city renewal; 
creation of urban development zones; developer clawbacks with the view to socio-
economic residential integration; strengthening of the emerging contractor 
programme; deepened engagement with the financial sector around the Financial 
Sector Charter);  
• Enhance resource transfers (accelerating the delivery of subsidies; informal 
settlements upgrade programme); and 
• Politico-institutional restructuring of power blocs through Lead/Pilot projects (Cape 
Town’s N2 Gateway Project being a case in point).  
Effecting the transition from the immediate post-apartheid housing policy framed by the 
parameters of the liberal market consensus state to the more recent BNG (couched more in 
the ethos and spirit of the social transformation state) is not without its own problems at 
policy and implementation levels. The organisational, institutional, financial and political 
imprint of the (old and ‘newish’) liberal market consensus state is extremely powerful, 
codified in a host of regulations around which some programme managers have built 
extremely durable ‘empires’, i.e. officials who command incredible power by virtue of their 
monopoly of knowledge, expertise and control over the mechanics of implementation. As 
new opportunities for a more progressive housing dispensation arise, they may use their 
knowledge of and expertise in ‘codification’ (rules and regulations) to frustrate the 
progressive impulses/thrusts of new policy objectives. But their power also extends into 
policy production and classic principal-agency problems 20 that serves to narrow the BNG’s 
development horizon21 and ‘negatively’ (DOH, 2007:49) impact on ‘improved service 
delivery’ (Ibid), with more progressive22 officials fighting a daily unremitting rearguard 
battle. 23
                                                 
20 There are various manifestations of this. In some instances, alliances between third tier top officials (Chief 
Directors or Programme Managers) and the most senior official in the department (the Director-General) results 
in the bypassing of formal organisational levels of reporting and accountability. In other instances, there is ‘a 
practice of uncoordinated inputs that are sent directly from sub directorates and directorates [to Cabinet and 
other governance structures] without the Chief Director’s or Programme Manager’s endorsement’ (DOH, 
2007:49). 
 
21 Partly to protect their empires and the integrity of their first generation or First Decade programmes. 
22 Distinguishing ‘progressive’ officials from those implicitly being characterised negatively as ‘not progressive’ 
or directly as ‘conservative’ is not straightforward. There is a tendency in the debates about South African 
public service reform to speak of the new guard (officials mainly employed post-1994) (portrayed as 
‘progressive’) and the old guard (apartheid-era officials) (villified as ‘conservative’). It is asserted that a key 
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At the level of implementation, the new instruments (being tested through ‘pilots’) have to 
negotiate their way through a maze of inherited apartheid-era regulations and first generation/ 
First Decade of Freedom policies, legislation and regulations. Complicating matters is the 
‘assumption’ that officials are the expert technocratic translators of political directives. 
Increasingly, these ‘expert technocrats’ ‘deliver’ to satisfy politicians and top officials, using 
simplistic sets of ‘instruments’ that are weak and, frankly, unworkable, without peer review 
and/or even properly applying their minds, thereby failing to meet the real needs of the 
people.  Additionally, time lags associated with the promulgation of regulations 24 to activate 
and give effect to new (strong and weak) policy instruments further compromises (efficient) 
implementation.25
It is the contention of this study that the policies framed by the parameters of the social 
transformation state affords government a unique opportunity to design and execute more 
sustainable human settlement interventions. However, the imprints and dominance of 
 Effective implementation is thus bedevilled by a host of tensions and 
contradictions with delays undermining the integrity, stature, authority and developmental 
potential of new policy. The net effect is a ‘business-as-usual’ outcome and, many a time, 
even worse outcomes.  
                                                                                                                                                       
problem confronting the state and negatively impacting on development performance is the intransigence of the 
(apartheid-era) ‘conservative’ officials who refuse to align their [personal] value systems with the 
transformation objectives of the post-1994 government. These divisions are evident in the Department of 
Housing. New guard ‘progressive’ officials are broadly committed to a development agenda that is 
redistributive and pro-poor. Their project spans both institutional and political reform with the intention being 
one of deepening democracy, restoring dignity and expanding citizenship. This project is one of shifting the 
state from service delivery mode to transformation mode. The (old guard) ‘conservative’ officials take as their 
starting point the preservation and reproduction of the inherited socio-institutional fabric writ large in apartheid-
era and first generation post-apartheid codes (and their work programmes). Whilst they may be committed to 
redistribution and equity, their development imaginations are not easily ‘re-programmable’, steeped as they are 
in the authoritarian rationalities of the apartheid state in whose service they spent many years. Their mindset is 
one that is disdainful of civil society and the state is viewed as the sole author and driver of development. 
However, it must be said that this view of the state is not exclusive to this group of officials. The distinguishing 
feature of these old guard officials though is their resistance and/or reluctance and/or inability to innovate and/or 
translate commitment to redistribution and equity into policy and programmatic instruments because self-
preservation and protection of organisational empires is their starting point. But preliminary research suggests 
that this distinction between the ‘progressives’ and the ‘conservatives’ is very crude as there are fissures within 
these groupings. Also to conflate ‘old’ with ‘conservative’ and ‘new’ with ‘progressive’ is equally problematic. 
There are messy alliances between so-called ‘progressives’ and ‘conservatives’/‘new’ and ‘old’ guard officials 
at different organisational levels. This alliance is cemented by ‘status scripts’ – stories, legitimations and 
symbolic references a social group employs to distinguish itself in its competition for resources, power or 
influence from others within the institution – and draw its strength from extant and emerging circuits of power 
(Sitas, 1996). Together, these officials set agendas, frame debates, design interventions and then ‘code’ them. 
Under these circumstances, policy, programmatic and institutional re-orientation is rendered ad hoc, fragmented 
and uncoordinated as the consolidation of power and prestige takes precedence over transformation.  
23 Most of the ‘progressive’ (old and new guard) officials share an identity of purpose with Minister Lindiwe 
Sisulu. Although her purpose is largely aligned with that of the most senior officials in the department, these 
officials have to work through the senior official and strategic managers (Chief Directors) who may frustrate 
their efforts to actualise this purpose.  
24 Leaving aside the thorny problem of the identity, intentions and motivations of the ‘codifiers’. 
25 Where the first decade housing policy had only 9 programmatic instruments, there are nearly 30 BNG 
programmes, a number which will probably increase with further refinement of the demand-driven, supply-
negotiated approach. 
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inherited apartheid-era regulations and first generation policies present very significant 
hurdles and obstacles manifested in a range and host of deformities and dysfunctionalities. 
The real acid test of the appropriateness, viability and efficacy of the BNG plan in respect of 
sustainable human settlement development resides in skilful management of the policy 
production-implementation nexus/conundrum (alluded to above); constant adjustments and 
innovations in the regulatory environment; socio-institutional capacity-building; and the 
construction and mobilisation of developmental social coalitions to support citizen-centred 
developmental statism. Anticipating and defusing tensions and contradictions associated with 
the new policy and additional ones (those generated during implementation) will require 
quite invasive (ongoing) ‘surgery’ to remedy institutional dysfunctionalities. This must of 
necessity run in tandem with systemic reform of our political economy which continues to 
reproduce and reinforce uneven development. With this in mind, the research problematic is 
one that probes and tests the assertion as to whether the Comprehensive Plan and the N2 
Gateway Project can deliver sustainable human settlements that contribute to wealth creation, 
poverty eradication and equity.  
Goals, Assumptions, Premises and Research Questions 
Amidst citizen and government disillusionment about the outcomes of first generation 
housing praxis are glimmers of hope – particularly in official circles, academia and civil 
society organisations – that the Second Decade of Freedom/second generation policies 
affords us opportunities to remake our human settlements in ways that are responsive to the 
needs and priorities of the poor. Whilst probing, testing and scrutinising the basis of this hope 
is the core component of the study, it is crucial here to signal an unapologetic commitment to 
use this research to inform and lend support to the broad project of advancing democratically 
empowering and poverty-eradicating shelter production regimes. Another goal is to take up 
Appadurai’s (2000) challenge to further ‘grassroots’/‘globalisation from below’ in the 
academic/research world. This is about engaging with the scholarship of the public 
intellectual and social critic – the intelligentsia of the poor – whose work is not primarily 
conditioned by the academic/professional criteria of criticism and dissemination associated 
with the (sometimes) barren world of the global professoriate. This research endeavour is an 
exercise in intellectual transgression – an attempt to find a rapport between the academic 
social scientific register and the humanistic styles of inquiry residing in the imaginations and 
aspirations of the poor and their intellectuals. The case study of the ‘alternative’, coupled 
with both formal and informal/structured and unstructured interactions with civil society 
representatives and champions are instances of the author’s commitment. These interactions 
and engagements are referred to in many places in this study. 
In pursuit of this objective, the research is guided by five primary, interrelated, research 
questions: 
• What are the key factors explaining the widening wedge between policy intent and 
outcome in the first generation of housing praxis?  
• What ‘alternatives’ have been presented by civil society to mainstream official 
practice? How was/were this/these ‘alternatives’ incubated? How did the state 
respond? What were the implications of the ‘appropriation’ of the ‘alternatives’ for 
civil society formations?  
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• If existing housing praxis stands guilty of perpetuating, reinforcing and renewing 
uneven development, and if the appropriation of the ‘alternative’ has not shifted 
praxis in any significant manner, what measures (policy, programmatic and 
institutional) has the state embarked on to bridge the gap between intent and outcome 
by way of policy and implementation? 
• What are the prospects of success for Comprehensive Plan? What are the key 
stumbling blocks within the state and wider political economy that presently and in 
the longer term are likely to frustrate and distort developmental outcomes? How are 
and can these stumbling blocks be addressed?  
• What insights does praxis, both locally and elsewhere, offer to improve human 
settlement development outcomes?  
This study is premised on the belief that development is a profoundly ‘ambiguated’ 
undertaking wherein processes of dependency and underdevelopment can be challenged and 
reversed by processes of development (Mkandawire, 2006). Arresting and reversing 
processes of dependency and underdevelopment pivots on striking and sustaining dynamic 
developmental balances between state, market and civil society, i.e. ‘tripod balancing’ 
(Evans, 2005:30). Of critical import here is the orientation of the state. If the state is one that 
‘settles’ on a social formation – ‘builds its behaviour’ on the existing social structure of 
society, reproducing within public services and its various development interventions the 
many inequalities existing in the social formation, then the prospects for developmental 
outcomes are severely circumscribed. This is because service delivery and related official 
development interventions become the ‘bearers’ or expressions of the class, gender, racial 
and other divisions of the society of which they are a part. The inequalities and differentials 
in infrastructure provision, service delivery, infant mortality rates and so forth, observed 
between poor and wealthy neighbourhoods of the post-apartheid South Africa, bear testimony 
to many of the imbalances spawned (albeit not wholly) by the minimalist programme of this 
‘settlement’ and/or liberal market consensus state.  
On the other hand, service delivery, housing provision and the multiple activities of the state 
are also a terrain for challenging continued social division and exclusion, i.e. the 
transformative state. This is a state that challenges existing power relations but whose project 
is broadly one of advancing the goals and objectives of social inclusion, equity and justice. 
But the transformative state’s development agenda and mode of intervention is not 
unproblematic. Although it has a demonstrable track record in benefitting the poor (through 
increasing their incomes and resource transfers), its interventions and manoeuvres have also 
been technocratic, modernist, oppressive, demobilising of civil society formations, thereby 
reducing citizens to passive beneficiaries and objects of development. In this sense, the state 
is simultaneously a critical part of the solution – in expanding citizenship and furthering 
social justice – but is also part of the problem (Mackintosh, 1998).  
Moreover, and more importantly, the state – as a key engine/dynamo of development – is not 
a monolithic entity with a single goal and driven by a single purpose.26
                                                 
26 Notable here is how Presidential pronouncements and edicts cascade through the political, institutional, 
organisational and bureaucratic hierarchies of government in uneven, fragmented, contested and conflictual 
formats. 
 Its intrusions, 
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interventions and penetration of civil society are not uniform but wavers/flitters between 
‘settlement’ and ‘transformative’ thrusts/dynamics, depending on the balance of social forces 
and the configurations of state-civil society relations. Hence, institutional reform and the 
strategic (re-)orientations of the state is – to paraphrase the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci 
– ‘a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria’ (cited in Desai 
& Imrie, 1998:637). This conception of development as being ‘ambiguated’, and the state as 
part of both the problem and solution is a recurring theme of the study and an essential 
premise in explaining praxis vacillation. Accordingly, whilst the study aims to register and 
record movements and shifts in praxis, and to constructively contribute to ongoing 
deliberations about sustainable human settlement development, the study will strive to 
negotiate ‘statecraft’ in both optimistic and pessimistic veins, realist and hopeful, drawing 
quite heavily from the work of scholars associated with the ‘political economy of policy 
reform’ school of thought. Underpinning this outlook is one of an engaged individual 
(contract researcher in the employ of the Department of Housing) and an epistemology 
anchored in critical theory.  
Approach  
Housing...is about everything but houses! It’s about the availability of land, access to 
credit, affordability, basic services, economic growth, social development, and the 
environment (Minister of Housing, 1997a). 
Housing praxis eschews being sectorally bounded. It cannot be officially, academically, and 
disciplinarily pigeonholed, and is impacted by and impacts on broader societal processes. 
Viewed ‘from above’, housing praxis is both expression and component of a society’s wider 
development agenda. As expression, the agenda is conditioned and circumscribed by the 
nature of socio-institutional regimes regulating intersecting associational economies that 
define access to (amongst other things) land, credit, services, incomes, and welfare. The 
contours and content of informal and official regulation of the relationship/s between 
landowners and landless, moneylenders and borrowers, workers and bosses, employed and 
unemployed, homeless and landlords, and so forth define the materiality of the official 
development intervention; its effectiveness/outcome; and the broader orientation of politics 
(settlement versus transformation). The orientation in turn is mediated by local and external 
forces anchored in the dominant logics (and discursive adaptations) pertaining to poverty 
eradication/alleviation, economic development and wealth creation, the state’s institutional 
architecture (inclusionary/exclusionary, unitary/federalist/co-operative), and the pressures of 
international market forces. As component, official interventions condition, interact with and 
echo off the outputs of other departmental and sectoral policies and programmes, often 
unfurling a host of unintended consequences in the everyday experiences of poor 
communities. Seen ‘from below’, a sustainable living environment is likewise a great deal 
more than ‘bricks and mortar’. It includes access to land and secure tenure; appropriate 
infrastructure and services; the strengthening and reinforcing of (horizontal/positive) social 
capital; civic empowerment; deepening the access of the poor to the circuits of bureaucratic 
and political power; maximisation of choice and opportunities; and active measures to 
counteract discrimination against vulnerable groups.  
The view from above and from below takes as its starting point how power (in all its 
manifestations and configurations) is assembled and wielded in mediating the boundaries of 
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social inclusion-exclusion, which defines access to and control over resources (land, credit, 
incomes, ‘voice’). Thus the housing question cannot but engage with poverty and inequality – 
not as discrete ‘policy problems’ – but constitutive problems, a starting point for negotiating 
and addressing uneven development. In other words, poverty and inequality – an 
understanding and appreciation of its political economy – cannot be residualised or blotted 
out in praxis deliberations. The political economy of poverty and inequality should be 
screwed into the marrow of praxis deliberations or be, more pointedly, the ‘essential entry 
point for transformative policy interventions’ (Parnell, 2004:10).  
When taken together – above (expression and component) and below – the research approach 
is of necessity eclectic at epistemological, theoretical and methodological levels.  
Epistemology and Theory  
The epistemology employed in this research combines – albeit not restricted to – inter-and 
multi-disciplinary approaches27 with critical theory, which is concerned with the critique of 
dominant ideology and practice, the effects of domination, and potential for resistance. The 
distinguishing feature of critical theory is its penchant to creatively borrow from different 
schools of theory and practice related to both resistance and emancipatory thrusts.28
The theoretical approaches deployed draw from fields and sub-fields of old and new political 
economy (e.g. Grindle, 1991, 2001; Fine, 2006, 2006a, 2006c; Jayasuriya, 2001, 2005; 
Rodrik, 2000a, 2000b; 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; 2006); comparative institutionalism (includes 
Amin & Thrift, 1994; Evans, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005; Chang, 2002a, 2006; Rodrik, 
1999; Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005); public administration and development management 
(amongst others, Luke, 1986; Bentley & Wilsdon, 2003; Cooke, 2001, 2003; Kirkpatrick et 
al., 2002; James & Lodge, 2003; Turner & Hulme, 1997; Grindle, 2007); urban planning and 
human geography (includes Harrison et al., 2003; Hillier, 2002; Holston, 1998, 2002; Judin 
& Vladislavic, 1998; Satterthwaite, 2002; Hajer, 1993; Hart, 2001, 2002, 2004a; Harvey, 
2007; Mantysalo, 2003; Sandercock, 1998, 1998a; Simone, 1997; Watson, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
 The 
schools this research relies on include critical rationalism (which encourages open-
mindedness and anti-dogmatism); and Marxism and neo-Marxism (to probe and uncover 
structural sources of power, to amplify the strategic selectivity and biases of the state, and to 
‘overcome’ the post-structuralist tendency of the subject being primarily a product of 
discourse) (Fine, 1998; Jessop, 1983, 1988, 1990, 2002, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Mackintosh, 
1998; Mouffe, 2000; Heartfield, 2002); postmodernism/ post-structuralism with its focus on 
deconstruction and discursive analysis (which facilitates questioning of ‘objectivity’ and 
practice of apparent objectivity, normality and factuality through language and text which are 
both socially shaped and socially shaping); multiple and multiple-layered realities; the power-
knowledge-order nexus and the contradictory nature of power (associated with the various 
works of Foucault) (e.g. Fischer & Forester, 1993; Dean, 2002; Flint, 2003; Flyvberg et al., 
2003; Gordon, 1991; Higgs & Smith, 2000; Moodley, 2003; Robinson, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
2003, 2004, 2004a, 2004b; Lemke, 2001).  
                                                 
27 Multidisciplinarity combines perspectives and interdisciplinarity integrates perspectives. 
28 The contours of these emancipatory thrusts are fluid and its peaks can never be scaled – as some would have 
us believe - in a single revolutionary outburst. 
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nd); and political sociology (democratic transition/consolidation and developmental state 
literature) (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989, 1997; Naim, 1994, 1995; Bresser-Pereira, 2006a, 
2006b, 2006c; Klug, 2000; Fine & Rustomjee, 1996; Fine, 1999, 1999a, 2001, 2003, 2006, 
2007; Gordon, 1996; Kohli, 2004; Leftwich, 2000, 2002, forthcoming; Przeworski & 
Limogni, 1993; Mkandawire, 1998, 2002; Sandbrook, 1996; Smith, 1993; Woo-Cummings, 
1999; Robinson & White, 2002.). 
The combination of inter- and multi-disciplinary approaches with critical theory permits the 
dissection of convoluted social relational fields that are bolted together by a conception of 
reality (ontology) that is provisional and fluid but framed in Realpolitik operating at multiple 
levels, i.e. political economy, social processes, institutional dynamics, and discursive 
adaptations. The theoretical approaches employed provide glimpses into Realpolitik from 
different vantage points but when layered and compacted into multi-focal lenses, they 
contribute to enabling unpacking and understanding Realpolitik. But the theory only partly 
assists in interpreting reality. Knowledge is also moulded and shaped by the modalities, form 
and substance of the individual’s engagement with the world, which conditions and shapes 
the methodological approach and methods of data collection.  
Methodology and Methods of Data Collection  
The research strategy encompasses a combination of textual analysis; case studies; structured, 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews; and electronic communication with activists, 
officials, practitioners, scholars, researchers and consultants. The texts are drawn from 
various sources including government media releases, speeches by government officials, 
policy, legislation, discussion documents and ‘grey’ literature (O’Laughlin, 1998) - 
documents not in the public domain. These include minutes of meetings, internal memoranda, 
internal organisational policy directives, internal evaluations, research reports and 
departmental business plans – to which the researcher had access to in his capacity as 
consultant to the national Department of Housing. Appropriate textual analysis techniques 29
This research strategy is located on a spectrum ranging from total engagement (utilising 
personal records, documents prepared for the Department, interactions during the author’s 
employment in the Department of Housing) to total disengagement or lack of engagement 
(reliance on (semi-/un)structured interviews and documents in the public domain). The 
strategy holds both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages include being able to 
understand and interpret present and unfolding praxis in an unmediated manner, i.e. direct 
exposure and insights into the workings of bureaucracy, housing practice and the dynamics of 
reform. Another advantage is the ability to clarify and test hypotheses and findings with key 
officials and politicians with a view to refining the research output. The disadvantages of 
total engagement are numerous but, in the main, they revolve around maintaining a critical 
‘distance’ that could potentially be compromised by ‘intimacy’ with the state and its 
functionaries. The ‘intimacy’ harbours within it the danger of restricting the research gaze to 
state visioning and imaginaries versus a research outlook that is some distance from the 
 
are drawn upon in the interrogation of these documents, aided by secondary literature from 
the various abovementioned theoretical fields.  
                                                 
29 Discourse theory, critical discourse analysis and genealogical analysis. 
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subject matter and supposedly more rigorous (not unproblematically associated with the total 
dis-/un-engaged stance). In sum then, total engagement allows immediate unmediated 
exposure; and the ability to test, clarify and verify findings. The challenge is maintaining 
‘distance’ and a critical research gaze (which is associated with the total dis-/un-engaged 
orientation). To reduce the risks associated with total engagement, the supervision is split 
between an academic and the previous Chief Director of Research of the Department of 
Housing – a PhD graduate who was seconded to government to mould and inform the content 
of the Comprehensive Plan.30 Dual supervision – by an academic and engaged intellectual31
Three case studies are presented which collectively reflect phases in policy development and 
practice refinement, i.e. state appropriation of an ‘alternative’; state-civil society re-
engineering of policy; and state-driven implementation of the new policy through the N2 
Gateway pilot project. Some lessons and trends are teased out (as per the traditional case 
study approach – see Yin, 2003) but the case studies are more about understanding statecraft 
through revealing patterns, rhythms, processes and motivations and the open-ended/fluid 
processes of institutional and strategic re-orientations of the state.  
 
no doubt contributes to safeguarding the rigour, integrity and credibility of the research as 
pertains to cross-checking and verification of findings.  
The first case study focuses on the HPA – the ‘alternative’ – and here the author draws on 
primary material (public and grey material) supplied by the HPA, and secondary material, 
supplemented by participant observation and structured interviews. The second case study 
focuses on the rationale and engineering of the ‘shift’ from the First Decade approach to the 
Second Generation strategy/Comprehensive Plan, drawing on a similar set of primary and 
secondary material but supplemented by the researcher’s personal involvement in the 
production of the Plan and interviews with key officials who drove (and are still driving) the 
design and content the BNG, and other officials responsible for implementation. An essential 
focus of the structured and semi-structured interviews with officials is identifying key 
obstacles to implementation, and how these obstacles are being negotiated. A select number 
of representatives from civil society organisations and housing institutions were consulted 
with the object being to record their views about the efficacy and appropriateness of the Plan. 
The third case study – which is not dealt with in depth – focuses on the N2 Gateway 
Project.32
The case studies strive to furnish the reader with a lens to view the mechanics of a society 
that is perpetually defining and redefining itself, its political identity and development agenda 
  
                                                 
30 This individual is familiar with academic protocols, has published work, and supervises other university post-
graduate students.  
31 The previous Chief Director continues engaging with the Department, refining and giving greater definition to 
the Comprehensive Plan.  
32 The initial research proposal intended to conduct a detailed study of the N2 Gateway, but two key obstacles 
arose. In mid-2005, there was a breakdown of relations between national and local government around the 
Gateway project, and relevant primary documents were ruled by the Minister of Housing, Western Cape MEC 
responsible for housing and Mayor of the City of Cape Town to be ‘secret’. In addition, the author’s contract 
with the Department of Housing included a confidentiality clause which meant it was not possible to undertake 
a detailed study, conduct interviews, or administer questionnaires. The N2 Gateway is therefore dealt with in 
less detail than was originally planned, drawing only on data extracted from documents circulating in the public 
domain.  
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in ways that are responsive to the needs and priorities of the poor. The first case study – the 
‘alternative’ – is one incubated in South Africa’s slums and adopted by the state through 
skilful political manoeuvring by the poor and their champions in civil society. The 
appropriation of the ‘alternative’ by government was not without its problems for civil 
society formations, but at the very least it alerts us to a state whose development agenda is 
open to influence by the poor (and their champions) and not – as conventional political 
economy theorists would argue – only serving the interests of the powerful and wealthy. The 
second case study relates the story of officially driven re-engineering of shelter policy with 
not insignificant contributions by prominent progressive development activists/practitioners 
located in civil society. The progressive impulses and thrusts of the Comprehensive Plan 
could potentially be thwarted by officials in the state (straddling various spheres and 
departments) and outside the state (in business and in international organisations). However, 
the BNG is nevertheless widely perceived as offering serious prospects for a real material 
advance of the poor. The third case study (N2 Gateway) speaks directly to how the state, 
through centralised decentralisation, attempted to materially transform the shelter conditions 
of over 100 000 inadequately housed citizens in a city that, years after the advent of 
democracy, remains the country’s most inequitable and divided. The N2 Gateway is a 
crucially important litmus test of BNG, hopefully providing clues about how (or how not) to 
deliver on a transformation project that views the production of viable social-public sector 
economy (in the Second Economy) as pivotal to deepening and consolidating socio-economic 
democracy.  
Summarily, the case studies enable reflection on and assessments of our understanding of the 
hopes and perils of social constructivism in service delivery and social transformation. These 
studies potentially equip us to comprehend (albeit partially) the ‘reality’ of development – its 
ambiguity, ironies, tensions and contradictions that theory, expert scientific knowledge and 
policies can never full digest, grapple with, understand and explain. They are firmly located 
in the ‘contextual constructivism’ (Bloor, 1997:235) frame that permits insights into how 
both theory and policy can be improved. ‘Strict constructivism’, as opposed to ‘contextual’ 
constructivism, is akin to social engineering as it sets up the vision of an ideal society 
(usually modernist), and then designs and assembles instruments, techniques and 
technologies to give effect to that vision. The problem with this approach is that it tends to 
‘fix the future…by appealing to precedents that negate the value of present circumstances’, 
i.e. ‘the conflict, the ambiguity and indeterminacy characteristic of actual social life’ 
(Holston, 2002:326). ‘Contextual constructivism’, in contrast, works backwards, i.e. from a 
reality of development underperformance and deficiencies filtered through life-experiences 
and real impacts. Policy – in the contextual constructivist frame – is a situated discourse and 
the generation of ‘solutions’ entails working with and through diverse ‘collectivist members’ 
in examining, debating and resolving competing claims, demands and objectives (Bloor, 
1997:236).  
Impact 
Development is a constant struggle over the shape of the present and future. This struggle is 
complex, dramatic and traumatic, conditioned by (and conditioning) our location in the socio-
institutional and political milieu. For those of us who are committed to pro-poor 
developmental outcomes, the aim of knowledge and knowledge generation is two-fold. 
Firstly, research is about critique to assist us in fighting, resisting and refusing to accept the 
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orthodoxies and inherited wisdoms of our world. To fight and resist what is constitutes an 
exercise in laying bare to our policy makers and other influential people in our society that – 
to paraphrase Ben Okri (1991) – their ‘dreams’, ‘visions’ and ‘imaginaries’ routinely 
brutalise the poor, but show them that the ‘facts’ of our world are far more imaginative than 
the productions of our (mainstream) imaginations. Every reality, alerts Okri, has an 
alternative possibility. Challenging power in its myriad formations and manifestations, i.e. 
visible and invisible, centred and decentred, conscious and unconscious, obtrusive and 
unobtrusive, is an essential step in re-dreaming and rethinking our world. If our realities, as 
Okri reminds us, are manufactured, and humans are blessed with the necessity of 
transformation, we must, as ‘creative participants in the universe’, re-dream our world.  
This re-dreaming – constructive visioning versus utopian plans/planning – is of the 
contextual constructivism type embedded in an ontology that rejects positivism and the 
endless (impoverished) relativism (of certain streams) of post-structuralism/post-modernism. 
Contextual constructivism, as situated discourse which critical theory layers and compacts to 
illuminate and clarify Realpolitik, determines the methodology of the research that, in this 
instance, ranges from full engagement to total dis-/un-engagement. Put differently, re-
dreaming is a journey that moves from critical realism (ontology) to inter- and multi-
disciplinarity and critical theory (epistemology), powered by degrees of dis-/engagement 
(methodology) with the destination being uncovering the structural distortions of our society 
and the ambiguity of development.  
In summary, if the epistemology and theoretical frame is embedded in critical theory, if 
deconstruction of discursive adaptations is a critical thrust, and if the research aesthetic33
• Redefining the scope of existing housing praxis scholarship and inquiry in order to 
break with dominant disciplinarily pigeonholed approaches and prising open 
energised theoretical vistas drawing from political economy, comparative 
institutionalism, democratic transition/consolidation, developmental state, political 
sociology and policy reform literatures;  
 is 
inspired by a passion and commitment to inform and support the broad project of advancing 
developmental shelter production regimes, the intended impacts of the research are: 
• Registering and recording the views of a select spectrum of excluded voices and 
perspectives from mainstream housing debates – previously characterised as an 
‘exercise in intellectual transgression’ - to demonstrate the value of other voices in 
enlivening housing praxis, and potentially rendering it more responsive to the needs 
and priorities of the poor;  
• Contributing to and deepening the knowledge base of democratic consolidation 
referenced to the complex and convoluted nature of policy formulation, policy reform 
and implementation in general, and the shelter sector more specifically; and  
• Contributing to improved shelter outcomes through the injection of research findings 
into (one of) the laboratories of policy formulation and implementation, namely the 
Department of Housing’s Policy Research and Programming Directorate.34
                                                 
33 See Silverman, 1997 for full discussion. 
 
34 The prospects of being able to influence ongoing official praxis debates and deliberations are improved by the 
researcher’s relationship to key national department officials in a number of strategic directorates. 
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Structure of Study  
The first Chapter delves into the origins, evolution and informants of post-apartheid housing 
policy, identifying and analysing the paradigms, pressures and forces that collectively 
conspired to produce a housing policy conditioned by ideas circulating in the late apartheid 
period. The dominance of the market enablement paradigm; the pervasive influence of 
planning orientations that fenced out power; the timing of the negotiations; the structuring 
and workings of the NHF (whose main concern was with ‘establishing some kind of 
compromise than with sorting out the optimal housing plan’ (Gilbert, 2002a:1928)); the 
ANC’s views on representation and leadership; the liberation movement’s moderation of its 
socio-economic transformation aspirations; and the hegemony of consensual models of 
reconstruction and transformation worked to generate a policy based on ‘precepts of the pre-
democratic period’ (Mabin, 2000a:15). Drawing from the policy reform literature, it is 
proposed that state policies are products of struggles to define and narrate problems which 
can be dealt with through state action, thus setting the bar at what is possible and 
implementable. In other words, the ‘effectivity of policy-making is closely tied to rhetorical 
and argumentative framing’, with ‘effectivity, like beauty’, existing ‘in the eyes (or ears) of 
the beholder’ (Jessop, 2001a:11). Elite discourse coalitions framed the problem (‘adamant 
that no other kind of subsidy programme [old IDT type] was possible’ (Gilbert, 
2002a:1920)), in ways that suppressed other discourses (namely, admitting and permitting 
only the past technocratic market-driven developmentalism - ‘housing as a technical problem 
which could be solved on the basis of a subsidy formula and minimum standards’ (Rust, 
1997:93)), and executed the policy reform process according to the ideas of the discourse, i.e. 
consensual and depoliticised modes of decision making which excluded service organisations 
and direct representation of the poor, a strategic blunder of the ANC. Underscored in this 
Chapter is the theme of continuity in discontinuity – that is, how ‘framing’, discourse 
coalitions and timing collectively conspired against adjustment of the boundaries of 
exclusion, i.e. modifying, rather than substantially altering, the existing distribution of power 
and privilege. 
The subject of Chapter Two is how a left-of-centre government came to settle on a minimalist 
and conservative housing programme that conformed closely to - and some even say was 
more conservative than - World Bank strictures. Surprisingly, this incoming government 
‘tacitly rejected’ (Mackay, 1999:388) World Bank strictures and ‘normally ignored’ (Gilbert, 
2002a: 1926) their advice. To explain housing policy’s colonial and apartheid continuity in 
the apparent discontinuity of the post-apartheid era, we move beyond the ‘agential’ (a term 
borrowed from Habib & Padayachee, 2000:259) analysis of Chapter One and turn to the 
structural, institutional and social dynamics conditioning developmental state construction in 
the transition and liberalisation periods. This is a discussion of the Realpolitik of post-
apartheid developmental state-making, spotlighting housing praxis as component and 
expression of these complex, confused and convoluted dynamics.  
The Chapter commences with a discussion of the core features of the developmental state, 
spotlighting its activist industrial policies, its challenging of the negative association of 
growth and rent-seeking, the state’s dense and intimate ties with capital, and its dismantling 
of existing socio-political blocs in the service of nurturing appropriate class coalitions to 
support and drive new development paths. We then detail the prejudices and hypocrisies of 
the present debates around late industrialisers (particularly in Africa) employing these same 
techniques on the grounds of these countries being dependent, prone to capture, lacking 
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ideology, and their past poor performance record. This all comes together in the 
‘impossibility thesis’, which rules out African governments mimicking these strategies. We 
trace how South Africa, in the early period of democracy, came to contest the impossibility 
thesis to its gradual embrace of pragmatism and minimalism refracted through the different 
conceptualisations of economic development and housing from the MERG to the RDP to the 
White Paper. Underscored here is the subordination of the shelter programme to orthodox 
macroeconomic policy orientations, i.e. to the fortunes and failures of existing path 
dependent economic growth cycles. The adoption of the fiscally disciplined instrument of the 
capital subsidy - a function of the rightsizing of the ANC’s economic transformation 
aspirations – is proposed as the ‘forerunner’ (Monty Narsoo, the ex-Deputy Director General 
of the national Department of Housing cited in Charlton & Kiharto, 2006:278) to our self-
imposed structural adjustment programme (Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy 
(GEAR)). GEAR, it is asserted, solidified further neoconservatism’s already firm grip over 
the shelter sector. 
The Chapter then shifts to a discussion of SA’s commitment to developmental state 
construction and details our weaknesses with respect to our fears and hesitancy to 
purposefully wrestle, developmental state-style, with white economic interests or the interests 
of capital more generally (Leftwich, 2000). This fear and hesitancy is also registered in the 
housing sector given the ANC’s view that for housing policy to have ‘credibility’, it 
necessarily required the ‘endorsement of the largely white professional, construction and 
financial community’ (Mackay, 1995:143). The ANC’s problematic conceptualisations of the 
mechanics and modalities of developmental state construction, its myopic conception of the 
world economy and globalisation, and its marginalisation of social forces that could partner 
with government in leveraging progressive change, places capital in a hegemonic position 
(the driving seat of reconstruction). The prospects of ‘getting the politics right’ to ‘get the 
prices wrong’ is in this context not very promising. The Chapter alerts us to the paramount 
importance of applying our collective minds to transformative state construction, given that it 
is highly ‘unlikely’ for ‘any society to make a speedy and successful transition from poverty 
without a state that in some senses corresponds to [the] model of a developmental state’ 
(Leftwich, 2000:169).  
Chapter Three closes the state construction-housing dialectic loop by focusing on the 
imprinting of these numerous miscalculations and myopias on post-apartheid housing praxis. 
The first part of the discussion concentrates on our governors’ conception of relationship 
between housing and the macroeconomy and the second hones in on the relationship between 
the housing intervention and poverty. This Chapter counterpoises the enshrinement of these 
relationships in the White Paper to that of East Asian developmental state praxis. The focus 
here is on how the key thrusts of our policy – housing as a short-term welfarist intervention in 
an untransformed political economy – differs from the approach of the East Asians. South 
Africa’s chosen approach negatively impacts on urban efficiency and productivity, socio-
economic and spatial integration, citizenship and asset accumulation, property market 
development, responsiveness to demand and need, institutional viability, and fiscal 
sustainability. The programme’s failure to locate itself in the microeconomics of livelihood 
and survival strategies, its blindness to demand-side factors, and its bias towards freehold 
tenure (amongst other things) exacerbates poverty and destroys fragile livelihoods. Searching 
questions are posed here about the substance and materiality of post-apartheid citizenship, 
our commitment to advancing human rights, the broad socio-institutional reform project, the 
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democratic construction of place, asset accumulation and wealth generation and urban 
restructuring and integration.  
Having alerted to a few fundamental problems of the housing programme and its many 
unintended consequences arising in significant measure from government’s inability to 
productively re-configure politics and prices or establish an appropriate social ecology, 
Chapter Four turns to an analysis and dissection of civil society-engineered alternatives. 
Targeting the most vulnerable segments of the poor (those living in slums, backyard shacks 
and hostels), the HPA rejected both apartheid and post-apartheid housing solutions. Anchored 
in the microeconomics of the livelihood and coping strategies of the poor, and at some 
distance from traditional forms of state-civil society collaboration and partnerships, the 
featured strain of civil society or democratic developmentalism rewires the terms of trade 
between the state and the poor premised on reclaiming the poor’s democratic right and power 
to choose, champion and implement their own development path. Contesting the dominant 
state-facilitated market-driven approach, the civil society delivery regime is positioned at the 
intersection of the inventiveness of civil society (their cents and pennies, their networks and 
social capital, their links which stretch from pavement to continental) and the intervention of 
the state (housing subsidy). The alternative pro-poor (Third Way) strategy, it is demonstrated, 
recorded progressive advances over the mainstream delivery regime. However, the marriage 
of conservative state governmentalities with the (not unproblematic) HPA counter-
governmentalities (self-empowerment, self-responsibilisation, the aestheticisation of poverty 
and heroic narratives about the poor) torpedoed the delivery regime. Put differently, when 
democratic developmentalism was harnessed by the state in the service of social wage 
downsizing and legitimisation of social contract minimisation, the result was its 
bastardisation (People’s Housing Process equals ‘savings’ and ‘sweat’ versus societal 
capability-building and empowerment). The main finding of this Chapter is that state 
developmentalism and civil society developmentalism rise and fall together. Similar 
experiences in Latin America demonstrate that the marriage of the inventiveness of civil 
society and the intervention of the state need not always degenerate into joint decline. In 
other words, and here drawing from experiments in the South, reconnecting state and 
economy (the vertical axis of governance) and state and society (supersizing civil society) 
need not degenerate into state ensnarement of civil society or societal capture of the state. So, 
if in South Africa, the failing of state developmentalism and civil society developmentalism 
resides in them jointly and separately ‘getting the politics right’ to ‘get the prices wrong’, 
historical record and contemporary experimentation, we argue, alert us to successful 
interventions pivoting on ‘deliberate interference with public and private operations’ (Burger, 
2006:n.p). This is arguably precluded by our zigzag politics of staying and changing the 
course and the dysfunctional developmentalism it generates, nurtures and perpetuates. It is 
this zigzagging that the narrative turns to in Chapter Five. 
Irreverently penned, Chapter Five addresses the causes of and reasons for our inability to 
reconnect and reconfigure the axes of governance and the associated slide into dysfunctional 
developmentalism. At the base of this dysfunctional developmentalism is the abiding 
(misguided) commitment of ‘doing the right things’ (Freund, 2006a:20) for the right people 
(the ‘tightly-knit elite of black businessmen, ex-politicians and public servants, bureaucrats 
and ANC leaders’ (Ibid)), which, in the end, comes to nurture and sustain a socio-political 
ecology of ‘fragile stability’ (Beall et al., 2005:697). The praxis schizophrenia generated by 
fragile stability goes some way in explaining our failure to break with inherited and new 
institutionally and socially corrosive fault lines and why, despite our best efforts and 
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intentions, the state, in the end, hijacks and sabotages its very own progressive policies, 
programmes and projects.  
Breaking New Ground – whose genesis, birth and evolution constitutes the subject matter of 
Chapter Six – has to negotiate and engage the complex hybridised dynamics generated by 
zigzagging and fragile stability. The Plan’s firm roots in the ‘sound fundamentals’ of the pre-
democratic/late apartheid precepts of the White Paper, Treasury’s considerable influence over 
the Plan’s emergence and genesis, and its contested lineage, divides experts and authorities as 
to whether BNG as strategy is just ‘more of the same’, ‘fundamental departure’, or ‘rhetoric 
trumping reality’. In practice, BNG has to cope with the numerous overlapping irresolutions 
of macroeconomic stabilisation, structural adjustment and the heightened dysfunctional 
developmentalism of contemporary post-adjustment strategies. These are manifested in the 
contests and controversies surrounding the extent of, and interactions between, 
commodification and decommodification, formalisation and informalisation, regulation and 
deregulation, sustainability and speed, centralisation and decentralisation. For many, the 
prospects for success of this genetically compromised, contradiction-laced and half-cooked 
Plan are slim, related to problems in the spheres of finance, institutional capability, 
instrument impurity, regulatory frameworks, deep-seated principal-agency problems, socio-
institutional capacity building and tripod re-balancing. For others, success is contingent on 
structurally rewiring housing delivery imperatives with land availability, infrastructure, 
transport, economic opportunities (which were delinked in the White Paper and inadequately 
addressed in BNG). This would mean, it is posited, a decisive break from continued reliance 
on charters, accords, compacts and memoranda of understanding, which offer diminishing 
returns under present market conditions. More importantly, this would require - and here 
again verified by historical record and experience - a radical redistribution of power that 
substantially alters structural power between the homeless poor, public authorities and the 
private sector; building and mobilising collective action of the poor; and the democratic 
negotiation of large scale collective solutions across the public-private divide. Once again, 
SA history and contemporary statecraft (in East Asia and Latin America) illuminate the many 
pathways to rewire the contacts, connections and circuits between rich and poor, state and 
citizens, and state and society, which our governors are not oblivious to and/or ignorant of. 
Indeed, without the strategic interventions and/or positioning of the (admittedly weak and 
hesitant) First Decade state, the building industry, the financial sector and construction sector 
would not have lent support (albeit grudgingly and not without problems) and/or been 
delivered to the immediate post-1994 housing drive.  
Latin American and East Asian case studies, amongst others, suggest that developmental 
states are not available on demand, commanded into existence, nor ‘had to order’. Against 
this backdrop, the Conclusion of the thesis is directed to re-dreaming, re-thinking, and 
resuscitating developmental statehood and statecraft grounded in experimentation, empirics 
and experience. In the closing pages, we locate the South African state in the contemporary 
debates and praxis of developmental statecraft and transformative state-making. Utilising two   
schools of developmental state scholarship (the ‘economic’ and ‘political’), the state is 
characterised as ‘weak/soft’ and ‘intermediate’ (respectively). The cumulative result is a state 
that refuses to engage in the invasive socio-economic and institutional surgery that 
characterises the developmental state. A further constraint, it is asserted, is the intertwining of 
state-orchestrated ‘outside in’ and state-facilitated conglomerate ‘inside out’ globalisation 
(Carmody, 2002:266). This gives rise to state that is embedded in global forces and 
negatively connected to (‘negative autonomy from’) domestic social forces. It is a state that 
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‘uses its power to constrain its power’ (Ibid) and thus undercuts the social foundations of a 
project of developmental state construction and intervention. Differently worded, the 
transnational capitalist business model embeddedness and the intertwining of globalisations 
potentially rules out any drastic interference in property rights, financial markets and the 
socio-political distribution of power. If the one leg of the explanation for poor development 
performance is located in the class-compromised nature of the present state, the mode of 
operation of the ‘intermediate state’ drives further the social distance between state and 
society, manifested in the design and execution of technocratic and authoritarian 
development policies, programmes and projects of the poor. The Conclusion invites and 
provokes us to re-interrogate our statecraft grounded in institutional and democracy/tic 
thickening/densification; opportunities presented by a reconditioned shelter-governance 
agenda regime (whose success hinges on squarely confronting and negotiating the 
exclusionary workings of the interlinked financial, land and property markets); old and 
contemporary experiences and lessons of developmental statecraft; and the present re-
balancing and realignment of domestic social forces. 
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Chapter One: Conceptually Framing Post-Apartheid Housing Policy  
Origins, Evolution and Informants 
Introduction  
Siphokazi Ntutela – a resident of QQ, one of the oldest squatter camps in Cape Town35
It is something most residents of QQ…are forced to do, because it not only has no 
toilet of any kind, but lacks even the primitive bucket system of many other camps… 
QQ’s people must walk to Q-section of Khayelitsha, beg strangers to unlock their 
outside toilet – and clean the excrement piled around it to earn the right to use it. 
Ntutela found her sister… on her knees, with plastic bags on her hands, tears 
streaming down her face. I thought, my God, what has happened to this country? That 
a young girl must do this just to be sanitary.
 – 
searched desperately for her 13-year old sister, Nombifuthi Mdibaniso, and eventually found 
her weeping ‘doing something unspeakable outside a stranger’s toilet’.  
36
In the third week of May 2005, QQ residents joined communities from Gugulethu and Happy 
Valley in demonstrations demanding delivery of housing and basic services, with tactics 
ranging from land invasions to the dumping of sewage buckets in the streets. Police action, 
reminiscent of the dark apartheid days, was swift and brutal, namely, rubber bullets, tear gas 
and arrests on charges of public violence. There were also reports – although denied by the 
National Intelligence Agency and the Western Cape Department of Local Government and 
Housing – of the intelligence services investigating the involvement of ‘sinister [third] 
forces’ in the 1980s-style township protests.
  
37
In the following week, President Mbeki reportedly told Parliament that the riots ‘did not pose 
an immediate danger to our democracy’, although the country’s stability could be threatened 
if the demands of the poor for housing and basic services went unaddressed.
  
38 But while the 
President uttered these words, another drama was quietly unfolding in the National 
Assembly. The honourable Member of Parliament Gatsha Buthelezi was reportedly subjected 
to what his colleagues termed ‘humiliating’ treatment after a security dog – following a 
customary sweep of the house before the Presidential address – defecated under his desk. The 
‘incident’ caused a furore. The honourable Buthelezi was astounded that ‘it should come to 
this in this holiest of holies’. After an exhaustive investigation of the ‘incident’ by both the 
police and Parliament’s management, Buthelezi was issued with apologies, with the police 
expressing relief that the ‘incident’ did not constitute a ‘breach of the President’s security’.39
                                                 
35 Residents have been living in this flood-prone area for over 15 years, with no access to sanitation, refuse 
collection or shelter. The streets are said to resemble sewage canals. Children are constantly sick and have 
‘purulent sores’ on their faces (Sunday Independent, 5 May 2005; Cape Argus, 18 July 2005). 
  
36 Sunday Times, 29 May 2005. 
37 Cape Times, 30 May 2005. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Cape Times, 27 May 2005; Weekend Argus, 28 May 2005. 
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When reflecting on these seemingly unconnected incidents, it is extremely unsettling that 
protests against the daily violations of the dignity of the Siphokazis and Mdibanisos of our 
world are brutally suppressed and criminalised; their politicians in high office, on the other 
hand, when confronted by dog excrement are issued with apologies for having to endure 
‘humiliating’ treatment. Suppression and criminalisation of the poor forced, in the words of a 
Khayelitsha protest organiser, to ‘live in shit’40
How South Africa arrived at this situation is partly the subject matter of this Chapter through 
a brief tracing of the origins, informants and evolution of post-apartheid housing policy, 
whose subsequent materialisation in legislation, regulations and institutions betrays its very 
deeply compromised underpinnings and foundations. But an argument of the policy being 
compromised is by no means an original insight if grounded in an understanding of policy 
reform and change as a ‘messy process’ conditioned by, amongst other things, a country’s 
history, ideology, political economy, influences of development agencies (foreign and local), 
policy entrepreneurs/experts, bureaucrats and civil servants, political parties, and pressure 
groups (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996:356; Klak, 1997). It is in this complex interplay of forces 
and force-fields that housing (like all other) policies and programmes always ‘result from 
political expediency’ (Jenkins, 2002:106), reflecting the prejudices of the age, classes and 
institutions from which they derive. In South Africa’s attempt to balance and reconcile 
‘antagonistic aims’ – community development and empowerment and private sector-driven 
(state-facilitated) delivery regimes - expediency led to the reliance on ‘previously tested 
mechanisms’; i.e. ‘policy and subsidy mechanisms were basically developed for 
implementation by the existing civil service, which had – and has – limited experience of 
alternatives’. Institutional and technical capacity constraints combined with the ‘political and 
economic goals of the new ruling elite and their consociational partners’ (Jenkins, 2002:106), 
spawned expedient policy.  
 – but exhaustive investigations and apologies 
for the elite who occasionally have to confront dog pooh in their grand debating chambers 
supposedly dedicated to upliftment of the lives of the poor and downtrodden! Surely, there is 
something profoundly awry with our society’s moral frame, not because of the co-existence 
of dual value systems. More pointedly, it is the depth and intensity of the difference in the 
way ‘public spectacle’ is perceived, managed and defused.  
But the cruel irony of ‘expedient’ policy (and policy manufacture) – a tale still to be 
coherently narrated – is how South Africa came to settle on a shelter policy that conforms 
closely to the World Bank (1993) prescriptions, even though the incoming government 
supposedly ‘tacitly rejected’ (Mackay, 1999:388) key Bank proposals and ‘normally ignored’ 
their advice (Gilbert, 2002a:1926).41
Unemployment, a low level of domestic investment, and poor economic growth presented 
(and continues to present) daunting challenges, but inflation and public sector debt were 
within international standards and therefore not considered problematic. Despite declining 
rates of net investment and savings, private sector financial surpluses were on the rise from 
 Important also is the finding that the leverage of Bretton 
Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) at the macroeconomic 
level was not significant, even well into the 1990s (Saul, 2005).  
                                                 
40 Cited in Sunday Independent, 5 May 2005.  
41 In contrast to housing policy, the influence wielded by the Bank in the spheres of infrastructure provision, 
service delivery reform, intergovernmental financing was extremely powerful (see R Tomlinson, 2002).  
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1988 (‘locked within giant conglomerates’) (Habib & Padayachee, 2000:247) and foreign 
debt was dramatically reduced through an ‘enforced debt rescheduling arrangement’ in the 
latter part of the 1980s. The country’s ‘physical infrastructure stock…and financial, banking 
and informational systems were impressive (albeit racially skewed) even by international 
standards’ (Ibid). Moreover, significant skills and expertise (technological, human and 
business) existed in ‘some sections of the population’ (Ibid). Undoubtedly, the South African 
state required very substantial re-orientation and surgery, but a ‘successful history of state-led 
industrialisation’ through parastatals (Luiz, 2002:601) presented promising avenues for 
sustainable poverty- alleviating growth. On the shelter front, there were also some 
‘potentially beneficial aspects’: cheap labour, low overall population and development 
densities, ‘English model sanitary and building codes’ that sustained infrastructure and 
prevented the type of urban collapse encountered in other developing country cities, ‘not 
excessively onerous’ planning and building regulations, and ‘well established’ building and 
building supplies industries (Mackay, 1999:388–9).  
The prospects for the negotiation of a more progressive development policy were further 
enhanced by the emergence in the early 1990s (grudgingly accepted even by the World Bank) 
of a ‘countercritique of the neoclassical [economic growth] paradigm based on a 
reinterpretation of the East Asian development experience’.  
The central thesis associated with the newly emerging countercritique, which we 
might classify as broadly ‘institutionalist’, is that the phenomenon of “late 
development” should be understood as a process in which states have played a 
strategic role in taming domestic and international market forces and harnessing them 
to national ends. Fundamental to East Asian development has been the focus on 
industrialisation as opposed to maximising profitability on the basis of comparative 
advantage. In other words, market rationality has been constrained by the priorities of 
industrialisation. Key to rapid industrialisation is a strong and autonomous state, 
providing directional thrust to the operation of the market mechanism (Onis, 
1991:109–10).  
In two of these East Asian developmental states – Hong Kong and Singapore – state-directed 
public housing provision, the ‘backbone’ of sustained and spectacular economic growth – 
‘preceded’ the economic take-off and was ‘functional’ to the rapid growth registered by both 
countries (Castells et al., 1991 cited in Lupton & Murphy, 1995:161, original emphasis). 
Evidence to support the idea that housing was functional to economic growth – not 
necessarily referenced to the developmental state – is ‘ample’. Housing investment stimulates 
economic growth and can ‘also be used to affect both the pace and direction of growth’.  
Countries with large settlement development and housing programmes tend to have 
faster economic growth, and often faster industrial growth, than countries without 
them. With few exceptions, countries that stimulate construction activities and make 
high allocations to settlement development and housing programmes achieve fast 
rates of economic growth, low rates of unemployment and an equitable income 
distribution (Adebayo, nd:5). 
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Predictably, the intellectual mercenaries of South Africa’s organised and traditionally myopic 
white capital, Mike Oelofse, the senior manager of the disbanded Urban Foundation’s 
Housing Policy Unit,42
If external leverage was limited ‘positive and potentially positive economic fundamentals 
were in place’ (Habib & Padayachee, 2000:247); policy precedents along the lines of 
developmental state housing interventions were available, relevant and transferable; a state 
with some history in undertaking successful state-led industrialisation was present; and 
‘potentially beneficial aspects in the housing system’ existed – all of which, collectively, 
afforded resources that could have been creatively and imaginatively mined. A further 
intellectual lever at the disposal of South Africa’s policy community resided in endogenous 
growth theory – although not unproblematic (see Fine, 2006, 2006a, 2006c) – profiling 
alternative growth, investment and development policy outcomes especially as this relates to 
the impact of investment on human capital formation and skills acquisition. Endogenous 
growth theory offered prospects to cobble policy balancing macroeconomic growth 
imperatives with democratically chosen priorities in the sphere of basic needs. This entails an 
approach that commences with democratically-oriented developmental objectives and then 
considering how constraints can be influenced to enable achievement of the objectives rather 
than vice versa (see Harris, 1997 for a full discussion).  
 were quick to dismiss developmental state examples as ‘not viable 
models transferable to the local situation’. The Singapore experience was slated as ‘too 
idiosyncratic’, and thus ‘irrelevant’ to South Africa (Oelofse, 1994 paraphrased in Lupton & 
Murphy, 1995:161). Radical geographers contested these assertions, claiming that the policy 
instruments and planning mechanisms of developmental states were relevant and transferable, 
i.e. an ‘efficient technocracy; stable fiscal policies; long term planning’ (cited in Lupton & 
Murphy, 1995:161).  
Alternatives were thus available and within our reach. South Africa, for one commentator, 
presented an ‘opportunity’ for a ‘democratic strategy of development’, which entailed 
government investment in social programmes, and structural transformation through 
democratic developmental means (Peet, 2002:77). Tragically, this opportunity was 
squandered. The evidence suggests that in the negotiation of the housing challenge, social 
forces did not seriously attempt to shape the future state into a developmental one, nor did 
they come to articulate a consistent and credible pro-poor shelter development policy. But 
should we have expected a different outcome, asks Peet (2002:77), in the face of the 
dominant perspective ‘articulated by SA capital through liberal business organisations 
strategically integrated into the ANC’? The writing seemed already to be on the wall in early 
1992, some months before the launching of the National Housing Forum. One of capital’s 
intellectuals – with not insignificant influence in the liberation movement’s policy circles – 
said:  
In my view it is likely that the housing policy debate will focus on adjustments (which 
could be quite substantial) to the De Loor proposals [43
                                                 
42 Representing the interests of organised business, the Urban Foundation (UF) was set up in 1976. Its core 
purpose was the maintenance of the economic status quo through liberal market-driven urban deracialisation 
(Swilling, 1998a).  
] rather than the consideration 
43 Appointed by the South African Housing Advisory Council, the De Loor Commission presented its proposals 
to government in 1992. It was during this time that the outgoing government became concerned to be perceived 
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of vastly different housing policy alternatives. Reasons include: a growing 
international consensus on approaches to national housing policy; pressures from 
international development agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF and others to 
think about housing policy issues in particular ways; the crisis on the left about the 
relation of ideology to policy; and finally a variety of practical considerations which 
have to do with existing capacity differentials (between the main actors) (Smit, 
1992:1, original emphasis)  
Every one of these ‘reasons’ – for non-deviation from De Loor – is deeply contestable and is 
nothing short of discursive adaptations justifying the retention and protection of the status 
quo. Accordingly, it will be argued in what follows that the conservative post-apartheid 
housing policy outcome is attributable to a complex confluence of forces and ‘constraints’ 
(primarily self-imposed) that pre-/overdetermined the contours and materiality of the 
transformation project (in general) and housing policy (in particular).44
This Chapter identifies, explores and elaborates the self-imposed constraints (and their 
mechanics) with specific reference to the origins and evolution of post-apartheid housing 
policy. The international policy environment is sketched as background informing the late 
1980s and early 1990s shelter policy deliberations. The discussion pertaining to the origins 
and evolution of post-apartheid housing policy points to the importance of not 
imposing/imputing a master-slave (global-local) binary on local policy development in light 
of its (previously alluded to) ‘messy’ nature. Not unexpectedly therefore, governments of less 
developed nations (in the area of housing praxis) have often ‘resisted the pressures of 
colonial rulers and the blandishments of the technical experts deployed by international 
agencies’ and ‘nations in the developing world have been more than passive recipients of 
ideas and programmes’ (Harris, 2003:165). Gilbert (2002b; 2004a; 2004b) further 
demonstrates that countries have considerable autonomy in negotiating their own shelter 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
as adhering to international trends in development policy and thus – started to become ‘especially responsive’ to 
policy recommendations emanating from international agencies and Bretton Woods institutions. The 
Commission borrowed from the World Bank’s market enablement approach, with its proposals falling within a 
market-oriented framework in which housing is seen as an ‘economic good’ or commodity. In accord with 
World Bank recommendations, the De Loor Report suggested that government should adopt an enabling 
strategy, ‘involving policy formulation, co-ordination, and the provision of key interventions, for example a 
once-off capital subsidy’. The role of the private sector was elevated on the basis of its perceived ‘superior 
ability’ to deliver and maintain sites and housing. The Report recommended that government’s budget for 
housing should increase from 3% to 5% of the gross domestic product. It called for an income graduated once-
off capital subsidy, commencing with the provision of a serviced site to a formal house. Interestingly the Report 
contained a proposal for the establishment of a housing finance corporation that would, inter alia, facilitate the 
provision of loans for land purchase, bulk infrastructure, rental housing, short-term development finance and 
finance for upgrading and urban renewal. The development NGO Planact challenged the key assumption 
underpinning these recommendations, i.e. South Africa’s ‘capital shortage’, pointing to the significant amounts 
of money already in financial markets, insurance companies and pension funds. Planact held that the dangers of 
deregulated housing finance and dependency on foreign capital had not been properly evaluated, nor was the 
assumption that poor households could afford deposits and pay housing loans and service charges. Planact 
contented further that the Commission’s subsidy proposals failed to target informal housing consolidation 
(existing and serviced sites to be delivered through the proposed subsidy intervention) or to factor in differential 
land costs (Lupton & Murphy, 1995:156–8). Bond (2000a:133) critiqued the report at length, labelling it as a 
‘synthesis defending status quo institutions and promoting neoliberal mean-spiritedness’.  
44 Large sections of the arguments below are extracted from Khan (2003). 
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policy through clever officials playing off powerful institutions against one another and/or 
exercising their market power (through sheer size) and/or mobilising expert knowledge to 
counteract unwelcome intrusions into domestic policy.  
Rebutting the conventional belief that policy transfer is only a top-down process is the 
finding that the flow/diffusion of policies and ideas between powerful social groups in 
periphery and metropole is mutually constitutive. But in relatively ‘closed’ and ’unexposed’ 
policy communities like South Africa45, instead of ‘introducing new ideas’, policy transfer 
through ‘lesson’ drawing – and its filtration through structurally uneven institutional terrains, 
perceived socio-economic and political imperatives and realities, and strategic 
(mis)/calculations of politicians and bureaucrats – tends to reinforce the existing status quo 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). This process of policy diffusion served (at most times, but not 
always) to ‘manage’ the adjustment of social boundaries in ways permitting the existing 
‘distribution of privilege to be modified rather than overthrown’ (Lester et al., 2000:135–6). 
Tracing the history of this dynamic from the early nineteenth century to the present, Lester et 
al. (2000) posit that the previous radical reconstruction discourse of social groupings opposed 
to the apartheid state came to be managed/moderated by (amongst other things) the workings 
of the negotiation process; (perceived) economic crises; the accommodationist stance of 
moderate factions of the opposing elite; the delegitimisation of radical solutions;46
The informants outlined below provide valuable clues related to the ‘tempering’ of the 
transformation project. However, it should be borne in mind that the reality of policy 
adoption, transfer and diffusion is a function of local socio-institutional mediation and not (in 
our case, at least) foreign authoritarianism (structural adjustment style) and/or internationally 
negotiated imposition (Gilbert, 2004a).  
 and the 
influence wielded by a triumphalist (post-Cold War) West and other international 
organisations (also see Leftwich, 1994; Swilling, 1999). In this context, South Africa’s much 
vaunted ‘transformation’, it is asserted, is more of a ‘transition’ to a ‘new, internationally and 
internally acceptable social and economic order than a radical break with the past’ (Lester et 
al., 2000:145).  
                                                 
45 According to Mackay (1999:388), the international development debates of the 1980s largely passed South 
African intellectuals/academics at a time when their efforts were concentrated on ‘the struggle’ and its 
repression.  
46 The delegitimisation of radical solutions is related to the disillusionment flowing from the collapse of Soviet 
Union socialism, which over the decades came to occupy a prominent place in the liberation movement’s 
imaginary. The collapse left the ‘aspirant liberation movement ideologically rudderless’. In the absence of a  
…critical stance toward Soviet socialism, having never partaken in the debates about the meaning of 
socialism – real and imaginary – the [South African] liberation movement in power found itself 
without a cognitive map to navigate the problems of national reconstruction. An “exodus without a 
map”, as Adler and Webster call it, became vulnerable to neoliberal redemption, especially when the 
entire globe is spell bound by the magic of the market (Buroway, 1997:1).  
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Section One 
Informants of Shelter Policy: The State, Urban Development, Housing and Planning  
During the 1980s and 1990s, an ‘emerging transnational class alliance...disembedded post-
war capitalism from its prevailing matrix of social and political regulation’ associated with 
Keynesian welfarism (Atlantic Fordism), developmental states (East Asian capitalism), and 
the ‘clientelist... populist political regimes and/or military dictatorships’ (developing 
economies in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia). Cognisant of the limits of the market 
as a ‘steering mechanism’ and ‘basis for social cohesion’, the alliance steadily came to re-
embed capitalism in a ‘new, rescaled form of market society with a new institutional 
architecture’ (Jessop, 2003a:2). 
Two interrelated set of features are discernable in this re-embedding project. The first relates 
to the pursuit of an accumulation strategy based on privatisation, liberalisation, de-regulation, 
marketisation, tax cuts and internationalisation. The second relates to the search for new 
forms of social regulation to construct a market society in accord with the imperatives of a 
globalising market economy. The emerging mode of regulation sought to foster international 
competitiveness and innovation through supply-side policies, with the emphasis moving 
away from full employment and planning. Social policy during this period was subordinated 
to economic policy, stressing labour market flexibility and downsizing of the social wage 
(considered a ‘cost of production’ as opposed to an instrument for redistribution and social 
cohesion). Allied to this regulatory regime was the diminution of national-scale policy 
making and implementation as local, regional and supranational levels of government and 
partnerships gained new powers and prominence. Finally, the new form of social regulation 
placed increasing reliance on partnerships, networks, consultation, negotiation and ‘other 
forms of reflexive self-organisation rather than on the combination of anarchic market forces 
and top-down planning’ (Jessop, 2003a:3). Although these changes were widespread, they 
assumed several forms reflecting different national and regional traditions and different 
combinations of socio-economic forces (see Jessop, 2002, 2002a, 2002b).  
In the urban development and shelter sectors, the international thinking during this period 
shifted quite dramatically. Cities were increasingly projected as engines of economic growth, 
centres of innovation, and key actors in promoting and consolidating international 
competitiveness. Underpinned by a development agenda privileging productivity 
maximisation, cost recovery and privatisation, the focus was on repackaging cities as 
efficient sites of production. Thus government was assigned the role of facilitator/enabler in 
enhancing city efficiency through managerial innovation; public-private partnerships; 
deregulation; intergovernmental reorganisation; and fiscal rationalisation (see World Bank, 
1991 and Khan, 1996a for a critique of the Bank’s position).  
In the shelter sector, the dominant theme (in the period 1986–1996) centred on market 
enablement, whose ascendancy and adoption came at a point in history when the state was 
‘least able to help the poor’ (Gilbert, 1992:444). Market enablement pivots on the re-
orientation of government activity away from direct housing provision and regulation of 
private housing markets. The two dominant rationalities of enablement are institutional 
capacity creation and promoting an open market environment for expanding formal private 
sector activity. Closely tied with these ideas is ‘good governance’ (World Bank, 1994) 
undergirded by the view that market forces furnish the optimal means to satisfy basic needs 
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provided they are steered in the ‘right’/‘appropriate’ direction through the rule of law, 
contract-enforcement, accountability, transparency, competitive political systems, i.e. the 
service delivery state. The policy recommendations accompanying the enablement approach 
– as articulated by the World Bank (1993) – identifies seven enabling instruments at 
government’s disposal to render markets more efficient and effective. The suggested reforms 
aim to address demand-side constraints (developing property markets, increasing mortgage 
finance, and targeted housing subsidies); supply-side constraints (infrastructure provision, 
regulation of land and housing development, measures to maximise the productivity of the 
construction sector); and focus on improving the management of the housing sector in its 
entirety.  
The market enablement approach has come under fire from a range of quarters. Firstly, and 
most damningly, the market enablement approach holds up ‘few concessions’ to a 
government committed to improving the lives of the poorest segments of society (Jones & 
Datta, 2000:411), i.e. ‘those who live in destitution’ (Adebayo, nd:13). Secondly, this 
approach has been described as inappropriate for developing countries because it ignores the 
need for considered expansion of, and support to, informal private land markets and 
developers in shelter production to deliver affordable and accessible housing at scale to the 
world’s poor. Thirdly, rightsizing of the state and political compromises severely limit the 
ability of governments to design, negotiate and execute the battery of suggested reforms 
(Baken & van der Linden, 1993 cited in Berrisford et al, 2003:12). Thus, even with 
commitment to enablement, the state has no ‘route map’ to guide the process of policy 
formulation – ‘how the principles are to be translated into concrete policy reform’. Policy 
makers have to figure out the ‘form of governance’ (beyond the Bank’s ‘good governance’ 
frame) implied by the strategy; the construction of a ‘system of government to administer 
decentralised mandates’; and ‘obtain a political consensus as to the desirability of the reform’ 
(Jones & Datta, 2000:410). Lastly, and complicating matters further, is that the Bank omits 
providing a ‘normative position on the sequence in which the principles of an enabling 
strategy are to be translated into policy’, which is of crucial importance to transitional 
societies in the throes of the dual processes of economic reform and political liberalisation 
(Ibid:411). For instance, if the housing intervention is intended to be ‘comprehensive’ and 
biased towards the poor, simplification of development regulations and legislative reform 
may be easily and rapidly accomplished but without simultaneous reform of malfunctioning 
and inequitable subsidy and end-user financial regimes and land markets, such simplification 
could produce perverse results.  
On the planning front, neoliberalism came to redefine the boundaries between public and 
private spheres, and remaking of market society was linked to a ‘wider range of political 
subjects than is typical of orthodox liberalism’. It tended to ‘promote “community” (or a 
plurality of self-organising communities) as a flanking, compensatory mechanism for the 
inadequacies of the market mechanism’ (Jessop, 2002:455). The net effect was erosion of the 
public realm within which planning was previously located (a theme returned to in the 
Conclusion). Planning also came to be challenged by critical Marxism and then 
postmodernity with the latter drawing attention to difference rather than possibilities for 
collective social action (Storper, 2001). By the early 1990s, planning theory was ‘in 
something of a muddle and it seemed unlikely that it would provide a source for a 
reconstituted legitimacy for planning’ (Harrison, forthcoming:2). What came to be dominant 
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though, during the 1980s and 1990s, was communicative action theory – with its 
universalising assumptions47
Embedded in this approach are assumptions that community divisions can be 
overcome and consensus can be reached on planning issues; that collaborative 
processes involving primarily civil society-based groups can act to put pressure on the 
state to act more responsibly; and that collaboration can provide a learning 
environment and can serve to build social capital within communities (Watson, 
2003:398).
 – suggesting that ‘planning decisions’ could be reached through 
‘collaborative processes involving all stakeholders, and conforming to particular rules’, thus 
ensuring that ‘participation is fair, equal and empowering’.  
48
Other planning theorists attempted to progress beyond the ‘assumptions of universality 
contained in communicative action theory’, allowing differences to surface between actors 
(but only at level of speech or ideas), which could be overcome through the force of ‘better 
argument’ and debate in a consensus-seeking process (see Watson, 2003:398). 
 
In sum, observable from this brief description of the international conjuncture is how the 
market economy of the 1980s and 1990s disembedded itself from the existing social milieu 
and attempted to re-embed itself in a society reshaped according to the dictates of the new 
accumulation strategy. This reshaping could not however rely solely on the rationality of 
market forces as the latter also had to be ‘tamed through more reflexive, dialogical 
rationalities of governance’ (Jessop, 2001a:12), readily furnished by communicative 
planning, which fences out power in it various manifestations. 
Before immersing ourselves in a discussion of the dynamics of ‘re-embedding’, a brief detour 
into the main framing elements of post-apartheid housing policy is presented to ground and 
contextualise the subsequent discussion.  
Section Two 
 South African Post-Apartheid Housing Policy  
By the early 1990s, it was widely recognised that South Africa needed a coherent and 
legitimate national housing policy. Different arms of the state responded in a poorly co-
ordinated manner to rapid informal settlement proliferation, ranging from ignoring them to 
relocation in site and service schemes situated on the peripheries of urban centres thereby 
perpetuating apartheid socio-spatial marginalisation and exclusion (Lupton & Murphy, 
                                                 
47 Drawing from critical theory – especially Habermas – it starts from a situation wherein there is already a 
shared worldview and a shared yardstick of rationality, both of which are highly problematic. Secondly, 
although Habermas defines the process of lifeworld production, he does ‘little…to assess how these processes 
work, how worldviews, allegiances, identities are elaborated, routinised, established, or altered’. Thirdly, how 
‘communicative and strategic actions intertwine to produce and reproduce forms of social and societally 
institutionalised behaviour’ is not analysed (Mantysalo, 2003:16, 20, 25). 
48 The similarities with the social compact/ corporatist type approach of the late apartheid and early political 
liberalisation periods are explored below.  
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1995:162). Moreover, the 1968 ‘directive from the Department of Bantu Affairs’ that ordered 
the ‘cessation of all provision of family housing in urban townships’ (Wilkinson, 1998:220 –
1), translated into the new government inheriting a ‘shelter crisis akin to that of the post-
Second World War period’ (Parnell & Hart, 1999:383).  
The urgency of a coherent and legitimate housing policy was also connected to a realisation 
that our human settlements are inequitable, inefficient, unsustainable, expensive to manage 
and maintain, and exacerbate(d) poverty and unemployment. South African human 
settlements are characterised by spatial separation of residential areas according to class and 
population groups; a ‘discontinuous and fragmented urban fabric, with development 
occurring in discrete pockets or cells’; ‘different land uses are agglomerated and separated 
from other uses to the greatest extent possible’; the ‘grain of urban settlements is loose and 
coarse’;49
The Housing White Paper (1994) states that government’s intention is  
 disparate levels of service provision; urban sprawl; low levels of suburban 
population density; and the concentration of the poor in relatively high-density areas in the 
urban peripheries and the wealthy in core and intermediate areas (Dewar, 1995:408; DOH, 
2000).  
... to establish viable, socially and economically integrated communities, situated in 
areas allowing convenient access to economic opportunities as well as health, 
educational and social amenities, within which all South Africans will have access on 
a progressive basis, to a permanent residential structure with secure tenure, ensuring 
privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; and potable water, 
adequate sanitary facilities including waste disposal and domestic electricity supply.  
The policy and programme commits government to mass and rapid delivery; people-centred 
housing processes prioritising the needs of the poor and vulnerable groups (women, youth 
and disabled); and the delivery of a decent standard of product with access to public services 
and amenities.  
Focusing resources on width rather than depth, the policy is described as ‘incremental’, with 
official documents underscoring its ‘progressive’ nature. The policy is founded on the 
principle of creating an enabling environment whereby the state supports and facilitates 
delivery rather than engaging directly in provision, i.e. a state-assisted, facilitated, and 
market-driven delivery approach. Levelling the playing fields and creating a supportive 
regulatory and institutional environment for efficient functioning of housing markets are 
central to enablement. Implementation is based on partnerships, i.e. the mobilisation and 
harnessing of the combined resources, efforts and initiatives of communities, the private 
sector and the state. The legislation underwriting the policy (Housing Act 107 of 1997) places 
considerable emphasis on housing development being economically, financially and socially 
sustainable. There is an emphasis on the need for housing development to redress inherited 
patterns of racial and spatial inequalities and to promote integration at socio-economic, 
physical and institutional levels.  
                                                 
49 Most buildings are free-standing and there are large land reserves, especially for roads, schools and other 
public buildings (Dewar, 1995:408).  
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The way the roles and functions of different spheres of government were defined follows the 
usual format with national government setting policies, norms and standards; determining 
and distributing funding to other spheres; and monitoring performance. Provincial 
government administers the programme, regulates and supports housing development 
through legislation; and disburses funding through provincial housing development boards. 
Public and private sector delivery agents applied to the Board for subsidies and their 
proposals were assessed according to the same criteria. Subsidies were accessed through the 
project-linked, individual and institutional delivery routes. These subsidies were aimed at 
new housing developments although top-up subsidies can be accessed in cases where there 
was prior state investment. Local government is primarily the implementing agency. In some 
instances, local government is the developer, but in most cases the municipality facilitates 
delivery through partnerships and joint ventures; identifying and designating land for 
housing; and ensuring the provision of basic services and infrastructure.  
The role and functions of the different spheres have, however, evolved over time and have 
been modified; moving in tandem with shifting thinking on local government’s role in service 
delivery and infrastructure provision. In the early part of the new millennium, a few 
initiatives were underway to accredit municipalities to administer and deploy subsidies, 
thereby according them greater authority over project selection and enabling them to link 
more closely their housing and spatial development plans. Local authorities – then and now 
(discussed below) – understandably expressed and demonstrated a measure of reluctance with 
respect to accreditation, fearful of what could degenerate into another unfunded mandate.50
Section Three 
 
The Housing Amendment Act (2001) abolished the housing boards, transferring their powers, 
duties, rights and obligations to the MEC responsible for housing in each province. The Act 
empowers the Minister of Housing to determine a procurement policy for housing 
development and details regulatory measures to restrict the sale or alienation of state 
subsidised housing.  
 Origins and Evolution of Post-Apartheid Housing Policy  
During the policy negotiation and formulation process, the liberation movement’s agenda of 
transforming inherited settlement patterns through housing policy was ‘seriously undermined 
by the outgoing apartheid government and business interests’. The ‘inappropriate timing of 
the negotiations’, and ‘fundamental oversights’ regarding the ‘critical connections between 
housing policy and core issues of citizenship, property and place’ overrode well-meaning 
attempts to formulate a pro-poor and empowering housing policy (Lalloo, 1999:36) 
(discussed further below).  
                                                 
50 Speaking at the South African Local Government Association conference in Bloemfontein, eThekwini’s 
(Durban) Mayor Obed Mlaba stated: ‘We are concerned that we are seeing a lot of powers being devolved to 
local government without the resources and budget that go with it’. He said there was a need for municipalities 
to engage with/in housing delivery because local government was the first port of call for people seeking 
housing – ‘If there is that need, let us get it [the power to decide on housing] with the finances appropriately 
allocated’ (Sunday Times, 8 April 2001).  
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How did this situation come to pass? The thesis proposed is that existing development policy 
is deeply conditioned by ideas circulating in the late apartheid period (Mabin, 2000), and is 
based on the ‘precepts of the pre-democratic period’ (Mabin, 2000a:15). At a general level, 
the Urban Foundation’s approach to housing was implemented at scale by the Independent 
Development Trust (described below) which ‘can be seen to have directly influenced the De 
Loor Task Group’.51
The implementation of this model over the last decade has produced ‘largely mono-
functional’ mass schemes, on ‘disconnected parcels of land and characterised by low-density, 
undifferentiated free-standing housing shells’. Notable by their absence are social and 
commercial facilities and other ‘vibrant urban activities’ and the local market is ‘so thinly 
spread’ that there are insufficient thresholds to support a range of goods and services. A 
‘striking feature is the almost total lack of spatial cohesion’ with buildings being ‘isolated 
events in a sea of space’. The results are lives that are ‘appallingly inconvenient and 
expensive’ and environments that are ‘overtly hostile’ to residents, offering ‘no shade, no 
cover, no features of interest or stimulation, [and] no short cuts’. It is ‘impossible to discern 
any social, economic and environmental concerns in the making of these schemes, which 
seem to have been ordered simply by questions of [physical and financial] engineering 
efficiency’ (Dewar, 1998:369).  
 In turn, the De Loor Task Group Commission on Housing Policy for 
South Africa report ‘undoubtedly contributed to the formation of the key ideas incorporated 
into the current policy framework’ given the ‘continuities between its membership and the 
membership of the National Housing Forum’. The key element of the post-apartheid housing 
framework – the capital subsidy scheme – is ‘cast in essentially the same mould as the earlier 
Independent Development Trust (IDT) scheme and conforms with the central proposals of 
the De Loor Task Group, taking the form of a once-off capital grant…graduated on a sliding 
scale according to income’ (P Wilkinson, 1998:225). Moreover, the ‘models’ espoused in this 
earlier policy thinking are ‘implicit’ in the post-apartheid policy, viz. a single household, 
detached dwelling unit situated on its own plot in a ‘properly planned’ township with full 
freehold tenure (P Wilkinson, 1998:223–5).  
                                                 
51 It is important not to read a direct/ linear continuity between policies. For instance, the Urban Foundation 
criticised the De Loor proposals for marginalising the poor and recommending an ‘inappropriate’ role for 
government. The Foundation argued that the recommendations paid inadequate attention to the consolidation 
process and to mechanisms that protected the poor regarding the identification and acquisition of well-located 
land for settlement. At the base of the UF critique of De Loor is that the poorest households (those earning 
under R1 000 per month) would receive a serviced site from the state and pay a monthly rental to a regional or 
local authority. As tenants, they would ‘enter into a dependency cycle’ which, the UF argued, was not 
sustainable (the UF favoured freehold tenure regardless of the consequences – discussed below). In this 
scenario, the state would become the ‘main player’, rather than the preferred option of an enabler/facilitator 
(Lupton & Murphy, 1995:157–8). But the Foundation’s criticism was informed by its hard-line enablement 
approach, which as pointed out earlier offers little to the most destitute (the poorest). Hence, differences in the 
policy orientations and thrusts – if the UF critique of De Loor is anything to go by – appear to be referenced to 
market (un)friendliness or extent of (de)commodification as inspired by conformity to the strictures of poverty-
agnostic enablement strategies. Strict conformity is preferred with any deviation slated ‘inappropriate’. Critique 
of one set of proposals by the authors of another is akin to fights between siblings. What is sometimes lost in 
these fights between siblings is the realisation/recognition that no country drafts policy starting from a blank 
slate – ‘there is likely to be considerable path-dependency so that an acceptance of the [World Bank’s] list of 
normative principles is likely to be mixed with an understanding of previous conditions’ (Jones & Datta, 
2000:410) which, in all four cited instances (UF, IDT, De Loor and White Paper) were inadequate.  
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The similarity in development outcomes of pre- and post-democracy official housing 
interventions was lamented by prominent members of state from 1995 to 2004 (noted in the 
Introduction). The continuity between the ‘old’ and ‘newish’ orders suggests that there has 
been no meaningful alteration in the inherited socio-spatial boundaries which include the 
privileged and exclude the poor. The reasons for this, it is proposed, can be located in the 
architecture and functioning of the institutions that drove the formulation of post-apartheid 
housing policy (the NHF); the process of knowledge production; authoritarian conceptions of 
social change coupled to radical shifts in ANC development thinking about economic 
development/transformation; transplacement/elite-pacting; and the associated underwriting of 
non-conflictual approaches to transformation and reconstruction.  
Negotiating Housing Policy: The Dynamics of Policy Production – Change and 
(Dis)/Continuity  
Apartheid is dead – Long live apartheid! 
(Graffiti on a shack wall in Mandelaville in Soweto – post 1994)52
The National Housing Forum was officially launched on 31 August 1992 with a mandate to 
negotiate a future housing policy and framework. The nineteen members of the Forum 
comprised major political groups; parastatal agencies (Development Bank of Southern Africa 
[DBSA], IDT, South African Housing Trust); representatives of the financial services, 
construction and insurance sectors; and two ‘non-governmental’ organisations (Urban 
Foundation and Kagiso Trust).  
 
Both the IDT and the Urban Foundation had very close links with business and their 
credibility was seriously questioned in many settlements. Created in 1991 by the de Klerk 
government, the IDT was set up to finance large numbers of urban upgrading projects on 
terms ‘defined by the logic of economic liberalism, legitimated by a politically correct board 
and justified by a conservative “basic needs” approach to development’ (Swilling, 1998a: 
289). The Chairperson of the IDT was Jan Steyn who, incidentally, was also the Chair of the 
Urban Foundation.  
From its establishment in the aftermath of the 1976 uprising to its disbandment in 1995, the 
Foundation – while presenting itself as ‘avowedly non-political’ (P Wilkinson, 1998:222) – 
was ‘untiring first in its search for minor palliatives for apartheid’;53 ‘always’ fell short of 
endorsing universal suffrage; and was the lead ‘stormtrooper for conservative (‘neoliberal’) 
social policy’ (Bond, 2000a:125–6). Its main aim was to ‘promote improvement of the 
quality of life in urban (and primarily African urban) communities’ (Urban Foundation, n.d. 
cited in P Wilkinson, 1998:222) through a redefinition of the (apartheid-) ‘established 
parameters of housing policy’. The objective was to create a property-owning (mortgage 
bonded) stable society, targeting African households in particular.54
                                                 
52 Sunday Independent – Reconstruct, 12 November 2001. 
 Pursuant to this end, the 
53 The Foundation drafted the Black Local Authorities Act of 1983. 
54 As liberal-capitalist political strategist Zach de Beer put it in 1998, ‘When people are housed – more 
especially when they are home owners – they are not only less likely to be troublesome, they are also likely to 
feel they have a stake in society and an interest in its stability’(cited in Bond, 2006:8).  
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Foundation came to aggressively promote ‘self-help’ based on individual freehold tenure, 
which in their minds was most suited to addressing the large and growing backlog of housing 
and creating the conditions for social stability.  
A number of the leading ‘radical’ intellectuals of the 1980s – who ‘did not challenge 
[apartheid] white hegemony’ (Mabin, 2000a:13) and who sought to ‘mobilise ‘free market’ 
forces in an arena from which they [had] been excluded for some thirty years’ (P Wilkinson, 
1998:222) – played a crucial role in the lobbying activities of the Foundation by way of 
generating pro-market policy documents and championing these positions in various 
forums.55
The balance of power within the NHF ‘favoured the business interests which generally acted 
in concert with the state and parastatal institutions’. Nine of the sixteen founding members of 
the Forum were businesses representatives or were pro-business, i.e. ‘business interests were 
over-represented’ (Lalloo, 1999:38–9). Business interests were also ‘favoured insofar as the 
Deputy Chair Matthew Nell, was a former employee of the Urban Foundation’ (Gilbert, 
2002a:1923) and ‘member of the De Loor Task Team’ (Rust, 1997:90).
 These ‘intellectuals’ also piloted and implemented the approaches they developed 
while consulting for the Foundation, most notably the supply-side, once-off small capital 
subsidy that created the legendary apartheid-perpetuating ‘toilet towns’ through arms-length 
apartheid-funded institutions like the IDT (Bond, 2000a:125–6).  
56
The consequence of the high reliance on consultants and their questionable neutrality 
was suspicion on the part of some members, and undue comfort on the part of others. 
Members from whose network consultants were drawn felt comfortable that the work 
emerging from consultants’ efforts was right and good, as it both justified their 
position and provided comfortable ground on which to tread. Members from whose 
networks consultants were not chosen, felt cheated, suspicious that their alternative 
 Nell’s position was 
crucial – he was not only ‘regularly pulled to the right by the NHF’s banking, business and 
parastatal groupings’ (Bond, 2000:134), he also ‘appointed the majority of technical experts’ 
(Gilbert, 2002a:1923), drawn from the ranks of the Urban Foundation. These conservative 
technical experts ‘guided the negotiations’ (Jenkins, 1999:191) and ‘controlled’ (Bond, 
2000a:133) and/or ‘dominated most of the proceedings’ (Bond, 2000:247). Nell, writing with 
others, acknowledges the significant role played by consultants, conceding that in ‘reality’ 
their ‘neutrality is never entirely possible’ (Nell et al., 1996:44). What is however significant 
is that consultants, appointed by Nell, constructed papers that framed the problematic of 
various working groups on the grounds that their ‘neutrality’ (theoretically speaking) would 
permit the levelling of playing field/s.  
                                                 
55 The names of Dan Smit and Jeff McCarthy stand out prominently here. As part of an ‘ageing clique of white 
radical men’, these intellectuals, during the late 1980s, ‘sold out their earlier radical beliefs’ and ‘also showed a 
radical disdain for the emerging societal demand for transparency’. Where before Smit and McCarthy ‘criticised 
capital’s agenda with undisguised venom’, they ‘changed their stripes’ even faster than ‘apartheid 
bureaucrats…, transmogrified into the UF’s [Urban Foundation’s] leading guides to the Left and its most insipid 
apologists’ (Bond, 2000a:129–30). During the 1990s, the work of these scholars, and those associated with 
them, centred around the promotion of ‘informal settlement intervention simply as a form of housing delivery, 
dismissing a role for community organisations, supporting the imposition of individual freehold titles and 
promoting increased stakes for the private sector’ (Huchzermeyer, 2001a:72). 
56 Rust (1997) lists Nell as the Chairperson of the NHF’s Co-ordinating Committee. 
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paradigm was not getting due audience, cynical that levelling the playing fields was 
more than an empty promise (Nell et al., 1996:44, original emphasis).  
Tilting the balance further in favour of business was their high level of organisation and 
capacity to generate positions very rapidly for consideration by the Forum. Civil society 
organisations, on the other hand, battled to participate not only because of ‘the lack of 
expertise, but also because of the lack of resources’ (Sandi Mgidlana of the South African 
National Civic Organisation (SANCO) cited in Nell et al., 1996:64). This imbalance tended 
to overly focus negotiations on ‘credit’ and expedient implementation.  
Where this mattered was in the extent to which the policy was accepted on the ground. Some 
members now argue that delivery constraints and social compact problems are consequences 
of the NHF’s oversight in this regard. On another level, the lack of support could also be 
argued to have contributed to the over-emphasis on credit as an answer to the housing crisis. 
Because the financial institutions could develop their own positions for consideration by the 
NHF and because organisations like SANCO lacked similar capacity, the focus shifted to that 
which was seen to be ‘possible’ rather than that which might have been more ‘appropriate’. 
The two are not always the same thing (Nell et al., 1996:64–5).  
But could this outcome – the ‘possible’ rather than the ‘appropriate’ – have been any 
different, given that the composition of the NHF, whose membership was limited to national 
level civil society organisations,57 was purposefully engineered to ‘depoliticise’ housing 
(Nell et al., 1996:44), and given that the ANC was complicit? (The ANC’s complicity may 
have been for different reasons – highlighted in the synthesis). Removing housing, posits one 
authority, ‘out of the political debate seemed logical, if also necessary’ to reduce the ‘risk that 
political interests seeking to gain favour with their constituencies could hijack the housing 
issue as a centre around which to mobilise’. Housing then became defined as ‘a technical 
problem which could be solved on the basis of a subsidy formula and minimum standards’ 
(Rust, 1997:93) to offset the ‘single most important constraint to the housing delivery 
process, that of affordability’ (RSA, 1994:S3.3.10). Although low income presents a huge 
challenge,58
Power was also stacked against the most marginal and vulnerable groupings of society – rural 
constituencies, issues affecting the poorest of the poor, rights of women, the disabled, the 
aged, and against planning in favour of mass implementation – by the narrow Work 
 the technicist solution proposed, by definition, delinks housing problems from 
‘historical inequalities and injustices in the educational and political structure’ (Mackay, 
1999:389) and the workings of the land, financial sector, property and labour markets (a 
theme returned to in Chapter Six and the Conclusion). It is this technocratic rationality allied 
to the ‘policy analytic’/‘policy rhetoric’ turn of the transition period (discussed below) that 
effectively precluded the formulation of ‘appropriate’ policy. 
                                                 
57 Three sub sectors of the extra-parliamentary interest in housing were identified, i.e. mass-based organisations 
(political organisations, civics and unions), business, and development organisations. 
58 It will be argued later that the externalisation of income from the policy – that is, poor/low/irregular incomes 
limiting affordability – is a fundamental flaw as it denies the lived reality of the majority. Poor/low/irregular 
incomes should be factored into the policy and not – as the Housing White Paper (RSA, 1994:3.3.9) mistakenly 
does – cast as a factor that ‘militate[s] against a massive increase in effective demand for, and supply of 
housing’ (RSA, 1994:3.3.9).  
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Programme of the NHF. ‘Indeed’, according to Nell et al. (1996:65), ‘the NHF only gave 
cursory attention to some of them’.  
Arguably though, the needs of these and other excluded sectors could have been potentially 
addressed through the envisaged second and third phases of the NHF agenda,59
Thus, the way that knowledge came to be produced in the NHF; discursive and programmatic 
frame-narrowing; depoliticisation; elevation of the ‘possible’ over the ‘appropriate’; 
exclusion of the voices of the most vulnerable segments of society; and non-recognition of 
the poor’s lived reality drastically limited the policy horizon’s responsiveness to survival 
needs. A small group of consultants organised into eight technical committees generated 
reports about housing conditions, delivery, equity and affordability that adopted very 
restricted views of the housing problem. Solutions proposed by these consultants were 
heavily influenced by experiences drawn from the United Kingdom, United States and the 
‘Benelux’ countries (Gilbert, 2004a:202), reflective of the ‘institutional history of SA 
academia’, i.e. its ‘colonial cultural/linguistic mindset and its obsession with the latest Anglo-
American intellectual and theoretical fashions’ (Simon, 2001:378). It is maybe for this reason 
that NHF policy formulation was based on the ‘intellectual assimilation of housing best 
practice on the part of key contributors to the negotiations’ (R Tomlinson, 2002:4). Two 
employees and a consultant ‘within the [Urban] Foundation’ are credited with having 
formulated the capital scheme. The employees, ‘already well-versed in housing issues 
consolidated their expertise by attending a course at MIT [Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology] and imported best practice’ (Ibid).  
 but this 
opportunity was also squandered when ‘appropriate housing strategy’ became confined to 
resource allocation matters only, and the third phase was ‘abandoned altogether’ (Lalloo, 
1999:40). The new state, Jenkins and Smith (2001a:493) assert, ‘did not continue the 
negotiation process on housing policy, reverting to the use of appointed Task Forces…and 
the review within parliamentary committees’ (which themselves were co-opted and 
manipulated by the executive (see the IDASA magazine, WHIP, 18 October 1996; and 
IDASA, 1999)). It is perhaps for this reason why the policy and subsequent modifications 
remain confined to the ‘possible’/‘implementable’, tending to ‘reinforce rather than reduce 
the spatial inequalities of the apartheid system’ (Lalloo, 1999:45–6). The policy overlooks 
the special needs of rural women trapped in exploitative patriarchal and African customary 
relations. In the absence of an urbanisation strategy, the policy is arguably rendered even 
more unresponsive to the needs of migrant workers and long-distance commuters, whose 
livelihoods depend on mobility and maintaining multiple residential bases (see Lalloo, 1999). 
In fact, mobility as part of a livelihood strategy is perceived as a ‘problem’ (Huchzermeyer, 
2001a:80 – original emphasis) given that the main aim of capital subsidy scheme (with its 
emphasis on individual freehold tenure) is to ‘permanently fix’ people in hostile spaces and 
tie them into a system of (ill-affordable) payment of rates, taxes and service charges. 
Abandonment of RDP houses is an expected outcome of ‘fixing’ poor people in space, whose 
survival depends on mobility. Such a ‘transient and placeless existence’ impelled by survival-
based mobility is at odds with subsidy-related ‘burdensome restrictions on movement’ 
(Lalloo, 1999:37).  
                                                 
59 The second phase entailed the development of appropriate housing strategies and the third entailed engaging 
the public in ‘interactive policy discourse’ (Lalloo, 1999:40). 
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Further evidence of deficiencies of the knowledge production process is evidenced in the 
crucial sphere of housing finance, which three of the eight committees focused on.60
In COSATU’s submission to the Portfolio Committee on Housing on the White Paper, the 
trade union federation criticised the policy on the grounds that it is ‘state-assisted and market-
driven’ (rather than state-driven and market-assisted); subsidised the private sector through a 
whole range of (hidden) subsidies without any performance obligations; encouraged 
individual ownership as the preferred form of tenure; paid no attention to the dismantling of 
cartels among the private sector building material suppliers; made no provision for financial 
sector re-engineering; offered the majority of poor households little hope of securing end-
user finance; and furnished little detail on the restructuring of parastatal organisations linked 
to the shelter sector and development finance more generally. COSATU called for the 
housing policy to be revised, underscoring the leadership role of government; the 
transformation and regulation of the private sector in housing delivery; and amendments to 
numerous aspects restricting access of working people and the poor to housing (COSATU, 
1996).  
 The 
reports produced paid scant attention to the background of current financial difficulties within 
townships or squatter settlements; there was little discussion of political conditions; no 
appraisal of informal finance methods; no detailed discussions of how the poor housed 
themselves over the previous two decades; and no consideration of how the poor saved or the 
costs of informal credit. Moreover, the reports were largely uncritical of past experiences 
with supply-side housing subsidies in South Africa (e.g. IDT-type interventions) and abroad; 
and did not adequately engage with alternatives proposed by non-establishment sectors, most 
notably the trade unions, Urban Sector Network (USN), South African Homeless People’s 
Federation (Jones & Datta, 2000: 399–400). The policy gaps, flaws and silences (as identified 
by these non-establishment sectors in their critique of the Housing White Paper) are recorded 
here as they continue to this day to be the very same hurdles and obstacles that compromise 
integrated and sustainable human settlement development (discussed below). Contemporary 
housing policy reform discussions and proposals are increasing coming to focus on these 
gaps.  
The Development Action Group (DAG), an NGO specialising in housing, played a leading 
role in drafting and presenting the Urban Sector Network’s response to the White Paper. (The 
Network is a national co-ordinating body of NGOs active in the built environment sector.) In 
it submission to the Portfolio Committee, DAG criticised the policy’s over-reliance on the 
private sector which had ‘little direct experience of the constraints and opportunities facing 
poor communities’ (DAG, 1996:1), and whose drive to reduce costs produces shelter 
outcomes out of kilter with developmental objectives, i.e. spatial peripheralisation and 
marginalisation of the poor. Secondly, the policy ‘assumes’ that the poor will add to the 
subsidies by way of bank loans, thereby excluding approximately 70% of the poor from 
housing opportunities. Thirdly, the exclusion of individuals without dependants from 
accessing subsidies spawns conflict, especially in private sector-driven project intervention 
which focuses on ‘existing communities’ (Ibid:3).  
DAG proposed a significant re-orientation of the policy including a social housing subsidy 
stream to furnish incentives for ‘non-profit, non speculative, local authority and 
                                                 
60 Only one committee looked at land and there was no dedicated committee on infrastructure. 
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community-driven housing provision’ and ‘planning’ to promote integrated cities via the 
development of high-density housing. This subsidy stream, it was proposed, should be 
‘protected from downward raiding and property speculation’; be invested in decommodified 
housing stock for the poor; and be coupled to the provision of ‘well located public land 
outside of the market pricing mechanism’ thus breaking with the White Paper’s dependence 
on market-related land pricing (Ibid:4, original emphasis). Other recommendations proposed 
to incentivise alternate housing production routes under the social housing rubric included 
greater support to NGOs (bulk subsidy allocations to accredited NGOs) and CBOs in low-
income housing provision, and disbursing of ‘retrospective subsidies to communities so as to 
enable them to bypass unnecessarily complex application procedures and recognise de facto 
development on the ground’ (Ibid).  
A second re-orientation called for the development of a rental housing subsidy and the 
provision of rental stock that would be affordable for the poor and accommodate people 
excluded from other subsidy streams. A third re-orientation recommended was for the policy 
to seriously address land pricing and land tenure matters. DAG noted that there was ‘little 
recognition of the land pricing mechanisms required to re-integrate the apartheid city’ 
(Ibid:5). In this regard ‘clear planning decisions, backed up by land pricing mechanisms 
which render well-located land – particularly that which is state owned – accessible for low-
income, higher density developments... is a minimum condition’ (Ibid) to redress apartheid 
spatial imbalances and achieve urban compaction and efficiency.  
Furthermore, the DAG submission deemed facilitating secure, flexible and legally sound 
tenure to be essential to enhance the effectiveness of the subsidy scheme and community 
investment in upgrading. The final suggested re-orientation was to review the macro-
economic assumptions that underpinned the approach to the budgeting and financing of low-
income housing. The submission recommended assessing the long-term costs of urban sprawl 
so that fiscal allocations for well-located, integrated housing take into account (amongst other 
ways) the resulting savings in transport subsidies, energy, and land-use. This could result in 
the provision of housing, rather than housing opportunities, and narrow the gap between 
community expectations and current reality (DAG, 1996:5).  
In its submission to the Portfolio Committee on Housing regarding the Housing White Paper, 
the Homeless People’s Federation (HPF) argued that the ‘overall policy was developed by the 
financial and business experts with inputs from high level bureaucrats. It is inevitable that 
this distorts the way housing support is implemented’ (cited in Rust 1997:90). People’s 
Dialogue (the NGO supporting the Federation) contended that government had designed a  
...capital subsidy system in order to allow the state to provide financial support as 
widely as possible, but set up rules which directly and simultaneously undermines the 
creation of an enabling environment. The result is that the overwhelming majority of 
subsidies are delivered to the private sector for families without tenure or without 
access to credit (n.d.:2).  
In sum then, although progressive and radical NGOs participated in the NHF discussions, 
their views (summarised above), carried less weight than establishment forces. More 
importantly though, the reasons for the Forum’s non-engagement with these views – over and 
above the power differentials and the strategic selectivity of the discursive terrain of the NHF 
– is more appropriately located in their effective exclusion from the discussions. This is 
because direct inclusion of low-income groups was restricted to the participation of SANCO 
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which, at the time, came under increasing pressure from the ANC to endorse and underwrite 
the party’s emerging conservative conception of ‘society’ and ‘social transformation’, i.e. 
less political, consensus-seeking, technical and managerial (discussed in greater detail 
below). The absorption and co-option of key civic leaders into ANC structures and the 
emphasis placed on a ‘united front’ in the 1994 elections played a significant role in blunting 
the contribution of the civic sector to housing policy formulation. Not unsurprisingly, the 
demands of SANCO for – amongst other things – the democratisation of development 
finance and associated institutions; a people-centred and people-driven approach to housing; 
and the need for community reinvestment legislation did not feature in the housing policy 
(Huchzermeyer, 2001).  
(Quasi-)/Structural Predispositions  
Whilst the rules dictating the composition and profile of the Forum, the relegation of housing 
policy to a technical fix, and the power imbalances arguably played significant roles in 
narrowing policy and development horizons, it would be problematic to argue that expansion 
of NHF membership and better power re-balancing between the members would have 
produced more developmental outcomes. This would underplay and misread the way both 
liberal and ‘radical’ political parties share similar notions of how social change is to be 
organised, orchestrated and led. Both liberal and revolutionary parties – despite their rhetoric 
– share an understanding of social change as being underpinned by hierarchical relationships 
between rulers and ruled and the primacy of leadership over mass action in effecting 
processes of change. Both agendas, ‘anchored in the tradition of the nation-state, conceive of 
change in narrowly statist terms despite their anti-statist rhetoric’.  
Furthermore, both visions of societal transformation and reorganisation are elitist in 
that they neglect the role of the popular masses in processes of change. Liberals 
advocate gradual, rational, managed change implemented by political leaders and an 
elite intelligentsia. Leninist vanguards push for faster, revolutionary change, but it is 
the role of an elite, revolutionary vanguard that is central to such change. Similarly, 
while both doctrines profess a stated belief in the rule of the people (that is, 
democracy), democracy is defined as a situation in which experts and elites represent 
the people, and are allowed to make essential political decisions, promoting the rule 
of the few, at least supposedly, in the interests of the many. In reality, liberalism has 
always supported the rule of the best, defined not by birth status but by educational 
achievement, that is, a meritocracy. Vanguardism, too, constructs its own 
meritocracy, defined by a combination of educational achievement, proper political 
training and political lineage (in the case of African liberation movements) (Johnson, 
2003:202).  
Consequently, despite the ANC’s ideology and rhetoric of popular democracy and people-
driven transformation, something which was significantly watered down in the run-up to, and 
during, negotiations – the non-establishment and establishment forces in the NHF shared a 
similar understanding of the role of leadership, representation and participation. The 
leadership role surrendered by the civil society formations to the ANC, particularly the exile 
wing, with its (secretive) top-down bureaucratic organisational structure and leadership style 
structurally predisposed the NHF negotiation process to be dominated by experts and 
consultants who were willing at all costs to ingratiate themselves with a leadership. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, the ANC leadership was coming under increasing pressure from 
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domestic and international elites to ‘moderate its aspirations for socio-economic 
transformation... as a precondition for achieving a smooth transition’ (Saul, 1999 cited in 
Johnson, 2003:214). For many analysts, 1993 was the turning point in this ‘moderation’, 
when the ANC – ‘as member of the caretaker South African government, the Transitional 
Executive Council [TEC]’ signed an International Monetary Fund Letter of Intent.61
The pursuit of more progressive housing policy based on the recommendations of other civil 
society formations may have been precluded by particular conceptions of and strategies for 
social change processes. This approach can be characterised as the structural predisposition to 
privilege expert knowledge over knowledge springing from the community halls and 
informal meetings of the poor in their townships and squatter settlements. The rightward shift 
of key heavyweights in the party (namely the SACP’s Joe Slovo, the first post-apartheid 
Minister of Housing and a key actor in the NHF negotiations) in the early 1990s (Saul, 2005) 
played no small role in him accepting a capital subsidy regarded as extremely conservative 
and offering poor families very little in terms of quality of the dwelling and location. Recall 
here that the IDT-type housing subsidies survived because of their importance to the 
grassroots, the citizenry and unions, and the ANC had announced a highly ambitious housing 
target (Gilbert, 2002a:1924):  
  
But, if 1 million subsidies were to be distributed in 5 years, and the budget was not to 
rise to the 5% for which the housing lobby was arguing,[62
                                                 
61 Saul (2005:14) argues that the ANC spent a great deal of 1993 signing on as a party to a series of decisions 
that ‘cast the die for future policies once it was in power: including an extraordinarily market-friendly Letter of 
Intent in order to guarantee a balance-of-payments loan [regarded by Fine (2001:12) as ‘unnecessary’]… and 
joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)’. The Letter of Intent pointed to the dangers of 
increases in real wages in both the public and private sectors; highlighted the importance of controlling 
inflation; promised monetary targeting, trade and industrial liberalisation; and repeatedly espoused the ‘virtues 
of ‘market forces’ over ‘regulatory interventions’. The ‘secret’ Letter (Peet, 2002:73) committed the new 
government to the following policies: reduction of the budget deficit to 6% of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] 
within a few years; ‘expenditure containment rather than tax increases’; curbing the civil service wage bill; 
continuation of the tight monetary policies of the previous four to five years, and monetary targeting; policies 
coupling wage restraint with promoting training and fostering investment; maintenance of the financial rand 
mechanism without the introduction of new exchange controls (the ANC did however speedily and 
unceremoniously dispense with the finrand shortly after assuming power); and a simplification and 
rationalisation of the tariff system and the phasing out of import licensing and non-tariff barriers (Padayachee, 
1997:32). While Saul (2005) seems to suggest that the Transitional Executive Council drafted the Letter, Habib 
and Padayachee (2000) state that the ‘standard, neoliberal, draft Letter of Intent drawn up the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] was accepted by the ANC’. The important point made by Habib and Padayachee (2000:250), is 
that in spite of the many amendments/ revisions to the Letter suggested by progressive economists allied to 
COSATU and the ANC – it ‘was accepted without any changes’.  
] the average cost had to be 
kept down. The answer found was to limit the budget to 2% of total expenditure and 
offer a once-off subsidy that would cover at least some of the cost of a new home. If 
the ANC pretended that the subsidy would pay for finished housing, rather than for 
the very low standard structure that it would cover in the larger cities, then all would 
be well.  
62 To clear the backlog within five years required housing’s share of the national budget to be increased to 5%. 
This amount was in accord with the ‘“growth with redistribution” model, which saw housing investment playing 
an important role in a programme of social spending, but not as a “lead sector”’ (Tomlinson, 1999:285). A point 
returned to shortly. 
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To maintain this pretence was essential for the election outcome – given grassroots pressure 
around housing – while at the same time staying true to low budgetary deficit targets. The 
point being driven here is that, notwithstanding the blame for the adoption of the problematic 
capital subsidy scheme being routinely apportioned to intellectual turncoats and sell-outs 
(associated with the Urban Foundation), the ANC senior leadership’s commitment to deficit 
reduction contributed in no small measure to acceptance of the subsidy scheme. South 
Africa’s basic premise then, like in Colombia and Chile, for the introduction of the capital 
subsidy scheme was to ‘reduce government spending’ – ‘While every minister of housing 
[South Africa, Colombia and Chile] was anxious to increase both total expenditure and the 
subsidy level, every finance minister tended to say no. Only moments of severe political 
crises would threaten the latter’s resolve’ (Gilbert, 2004b:33).  
Coherently, judiciously and rigorously accounting for the ANC’s ‘moderation’ is a dangerous 
undertaking, given the dearth of literature recording the mechanisms and mechanics of its 
orchestration, especially the main forces and individuals involved, party-political and elite 
machinations.63
‘Transplacement’, they opine, is guided by discursive adaptations that reformulate social 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in ways that do not threaten dominant established 
interests – a necessary precondition for elite pacting. ‘Transplacement’ is a common feature 
of transition in which the dominant groups in both the government and the opposition realise 
that they are incapable of unilaterally determining the nature of the future political and 
economic system (the apartheid government and the mass democratic movement in our 
context). This inability is situated in the context of global economic restructuring, the 
dominance of conservative elites and development ideoscapes (national and international), 
and the demise of alternative visions and formats for organising and governing society. 
Arguably, the players, accordingly, purge themselves of any remaining radical rhetoric and 
progressive ideas – an exorcism, for some, conducted by intellectuals (progressive 
economists turned apologists) 
 The dilemmas generated by democratic transition and consolidation add 
further levels of complexity. A useful way to commence thinking of change in transitional 
societies must of necessity combine (amongst others) political science, political economy and 
sociology. And here the work of Habib et al. (1998) is useful in their deployment of the 
‘transplacement’ phenomenon.  
64
                                                 
63 This is not in any way intended to dismiss, demean and/or belittle the scholarly works in this area, e.g. Bond 
& Tait, 1997; Marais, 1998; Michie & Padayachee, 1997; Bond, 2000, 2000a, 2002b.  
 to reign in and disciplined/errant social movement forces 
64 Previously progressive academic economists played no small part in the ANC’s ‘moderation’. With the 
ANC’s ‘leadership slide into neoliberalism’ (most noticeable from early 1993), the impact on the decisions and 
choices of the progressive economics community was most dramatic. The main reason for this, argues 
Padayachee (1998), ‘lies in the attraction to power, and loyalty to political patrons, that academics have 
displayed for most of this century’. Padayachee (1998), citing Said (1994), points to how willing intellectuals 
have been to respond to governments who recognised the importance of having:  
…as their servants those intellectuals who could be called upon not to lead, but to consolidate the 
government’s policy, to spew out the propaganda against official enemies, euphemisms and, on a larger 
scale whole systems of Orwellian Newspeak, which could disguise the truth of what was occurring in 
the name of institutional ‘expediency’ or ‘national honour’(445, original emphasis). 
Padayachee (1998:445, original emphasis) cites comments made by the right-wing commentator Johnson 
(1988): ‘far from being highly individualist and non-conformist people, [intellectuals] follow certain regular 
patterns…they are often ultra-conformist within circles formed by those whose approval they seek and value’. 
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under the banner of ‘unity’. This they do in the hope of establishing the appropriate 
credentials with international financiers and domestic capital. These are the essential pillars 
of the ANC’s transplacement. But this is only one part of the complex tale. 
It was also during this period that it became a universal article of faith in development 
thinking that the optimal organisational route to secure consensus around ‘acceptable’ socio-
economic policies – especially in societies undergoing transition that needed to bring 
disruptive social elements to heel – was through corporatist/neocorporatist65
Transformation and Social Change Narratives  
 institutional 
arrangements. In our case, this was strongly anchored in notions of ‘national unity’, ‘rainbow 
nation’, ‘reconciliation’ and ‘compacting’ (discussed below). Corporatist institutional 
arrangements – usually a response to systemic crises in governance – are state creations 
reflecting the programmatic goals of elites struggling to realise an ‘integral’ security that 
serves to defuse conflict and stabilise a new regime of state-society relations, i.e. re-
embedding (Habib, 1998; Jenkins, 1999). Corporatist institutional arrangements appeal to 
elites as they serve to re-establish their authority, precluding the possibility of a more 
thorough going, participatory and self-empowering democratic alternatives (Ginsburg, 1996). 
The NHF was one such institution. The difference with the Forum was that the apartheid state 
did not participate in its proceedings directly, but set itself up as a ‘bilateral negotiating 
partner’. The apartheid state thus wielded considerable influence through the parastatal 
organisations, and, the allocation of public funds for the continued implementation of the IDT 
capital subsidy scheme. The continued implementation of the IDT scheme shifted the NHF’s 
focus away from long-term policy issues to immediate delivery (the ‘numbers game’) 
(Lalloo, 1999). Chasing ‘numbers’ (quantitatively measured), often to the detriment of 
quality living environments (qualitatively measured), is a legacy that still haunts us today.  
But if corporatist forums are predisposed to such outcomes, the dominant conception of 
society and social transformation that the ANC had come to settle on in the transition period 
further frustrated the realisation of an empowering and people-centred housing policy. 
Loosely dubbed the ‘let’s-join-hands [LJH] paradigm of transition’,66
                                                 
65 Corporatism is defined as a system of interest representation welded by an ideology of national unity wherein 
organs of civil society, and in particular labour unions and employer associations, are given access to, and the 
possibility of informing policies decided in, state institutions, in exchange for restricting their demands, 
operating within the parameters laid down by and observing the ideology of national unity (Khan, 1997).  
 the thrust was to 
socialise a non-conflictual view of society. Thus, within the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (ANC, 1994), for instance, ‘there are no essentialist identities, no oppositional 
identities’ (Leroke, 1996:244). Potential tensions, conflicts and disagreements around the 
notions of ‘fundamental transformation’, ‘democratisation’ and ‘restructuring’, for example, 
are eliminated by ideological fiat, i.e. tensions around societal transformation ‘are 
immediately offset by dissolving the differences into the goals’ (Wolpe, 1995:97). The effect 
of adopting this consensual model of society as one’s point of departure is that it permits 
contradictory goals to be accommodated within policy frameworks, thereby obscuring or 
eliminating the need to examine or meaningfully engage with conflict and power. In the 
housing and urban development sector, for instance, the interests of the white suburbanites, 
66 See Mail & Guardian: Quarterly Reconstruct Supplement, 12–18 July 1996. 
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bankers, developers, construction material suppliers, industrial corporate polluters, estate 
agents, and slum landlords are presumed to be consistent with those remaking towns and 
cities in a productively inclusive, socially just and democratic manner (see Bond et al., 1996 
for a full discussion). Failure to grapple with and negotiate these tensions leads to poor policy 
coherence/integrity with negative impacts on implementation. Is it then at all surprising why 
a very prominent housing authority remarked that the ‘key problem is that the [housing] 
policy is underpinned by conflicting and contradictory principles’67
The LJH approach – with its apolitical and non-conflictual view of society – was carried 
through into the post-apartheid housing policy via the ‘social compact’ philosophy and practice. 
Initially introduced by the IDT in response to criticisms of their intervention being 
unsupportive of community participation/empowerment and the overly prescriptive nature of 
housing package (Adler & Oelofse, 1996), a social compact is an agreement signed by the 
‘community’, the developer and others with the intention of bringing all stakeholders to 
decide on a common goal and then working towards achieving it (Tomlinson, 1999:287). In 
the IDT (and post-apartheid) versions, the compact had to be in place as one of the conditions 
for project funding. The compacts (IDT-style) ‘were to initiate the establishment of 
community development organisations’ (trusts, in most cases) that would receive financial 
support for the training and employment of ‘consolidation co-ordinators’ or community 
development officers. The latter became responsible for ‘driving the longer-term 
consolidation of beneficiary communities’, organising needed health, education and other 
social facilities in the absence of local government structures (Adler & Oelofse, 1996:118).  
 not easily reconciled and 
which ‘end up conflicting with one another’ in practice (Tomlinson, 1998 cited in CSIR, 
1999:50).  
The underlying premise of the South African social compact is conflict management through 
LJH-type social corporatism, i.e., ‘no matter how complex the situation,’ corporatist 
structured negotiations – between rich and poor, slumlords and tenants, squatters and wealthy 
residents, black and white, etc. – would supposedly yield ‘solutions’ broadly supportive of 
democratic urban reconstruction ‘given the necessary goodwill’ (Baskin, 1994 cited in Khan, 
1997:11); and, recalling Watson (2003), rational argumentation and debate. The critical role 
of social compacts as an instrument to downsize/rightsize the social wage has not gone 
unnoticed by some commentators (Khan, 1997).68
In summary, the nature of the NHF agreements struck were ‘predicated’ by perceptions of the 
balance of socio-political forces, institutional processes, and dominant development 
ideoscapes. The process of securing consensus ‘essentially entailed groups with major 
differences reaching the “lowest common denominator” [LCD] in their agreements, i.e. that 
beyond which they would not concede’ (Jenkins, 1999a:433). What is perhaps most 
disturbing about the policy outcome is that LCD-type agreements came to be forged around 
an uncritical understanding of the housing process prior to 1994 (Jones & Datta, 2000), 
resting on ‘unexamined assumptions about the needs of the population’ (Wilkinson, 
  
                                                 
67 Rapid and visible developer-driven delivery, on the one hand, and community participation and 
empowerment, on the other.  
68 This does not necessarily mean or translate into a cessation or annihilation of class-/interest-based conflicts 
within (and outside) the social compact framework. It merely points to the limitations/horizons of the fields of 
interactions and struggles in what comes to be enshrined in these LCD-type arrangements (see below)  
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1998:224); and a largely apolitical/technical perspective centred around the production of 
dwellings rather than the development of viable living environments. Institutional and 
technical capacity constraints drove the conservative nail further, with policy coming to settle 
on ‘previously tested mechanisms’. Consequently, the ‘new’ policy is but an ‘extension’ 
(Jenkins, 1999:192) and/or ‘adaptation’ of the supply-driven IDT scheme (Tomlinson, 1999 
cited in Jones & Datta, 2000:410) which made/ makes no concessions to the poor.  
The fact that the new policy is, at best, an adaptation, and, at worst, an extension of the pre-
democratic approach is most clearly evidenced in capital subsidy scheme and the integration 
of the financial and housing sector – both conforming to varying degrees – to the market 
enablement approach. While the extent of South Africa’s conformity to the ‘enabling’ 
approach is widely debated, at a very general level, it can plausibly be argued that post-
apartheid policy does ‘appear to be similar’ to that of the Bank’s (Goodlad, 1996:1642), but it 
has drawn very selectively based on narrow ‘technical arguments’ and with little 
consideration of beneficiaries needs (Jones & Datta, 2000:397–8). Of the seven strategies 
outlined in the White Paper (RSA, 1994), two concerned the development of housing finance 
(subsidy provision and the mobilisation of savings and credit at scale), and the other centred 
on the ‘stabilisation of housing environment’, which had a finance component. The 
remaining strategies were cobbled together without reference to alternatives or critiques of 
past policy.  
Local Mis/Appropriations of Enablement  
The post-apartheid capital subsidy scheme – as discussed above – is a modification of the 
previous IDT scheme. Originally designed by the Urban Foundation, this scheme was based 
on the principle of a ‘standardised, household-based capital subsidy, defining the individual 
plot size, service level and form of tenure’ (Huchzermeyer, 2001a:71) or a ‘quantifiable 
product being a standardised serviced site financed through a once-off capital subsidy’ 
(Huchzermeyer, 2001:309). The scheme has been criticised for a number of reasons including 
dismissing/discouraging community participation and engagement;69 inflexibility around the 
product; imposing individualised tenure (in the hope of stimulating/activating property 
markets);70
                                                 
69 Civic and community organisations are dismissed as ‘exploitative, corrupt and self-seeking obstacles to 
government delivery’ thereby justifying an ‘intervention approach that ensures that the government 
administration interacts (be it via a developer) directly with the individual beneficiary’ around a ‘standardised 
capital subsidy (linked to freehold title)’ (Huchzermeyer, 2001a:77–8).  
 perpetuating the spatially segregated urban form; delivering incomplete houses; 
and, because users cannot afford monthly service charges, opens up the possibility of 
downward raiding (Adler & Oelofse, 1996; Lupton & Murphy, 1995; Huchzermeyer, 2001, 
2001a). This scheme, with slight modifications, was adopted with ‘relatively little question’ 
by the NHF, with previous Urban Foundation staff working in the Forum being ‘adamant that 
no other kind of subsidy programme was possible’ (Gilbert, 2002a:1920).  
70 There is little or no demand for buying into upgraded settlements at a price equivalent to the subsidy and that 
there is no appropriate financing regime to support this market (banks have no interest in this segment of the 
residential market). This shores up the limited understanding the architects of the capital subsidy have of the 
functioning of property markets.  
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The problems associated with the scheme in the past, notwithstanding modifications related 
to the inclusion of a core house, continue to adversely impact housing praxis. Five specific 
problems stand out.  
Firstly, the subsidy tends to create socially and economically homogenous ‘communities’ 
with respect to income, household composition, and size (CSIR, 1999). This type of 
intervention has ‘produced ghettoes of unemployment and poverty’ (Gilbert, 2004b:27–8). 
Beneficiaries cannot afford to maintain the dwelling or pay service charges. They abandon 
the property and/or sell it informally (at a fraction of the cost) and/or rent it out, thereafter 
reverting to living in a shack.  
The application of the subsidy regime to informal settlements oftentimes destroys the fragile 
livelihood and coping strategies of the poor. In fact, not unlike the residualisation of the 
informal economy in our dominant economic thinking, informal settlements, the spaces 
wherein the ‘the most critical aspect and dynamics of development occur’ (Minister of 
Housing, 2000) and which houses 1.84m households (2001 figures, DOH, 2004a:4), are 
viewed as illegal, disorderly and consequently a ‘problem’. Rather than accepting informal 
settlements as a ‘leading and dominant way of life for millions’ and supporting them as 
‘productive and creative housing solutions’ (Hall & Pfeiffer, 2000:248, 246), the housing 
intervention was (until recently) geared towards ‘remov[ing] the scourge’ of informal 
settlements (Minister of Housing, 2001),71
Secondly, the emphasis on private ownership (erroneously ‘modelled on the functioning of 
middle class property markets’ (Huchzermeyer, 2001:317)) and the narrow fixation on the 
production of housing units (as part of a ‘larger agenda of increasing the stakes of the profit-
market sector’ (Huchzermeyer, 2001a:80), both upstream and downstream), is not supportive 
of urban restructuring objectives; viz. higher density housing in areas that maximise the 
access of the poor to amenities and opportunities. Most projects are located close to the old 
African or coloured areas (Gilbert, 2004b:26). Indeed, in the absence of any intervention in 
the land markets with the view to bringing poor people closer to employment opportunities 
and other social facilities, the deployment of the subsidy instrument continues to perpetuate 
spatial segregation and fragmentation (further discussed in Chapter Five).  
 their ‘eradication’ and ‘ensur[ing] that new 
informal settlements are effectively prevented’ (Minister of Housing, 2001:5). Replacing 
shacks with ‘proper homes’ is perhaps a noble intention, but the social and economic 
consequences of this type of formalisation is rarely factored into official thinking. Many 
critics of government policy point out that ‘in situ’ upgrading is far less disruptive of survival 
networks, but government counters that in situ upgrade is ‘seldom possible’ as ‘most land 
occupied illegally is unsuitable for development’ (Minister of Housing, 2001:2). This, it is 
asserted, necessitates securing new land and relocation of affected communities. The 
relocation and subsequent reconstitution of communities (as per the subsidy qualification 
criteria) not only creates artificial communities in peripheral locations, but is also 
exceptionally brutal.  
Thirdly, the lumping together of tenure, infrastructure and topstructure in a (previously) non-
inflation indexed subsidy that privileges width over depth not only compromises the quality 
of the product and the location of the housing, it also sets up tensions between individual and 
                                                 
71 Cited in Mail &Guardian, 23 February–1 March 2001. 
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collective interests. Compromising on quality and location has implications for the 
development of secondary markets and broader issues related to redressing spatial imbalances 
(elaborated further in Chapter Three). Cash strapped municipalities demand minimum 
standards of infrastructure so as to reduce maintenance expenditure (collective interest) while 
residents seek to maximise personal assets (house size and high quality internal services) 
(CSIR, 1999).  
Fourthly, there are very serious democratic deficits relating to the ability of local government 
politicians and communities to meaningfully engage with the housing intervention. Taken 
together, the extreme pressure to accelerate delivery, the inordinate influence wielded by 
private developers; the removal of the requirement for social compacts;72 and community 
suspicion regarding the bona-fides of ‘social facilitators’73
Lastly, the inability of the subsidy to bridge the finance gap between income and housing 
costs – especially in the context of the absence of an appropriate pro-poor end-user financing 
regime (discussed below) – is a major contributor to poor quality dwellings in poor quality 
locations. Although government ‘never intended’ for the subsidy to be the only financial 
contribution to housing,
 are akin to a powder keg with a 
dangerously short fuse.  
74
The success of the enabling approach to housing is dependent on the individual 
household’s contribution to the housing process. Yet, the lack of access to 
employment opportunities, lack of access to labour and employment skills and 
absence of credit mechanisms for low-income households, all of which have severe 
impacts on the enabling approach, continue to be a reality in South Africa today... 
Without affordability of credit and availability of appropriate credit mechanisms, the 
subsidy scheme is merely empowering people to become property owners without 
empowering them to benefit from investment in housing (Adebayo, nd:3–7).  
 the policy never required any form of ‘personal stake’ as a 
condition for receiving the subsidy (Tomlinson, 1999:292). And herein lies the ‘greatest 
contradiction of the South African housing policy’.  
With respect to the integration of financial and housing sectors (related to consolidation, 
deepening financial markets, primary and secondary market development) policy makers 
have tried to integrate sectors through various institutional and regulatory interventions 
designed to maximise the participation and involvement of the formal (established banking 
and financial sector) and informal lenders. Until recently, the emphasis was on the formal 
                                                 
72 Difficulties encountered by the private sector in securing agreements through social compacts led to them 
being scrapped in late 1996 (Jenkins, 1999a) even though the highest levels of satisfaction with the housing 
product were registered in those projects wherein social compacts were successfully implemented (Tomlinson, 
1999). 
73 The facilitators tasked to work with communities in negotiating social compacts were – according to the 1994 
agreement between the Department of Housing and NHF – to be chosen from a Housing Board list of ‘approved 
candidates’ selected on a ‘fair and equitable basis’ as per their experience in project development, neutrality and 
local knowledge. Not unsurprisingly, many of the facilitators were former government employees turned 
consultants or consultants (Jones & Datta, 2000:402–3). 
74 Wilkinson (1998:226) characterises the policy as a form of ‘state-assisted self-help’. A ‘central tenet of the 
policy framework’ is that state investment ‘must be supplemented’ through people’s own efforts via banks and 
financial institutions, and their ‘own resources of energy, accumulated savings and social networks’.  
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sector). What is notable is how the pre-democratic approach related to the upward 
redistribution of income to the more privileged (not-so-poor) black households during the 
1980s township housing boom (see Bond, 2000) is reproduced in the new policy (discussed  
in the N2 Gateway Project case study). This is a cruel betrayal of the poor by the incoming 
democratic government. Government chose to exclude the NHF from a say in the most 
sensitive aspect of housing policy, namely, end-user finance; instead, it chose to negotiate 
this directly with the financial institutions.75 A ‘significant casualty of this development was 
SANCO’ (Adler & Oelofse, 1996:133) who for some time were pushing for the 
democratisation of development finance, an end to redlining, and coaxing banks to extend 
finance to low-income black households (Huchzermeyer, 2001). The bilateral negotiations 
between the new government and financial institutions – whose outcome is enshrined in a 
1994 Record of Understanding (ROU) (DOH, 1994b)76 – created a plethora of institutions 
and incentives to normalise the lending environment for the not-so-poor (see discussion 
below).77
Not surprisingly, despite the repeated assurances, numerous guarantees, generous incentives 
and continuous moral suasion, credit-linked housing development accounted for only 4% of 
the housing programme in 2000 (Minister of Housing, 2000), and only 2% of total national 
housing provision from 1994 to October 2000. More recent figures obtained from officials of 
the Department suggest that credit-linked subsidies (from 1994 to 30 June 2005) totals 
49 116, representing 3% of the total national finance provision (J. Minnie, DOH Official, 
personal communication: 4 August 2005). Financial institutions, in short, have failed 
miserably in delivering on their commitments. In 1994, they undertook to deliver 50 000 
loans in a year. Ten years later they have only delivered 49 116 loans. Two years later after 
signing the ROU, they redlined more than 25% of the areas in which they were charging 
higher interest rates than those extended to the wealthy (Ruiters & Bond, 1996 cited in 
Goodlad, 1996:1640). The BNG Comprehensive Plan notes that redlining of inner city areas 
and traditional black townships continues to this day (DOH, 2004a:4).  
 On balance, the incentives were perceived to be ‘extremely generous for banks’ 
(Bond & Tait, 2000 in Bond, 2000:298) with few sanctions should banks not deliver on their 
commitments (further debated in the next chapter).  
Successive Ministers of Housing have delivered harsh criticisms of the commitment of the 
financial sector to transformation and their poor delivery record. In 2000, the Minister of 
Housing lambasted the banks for violating agreements elaborated in the ROU; ‘breaking the 
law of the land [referenced to equality and housing clauses of the Constitution] without [sic] 
                                                 
75 The NHF Task Team was – prior to the accession to power of the post-1994 government – deliberating on 
end-user finance, focusing on creating and supporting retail lending capacity in the incremental housing market. 
It does not appear as if these deliberations were seriously considered by the new government.  
76 The Record made provision for the ‘resumption’ of lending by financial institutions to the low-income 
segment of housing market. The government committed itself to campaigning for a resumption of payment for 
goods and services, and to provide ‘temporary (three year) mortgage indemnity’ in areas wherein there was a 
breakdown of law. The banks, in turn, pledged to supply the Ministry with information on lending practices and 
to publish guidelines for credit extension (Goodlad, 1996:1637).  
77 These included a mortgage indemnity fund; a parastatal organisation to resolve problems related to property 
repossession; a warranty fund against defective building; a state controlled National Housing Finance 
Corporation to stimulate housing finance alternatives (Jenkins & Smith, 2001a, 491–2); and the National Urban 
Reconstruction and Housing Agency that guaranteed bank originating bridging finance for developers (Bond, 
2000a:147).  
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impunity’; discriminating against people on the basis of gender, race, social class and 
location; and failing to perform their ‘social responsibility’. Addressing the National 
Assembly at the First Reading of the Mortgage Disclosure Bill, the Minister of Housing 
stated: 
We hope to not only eradicate the imbalances that [have] been entrenched for years 
but also improve what has been so far a dismal failure by financial institutions to 
penetrate the lower end of the market. By introducing a strong and effective 
regulatory tool, we are shutting the door to discriminatory practices and ushering a 
philosophy and way of life that is in synch with our national agenda. I am sure the 
banking sector will welcome this because it is one thing to stand on the world’s 
elevated stages pronouncing about the negative effects of globalisation when ignoring 
cleaning up the cobwebs that shade the transparent, equitable and fair distribution of 
resources. We need to see the banking sector walk the talk (Minister of Housing, 
2000).  
Government continues to emphasise fairness, equity and co-shouldering the responsibilities 
attached to redressing imbalances of the past. Financial institutions, on the other hand, stress 
efficiency, returns on investment and growth (Abedian, 2001). The latter demands of 
government to concretely define the ‘elusive knife-edge’ between a sound financial sector 
and an affirmative approach to financing (South African Institute of Race Relations, 
2001:415). Factors contributing to banks not extending finance include low incomes, poor 
credit ratings, insufficient collateral, problems related to repossession coupled to the absence 
and weaknesses of the secondary housing market in the low-income housing sector, high 
levels of household debt, interest rate volatility with impacts on affordability, and high and 
invariant transaction costs (from origination to servicing) that make small loans expensive 
(see Porteous & Naicker, 2003). 
While most critical commentators single out limited disposable income and the structure and 
practices of the financial sector as the main reasons for exclusion of the poor from formal 
financial/credit circuits, there has to date been very little serious discussion about why 
government has devoted so much attention and committed massive resources to the 
‘estimated 30% of the housing market that does have the ability to contribute financially to 
their housing needs’ (Jones & Datta, 2000:405–6). This segment of the market is likely to be 
formally employed and able to provide the guarantees of pension backing and payroll 
deduction. But these policies are at best irrelevant to the majority of the homeless poor who 
comprise the working poor, informally employed and unemployed; a large segment of whom 
have (despite all odds) demonstrated a remarkable ability to save and even provide a deposit 
(cash collateral) for a house (see Porteous & Naicker, 2003).  
Disregarding for a moment the equity question, there is widespread agreement amongst 
housing professionals that ‘while traditional mortgage bonds are very successful in 
conventional markets, they are, by and large, inappropriate lending instruments’78
                                                 
78 Mary Tomlinson cited in Mail & Guardian, 23 February–1 March 2001 
 for those 
earning R3 500 (and below), which contra Jones and Datta (2000), incidentally includes the 
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30% they mention above.79
When the time came to renew the ROU in March 1998, the government ‘finally seemed to 
accept that forcing unwilling consumers and lenders into this [traditional mortgage] market 
should not be repeated’ (see DOH, 1998 for more detail). Attention shifted to fostering the 
development of alternative (‘appropriate non-mortgage’) financial instruments and it is at this 
point that the micro-lending sector drew government’s attention (Tomlinson, 1999:289–90).  
 There are multiple reasons accounting for its inappropriateness. 
Firstly, low-income households cannot afford the deposits required by banks, have limited 
disposable incomes and ‘inadequate credit records’. The use of pension and provident funds 
as a deposit is extremely dangerous as the loss of one’s job combined with overall high levels 
of consumer indebtedness means the risk of losing one’s life savings and home. Secondly, the 
volatility of the labour market and fluctuating interest rates militates against poor households 
committing themselves to long-term mortgage indebtedness. Thirdly, and not 
uncontroversially, new borrowers, it is said, ‘often misunderstand’ the complexities of the 
mortgage bond instrument, and ‘consequently default’ (Tomlinson, 1998:289).  
Research (at the time) demonstrated that most low-income households could afford a small 
micro-loan (short to medium term) of between R6 000 and R15 000 (Tomlinson, 1999:289), 
with the micro-lending sector coming to play a critical role. A survey by the Micro Finance 
Regulatory Council released in April 2001 showed that in the first full year of regulation 
(September 1999 to August 2000), the 1 351 registered micro-lenders made nearly nine 
million loans totalling almost R13bn. The industry had outstanding loans of R10.9bn at the 
end of August 2000, compared to R277bn total credit extended to all private households in 
September 1999.The nine banks registered as micro-lenders accounted for 38% of the 
R12.9bn.80
Although micro-lenders have come to fill an important gap in the market – servicing the 
needs of those who do not possess collateral and ‘without regular employment’ – concerns 
have been raised about their limited impact when assessed in relation to the ‘scale’ of finance 
required. Additionally, many non-traditional lenders are ‘managerially weak’ and are unable 
to access formal financial markets. In cases where they have met with some measure of 
success, the cost is so high that it renders it unaffordable for the poor and/or credit is 
extended to the poor at extremely inflated interest rates. Limited product range and 
geographic spread are further problems (Adebayo, nd:9).  
  
The impact of micro-lending on the housing sector also is difficult to assess given that micro-
loans are fungible and hard to monitor. A 1998 survey of National Housing Finance 
Corporation (NHFC) micro-lender clients showed that largest category of loan usage (45%) 
was for home improvements (purchasing building materials and renovations of existing 
structures). Most of the improved housing was in township areas, although significant 
portions (25%) were in rural areas (cited in Porteous & Naicker, 2003).  
                                                 
79 Banks were severely criticised by the Minister of Housing for not supporting this segment of the population. 
The Minister argued that banks ‘were urging us [government] to ignore the lower end of the market and look at 
household incomes above R3 500’. This would entail ‘ignoring the people who need us most’ (Minister of 
Housing, 2001 cited in Business Day, 18 June 2001). 
80 Business Day, 18 April 2001. 
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On balance, though, many primary lenders have successfully operated in the housing sector 
for about ten years and have developed mechanisms that reduced their bad-debt ratio to less 
than 2%. This renders their models safer than traditional mortgage-backed finance operating 
in the ‘developed market’. The large banks have expressed a willingness to continue funding 
securitisation of these primary dealers through their books. In the words of former Standard 
Bank chief economist, Iraj Abedian, ‘that’s the meaning of deepening the financial market, 
creating a space for new players and refining the functions that big banks can’t play and 
maybe shouldn’t play’. Inexperience, the lack of a methodology to assess risk in black areas, 
and perceptions of a fairly high potential for default, are reasons why banks prefer working 
through primary lenders. For government and primary lenders, the ‘lack of experience’ and 
related arguments offered as reasons for non-involvement are euphemisms for continued 
racial discrimination.81
Although the state has come to recognise the very valuable role played by the micro-finance 
sector in meeting the credit needs of the poor, the Minister of Finance in 2001 repeatedly 
expressed the need for further regulation of this sector as 50% of the R13 billion worth of 
loans disbursed in the period 1999/2000 were made available by companies not registered as 
banks.
  
82 The reason why many turn to these unregistered institutions is partly because of 
indiscriminate blacklisting by unaccountable credit bureaus. According to the Minister of 
Housing (2005c), the bureaus keep information on 18m South Africans which is then 
supplied to banks and retailers. Indiscriminate blacklisting (partly) accounts for a situation 
where 67% of the population secures less than 6% of credit granted, while 18m consumers 
are forced to take out expensive micro-loans on which they pay as much as 360% in 
interest.83
Synthesis 
 Adjustments to usury legislation and credit extension legislation will go some way 
to protecting consumers, but there is a concern that lower interest rates, high administrative 
costs related to transparent reporting and accountability, and difficulties encountered in debt 
collection may lead to increased bad debts and reduced profits. Higher levels of micro-
finance institutional concentration and consolidation could potentially follow, accompanied 
by stricter lending criteria. One of the few avenues available to poor households to access 
credit for housing may therefore be threatened. Whether this is government’s intention is a 
moot point, but increased regulation of the sector could reduce the amount of formal micro-
finance borrowing, generating new forms of potentially more exploitative informal lending 
practices.  
The Chapter began with a harrowing tale of a 13-year old, crying, on her knees with plastic 
bags on her hand, cleaning a toilet to relieve herself. These daily violations of dignity 
generated massive protests, which the state countered by repressive measures and 
criminalisation. In the same city, in the hallowed halls of Parliament, the ‘humiliation’ 
suffered by a senior politician being confronted by animal faeces was met by an investigation 
                                                 
81 Sunday Business Report, 1 July 2001. 
82 Business Report, 20 April 2001. 
83 Minister of Housing, 2005 cited in Business Day, 27 July 2005. 
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and apologies. These contrasts were used in an attempt to explain how our society has come 
to fail its most vulnerable members.  
The attempt commenced by posing the question as to why our post-apartheid housing policy 
came to embrace conservatism, generally conforming to World Bank strictures and policy. 
The answer to this question was to be found in a host of forces and force fields. At the 
international level, the emerging consensus on market enablement (traces of which were 
already present in the policy positions of the late apartheid state) and the ascendancy of 
planning paradigms (fencing out power) came to exert a considerable influence on the nature 
and shape of post-apartheid housing policy mediated, as always, through local geometries of 
power vested in institutions and social relations. Key in this regard were the structural 
unevenness of the negotiation forum; the way knowledge came to be produced in the NHF 
(an outcome related to the ANC’s conceptualisation of leadership, representation and 
participation); the ‘moderation’ of the ANC’s elite’s vision/aspirations for socio-economic 
transformation effected through a combination of domestic (societal governance) crises; 
international pressure (albeit not overwhelming) and transplacement; and relaying/ 
transmission of the ‘moderation’ through the body politic via the underwriting of an 
apolitical/non-conflictual/consensual model of social change and transformation. The 
cumulative impact of these forces and force fields – a great many of which were of domestic 
origin and of self-construction/imposition by both default and design – functioned to produce 
a housing policy conditioned by ideas circulating in the late apartheid period and based on 
precepts of the pre-democratic period.  
For those concerned with the politics and dynamics of policy reform and change – and with 
special interest in forwarding non-teleological explanations of social change – the thesis 
presented above suggests that  
...state policies do not so much objectively represent the interests located in or beyond 
the state [the ANC and its constituency] or objectively reflect ‘real’ problems in the 
internal or external environments of the political system as they are discursively-
mediated, if not discursively constituted, products of struggle to define and narrate 
‘problems’ which can be dealt with in and through state action [that is, the 
‘possible’/‘implementable’ versus the ‘appropriate’]. In this sense the effectivity of 
policy-making is closely tied to its rhetorical and argumentative framing – especially 
as effectivity, like beauty, often exists in the eyes (or ears) of the beholder (Jessop, 
2001a:11). 
It is this blind spot of South Africa’s housing praxis scholarship that could compromise our 
future attempts to reform policy. This is because discourses are, following Foucault 
(Sheridan, 1980:129), instruments and objects of power. In the case of the National Housing 
Forum, selected (elite) experts ‘framed’84
                                                 
84 ‘Framing’ is not a neutral process. They are problem-setting stories/narratives linking casual accounts of 
policy problems to implicit/explicit proposals for action and ‘facilitate the normative leap from “is” to “ought”’ 
(Rein & Schon, 1993:148). Stories/narratives are the ‘medium through which actors try to impose their view of 
reality on others, suggest certain social positions and practices, and criticise alternative social arrangements’ 
(Hajer, 1993:46). 
 the problem and were drawn into working 
relationships with traditional economic and political elites, creating a ‘discourse coalition’ 
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(Hajer, 1993:47), or more appropriately, an ‘elite discourse coalition’ (Fischer & Forester, 
1993:8), i.e. a grouping of actors (elites) sharing an ensemble of ideas, concepts and 
categories via which a phenomenon is ‘politically framed and given social meaning’. The 
‘elite discourse coalition’ included experts from liberal and conservative ‘think tanks’ (the 
Urban Foundation) (Gilbert, 2004a:202) involved in ‘national policy agenda setting’ and 
aligning the ‘articulated advice of leading experts with the interests of economic and political 
elites’ (Fischer & Forester, 1993:8–9). A discourse coalition comes to rule when ‘it 
dominates the discursive space; that is, its central actors are persuaded by, or forced to 
accept, the rhetorical power of a new discourse (condition of discourse structuration)’ 
(consultants framing the problem); reflected in the ‘institutional practices of that political 
domain; that is, the actual policy process is conducted according to the ideas of a given 
discourse (condition of discourse institutionalisation)’ (Hajer, 1993:48). This coalition was 
institutionally embedded in a forum driven by consensual modes of decision-making, 
‘fudging vital differences’ (Tomlinson, 1998:4) and promoting LCD-type agreements. 
If the conditions of discourse structuration and institutionalisation were so heavily stacked in 
favour of establishment forces, the ANC (as argued earlier) strategically blundered. And here, 
the role of the ANC’s main negotiator, and the post-apartheid Department of Housing’s first 
Director-General, Billy Cobbett, is very significant. Cobbett ‘largely’ decided which 
segments of the liberation movement participated in the Forum.  
When questioned why he largely kept the service organisations[85] out of the process, 
he said that his political bosses wanted the emphasis to fall on direct representation by 
political and civic leaders, rather than on ‘experts’ from the service organisations. 
This contrasted markedly with the strategy of organised business – in particular the 
banking institutions – which seconded large numbers of experts, and in so doing 
directly influenced policy... The democratic movement’s overcommitted political and 
civic leaders were not equipped to deal with this army of technical experts entrusted 
with broad negotiating mandates. The consequences of this strategic miscalculation 
will be felt for many years (Swilling, 1998a:295).86
Even where civic and political leaders – who were denied access to independent sources of 
information and analysis via the policy formulation process of the NHF – drew on the advice 
of their own ‘experts’ (from service organisations), their espousal of ‘alternatives’ was 
rendered extremely difficult. The ‘new, generalised, consensus’ – ‘policy analysis’/policy 
rhetoric – wrapped up in the ‘abstract, positivist methodological validation rooted in 
traditional epistemology, including the “objectivity” of the analyst’ – ‘required, by definition, 
the suppression of [radical] discourses that reflected unmet demands and needs’ (Swilling, 
1998a:293). Whereas in the past, these very same ‘experts’ put their services to empowering 
 
                                                 
85 Urban service organisations that traditionally supported CBOs, both technically and politically. 
86 The analysis presented by Swilling (1998a) differs considerably from the ‘more teleological explanations’, 
which suggests that the conservative housing policy is a function of private sector dominance in the policy 
process.  
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the poor by espousing strategies and solutions that supported their collective actions, 
grounded in their needs and demands, this uncoupling87
The mechanics of discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation potentially also 
conspired to reinforce rational high modernist models of social engineering, i.e. a single 
household, detached dwelling unit situated on its own plot in ‘properly planned’ townships 
with full freehold tenure. Following Scott (1998), social engineering of this high modernist 
type is politically promiscuous in that it appeals to both conservative and revolutionary elites. 
Structuration and institutionalisation are indispensable tools as they function to negate the 
conflict, uncertainties, indeterminacies and ambiguities of everyday life, moulding them into 
categories/units/schemas that privilege certain solutions over others (Scott, 1995), which can 
be ‘dealt with in and through state action’ (Jessop, 2001a:11), i.e., drawing on ‘previously 
tested’, ‘possible’/‘implementable’ mechanisms. The deployment of authoritative expert 
knowledge – a critical component of modernity’s social engineering arsenal – has a ‘tendency 
to disallow other competing sources of judgement’ and modernists’ ideology ‘tends to 
devalue or banish politics’ on account of political interests frustrating the solutions ‘devised 
by specialists’ (policy wonks) (Scott, 1998:93, 94). The banishing of politics, the disallowing 
of other sources of knowledge, a commitment to ‘comprehensive...administering ordering of 
society’ and a ‘prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist [high modernist] plans’ 
(Scott, 1998:88, 89) were all components of pernicious apartheid social engineering. High 
modernist aspirations/projects and the associated stratagems of social engineering, it seems, 
are indeed politically and historically promiscuous and when civil society is demobilised 
and/or emasculated and/or powerless to resist the project, the consequences are horrific, e.g. 
new RDP housing estates. 
 generated a mind-set of pragmatism.  
While this Chapter focused in the origins, evolution and informants of post-apartheid – the 
dominant thrust being one of uncovering the reasons for and drivers of policy continuity in 
(perceived) discontinuity – it is largely internally focused, and thus myopic. In other words, 
there is little engagement with the dialectic between statecraft and housing praxis. On the one 
hand, it remains for us to detail how statecraft and state construction, in its transformation or 
developmental incarnation, came to be conceived, imagined and appropriated as imparted by 
and impacted on by structural, social and institutional dynamics. Proceeding from this, we 
need to detail the implications and imprints of these dynamics on the shelter and housing 
problematic with the objective of improving our understanding of why a left-of-centre 
                                                 
87 A product of the transition process – or the shift from oppositional politics to ‘preparing to govern’ – which 
included the deligitimisation of mass action by the ANC, the relegation of local struggles to a secondary status 
in the pursuit of the ‘seizure of state power’, and the domestication of the civic movement via the formation of a 
unitary SANCO. It is interesting to note here that a similar dynamic was at play in the sphere of economic 
policy. Padayachee (1998:444) remarks that the: 
…defeat, emasculation and disappearance of many civil society organisations in the 1990s, and the 
decision by many others, including COSATU, the SACP and SANCO, to accept the leadership of the 
ANC in the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1990s, effectively excluded civil society organisations from 
the policy world, as independent constituencies. As a result many progressive economists lost direct 
touch with the dynamic and more radical traditions of these mass-based labour and social movements. 
Progressive academic economists found themselves relating more and more to the ANC’s elite 
leadership, whose concerns and agendas were increasingly being set by conservative forces and 
institutions. They followed the current into… the ‘corporatist statism’ of the 1990s. Many already 
conform to Mahmood Mamdani’s characterisation of African intellectuals as ‘state fetishists’.  
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government came to settle on a conservative programme. Accordingly, the next Chapter is 
about the Realpolitik of post-apartheid developmental-state making and housing praxis as 
component and expression of these complex, confused and convoluted dynamics. This 
discussion – of  housing from above - lays the foundations for Chapter Three, namely the 
imprints of these dynamics, and impacts on performativity - housing from below - 
spotlighted via the (problematic) linkages between shelter and the macro-economy; between 
shelter and poverty eradication; and between low-income housing delivery and whole sector 
development. Implicated in these problematics are searching questions about citizenship, 
human rights, institutional reform, the construction of place and urban restructuring. An 
attempt is made in this Chapter to demonstrate that the key thrusts of the White Paper 
constitutes (in retrospect) a minimalist programme for transforming housing and shelter 
conditions which, despite the rhetoric of the developmental state, are more reflective of the 
rationalities and ethos of the service delivery state.   
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Chapter Two: The Developmental State and Housing  
The View from Above 
Locating South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Housing Praxis in Realpolitik 
 
They [East Asian dictators] may be sons of bitches but at least they are our sons of 
bitches (American President cited in Leftwich, 2000:128, original emphasis).  
South Africa’s relative industrial strength and economic sophistication have been 
built by a strong interventionist state, not market capitalism (Lodge, 1995:206). 
It is by now conventional wisdom that the negotiated end to apartheid severely limited 
the room for manoeuvre available to the successor state. The essence of the CODESA 
[Convention for a Democratic South Africa] compromise was a trade-off between 
majority rule and capitalist stability. The National Party conceded universal suffrage 
in a unitary state; and the ANC accepted that there would be no expropriations nor 
radical redistribution; that existing relations of production would be maintained. It is 
equally uncontroversial that the ANC government’s macroeconomic policy has 
pursued neo-liberal orthodoxy: fiscal discipline, debt reduction, deregulation and 
investor friendly provisions – a policy package that amounted to paying the entrance 
fee to the competitive arena of global capitalism (Bundy, 2004:1–2).  
We can’t live in a society where these sorts of things [murder] happen at this kind of 
level... There is enough killing in the lower classes, let alone when you get into high-
profile people (Roger Kebble, father of tycoon Brett Kebble, at a press conference on 
his son’s murder, 2005).88
Seize our houses, seize our lives! (Slogan of Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign 
(Khayelitsha, Cape Town) cited in McKinley & Verriawa, 2005:24). 
  
United to combat poverty! (Slogan of Bayview Flats Residents Association 
(Chatsworth, Durban) against service cut-offs and evictions, cited in McKinley & 
Verriawa, 2005:30). 
Destroy the meter, enjoy the water! (Slogan of Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee 
(south of Johannesburg) against installation of pre-paid meters and cut-offs, cited in 
McKinley & Verriawa, 2005:35).  
We are not Asian Tigers (Rob Davies, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, 
2005).89
  
 
                                                 
88 Cited in Cape Argus, 30 September 2005. 
89 Interview, Mail & Guardian, 30 September–6 October 2005. 
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Introduction  
The West’s commitment to democracy, human rights and good governance has historically 
been ‘provisional and conditional, and always subject to considerations of the national 
interest’, i.e. regional/global security interests and/or economic interests (Leftwich, 
2000:128). During the Cold War, and well into the 1990s, military, financial and 
technological support to predatory and developmental states demonstrated a ‘clear pattern of 
subordination of human rights and democracy to other dominant foreign policy concerns, 
especially economic self-interest’ (Crawford, 1997 cited in Leftwich, 2000:129) and, until 
recently, arresting the spread of the ‘communist infection’. With the ‘end of history’ 
(Fukuyama, 1992) and the ascendancy of the ‘Washington Consensus’, developing countries 
were coerced into competitive restructuring of their economies, ruling out the mimicking of 
‘bad policies’90
Chalmers Johnson is the pioneer of the concept of the ‘capitalist developmental state’, 
elaborated in his monumental (1982) study of Japanese industrialisation. The essential 
elements/features of the model are four-fold. Firstly, government sets the rules of economic 
competition through a small, inexpensive elite state bureaucracy staffed by the finest 
managerial talent. Employing market-conforming methods of state intervention, the duties of 
the bureaucracy included choosing the industries to be developed; identifying optimal means 
for the development of these industries; and supervising competition in the designated 
strategic sectors. The second element of the model is a political system in which the 
bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take initiative and operate effectively. The third 
element pivots around the development of methods of intervention; viz. the creation of 
governmental financial institutions; indicative plans to set goals and guidelines for the entire 
economy; creation of forums for exchanging views, revising policies, obtaining feedback and 
resolving differences; extensive reliance on public corporations; creation and use of an 
‘investment budget’ separate and not funded by the general account budget; anti-trust policy 
oriented to developmental and international competitive goals rather than strictly to the 
maintenance of domestic competition; and government conducted and sponsored research 
and development. The final element was the pilot organisation, namely the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). This agency controlled industrial policy, combining 
planning, energy, domestic production, international trade and a share of finance (particularly 
capital supply and tax policy). The key characteristics of MITI include its small size; indirect 
control of government funds (thereby freed from subservience to the finance ministry); its 
think tank function; and vertical bureaus for the implementation of industrial policy at the 
microlevel (Johnson, 1982:314–20). 
 (Chang, 2002) adopted by both Western and East Asian developmental 
states. The latter are unique for not only have they been able to generate high and sustained 
average annual growth rates but have also managed to lift their societies out of poverty, 
hardship and vulnerability, and achieved average annual rates of growth in gross national 
product per capita of 4% over two to three decades (Leftwich, 2002:52, 62).  
The distinguishing feature of the developmental states is that their ‘political purposes and 
institutional structures… [are] developmentally driven, while their developmental 
                                                 
90 These include trade barriers, industrial policy, infant industry protection, export subsidies, and patent 
violation. This is discussed further below.  
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objectives… [are] politically driven[91]’ (Leftwich, 2000:154). Their distinctiveness derives 
from their mission of fostering economic development growth in which the state plays a 
‘strategic role in taming domestic and international market forces and harnessing them to 
national ends’ with the focus being on industrialisation as opposed to maximisation of 
profitability on the ‘basis of current comparative advantage’ (Onis, 1991:110). The degree 
and nature of state involvement in socio-economic activity varied over time, with neither 
undiluted statism nor a dogmatic commitment to the free market characterising a successful 
developmental state (Khan, 2004). Rather, what is observed is market guidance, governed 
market, market-rational, market-conforming, and plan rational92
Sustained development derives from their unique ability to:
 interventions (Johnson, 
1982; Onis, 1991; Doling, 1999, Wade, 1990) providing ‘directional thrust to the operation of 
the market mechanism’ (Onis, 1991:110). State elites establish a ‘singular principle for their 
legitimation: the ability to promote sustained development’, i.e. high and steady rates of 
economic growth, structural change and industrialisation (Thompson, 2002:2).  
93
• Extract and deploy capital productively;  
 
• Generate and implement national and sectoral plans;  
• Effect dynamic egalitarian and productivity-enhancing development programmes in 
land, education and training, small enterprise, infrastructure and housing sectors;  
• Manipulate private access to scarce resources through amongst others financial sector 
re-engineering, subsidies, taxes, concessions, high levels of lending;  
• Cultivate close and productive relationships with business in which state leadership is 
more important than its followership;  
• Manage interest groups through state corporatism (authoritarian top-down imposition 
of the state’s agenda rather than social corporatism);  
• Co-ordinate the efforts of individual business through encouraging the emergence 
and growth of private economic institutions; target specific industrial projects and 
sectors; 
• Resist political pressure from popular forces and, at times, also brutally suppressing 
them;  and 
• Mediate and/or insulate their domestic economies from (extensive) foreign capital 
penetration; and, most importantly, 
                                                 
91 Includes nationalism, security, catching up with the West.  
92 The state sets national goals and objectives and ‘intervenes in order to direct the economy as a whole as well 
as its constituent sectors to achieve them’ (Doling, 1999:236).  
93 Extracted from Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1989, 1997; Pugh, 1997; Leftwich, 1995; Campos & Root, 1996; 
Leftwich, 2000:158; Khan, 2003. 
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• Sustain and implement a project of productivity improvement, technological 
upgrading and increased market share that breaks with their existing ‘path 
dependence’, i.e. economic, financial and institutional frameworks/structures of 
domination and co-ordination which locks a country into a particular inherited 
growth/development path.  
But ‘whether we like it or not’, remarks Thompson (2002:7), ‘it is very unlikely that the 
‘international community would tolerate a widespread adoption of these kinds of policies 
amongst the large and developing countries that are the models for the present process of 
development: China, India,[94
This Chapter begins by narrating the mainstream arguments related to why the development 
state in both form and function is considered not to be applicable to developing country 
(especially African) contexts, this being the so-called ‘impossibility thesis’. The consequence 
of uncritical acceptance of the impossibility thesis locks developing countries into existing 
exploitative and inequitable path dependence. An attempt is undertaken in this section to 
deconstruct the ‘impossibility thesis’ to reveal its fallacious underpinnings and logic. 
Following this – in Section Two - is a discussion of South Africa’s bold attempt to contest the 
impossibility thesis, focusing, in the main, on the evolution of the 1990s economic 
restructuring debates with passing references to housing policy. The journey from the early 
expansive economic restructuring and shelter visions to minimalism is tracked and recorded 
through a discussion of various policy documents. Section Three lays bare the limitations of 
South Africa’s approach to the developmental state with respect to the shelter intervention by 
briefly sketching some key components of the housing programmes in select south-east Asian 
countries with ‘similar levels of development’.
] Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico’. Additionally, these 
countries are presently members of international institutions of economic governance 
responsible for policing the policy regimes of developing countries with additional gusto/ 
determination. They will thus not be permitted to embark on the path of a developmental 
state ‘even if they wanted to or could do’ (Thompson, 2002:7).  
95
Picking up on this thread and employing the developmental state literature, the study briefly 
unpacks the reasons for South Africa’s lacklustre performance in the areas of industrial 
development, employment and income growth and institutional reform. The reluctance of our 
economic technocrats, planners and politicians to contest status-quo preserving social forces, 
it is contested, has produced outcomes inimical to socially inclusive growth and 
development. The Section titled ‘We are not Asian Tigers’– alerts us against the unqualified 
embrace of (developmental state) models, especially because of our own peculiar economic 
structure, political milieu and reform/change imperatives. On the other hand, it does point to 
particular institutional and political economy endowments that are available to construct a 
 The purpose of this discussion is to 
highlight the nature, depth and extent of developmental states’ intervention in the housing 
sector, of which our professed ‘progressive’ – but ultimately minimalist ‘liberal solution’ – is 
arguably not even a shadow. It further argues that major resistance to deal with the 
fundamental flaws in a nation’s housing system may stem from society’s resistance to deal 
with race, and, by implication in South Africa, wider issues of political economy. 
                                                 
94 Although China and India combine both orthodox and heterodox economic development programmes/ 
instruments (Mukand & Rodrik, 2005).  
95 Business Day, 9 November 2005. 
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developmental state without which our transition from poverty will be slow and the human 
costs immense. The construction of such a state will need to wrestle with a range of 
misconceptualisations that the post-apartheid government has fallen victim to (and 
reinforces) with damaging prospects for democratic consolidation and socially responsive 
development policy. This comprises the focus of Section Five. The final Section cautions 
against our uncritical appropriation of stylised facts pertaining to developmental state 
construction, with particular reference to the relationship between state and capital.  
Section One  
The Developmental State: ‘Getting the Politics Right’ and ‘Deliberately Getting the 
Prices Wrong’ – Construction and Deconstruction of the ‘Impossibility Thesis’ 
The economic crisis of the 1970s; the disastrous record of ‘development planning’ in many 
countries (Monteiro, 2003); the ‘counter-revolution’ (Toye, 1989:22) in economics which 
reproduced the liberal dualism between economy and polity and stripped the state of any 
transformative potential as an agent of change and progress; the hegemony of 
neoconservativism in powerful metropolitan centres; and Afropessimism/ anti-
Thirdworldism, collectively ‘pointed to “government failure” as more insidious than market 
failure that state policies had purportedly been designed to correct’ (Mkandawire, 2001:294).  
Consequently, the most important case against developmental states in Africa is not 
faith in flawless markets, but rather that whatever the degree and extent of “market 
failure” African states cannot correct them in ways that do not make things worse. 
What emerges in the literature on Africa is that what has obviously worked in other 
“late industrializers” is simply a non-starter in Africa. While it is now admitted that 
the state has played a central role in the development of Asian countries, it is 
suggested that the replication of the Asian experience is somehow impossible for 
Africa. The reasons include the (a) dependence, (b) lack of ideology, (c) “softness” of 
the African state and its proneness to “capture” by special interest groups, (d) lack of 
technical and analytical capacity, (e) the changed international environment that did 
not permit protection of industrial policies, and (f) past poor record of performance 
(Mkandawire, 2001:294).  
The validity of these findings aside for a moment, governments of developing countries 
(especially Africa) who were forced to implement economic programmes imposed on them 
by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)) – which brought no ‘visible 
economic growth and far from alleviating poverty they increased it’ (Mafege, 2001:18)) - 
contended that they were ‘misconceived’ in that they sought to apply ‘Euro-American 
development models in Africa’. The general view among African intellectuals and 
governments was that stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes and the state model 
that underpinned it were inappropriate to address deep-seated maladies, particularly in the 
agricultural/agrarian sector. Consequently, there was - and still is - an insistence on the need 
and role for a democratic developmental state. They also contended that addressing pervasive 
poverty was not a problem of amelioration but of development, necessitating radical change 
and not cosmetic reformism, i.e. interventions that reduce power imbalances, flowing from 
economic and political inequalities (Mafege, 2001:18).  
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Without these interventions, remarks the World Bank (2005), institutions charged with 
reducing poverty and driving inclusive growth will continue perpetuating inequalities in 
power, status and wealth, frustrating investment, innovation, and risk taking that undergirds 
long-term growth. Countries moving onto institutional paths marked by sustained prosperity 
achieved this through altering the balance of political influence and power so as it render it 
more equitable. Policies proffered by the Bank entail redistributions of influence, advantage 
and subsidies away from powerful groups through, amongst others, investment in human 
capacities; expanding access to justice, land, and infrastructure; and promoting fairness/ 
equity in local and global markets.  
Although the proposals forwarded by the Bank are not of the archetypal ‘developmental 
state’ variety, what is indeed interesting is their finding that inequality affects long-run 
processes of development and that without measures to effect redistribution, institutions will 
repeatedly reproduce systemic imbalances with attendant consequences for the growth 
elasticity of poverty reduction. Put differently, the higher the proportion of poor people there 
are in the economy, the lower the rate of growth; countries with high initial inequality 
experienced lower rates of growth; and initial inequality reduces the poverty reduction 
potential of growth. High inequality dulls incentives for wealth creation; fosters 
macroeconomic instability; and impedes efficiency promoting reforms that need trust and co-
operation. Rapid poverty reduction requires a combination of more growth, a more pro-poor 
pattern of growth and success in reducing inherited inequalities that limit the prospects for 
poor people to share in the opportunities unleashed by economic growth – the main qualities 
of the social transformation state’s development path. Interventions that make institutions 
work better for the poor assist in promoting growth in the future, with successful policies 
focussing on correcting underlying market and governmental failures, or direct interventions 
to redress asset inequalities (see Ravallion, 2005).  
Effecting productive linkages between redistribution, growth, poverty reduction and 
institutional reform is often said to be precluded by globalisation and the policy imperatives 
flowing from them. But progressive economists and political scientists maintain that 
successful pro-poor and sustainable development is predominantly determined and 
conditioned by domestic factors (Rodrik, 1998, 1999a), and that while development is subject 
to and conditioned by external factors, they are not the outcome of external factors (Wilson, 
1996). The question then becomes one of interrogating the ‘room for manoeuvre’ around 
domestic constraints to engineer pro-poor patterns of growth. These constraints are 
influenced and shaped by the degree of social cohesion within a country. The chief economist 
and top social scientists of the World Bank (Ritzen et al., 2000) have argued that ‘social 
cohesion[96
                                                 
96 Taken here to mean the inclusiveness of a country’s communities. 
] and room for manoeuvre determine the quality of institutions, which in turn 
have important impacts on whether pro-poor policies are devised and implemented’ (Ibid:3). 
Class, ethnic and racial inequalities place severe constraints on the attempts of even the 
‘boldest, civic-minded and well-informed politician’ striving to effect sustainable policy 
reform. High quality institutions – one of the hallmarks of developmental states – are 
positively associated with both higher average growth rates and lower levels of inequality. 
Greater levels of social cohesion produce better institutions and these in turn lead to higher 
growth. Policies to reduce inequality and address exclusion (e.g. land reform, boosting the 
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social wage, centralised decentralisation, participatory budgeting, etc.) are thus central to 
building social cohesion, good-quality institutions and pro-poor growth.  
Such policies in the developmental states often entailed quite radical social surgery including 
the restructuring of organised power blocs. Institutional reform in developmental states 
proceeded in parallel with political interventions that restructured the distribution of social 
and organisational power – both disciplining and directing capital – with a view to 
encouraging the construction of productive coalitions to support the objectives of the social 
transformation state. In other words, ‘getting the politics right’ is ‘developmentally prior to 
getting the prices right’ (Leftwich, 2000:195) or the ‘prices wrong’ as Amsden (1989, 1997) 
argues; a point elaborated below in the discussion of incentives/rent-seeking. This is indeed a 
pretty radical approach to effect social change going way beyond what Mafege (2001) calls 
‘petty reformism’:  
…there is a greater predisposition towards petty reformism or continuity than towards 
radical change, which often threatens instability and, therefore, a general sense of 
insecurity. This is particularly true of those groups or classes which enjoy hegemonic 
power nationally and internationally. Almost as an ideological reflex, opinion-leaders 
from the West often spurn anything that smacks of radicalism. Yet, radical and at time 
ruthless reforms is what brought western countries to a superordinate position. 
Therefore, it can be said that despite the tendency towards conservatism in society, 
under certain circumstances radical change can be the only way to guarantee that 
which is denied and to release latent social energies (Mafege, 2001:20).  
The tragedy of modern times is that these radical and ruthless reforms implemented by both 
Western countries and developmental states in their rise to industrial and economic 
supremacy are regarded as market-distorting ‘bad policies’. In other words, these economies 
actively used ‘bad’ trade and industrial policies; practices now frowned upon – if not banned 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO). These included:97
• Infant industry promotion strategies and tariff protection (and even banning imports 
and exports of some items);  
  
• Generous industrial financing schemes for targeted industries and sectors;  
• Subsidies and import tariff rebates on inputs to promote exports; extensive and 
sustained government investment (deficit financing) of infrastructural development; 
•  Establishment of elaborate social welfare institutions;  
• Labour and investment planning – directed credit programmes and generous support 
for research and development, training and education;  
• The state setting up and running model factories that the private sector was hesitant to 
invest in; government grants of free imported machinery to private sector firms; 
                                                 
97 Culled from Chan (2002). 
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• State engagement in industrial espionage, smuggling of contraband machines, patent 
violation/refusal to acknowledge foreign patents, poaching of skilled workers and 
sometimes even banning emigration of skilled workers;  
• State-created institutional mechanisms to facilitate public-private co-operation (joint 
ventures, subsidized industry associations with close links to government);  
• Establishment of state-owned enterprises and nationalisation of select industries; 
aggressive restructuring of banking institutions and regulation/mediation of the 
relationship/link between financial capital and industrial development;  
• State encouragement of mergers aimed at restraining wasteful competition and 
achieving scale economies, standardised processes and outputs, introduction of 
scientific management techniques;  
• Government-instituted policies preventing the development of manufacturing 
capabilities in colonies through outlawing select manufacturing activities (banning 
exports from colonies that competed with their colonial countries); and 
• Government-instituted ‘unequal treaties’ that imposed free trade thereby depriving the 
colonies of tariff autonomy; and tools for supporting and nurturing infant industries. 
Chang (2002) demonstrates that once these countries reached industrial supremacy, they 
shifted their policy stances accordingly, i.e. they began advocating and pressed for free trade, 
prevented the outflow of skilled workers and technologies, and became strong 
defenders/protectors of patents and trademarks. They turned into gatekeepers, maliciously 
kicking away the economic/industrial development ladder that served them so splendidly. 
Preventing developing countries from using the ‘bad policies’ associated with developmental 
states constitutes a serious constraint on their capacity to generate sustainable economic 
development. Chang (2002) challenges the international development policy community to 
provide a valid explanation to the developing countries why the ‘bad policies’ are not suitable 
for poor countries and why – given their own experience – they insist on imposing a one-
size-fits-all-laissez faire model on the poor of the world. This question is especially important 
because given the huge productivity gap between developing and developed countries. 
Developing countries now need to deploy much higher tariffs (compared to the now-
developed countries in earlier times) just to achieve the same protective effects.  
The negative impact of the non-deployment of ‘bad policies’ are aggravated by extremely 
restrictive international prescriptions for state reconstruction and statecraft. Atop the 
minefield of socio-economic apartheid and the inequalities of contemporary times, the ‘good 
governance’ agenda – whose provenance derives from the 1980s shift in the developed world 
from public administration to ‘new public management’ (Turner & Hulme, 1997:230) – is 
laid on with its emphasis on accountability, the rule of law, predictability and stability for the 
private sector, and transparency. Good governance is equated with sound development 
management, drawing its inspiration from the minimalist state. The emphasis is on private 
sector management techniques and non market-distorting market incentive regimes. In the 
words of Jayasuriya (2001:110), this governance orientation signals the  
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…emergence of a kind of ‘economic constitutionalism’[98
Once again, Chang (2002) demonstrates that the strictures of ‘good governance’ (and 
representative democracy) – including clean and efficient bureaucracy and judiciary; 
protection of property rights, contracts and patents; good corporate governance institutions; 
and an independent central bank,
] which endeavours to place 
certain market regulatory institutions [e.g. central banks, competition commissions, 
state auditing watchdogs, etc.] beyond the reach of transitory political majorities or 
the actions of the political executive through mechanisms that provide for a high 
degree of autonomy for these institutions.  
99
More intriguing is Chang’s (2002) finding that developed countries were institutionally much 
less advanced in those times than the currently developing countries at similar stages of 
development. Put differently, the now-developed countries had relatively low levels of 
institutional development compared to the developing countries of today at comparable levels 
of development (especially per capita income). For instance, the United Kingdom in 1820 
had only a slightly higher per capita income than today’s India but the latter has universal 
suffrage (the United Kingdom did not even have universal male suffrage), a central bank, 
income tax, bankruptcy laws, a professional bureaucracy, and labour legislation. Another 
example: the Italy of 1875 is comparable to today’s Pakistan (in per capita income terms), but 
the latter has universal male suffrage, an independent and professional judiciary, and a central 
bank. Paradoxically then, today’s under-developed countries, it might be said, are, perhaps, 
institutionally over-developed. The maintenance of this over-developed institutional 
infrastructure may also be responsible for diverting scarce resources away from much-needed 
 – was the outcome rather than the cause of economic 
development in the now-developed countries. He further shows that the numerous institutions 
demanded of today’s developing countries are irrelevant or harmful to their present stage of 
development, and are costly to run. The genius of Chang’s (2002) argument is his empirical 
demonstration that in many of the now-developed countries up until 1913 (and even beyond) 
universal suffrage and secret balloting was a novelty; there was widespread nepotism and 
corruption in the public sector; corporate governance institutions fell miserably short of 
modern standards; competition law was non-existent; banking regulation was underdeveloped 
and patchy in most countries; insider trading and stock price manipulation was common; 
income tax was a still a novelty; and labour legislation regarding working hours, occupational 
safety, child and female labour standards were patchy, coverage limited and enforcement 
poor. In other words, it took the developed countries centuries and decades to develop the 
institutions now demanded of developing countries. Thus, the current demand that 
developing countries should adopt world-class institutions right away or face punishment is 
at odds with historical experience of the developed countries.  
                                                 
98 Economic constitutionalism refers to attempts to ‘treat the market as a constitutional order with its own rules, 
procedures and institutions that operate to protect the market order from political interference’ (Jayasuriya, 
2001:121).  
99 An independent central bank rips the heart out of the developmental state through removing the power and 
capacity of ‘central economic agencies’ to direct the kind of industrial policies that were a marked feature of 
developmental states. The shift of power away from technocratic economic agencies to independent central 
banks effectively erodes the close political relationship or bargaining between state and business that informs 
the operations of core state developmental agencies (Jayasuriya, 2001:118).  
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investment in poverty eradication and human development, a state of affairs that is harmful to 
equitable development and contributes to their enslavement to the powerful of this world. 
These comparisons can go on but suffice to say that, in their early days of economic 
development, the developing countries operated with institutional structures that were cruder 
or less sophisticated than that which exists in today’s developing countries at comparable 
levels of development, and that their democratic credentials referenced to representative 
democracy and good governance were extremely suspect. Even in the developmental states of 
East Asia, a significant component of their success resided in a unique combination of close 
government ties with business, clientelism and bureaucratic insulation – termed in the 
literature ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans, 1995). Similar practices in Africa are slated as ‘state 
capture’, corruption and neo-patrimonialism – fundamentally at odds with World Bank 
notions of ‘good governance’ (Mkandawire, 2001).  
It is ‘doubtful’, says Stein (2000:9), whether accountability, transparency and the rule of law 
will produce vibrant economies in the developing world. It follows  
…the general neoclassical notion of institutional neutrality… that will permit an 
unimpeded space for optimal private decision making. Passively create the conditions 
perceived as inducing private production and investment and “ye will come” (Ibid).  
Fostering institutional neutrality for the removal of market-distorting rents (recently 
recognised as a flawed assumption under structural adjustment programmes) and now their 
redirection away from non-productive activities (import substitution industrialisation 
strategies) to (so-called) productive activities (export-oriented industrialisation), but with 
minimal state interference, is in neoclassical economics perceived as central to the 
achievement of competitive outcomes. Rents, in neoclassical economics, are perceived as 
exogenous to growth and competitiveness of firms/industries, and enterprises will 
(inappropriately) allocate resources to secure them. This allocation, it is argued, will leave 
fewer resources for productive investment if the state tampers with the process. If the 
assumption of exogeneity is removed and rents are now (more correctly) being seen as an 
indispensable function of a firm’s performance, their pursuit and securing can lead to the 
expansion of productive activity. Rent-seeking then becomes a spur to growth as rent seekers 
attempt to capture the maximum amount of rents. It is in this context that ‘government 
mediation of profits’ – a significant component of the developmental state’s intervention 
arsenal – and ‘even extensive cronyism’ - is compatible with heightened levels of productive 
investment and dynamic growth (depending on political conditions) (Mkandawire, 1998:11).  
In the developmental states, rents created and allocated by the state – in which higher-than-
expected profits are provided to the private sector in return for investment and production in 
economically targeted activities – played a crucial role in the development of a capitalist 
class and robust accumulation. In the words of Amsden (1997), the development of dynamic 
productive capacity and processes entailed the deliberate creation of ‘distortions’ in the form 
of firm-specific skills, knowledge-based monopolies and other types of entry barriers. 
Government’s role involved ‘joining’ with the private sector to ‘socially construct 
competitive assets’ (resources, capabilities and organisations) rather than create perfect 
markets.  
To construct socially those competitive assets for production purposes, governments 
have rigged key exchange prices, such as the price of foreign currency, credit, and 
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labour (by weakening its bargaining power); that is they have deliberately got relative 
prices “wrong”. Thus, even if the ultimate correction of market failures aptly 
describes the government’s normative role in the realm of exchange, it is a poor 
explanatory device for understanding its role in the realm of production, which is 
better analysed in terms of the “social” (public-private) construction of competitive 
assets (Ibid:471). 
Accordingly, the system of contingent rents in the developmental states was effective because 
they were extended in response to activities deemed to serve the national interest. Rent-
seeking costs (information collection, influence peddling, and bargaining) were kept low, 
governments closed off non-productive avenues for wealth accumulation such as real estate 
speculation (critical to the success of the housing programme alongside the successful 
capture of increments in urban land development/development gains), rents were provided on 
a selective and temporary basis and withdrawn as new industries matured enough to compete 
globally, and strict performance standards were enforced (Akuyz, 1996 cited in Stein, 
2000:18).  
The point of the Asian experience, remarks Mkandawire (2001:302), 
…is that the use of “rent seeking” as an argument against a more active 
developmental state is simply not credible. The relevant issues are “rents’ for whom 
and with what reciprocal obligations for receivers of rents? And the answer will lie in 
the desired income distribution and strategy of development. The denial of an active 
developmental state for fear of “capture” is tantamount to the denial of the 
possibilities in Africa of accelerated development achieved by a deliberate 
“government of the market” towards greater mobilisation and developmental 
allocation of resources (including rents). In the African debates, the fear of the 
damaging effects of rent seeking has not only sustained the argument for a minimalist 
state, but has also given the foreign experts, who for inexplicable reasons do not 
engage in rent seeking like all other mortal beings, a moral upper hand.  
‘Bad policies’ and their subsequent outlawing by the powerful; ‘rent-seeking’ and their 
present day vilification; and ‘good governance’ precepts are bolted together in a tight self-
serving manner. As the main scaffolding of the impossibility thesis, they not only rip the 
heart out of the developmental state model and deny others the opportunity to ascend the 
ladder of economic progress and material upliftment; more importantly, they function to 
expunge from history the existence of such a ladder. Expunged also from history (implicitly, 
at the very least) is the active support of these developed countries to yesteryear’s (East 
Asian) dictators (‘our sons of bitches’) and the former’s present deployment of economic 
hitmen (EHMs) to build and sustain their globally corrupt empire. The words of John 
Perkins, a self-confessed economic hitman, quoted here at some length, are most apposite:  
We are an elite group of men and women who utilize financial organizations to 
foment conditions that make other nations subservient to the corporatocracy running 
our biggest corporations, our government, and our banks. Like our counterparts in the 
Mafia, EHMs provide favours. These take the form of loans to develop infrastructure 
– electric generating plants, highways, ports, airports, or industrial parks. A condition 
of such loans is that engineering and construction companies from our own country 
must build all these projects. In essence, most of the money never leaves the United 
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States; it is simply transferred from banking offices in Washington to engineering 
offices in New York, Houston, or San Francisco... Despite the fact that money is 
returned almost immediately to corporations that are members of the corporatocracy 
(the creditor), the recipient country is required to pay it all back, principal plus 
interest. If an EHM is completely successful, the loans are so large that the debtor is 
forced to default on its payment after a few years. When this happens, then like the 
Mafia we demand our pound of flesh. This often includes one or more of the 
following: control over United Nations votes, the installation of military bases, or 
access to precious resources such as oil or Panama Canal. Of course, the debtor still 
owes us the money – and another country is added to our global empire...The subtlety 
of this modern empire building puts the Roman centurions, the Spanish conquistadors, 
and the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European colonial powers to shame. We 
EHMs are crafty; we learned from history. Today we do not carry swords. We do not 
wear clothes of armour that set us apart...We appear humble, normal. We visit project 
sites and stroll through impoverished villages. We profess altruism, talk with local 
papers about the wonderful humanitarian things we are doing. We cover the 
conference tables of government committees with our spreadsheets and financial 
projections, and we lecture at the Harvard Business School about the miracle of 
macroeconomics. We are on the record, in the open. Or so we portray ourselves and 
so we are accepted. It is how the system works. We seldom resort to anything illegal 
because the system is built on subterfuge, and the system is by definition legitimate. 
However – and this is a very large caveat – if we fail, an even more sinister breed 
steps in, ones we EHMs refer to as the jackals, men who trace their heritage directly 
to those earlier empires. The jackals are always there, lurking in the shadows. When 
they emerge, heads of state are overthrown or die in violent “accidents”. And if by 
chance the jackals fail, as they failed in Afghanistan and Iraq, then the old models 
resurface. When the jackals fail, young Americans are sent in to kill and die (Perkins, 
2004:xvii–xxi).  
In sum, there is little evidence to suggest to any meaningful shift in the strategies/stratagems 
deployed by the powerful in the past and now and/or that the neoliberal governance model is 
any less corrupt/subversive/violent than some characterisations of the developmental state as 
‘crony capitalism’. One is left wondering whether the ‘impossibility thesis’ is less about the 
world we live in (Realpolitik) than the world we are told/made to believe we live in.  
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Section Two  
The South African Journey – From Contesting ‘Impossibilism’ to Pragmatism and 
Minimalism  
The Transition Debates on Economic Restructuring and Housing: From MERG to the RDP 
The early 1990s economic policy debates in South Africa contested the ‘impossibility’ thesis 
and proposed mild forms of ‘bad policies’. This amounted to an argument in favour of the 
need for the ‘establishment of a culture of ‘developmentalism’, not only within the state, but 
also within ‘civil society’. Democratic government and the setting of national development 
goals would provide the platform for economic policy functional to both growth and 
redistribution objectives. A ‘slimmed down but strong state, insulated from sectional 
interests, but at the same time basing interventions on well-developed consultative 
mechanisms’ would furnish the requisite implementation infrastructure. Mindful of the 
limitations of the transformative capacity of the state and policy, it was recognised that the 
extent and nature of state intervention would ‘necessarily be constrained not only by the 
objectives of policy, but by the capacity of the bureaucracy’ (Black, 1992:142).  
The progressive movement’s economic programme came to centre on addressing structural 
inequalities through an extensive and rapid redistribution of wealth and incomes. Redressing 
the imbalances of the past for the promotion of socially responsive and employment 
generating accumulation strategies constituted the cornerstones of the progressive 
movement’s growth path, i.e. growth through redistribution (Kaplinsky, 1993). Growth 
through redistribution underscored the need for radical changes in the existing structure and 
distribution of socio-economic power. More precisely, accumulation depended upon the 
‘prior redistribution of resources’. ‘Redistribution’ was not seen as a ‘clever stratagem to 
wheedle concessions from the rich by allowing them to maintain real income growth, but 
rather as a necessary requirement for accumulation to occur’ (Kaplinsky, 1993:50).  
Criticising the growth paths proposed at the time by establishment-aligned forces/thinkers for 
‘their modest and uncertain views of state intervention’ was described as taking production 
and growth ‘too much on business’ terms, confined to fiddling with the slack space remaining 
from improving tax policies or saving on military expenditure after making business happy’ 
(Freund, 1992:85). Progressives argued for the redistribution of income, political power, 
educational and training opportunities, housing and infrastructural expenditure, regional 
growth, land and wealth to address the conglomerate structure of the South African economy 
(Khan, 1992).  
In this alternative strategy of the progressive movement, a central role was accorded the state, 
whose capacities were viewed as crucial to counterweight the power of highly 
concentrated100
                                                 
100 In 1971, the Mouton Commission found that in 37 sectors, three or few producers shared more than 75% of 
the sector’s market. Rumney (2005:409) cites McGregor’s (2004) contention that the degree of sectoral 
concentration has increased: ‘It is now hard to find sectors where there are not three or fewer dominant players’. 
 (recalcitrant) capital, which was, and continues to be, viewed as unprepared 
to commit their financial resources to domestic investment in industry and/or to social and 
economic transformation (whether through private sector and/or public-private partnership 
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sector initiatives) in order to meet basic needs (Edwards, 1998). South African industries 
were perceived as too concerned – and still are – with integrating their domestic operations 
with their international interests (Chang, 1996). There was (and remains) no reason why the 
interests of South Africa’s minerals-energy complex (MEC) would coincide with the 
imperatives of generating viable domestic industry, related to the age of capital stock, low 
levels of vertical integration, the lack of intermediate and capital goods. There was also a 
general predisposition to oppose interventionist policies and there remains extreme pressure 
for the removal of (remaining) exchange controls restricting domestic corporations from 
capital export (Fine, 1998). It is for these and other reasons that the state was accorded a 
central role in redirecting capital accumulation and economic growth through a 
redistribution-driven reconfiguration of dominant socio-economic blocs – especially the 
conglomerates.  
It was believed that the highly concentrated corporate structure dominated the provision of 
finance to industrial firms, with financial linkages between the various conglomerates 
constituting the nexus of the process. The subordinate position of the banks relative to non-
bank financial intermediaries within the conglomerate structure reinforced their relative 
immunity from state control (Gelb, 1990). In West Germany, Japan and Taiwan, the opposite 
held and the state effectively shaped industrial development through central bank regulation, 
i.e. there was significant institutional mediation between finance and investment capital, 
which differs from South Africa’s Anglo-Saxon capital-based financial systems (Khan & 
Hemson, 1998).  
In 1998, progressive economists continued arguing for the state to take active measures to 
reform the financial system to ensure lower interest rates and to direct funds out of the highly 
concentrated and integrated MEC core of the economy. The financial sector, they charged, 
was dominated by six, broad-based, organically linked axes of capital each with varying 
interests in mining, manufacturing and the financial sectors, i.e. SA Mutual, Sanlam, Anglo-
American, Liberty/ Standard, Rembrandt/ Volkskas, and Anglovaal. This highly integrated 
and concentrated structure (four banking groups controlled 95% of all deposit taking 
institutions in 1991) also produced a highly segmented structure. The rates of interest charged 
on loans outside and inside the MEC varied quite considerably, impacting on the rate of job 
creation, investment and diversification potential. These rates rose by leaps and bounds, with 
the highest rates charged to small, micro and medium enterprises, and particularly the 
unbanked, poor majority (Edwards, 1998).101
Accordingly, borrowing from German, Japanese, East Asian examples, progressive 
economists asserted that the state must supervise closely the activities of the component parts 
of the MEC to direct credit into strategic areas; limit and regulate the outward flow of capital; 
and ensure the implementation of integrated and diversified industrial growth policies that are 
more employment-generative and poverty-eradicating. State intervention, it was contended, 
would on the one hand be ‘targeted’ and ‘selective’, yet ‘pervasive and far-reaching in 
shaping the activities of economic agents, in contrast to the neo-liberal reliance on 
autonomous responses’ (Gelb, 1991:31). A co-operative relationship between business firms 
and government planning institutions was to be secured through the latter’s involvement in 
sectoral planning, but with firms accepting a ‘subordinate role’ in the restructuring process on 
  
                                                 
101 These themes are revisited in the Conclusion. 
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the grounds that the state was the key agent in securing the conditions for productive, 
sustainable accumulation (Khan, 1992).  
In sum, the progressive movement wanted to deploy redistribution as a mechanism to satisfy 
basic needs and create new patterns of demand away from racialised Fordism. A main plank 
of this alternative strategy – redistribution of investment into productive and employment-
generative spheres – singled out housing as the most important sector for targeted investment. 
The envisaged strategy would strive to engineer a creative link between shelter, capital 
accumulation and production, and redistribution (van Gass, 1991).  
A major influence on ANC economic thinking in the early 1990s was the Macroeconomic 
Research Group, a team of economists assembled by the ANC, whose report Making 
Democracy Work: A Framework for Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa (1993) - 
‘recommended significant intervention in the market place’ (Friedman, 2004c:177). The 
MERG report recognised that housing played an important role in the economy as a generator 
of income and employment and a ‘stimulus to growth in kick-start scenarios’ with 
construction spurring demand across employment-intensive sectors, with limited demands on 
the balance of payments, and with the potential to be non-inflationary. Housing was also said 
to be ‘integrated into the economy in other ways’ beyond these multiplier effects. Housing 
availability interacts with the ‘functioning of the labour market, the money market and 
savings rates’ (MERG, 1993:84). Moreover, housing was seen to be heavily implicated in 
political processes, i.e. boycotts on rent and service charges, and access to land. The report 
drew on critiques of apartheid and late-apartheid housing praxis and emphasised a continuum 
of housing markets (low and upper-income) and their functional relation (underscoring the 
need to address the housing system as a whole); focused attention on alternative forms of 
tenure (away from the fixation on subsidised owner-occupation that was insensitive to 
mobility-based household livelihood strategies); supported informal upgrading; and singled 
out the need to pay particular attention to women-headed households.  
The report cautioned that housing, by itself, was of ‘limited worth in the absence of jobs, 
infrastructure and communal facilities’ and the multiple components of housing delivery 
should not only be confined to financial issues. Equally important should be a focus on 
addressing the highly cartelised building supplies industry; upgrading state capacity to deliver 
separate but related components of the housing production (from land acquisition and 
assembly through to final finishing); tackling land speculation; lending support to collective 
forms of tenure (example, housing associations) and public rental accommodation (which 
should not be ‘precluded at the outset through an ideological commitment to owner-
occupation’). Rather than soliciting a housing programme through private sector finance 
(formal and/or informal and/or intermediaries), far more reliance should be placed on state 
finance to fund a public housing subsidised rental programme. Thus the solution proposed to 
affordability problems and bond boycotts – neither of which ‘can be solved by efforts to 
devise the appropriate structure and form of financial instruments’ – resided, according to 
MERG, in state provision of rented housing.  
The degree of state intervention can vary over the range of functions involved – it can 
be a builder itself, or subcontract to an audited private sector; it can provide or 
guarantee loans; it can subsidise rents or charge at market value. Nor does extensive 
state intervention now preclude a more market-oriented stance in the future (MERG, 
1993:84). 
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The MERG report presented its housing programme as appropriate for a ‘transitional period’, 
pivoting on the necessity to reduce, in the short term, gross inequities for medium- to long- 
term growth to realise the country’s economic potential in an equitable manner. Following 
World Bank (1993) advice on tackling the reconstruction tasks confronting South Africa, the 
proposed aim was to transfer a significant amount of resources to the poor in the short term, 
cognisant that policy instruments of the proposed strategies would ‘not necessarily be 
appropriate for medium- and long-term vertical and horizontal fiscal balance’ (MERG, 
1993:84).  
Although short on the specifics of state intervention to address market failure, the report 
recommended regulating the housing market; breaking the white monopoly of contractors 
over local authority work through promoting black businesses that are more efficient and 
independent of white-controlled large-scale contractors; redressing the high degree of 
concentration in the cement industry; ‘compulsory purchase’ of privately-owned land and 
ensuring an equitable distribution of development gains; effective functioning of housing 
supply; and urban and regional planning. Implementation hinged on institutional reform and 
capacity building, with the report proposing a ‘unitary national housing authority with 
corresponding institutions at lower tiers of government’. The responsibilities of the authority 
would include: urban and regional planning; infrastructural provision; restructuring of the 
apartheid city; co-ordination of all aspects of housing delivery; formulation and monitoring 
of planning regulations and ensuring their effective functioning; and facilitating the release of 
land for housing (Ibid).  
On balance, the nature of proposed state intervention (influenced in significant dimensions by 
readings and interpretations of the developmental state experience) was rooted in the belief 
that sustainable growth necessitated a radical redistributive programme to address the chief 
obstacles to growth rooted in structural inequality. The restructuring of the economy, it was 
said, could not be left to the autonomous actions of capital, but required decisive state 
leadership, in which capital would have to accept a subordinate role in returned for increased 
profitability. Restructuring the distribution of political and organisational power with a view 
to encouraging the construction of productive coalitions to support the reforms of the state 
was to be effected through a novel combination of consensual and inclusive embeddedness, 
distinct from East Asian state corporatism. Important in this growth path was the view that 
poverty eradication/reduction was not an ‘add on’ to the growth strategy, but an integral part 
of it (see Makgetla, 2004).  
Government would thus use large scale anti-poverty programmes while expanding domestic 
demand, skills, services and infrastructure – a strategy used to great effect in 1950s in the 
high performing Asian economies (Makgetla, 2004:280). This was echoed in the RDP (ANC, 
1994), which emphasised land reform and support for co-operatives and micro enterprises, as 
well as massive expansion in basic infrastructure, housing, education, welfare, and health 
care for poor communities (Makgetla, 2004: 270). 
From the RDP to White Paper and GEAR  
The original RDP broadly supported MERG’s development policy orientation and strategy, 
premised on ‘reconstruction and development being parts of an integrated process’. In 
contrast to establishment viewpoints that ‘growth and redistribution are processes that 
contradict each other’ (in this view, growth is seen as ‘the priority that must precede 
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development’ and development is portrayed as ‘a marginal effort of redistribution to areas of 
urban and rural poverty’) the RDP ‘breaks decisively with this approach’ (ANC, 
1994:S1.3.6). The establishment position, it is asserted, ‘would leave intact the severe 
regional, racial and gender and structural imbalances that characterise the present economy’ 
(Ibid:S 4.3.1). Moreover, with the objective of effecting structural transformation, it was said, 
that it ‘cannot be expected that the market will make such a structural transformation on its 
own’ (Ibid:S 4.3.1).  
The fundamental principles of our economic policy are democracy, participation and 
development. We are convinced that neither a commandist central planning system 
nor an unfettered free market system can provide adequate solutions to the problems 
confronting us. Reconstruction and development [an integrated process] will be 
achieved through the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving public sector, 
and active involvement by all sectors of civil society which in combination will lead 
to sustainable growth (Ibid:S 4.2.1).  
The RDP (ANC, 1994) repeats many of the themes encountered in the early economic 
restructuring debates, arguing for the integration of growth, development, and reconstruction 
into a unified programme. They key to this link was said to lie in an infrastructural 
programme that would provide people with access to basic services thereby opening up 
‘previously suppressed economic and human potential’, leading to ‘increased output in all 
sectors of the economy’. In the housing sector, the RDP restates MERG proposals and 
introduces a few significant new ones. The RDP recognises that:102
• A mass housing programme can help generate employment, skills and economic 
activity (both directly and indirectly);  
 
• Commits government to the goal of allocating 5% of the budget to housing, 
sustainable human settlement development, tenure security and support to diverse 
tenure forms, and settlement upgrading (with high standards akin to formal housing); 
• Development of legislation to address tenants’ rights, squatter rights’, women’s 
access to credit and housing support, community re-investment by banks, evictions, 
consumer protection, community participation in planning and development;  
• Intervention in the land market to deepen access; prevention of land speculation and 
breaking up of land monopolies; provision of affordable rental housing stock 
(‘provincial and local government should be…particularly active in the delivery of 
rental housing stock’); establishment of a national housing bank and home loan 
guarantee fund;  
• Mechanisms to prevent speculation and downward raiding; demand-side subsidies; 
encouraging commercial banks through legislation and other incentives to make credit 
available in low-income areas;  
                                                 
102 Text drawn from ANC, 1994: S2.4.1–S2.5.21; S 4.7.1–S4.7.8. 
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• Prohibiting redlining and other forms of discrimination by banks; introducing 
community-controlled financing vehicles;  
• Devising unemployment bond insurance packages and guarantee schemes with a 
demand-side orientation; keeping interest rates as low as possible;  
• The ending of cartels, price agreements and market share agreements in the building 
materials industry;  and 
• Resourcing small and medium-sized developers/ builders/ enterprises; and 
communities benefiting directly from the housing programme via employment, 
training and awarding of contracts.  
As the elections drew closer and the ‘Left’ of the ANC lobbied for assertive redistribution 
(drawing in part on MERG findings), the ANC’s Department of Economic Planning (Trevor 
Manuel and Tito Mboweni in particular) were listening to technical specialists from the 
ANC, World Bank advisors and business people (‘mostly but not exclusively foreign’). They 
subsequently ‘became the prime advocates of economic pragmatism’. The Department of 
Economic Planning sought substantially to ‘water down MERG’s redistributive thrust’, with 
the ‘policy shifts they initiated appear[ing] to enjoy tacit or explicit [senior ANC] leadership 
support’ (Friedman, 2004c:217–8).  
The strategy that came to be endorsed and later consolidated in the 1996 Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) (Department of Finance, 1996), very 
fundamentally changed the nature and orientation of economic policy. In the original RDP 
document, it was contended that the market on its own cannot effect structural transformation 
and that, if the present structure of the economy were left intact, it would further entrench and 
reproduce inequalities. It was recommended, therefore, that a programme driven and led by 
the newly-elected government was needed to ‘transform’ society, polity and economy along 
democratic and equitable lines. With GEAR, the focus on inequalities in income, wealth, 
access to productive assets, and the structure of production is displaced. Government 
embraced a ‘competitiveness strategy’, ‘predicated on the argument that apartheid repressed 
markets for labour, international trade and capital flows, particularly in the agricultural and 
financial sector’ (Makgetla, 2004: 267). Government’s primary role was defined as 
facilitating conditions (through fiscal restraint, budgetary reform, deregulation)103
                                                 
103 GEAR proposed a medium-term plan that would ‘bridge’ the existing constrained economic environment to 
improved growth and employment through tighter fiscal controls to counter inflation; the setting of what it 
called an ‘appropriate’ medium-term deficit target to eliminate government dissaving; further revision of the tax 
structure and a range of budgetary changes to contain costs and improve the redistributive goals of public 
investment; the gradual relaxation of exchange controls; monetary policies to further reduce inflation and 
exchange rate management; trade and industrial policies that lower tariffs, introduction of tax incentives to 
stimulate investment etc.; public sector asset restructuring, the sale of other state assets and the creation of 
public-private partnerships; an expansionary public infrastructure and investment programme; flexibility in the 
labour market; and processes to facilitate wage and price determination (Department of Finance, 1996:4). 
 to produce 
a ‘competitive fast-growing economy’ that would generate more jobs. This, in turn, was 
believed to be the route to an ‘equitable distribution of income and improved standards of 
living for all’ (Department of Finance, 1996:14). Mhone’s (2003:49) précis of GEAR is 
apposite:  
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GEAR is predicated on creating an enabling environment for the market to restructure 
the economy… Within this context, the government is expected to play an enabling 
role by providing a good macroeconomic environment, and by nudging the economic 
players through the provision of infrastructure and incentives and an appropriate 
regulatory environment… [T]he market should do the main job of restructuring the 
economy.  
With the introduction of GEAR – a ‘self-imposed structural adjustment programme’ (Joel 
Netshitenze, 2003 cited in Khan, 2004:28) – South Africa seemed to internalise the 
‘impossibility thesis’. GEAR turned the ANC’s previous commitment to building a 
developmental state which borrowed from the experience of newly industrialising countries 
on its head by implying that an inclusive and sustainable growth path could ‘only be 
precipitated by undertaking a major policy intervention that redistributes assets and undoes 
major allocative, technical and microeconomic constraints’, with the purpose of kick-starting 
a ‘virtuous cycle’ of endogenously driven growth and development, and ‘complemented by 
external factors such as exports and foreign investment’ (Mhone, 2003:63).  
Debates rage about the efficacy of GEAR in addressing the structural distortions of South 
African economy and the deep social deficits. The distributional coalition that underwrites 
GEAR (white elite and emerging black business, resting on policies to promote globalisation 
and black economic empowerment (Terreblanche, 2003)) coupled to elite perceptions of 
poverty (see Box 2.1), and the shutting out of the poor from participation in political debate 
and development policy-making deliberations104
                                                 
104 For Aubrey Matshiqi (2005:7), political debate in post-apartheid SA is fraught with many tensions; there is 
an attempt to impose ‘a canon of rational debate or rational thought. Anything that falls outside this rational 
canon of thought is regarded as irrational’. Beyond the chambers of the educated who can participate and shape 
the rational debate – the privileged minority – is the majority, on the periphery, who ‘tend to be black, they tend 
to be poor, they tend to be women, they tend to be the working class’. ‘They are not part of this debate’ and are 
denied access both because of the technical jargon and language (predominantly English) (Ibid: 8–9). The ‘net 
effect’ is a ‘democratic political framework ‘caught between the tension of [an avowed] rule by the people and 
rule for the people’. The ‘technical nature of governance’ – relayed by the rational canon of thought – 
 does not present optimistic prospects for the 
installation of a social transformation state that can address structural distortions and deficits. 
But developmental states, Leftwich (1995:421) reminds us, ‘are not static’. Changes in social 
and economic structures, politics, and international environments can produce shifts of elite 
coalitions, and the ties and interests that bear on and bind them. Thus, even though the South 
African state ‘reflects an aspirant democratic developmental state’/‘proto’ democratic 
developmental state (Leftwich, 2002:57), extolling the ‘features of a democratic ‘non-
developmental state’’ (Pieterse & Donk, 2002:4), the jury is still out that this will remain the 
situation in the long term (a theme revisited in the Conclusion). It should be borne in mind, 
though, that developmental states are not available on demand, commanded into existence, 
nor ‘had to order’ (Leftwich, 2002:255).  
...requires not rule by the people, but patience by the people while rule is left to the experts. Policy-
making therefore increasingly looks uncomfortable, irritated and impatient when put before the eye of 
public oversight, and public input in any substantive manner loses its efficacy and is reduced to the 
rituality of practice diluted of its foundational meaning. Decisions about public life, about the will of 
the people, are made behind closed doors; deals are struck in hotel lobbies, on golf courses, or…‘think 
tanks’ (Pillay, 2005:7).  
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Box 2.1: South Africa’s Elite Perception of Poverty 
At a very general level, sustained and rapid shifts in socio-material boundaries separating the elite and 
poor – especially in those countries that secured the fastest reduction in poverty for the largest number 
of people ever recorded in history (Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand) – came to depend 
on three conditions (Watkins, 1998). Firstly, the elite perceived their welfare and those of the poor as 
interdependent. The elite were unable to insulate themselves from the living conditions of the poor. 
Secondly, the elite recognised that the poor did in fact have the ‘means’ to affect their welfare through 
crime, insurrection and disease. Thirdly, the elite came around to the view that some action would be 
efficacious in reducing threats to their welfare posed by the behaviour and action of the poor majority 
(De Swan, 1998 cited in Toye & Jackson, 1996; Toye, 1999). In Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore (see Khan, 1999; Khan & Pieterse, 2000 for a more detailed 
elaboration of pro-poor development policy interventions), bona fide political will – as opposed to 
mere rhetoric – was instigated by self-enlightened elites who perceived grinding poverty as the most 
significant threat to national security (see Hossain & Moore, 1999). In South Africa, the evidence 
suggests that, at present, the poor pose no significant threat to the elite (although this is slowly 
changing). Elite perception of poverty is highly skewed, often associated with urban crime and 
unemployment. The more endemic problem of rural poverty remains invisible and ignored. Moreover, 
there is little awareness amongst the elite of the interdependence between social groups and/or that the 
elite bear some responsibility for the suffering of the poor (evidenced in Roger Kebble’s statement on 
the murder of his son at the media briefing quoted at the beginning of this Chapter). Gated 
communities, private security services, decentralised office and commercial facilities insulate the 
elite, thereby increasing their socio-physical distance from the poor. On the other hand, there is a 
ruling elite that displays altruistic ideals with regard to poverty, but international market pressures are 
perceived as insurmountable (Kalati & Manor, 1999:2). 
Of immediate concern, in this section of the chapter, is the impact of the shift to economic 
pragmatism, which many high-ranking ANC members involved in the housing policy 
negotiation process came to realise in 1993 (Gilbert, 2002a). Whilst the early radical 
positions of MERG and RDP on housing gave hope to those committed to an expansive and 
developmental shelter policy, pragmatism exercised an influential role on those involved in 
the writing of the housing White Paper, which clearly subordinated the shelter programme to 
macroeconomic policy orientations (discussed below). If the dynamics of the negotiations in 
the NHF tilted the balance of power in favour of Establishment forces, the downsizing of the 
housing programme was informed by this economic pragmatism at the policy level, resulting 
in the adoption of the fiscally-disciplined instrument of the capital subsidy that in reality was 
the ‘forerunner to GEAR’ (Monty Narsoo, the ex-Deputy Director General of the national 
Department of Housing cited in Charlton & Kihato, 2006:278).  
As the forerunner of GEAR, the housing programme is a minimalist market-driven one with 
the ‘crucial question’ being:  
Will carefully constructed liberal solutions to enormous housing problems be able to 
survive long enough to produce enough results to be able to stave off the demands of 
radical activists [and the homeless majority]? (Mackay, 1995:144). 
This question cuts to the heart of the post-apartheid project. The social protests around the 
country by the likes of the Anti-Eviction Campaign, the Bayview Flats Residents 
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Association, and the Orange Farm Water Crisis Committee signal the failure of the liberal 
solution to basic needs provision, presenting serious threats to our democratic stability and 
consolidation. According to Jackie McKay, head of the National Intelligence Agency 
Information Centre and involved in monitoring these social movements, the greatest threat to 
national security is the potential for unrest as a consequence of socio-economic conditions 
(cited in McKinley & Verriawa, 2005:54). The ‘greatest danger’ presented by these state-
community conflicts is the ‘manner in which its current terms structure a self-reproducing 
discourse of marginalisation and repression’ (McKinley & Verriawa, 2005:56). 
At a general level, then, there is great distance between the MERG and RDP proposals 
(which countenanced measured redistribution of economic and political power) and the 
policy expressed in the Housing White Paper. Describing the White Paper, Patrick Bond 
(2000a):  
[I]n contrast to the RDP mandate, each major facet of the housing policy relied upon 
the market: the broad policy objectives (specifically, ‘to contribute to the certainty 
required by the market’); the role of communities (none, effectively); the size of the 
housing backlog (the ‘present housing backlog’ was considered to be merely the 1.5 
million urban informal units such as shacks, not hostel beds or rural huts); housing 
standards (extremely low); the (unsubsidised) interest rate on bonds; housing finance 
guarantees that favour lenders not borrowers; an insistence upon full cost recovery for 
services; (self-) regulation of the construction industry; building materials price 
inflation (ignored); emerging construction firms (‘not seen as a primary housing 
responsibility and therefore does not justify the allocation of housing funds’); housing 
tenure (no rental and very little support for co-ops); and a variety of other RDP policy 
provisions that were disregarded…[There is in the White Paper]…no explicit 
commitment to eliminating gender bias; no support for squatters’ rights; no 
commitment on linking subsidies to ending bank discrimination; no assurance of end-
user and bridging finance availability to complement the meagre subsidies; no 
possibility of land banking for future development (so as to lower land prices and 
make subsidies go further); no means of applying subsidies to higher cost inner-city 
areas; no attention to linking subsidies to the pricing of building materials or to 
private sector anti-trust considerations…; effectively limit[ing] tenure form to 
individually owned sites…(Ibid:145, 136). 
Even in areas where there was agreement amongst both establishment and non-establishment 
actors on tenure and financial interventions, there was significant (and perhaps unnecessary) 
political compromise. For instance, the RDP spoke of a Housing Bank.105
                                                 
105 ‘The democratic government must establish a Housing Bank to ensure access to wholesale finance for 
housing projects and programmes’ (ANC, 1994:S4.7.4).  
 The consultant 
charged to look into the merits of this proposal (Dan Smit) reportedly rejected the idea in his 
report to the NHF, citing none of the arguments in favour of the proposal. Thus it ‘came as a 
shock to conservative NHF participants when a National Housing Bank was strongly 
promoted not only in the RDP in early 1994, but by Slovo and Cobbett immediately 
following the election’ (Bond, 2000:277, original emphasis). Instead, the White Paper 
provided for the establishment of a Housing Finance Corporation (Mackay, 1995), which has 
been criticised as being ‘too risk-averse [charging interest rates way beyond affordability 
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levels of poor households] in order to protect their own credit ratings, as well as to have not 
opened up critical areas of the housing finance market’ (Gardner, 2003:19).  
In the case of programmes to ensure that state expenditure assumes the form of ‘non-
speculative subsidies’ (Bond, 2000a:145), the constituencies on the ‘Left and the private 
construction sector argued that the government should provide mass rental housing’. Mass 
housing based on subsidised rental was, for the Left, a means of extending affordable, high 
quality housing for the poor. The private construction sector also argued for the ‘highest 
possible standards, as they would positively influence their profits’. Additionally, ‘they 
wanted to act as contractors, rather than ‘developers’, to ‘limit their financial risk’’ 
(Tomlinson, 1999:286). The White Paper, though, paid scant attention to rental housing due, 
in part, to the assumption that most people wanted to become homeowners as opposed to 
renters – an assumption that has not been sufficiently tested (Smit, 1999:8) – and also forced 
upon the NHF and Department of Housing by the imperatives of rapid delivery.  
To facilitate rapid delivery under the new subsidy system, the NHF and the 
Department of housing concentrated on project-based housing with individual title as 
its objective. This was the simplest way of delivering housing, since the actors in the 
housing environment were most familiar with this mode of delivery, and the 
necessary legal structures and implementation capacity was already in place (Adler & 
Oelofse, 1996:127).  
Whilst the NHF supposedly engaged with MERG proposals – dismissing them on the basis of 
construction supply bottlenecks (and the consequent negative impacts on the balance of 
payments) and ‘problematic for marginalised low-income groups’ (Brugge, 1996:78) – it is 
not clear how seriously the NHF grappled with them. It is reported that the NHF ‘debated 
quite vigorously the merits of social and collective ownership by housing co-operatives, 
NGOs and local authorities’ but it is also said that there ‘was a lack of information on rental 
tenure in South Africa, and the financial, legal and technical complexities of rental provision’ 
(Adler & Oelofse, 1996:127). Yet there is extensive experience of the provision of affordable 
rental accommodation 106
Although a wide body of literature can be summoned to dismiss the public housing rental 
option as expensive, there is – according to a world renowned authority on rental 
accommodation – ‘no theoretical reason why governments cannot manage public housing 
effectively’ (Gilbert, 2003:394). Peter Marcuse, another authority on housing policy, cautions 
against the (contemporary conservative) ‘premature rejection of the possibilities of social 
housing’, pointing to the ‘unwillingness [of governments] to face up to the issues of resources 
than a detailed exploration of the possibilities of social housing’. It is ‘easier, in other words, 
to seek solutions that are cheap, than to explore alternatives that might be more expensive but 
 by a ‘heavily interventionist, administratively pervasive and 
bureaucratically complex state’ (Lodge, 1995:196) that was not respectful of market-
determined interest rates, courted market distortions, and risked vertical and horizontal fiscal 
imbalances in the interests of a racist transformation project, i.e. the apartheid state (see 
Parnell, 1997). To dismiss this experience and/or not productively deconstruct it and its 
mechanics surely constitutes a gross error in public policy discourse and analysis. To dismiss 
the public rental option on economic grounds is also problematic.  
                                                 
106 For white, Indian and coloured low-income groups. 
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still within the range of possibilities’. Social housing was provided, he writes, under 
apartheid in an effective manner. Citing Khayelitsha, which won a prize for outstanding 
planning (from the ‘International Union of Architects’), he says:  
Leaving apart its segregated nature and purpose, and its location, the provision of 
fully serviced lots and solid walls and a roof, with room to expand, was done at not 
unmanageable cost. The units remained publicly owned, although residents were 
permitted to add to and expand, and did so; a lively informal market for units 
developed, but within bounds that could be largely policed by government (Marcuse, 
2004:np). 
The past does indeed hold messages to alternative developmental futures but only if we are 
prepared to ‘brush against the grain of history’ (Benjamin, 1969 cited in Gilly, 2003:277). 
And once again, the White Paper’s insistence on levelling the playing fields, privileging the 
market, delivery within a normalised market frame, and the (accompanying) residualisation 
of the public sector107
Even a cursory analysis shows that the financial sector has not supported employment 
creation either directly or, through its impact on investment patters, indirectly. Nor 
has it contributed adequately to meeting basic needs, particularly in terms of low 
income housing... It has not overcome patterns of discrimination on the basis of race 
and gender, and continues to neglect relatively depressed rural areas. Finally, the 
sector demonstrates a high degree of concentration, and the regulatory agencies have 
not been systematically restructured to ensure more openness and accountability 
(COSATU, 2001:9)  
makes no allowance for short-term market distorting interventions that 
would potentially deliver long-term gains - a key feature of the developmental state. Unlike 
apartheid and late-apartheid housing strategies that permitted interest rate subsidisation, the 
new government, wedded to the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis, fiscal conservatism, and the 
maintenance of favourable international credit ratings, envisaged no re-engineering of the 
oligopolistic and anti-developmental financial sector, whose economic sophistication and 
strength rests on a foundation furnished by a strong interventionist state, not market 
capitalism (as Lodge (1995) observes). The findings about the financial sector in the early 
1990s, still holds true today.  
Against this backdrop, it is indeed surprising that there is no provision made for some 
modicum of intervention in the financial sector, despite the RDP mooting the idea of 
community reinvestment legislation coupled to its extensive provisions on reforming the 
financial sector (see ANC, 1994:S 4.7) – and given that the housing policy is designed largely 
on the assumption that it would leverage private finance. The Record of Understanding 
(DOH, 1994b) – a ‘weak mechanism’ reliant on ‘publicity as the only means of enforcement 
or encouragement’ (Diamond, 2002:5) – depended entirely on bank self-regulation and even 
permitted the private sector to charge higher (than normal) interest rates to low-income 
people (DOH, 1994b:4). The proposal to reduce the costs of borrowing to the poor by 
spreading the burden of lending across the financial sector (cross-subsidisation between high 
and low income earners and loan products, for example) (see Diamond, 2002), is dismissed in 
                                                 
107 A theme revisited in the Conclusion 
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the ROU on the grounds that it would ‘diminish the ability of banks to operate in a 
competitive environment’ (DOH, 1994b:12). Even more bizarre are the many concessions 
afforded to banks in extending finance to areas considered ‘unstable’ and ‘risky’. The 
‘reinstatement of a habitable public environment’ referenced mainly to an ‘acceptable level 
of civil responsibility and behaviour’, ‘civil and criminal law enforcement’ and payment of 
service charges, rates and mortgage bonds, points to extent to which the government made 
concessions to the private sector, i.e. restructuring of the low-income areas along ‘business’ 
rather than ‘civil service principles’ (Mackay, 1995:140) with no guarantees that the private 
sector would deliver on its side of the bargain (the ROU).  
Section Three 
South Africa’s Commitment to a Development State?108
How the ANC came to settle on minimalism was the subject of the previous chapter. 
Germane to this discussion was that the omission from the White Paper of the various 
strategies proffered by the developmental state-influenced position papers and documents 
(e.g. MERG and RDP). This lays bare the commitment of the ANC to the establishment of a 
developmental state. A cursory examination of the interventions of the developmental state in 
the shelter sector reveals the hollowness and poverty of our shelter production and delivery 
approach.  
 
The ability to establish and maintain legitimacy through rapid growth and low inequality 
(‘shared virtues’ (Campos & Root, 1996:12)) is an important lesson from developmental 
states. Successful efforts were undertaken to ensure more equitable ownership and 
opportunities through the 1950s. The developmental states emphasised land reform, 
education and training support for small enterprise and the provision of housing and 
infrastructure. The state generally subsidised skills development, education, housing and 
transport. The high performance economies formulated and implemented housing and land 
development systems that rendered distributions of wealth and income more egalitarian, 
thereby contributing to economic growth rates (Pugh, 1997a:1557). Again, a defining feature 
of the developmental state in these sectors is that they have been ‘serious and effective’ in 
bringing public housing (and other facilities including schools, roads, health centres) to an 
expanding number of people (Leftwich, 1995:419). This was achieved by implementing 
precisely the type of interventions, which the White Paper omits, dismisses and ignores.  
In the developmental states of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, housing and 
land development systems are ‘typically dominated by state planning, overriding private 
interests’ (Doling, 1999). In Singapore and Hong Kong, land is owned by the state; and the 
Taiwanese and South Korean governments wield considerable control via manipulation of 
development rights. These arrangements have facilitated the ‘planned supply of land’ for 
shelter development and have also furnished these governments with leverage over the 
quality and size of dwellings produced. Strong controls over finance ensured containment of 
                                                 
108 A great many of the references in this section pertaining to South Africa’s political economy are drawn from 
the late 1990s. The choice is deliberate, given the intention to contest the ‘impossibility’ in this early period of 
democratic consolidation. They function to shore up the limits and contestation of mainstream thinking in this 
period. Later sections and chapters update these references and alert the reader to the continuity in thinking and 
academic writing, i.e. reinforcement of the impossibility thesis.  
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capital costs, replicability and going to scale. In the construction of dwellings, all four 
governments intervened extensively by way of subsidies, contracts and regulations to 
modernise industries with a view to reduce costs and enhance industrial efficiency. 
Summarily, the success of the shelter programmes in these developmental states can be 
attributed to ‘deep interventions’ – which the White Paper shies away from – in which 
government directly organised the ‘factors of production’ (Ibid: 234, 247) (see Box 2.2).  
Box 2.2: Developmental States and Shelter Interventions 
Singapore has mass (cross-subsidised) social housing programmes (rental and homeownership 
tenure). Housing is arranged in polycentric new towns. Government is empowered through legislation 
to acquire land below market value and, because land ownership can be threatened by state 
acquisition at any time, this reduces speculation. Finance for the housing programme is secured 
through the Central Provident Fund (CPF, a mandated employer-employee pension scheme). The CPF 
channels low-interest funds into the public sector to support the housing programme. In Taiwan, 
taxation of land value, the capturing of unearned increments in urban land development, and land 
acquisition provides resources for intensive redevelopment schemes in cities. Development is 
regulated by an extensive regional and city planning system. Finance to construct housing comes from 
a loan fund, supplemented by central government budget, which is then lent to provincial and city 
governments. The latter levy a land tax, the proceeds of which are used to purchase land and extend 
loans to households. Much of the publicly constructed housing is for sale with buyers benefiting from 
interest loan and property tax subsidies. In South Korea, legislation provides for the state 
appropriation of land below market prices. The unique method of land development provides for 
timeous land release and ‘recapture of development benefits’ enables reinvestment in other land 
development projects and combats speculation. The funding of the programme derives from state-
established organisations. The Housing Bank collects and allocates funds. The National Housing Fund 
raises funds from savings deposits, lottery funds and housing bonds. Housing (rental) for the poorest 
is funded directly from the state budget. In Hong Kong, almost all land is owned by government and 
only that not set aside for public housing and infrastructure is allocated through the market. The 
government employs land ownership to achieve other objectives; e.g. land cleared of squatter 
settlements and declared available for commercial development is sold via public auction to the 
highest bidder raising considerable money for the state. The capital cost of the housing programme is 
provided by government with almost 50% of the population residing in public rental stock. 
Major resistance, remarks Hartman (1998:240), to engaging with the fundamental flaws in 
the nation’s housing system may stem from society’s resistance to deal with race, and by 
implication in South Africa political economy issues. In the housing sector, the ANC was of 
the view that for the housing policy to have ‘credibility’, it was ‘essential that proposals 
should have the endorsement of the largely white professional, construction and financial 
community’ (Mackay, 1995:143). More generally, the ANC government, Leftwich 
(2000:141) argues, has been extremely careful in not threatening white economic interests or 
the interests of capital more generally. If one were to use the developmental state model to 
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suggest explanations for our failure to ensure rapid and equitable growth, the main arguments 
would be as follows.109
• Unlike the developmental states, South Africa’s main economic groups are based in 
mining
  
110 and related financial services, rather than manufacturing and trade, but with 
considerable inter-locking, inter-meshing and integration of mining, finance and 
manufacturing. South African authorities, writes Chang (1996), have been far too lenient 
in controlling and regulating interlocked firms which have unusually advanced 
capabilities to engage in transnational investment activities. In other words, they are ‘too 
internationalised’ to sufficiently benefit the national economy. Unless institutional 
constraints are put on their investment behaviours – not avoiding making unpleasant and 
unpopular decisions on the grounds of political expediency – it will be very difficult to 
regulate the outward flow of capital by the highly diversified conglomerates and their 
new-found allies in the politically powerful and financially hungry black empowerment 
camp, especially with accelerated financial liberalisation. Currently, this possibility seems 
to be completely ignored, for ‘obvious political reasons’ (Chang, 1996:17). From the late 
1990s, many economists (including die-hard free traders)111 and decision-makers began 
questioning the abolition of foreign exchange controls with the World Bank 
recommending ‘tighter financial regulation and where necessary, restrictions on capital 
flows’.112
 
 Indeed, those developmental states that maintained capital controls (e.g. 
Singapore) escaped the 1998 financial crises and their re-introduction in Malaysia 
enabled that economy to recover rapidly. It is for this reason why the iconoclastic 
economist, Paul Krugman (1998), proposed the (temporary) introduction of exchange 
controls, which would allow for a severing of the automatic link between the local 
currency and the domestic interest rates. Other economists moot the idea of ‘speed 
bumps’ in the form of a tax. First proposed by the Nobel Laureate James Tobin in the 
1970s, it comprises a small uniform tax on private foreign exchange transactions that 
disincentivises financial speculation, slows down the speed of global financial flows, and 
rolls back the volume of foreign exchange transactions (see Khan, 1999). Proponents of 
this view often point to Chile which, although is the sweetheart of the neoliberal 
establishment (see Box 2.3), introduced capital controls.  
 
 
 
                                                 
109 The heads of argument presented below are extracted from COSATU (2005).  
110 Taxation, tariffs and energy prices are historically structured to support mining. 
111 ‘It’s a lot of ideological humbug to say that without free portfolio capital mobility, somehow the world 
cannot function and growth rates will collapse’ (Jagdish Bhagwati - A Die-Hard Free Trader, cited in Mail & 
Guardian, 10 July 1998). 
112 Cited in Business Report, 3 December 1998. 
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Box 2.3: Chile: Neoliberal Poster Child? 
It is interesting to note that Chile mimicked many developmental state-type interventions, including 
keeping its largest export industry (copper) under state ownership; it has maintained capital controls 
on financial inflows through the 1990s (elaborated in Box 2.4 below); and extended significant 
technological, organisational and marketing assistance to its growing agro-industries (Rodrik, 
2003:16). Over a decade, Chile managed to halve its poverty level – from 45.1% in 1987 to 20.6% by 
2000. It has been reported that President Mbeki wishes to learn more about how Chile achieved this. 
‘We would send people here to see how Chile confronted this problem of poverty, how this success 
has been achieved in such a short space of time’; ‘After a decade of democracy, we have not achieved 
that level of success in our own country’ (Thabo Mbeki, cited in Sunday Times, 12 June 2005). 
Developmentalism, capital controls and the combination of pro-poor social policies (targeted 
programmes in nutrition, employment and housing – Pugh, 1995 & 1997a) are all components of the 
Chilean success. What South Africa will learn from Chile is debateable as the interventions 
undertaken there may appear a tad too radical for the local elite. 
The conservatives’ argument that controls inevitably lead to the contraction of capital inflows 
carries little weight in light of Chilean experience, which clearly demonstrates that countries 
can attract a significant volume of capital inflows, despite imposition of controls to 
discourage short-term speculative inflows (see Box 2.4).  
Box 2.4: Chile and Capital Controls 
In the early 1990s, Chile experienced a surge in capital inflows that created a conflict between 
maintaining a tight monetary policy and spurring export competitiveness. In 1991, the Central Bank 
imposed controls on capital inflows in the form of a one-year unremunerated reserve requirement on 
foreign credits. In simple terms, this meant that local firms, which borrowed from abroad, had to 
deposit 20% of the loan in the central bank – without interest – for one year. In 1992, the 20% reserve 
requirement on foreign loans was extended to foreign currency bank deposits. In May 1992, the 
required reserve ratio was increased to 30%. In July 1995, the reserve requirements were extended to 
all types of foreign investments in Chile. These controls helped the economy in many ways. Firstly, it 
discouraged short-term and speculative foreign capital inflows, as these became expensive. Secondly, 
long-term capital inflows increased as these measures encouraged firms to borrow for long-term 
purposes. Analysts found that these controls led to major changes in the composition of inflows, from 
short-term to long-term, without adversely affecting the overall volume of capital inflows. Thanks to 
the controls, the impact of the Mexican crisis of 1994 on the Chilean financial markets was almost 
negligible, even though other countries in the region were badly affected. In fact, the stable external 
financial position coupled with strong ‘economic fundamentals’ enabled Chile to become the first 
country in the entire Latin American region to obtain an investment rating of (A-) from Standard and 
Poor in 1995. Colombia in the 1990s followed Chilean policy measures to control foreign capital 
inflows (Singh, 1999). 
It is interesting to note that the ANC ‘steadfastly refused to introduce [the kind of] capital 
controls’ that proved successful in Chile and Malaysia. ‘The ANC feared that such a move 
would send a [wrong] signal to the market... and lead to an even bigger backlash’ (Gumede, 
2005:93). Following the conservative line, South Africa’s deregulation and liberalisation 
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have not succeeded in attracting significant amounts of foreign direct investment (but there 
has been considerable speculative investment). Additionally, it has facilitated net capital 
outflows and large companies moving their primary listings offshore.113 In the words of Mark 
Breedon, Senior Vice President of Alliance Capital, one of the largest asset management 
firms in the United States, primary listings offshore are ‘retrogressive’. Johannesburg could 
be a substantial financial centre in its own right if big companies were to stay – 
‘Johannesburg should not be regarded as a second best listing’, he said.114
Unlike the governments of the developmental states, South Africa has not really purposively 
prioritised equity-enhancing, employment creating growth in economic and social 
development programmes. There is a strong emphasis in government documents on 
enhancing competitiveness, with little reference to restructuring the economy through 
effective and dynamic ‘incentives’ so vital in re-orientating/diversifying the economy away 
from its strictly mining-finance base
 And here we arrive 
at one of the ironies of economic restructuring in South Africa, i.e. to the extent that this 
country faces national and international ‘constraints’, these are ‘exacerbated by the policy 
actions of government itself’ (Harris & Michie, 1995:6) who then argue that the ‘constraints’ 
render government powerless to break with existing path dependence (a theme returned to in 
the Conclusion). By exacerbating the constraints, the room for manoeuvrability becomes 
more limited and inequalities deepen (see earlier reference to Ritzen et al., 2000 of the World 
Bank).  
115
The reluctance to prioritise equitable growth is evident when contrasting engagements on 
sector strategies and the implementation of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). In the 
2000s, nearly every government department adopted policy documents referenced to BEE 
and drove BEE Charters in key sectors. There was considerably more difficulty in ensuring 
government commitment to sector strategies to ensure employment creation and more 
equitable ownership. Worse still, even in the BEE Charter negotiations, community and 
labour and business representatives have usually had to promote commitments to serve the 
majority and improve investment, with little encouragement from government whose focus 
has been more on ownership, control and employment equity, practically ignoring 
developmental initiatives (Makgetla, 2004). In the sphere of health, education, housing and 
household infrastructure programmes, government has not gone far enough in supporting 
equitable economic growth or alleviating poverty. 
 (this theme is revisited below). South Africa provides 
a ‘textbook example of inappropriate job-destroying capital-intensive production’ (Samson, 
1999:8). The pattern of capital and labour use is typical of industrialised economies with far 
lower unemployment rates (see Box 2.5 below).  
                                                 
113 In late 1998, as the recession was announced, Anglo American, South African Breweries, Liberty Life and 
Old Mutual announced plans to relocate their South African share listings to London (Bond, 1999). Implicated 
here are three of the six broadly-based organically-linked axes of capital dominating the financial sector. 
114 Cited in Business Times, 7 February 1999. 
115 Minerals and metals contribute two-thirds of exports but only 10% of gross domestic product and 
employment. Diversification within minerals will continue, with government efforts to support growth in the 
high end of the formal sector such as heavy chemicals and vehicles. With this structure of production, formal 
employment will grow slowly (about 1% a year), and unemployment will remain high. Should there however be 
a crash in commodity prices, redistribution will fall apart as both tax revenues and employment shrink 
(Makgetla in Business Day, 9 September 2005).  
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• Economic policy has adopted an export orientation – especially minerals and the capital 
intensive automotive sectors116 – but has not ensured a basis for local production ‘in an 
increasingly equitable, prosperous and protected domestic market’.117
 
 A disproportionate 
emphasis on the role of exports for long-term economic growth can frustrate the 
development of a viable domestic market and the economy’s ability to absorb ‘surplus’ 
labour. These are both important prerequisites for achieving sustainable growth. Indeed, it 
is a paradox that South Africa’s trade flows are dominated by capital-intensive exports 
and labour-intensive imports while unemployment levels are disturbingly high and rising.  
                                                 
116 The National Economic Development and Labour Council, (NEDLAC) report on the government’s Motor 
Industrial Development Programme (MIDP) reveals that the Programme has yielded benefits of R55bn to car 
manufacturers over the last decade. NEDLAC claims that the cost of the programme ‘may have outweighed its 
benefits to the country’. The report alleges that R22bn worth of the benefits went to two German luxury car 
makers and R37bn to four companies in the first eight years of the programme. The report says that the benefits 
of the programme in terms of employment and consumer interests have been overstated. Vehicles are less 
affordable under the MIDP than they would have been without the programme. Ten years into the programme, 
car makers in South Africa are still not competitive (cited in Business Day, 8 November 2005).  
117 Makgetla in Business Day, 17 June 2005. 
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Box 2.5: South Africa: Job-Destroying Capital-Intensive Production 
Some of reasons proffered for the imbalances in capital and labour use relate to distortions, 
unqualified admiration of inappropriate technology from industrialised countries, scarcity of skilled 
workers, imported consumer preferences that skew demand towards capital-intensive goods, and anti-
competitive behaviour by large South African conglomerates that undermine smaller labour-intensive 
enterprises. One study estimates two million job losses over the past 20 years from inappropriate 
capital intensity. Statistical analysis links this inappropriate capital and labour use to consistent under-
pricing of capital relative to labour (Samson, 1999). The absence of significant capital taxes supports 
the relative attractiveness of capital over labour, particularly since the weight of the tax structure falls 
on labour income and consumption. Stringent monetary policy that maintains the value of the rand 
also tends to keep the price of imported capital equipment from rising. Furthermore, the allocation of 
fixed capital is skewed within the economy. Certain industries are characterised by abundant labour-
saving capital, while others – particularly in the informal sector – lack adequate capital to effectively 
employ labour. Historically, public policy has encouraged relatively capital-intensive production 
rather than job-creating growth. The Katz Commission Interim Report, for instance, identified tax 
distortions that have lowered the user cost of capital and made labour relatively more expensive. 
These include skewed depreciation rules, investment allowances, payroll levies, registration fees, and 
the employment-discouraging manner in which the Secondary Tax on Companies has been 
implemented (Ibid). The cost of capital in South Africa does not reflect the true cost to society of 
diverting resources to employing machinery and equipment. Enterprises retrench workers, replacing 
them with automated machinery based on expected cost-benefit analysis that assesses the relative 
costs to the firm. The additional costs borne by society of increasing unemployment do not enter the 
calculation, yet they are very substantial, in terms of social safety net costs (both public and private) 
as well as increased crime and social unrest (a theme revisited below). Policy-induced measures to 
increase the cost of fixed capital constitute an essential ingredient of poverty-eradicating job creation 
and redressing market failure resulting from decades of generous capital subsidies. Calls and demands 
for higher wages tend to make capital expenditure relatively more attractive, reducing the 
employment of workers. While higher labour productivity will tend to offset this, it may be 
insufficient. Policies that directly increase the cost of capital can be an effective way to shift factor 
demand towards job creation. Such policies may include higher taxes, reduced subsidies, as well as a 
weaker rand. These policies would also have other benefits. The capital taxes and resources freed 
from eliminating capital subsidies can support social investment objectives. A weaker rand goes hand-
in-hand with lower interest rates, broadly supporting the objectives of poverty-eradicating job 
creation. In this scenario, government is advised by experts to implement policies that increase the 
price of capital relative to labour, thus shifting incentives towards more rapid job creation. Firms that 
restructure their production processes with the purpose of shedding labour should face the true cost to 
society of their contribution to increased unemployment. Protective labour legislation alone might be 
inadequate to achieve this objective, since increased protection for workers might discourage firms 
from hiring workers in the first place. Increasing the cost of fixed capital would discourage firms from 
substituting machines for workers in order to escape the costs of labour equity (Ibid). 
What is also surprising to learn is that the effect of non-gold, non-agricultural exports on 
employment are statistically insignificant (in fact, research in the late 1990s shows that 
employment losses have been comparatively larger in export-oriented sectors), while an 
increase in non-export output has significant effects on employment (Adelzadeh et al., 1998) 
(see Box 2.6 below). Something has gone profoundly awry when government extends 
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generous support to a capital-intensive export sector but is yet to prioritise investment and 
direct assistance to domestically-oriented enterprises that are potentially more employment-
generative. In contrast, governments in East Asia complemented their (labour-intensive) 
export orientation with a coherent domestic investment strategy that boosted private returns 
to capital, promoted entrepreneurialism and was employment-intensive.  
Box 2.6: South Africa’s Export-GDP Ratios 
Comparatively, it is notable that the export-GDP [gross domestic product] ratios of the North 
American, European and Asian countries have remained small, despite long-term growth and 
vigorous export promotion over numerous years. All these economies show that a high percentage of 
production is geared towards domestic use (consumption and investment). For example, the US and 
Japan’s share of exports of total output respectively averaged 8% and 10% on average between 1960 
and 1994. The corresponding ratio for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
countries was 15%. The average annual exports of India, Brazil, and South Korea hovered around 
16% of the GDP between 1960 and 1994. During the same period, South Africa’s non-gold, non-
agricultural export-GDP ratio averaged 22%, which is higher than all the countries above (Adelzadeh, 
et al., 1998). Moreover, empirical studies have shown that production for the domestic market is more 
job-creating than production for exports. Estimates for the US economy show that a 1% increase in 
non-export production creates almost twice as many jobs as a 1% increase in export production. This 
ratio is even larger for the United Kingdom and Italy, where an increase in non-export production 
generates four times and 3.4 times more jobs than similar increases in production for exports, 
respectively (Ibid). The existing export-oriented strategy of South Africa might explain the country’s 
recent experience of jobless growth as domestic consumption demand is increasingly being satisfied 
from labour-intensive imports. 
• Monetary policy has concentrated more on maintaining inflation targets (rather than 
currency manipulation to support exports). The developmental states of Asia consistently 
held down the value of the currencies to limit imports and stimulate exports. This was 
coupled to substantial financial support and tariff protection for industries, which enabled 
them to compete on the basis of dynamic competitiveness rather than comparative 
advantage deriving from currency fluctuations. Tight deficit reduction targets add further 
to our woes. The Poverty and Inequality Report (May, 1998) supported this finding, and 
was highly critical of GEAR reaching its targets, and its ability to generate the necessary 
growth and investment to address poverty and inequality. The authors of the Report argue 
that the fiscal and monetary policies necessary to restrict inflation to any single digit may 
reduce employment opportunities and real income in the short term. GEAR asserted that 
raising the deficit above 5% will ‘crowd out’ investment, but the Report stated that 
government investment in urban and rural infrastructure and human resources would 
‘crowd in’ private sector investment (a theme discussed below). These authors argued 
that rapid budgetary compression could constrain government in reducing poverty and 
inequality. The high real interest rate regime can lead to demand contraction, depressed 
output and lower job creation. Moreover, public sector restructuring, if not strategically 
managed and implemented, can whittle away existing state capacity – the institutional and 
policy support so critical to enhancing the economy-wide net employment effects of any 
growth path (see UNDP, 2003). 
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Unlike in the developmental states, government has not ensured direct benefit to workers and 
communities from economic growth, spawning persistent conflict in workplaces and 
communities. Shared growth has remained elusive in South Africa. Although the government 
has used the budget to redistribute resources (more effectively though in income transfers 
rather than asset creation and accumulation by the poor), income earned from employment 
and ownership has remained highly inequitable. From 1993 to 2002, the share of profits 
increased while employee compensation declined (Makgetla, 2004). In contrast, the early 
phases of industrialisation in East Asian developmental states witnessed rapid improvements 
in workers pay in real terms, although from a low base. Keeping the cost of living down 
through subsidised housing, education, transport and relatively cheap food boosted the wage. 
Undervaluation of the currency reduced pay in foreign terms, but did not raise living costs, 
and non-tariff obstacles blocked imported goods.  
In contrast, apartheid settlement patterns and concentrated farming118
• On the institutional front, the defining characteristics of the developmental state is the 
concentration of power, autonomy and capacity at the apex of the state to ‘pursue and 
encourage the achievement of explicit development objectives whether by ‘establishing 
and promoting the conditions of economic growth’ and/or ‘organising it directly’ 
(Leftwich, 2000:155). This is a state comprising a determined developmental elite with 
some measure of relative autonomy and staffed by a powerful, competent and insulated 
economic bureaucracy (Leftwich, 1995:405). But this type of bureaucratic rationality and 
ethos and its effective deployment depends critically on the ‘apportionment of power 
among state policy agencies’. And here the notion of ‘internal cohesiveness’ is critical. In 
order to promote or organise directly the conditions for development, the developmental 
state was able to act as a corporate entity with ‘broadly collective goals, rather than a sum 
of the individual strategies of the functionaries’ (Chibber, 2002:952). This internal 
cohesiveness of the developmental state was normally secured through the creation of 
 and retail systems 
increase the cost of basic necessities. High unemployment and high dependency ratios render 
it impossible to reduce worker’s salaries. Inequalities in opportunity, distorted and deficient 
human capital formation and weak institutions through which the poor can express voice 
undermines social mobilisation around economic growth and improved access to basic needs 
and services. This largely rules out the generation of trust, collaboration and deal making 
around a social contract between state and society of the kind encountered in early stages of 
industrialisation in East Asian developmental states. Such a compact provides for societal 
compliance to a politically- driven and state-directed economic development path in return 
for rising incomes and basic needs provision.  
                                                 
118 Dynamic smallholder agriculture, rather than large-scale commercial agriculture, has been one of the 
foundations for growth in East Asia. Land distribution in most of East Asia is more equal than in the African 
and Latin American regions. As a result, poor rural producers have had access to one of the productive assets 
needed to take advantage of market opportunities and contribute to economic growth, which in turn is strongly 
correlated with poverty reduction. Countries where land ownership patterns are highly unequal have suffered on 
both counts. World Bank research suggests that of those countries with the most unequal distribution of land, 
only two (out of the total of 15) have sustained growth rates in excess of 2.5% a year (cited in Watkins, 1998). 
Research confirms the negative impact of concentrated asset ownership for growth and poverty in Latin 
America. According to the Washington-based Inter-American Development Bank, asset distribution has been 
the single most significant influence on growth in the region, retarding overall economic performance by about 
2% per annum (Ibid).  
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powerful planning agencies to which all other state departments were accountable, guided 
by and which had the power to approve or reject policies and programmes. This 
prevented the slide into predatory practices by sectoral departments and individual 
functionaries, and the wastage of resources through a lack of selectivity in development 
policies (Ibid:955). The RDP held that the inherited apartheid state suffered from 
‘excessive departmentalism leading to uncoordinated, sometimes contradictory, decision-
making by various state agencies’ (ANC, 1994:S6.1.1.1).  
Strategic intervention in social and economic development (S 5.2.4) – via the state exercising 
a leading and enabling role in reshaping the economy (S 4.2.3) – required democratisation 
and building of the requisite capacity to intervene effectively. Accordingly, provision was 
made in the RDP for the establishment of structures to ‘manage policy and determine 
spending priorities within a strategic perspective’ and to ‘coordinate resources and actions’ (S 
6.2.2.1; S 6.2.2.2). These structures would elaborate planning frameworks and envisaged was 
the allocation of ‘real powers of coordination and appropriate budgets’ (S 6.3.2). The national 
RDP structure ‘should also have oversight of inter-governmental financial transfers…to 
ensure that these are in conformity with overall national objectives of the RDP’ (S 6.3.2). 
Regrettably, instead of the government establishing a planning agency that exercised real 
leverage and control over government departments, a co-ordinating agency was established in 
the Office of the Presidency (the RDP Office) with little power to rein in and control line 
departments, a small budget, a limited staff complement, no systems to manage state 
spending, and with no power to lead and influence economic policy.  
After the closure of the RDP office in 1996, co-ordination shifted to the Treasury, which had 
no truck with heterodox economic thinking and institutional restructuring, being in the main 
relatively finance-driven and conservative (centred on such goals as deficit reduction, fiscal 
stability and systems maintenance). The establishment of the Co-ordination and 
Implementation Unit (CIU) in the Office of the President and its successor, the Policy Co-
ordination Advisory Services (PCAS) did not help matters. Although these entities had more 
professional and competent personnel and dedicated funding through the increased 
Presidential budget, their remit was, and remains, confined to oversight, monitoring and co-
ordination, rather than leadership, guidance and control over the state apparatus and the 
direction of economic development (COSATU, 2005). 
The discussion above spans post-apartheid South Africa’s industrial strategy, monetary and 
fiscal policies, economic and social development programmes and distributional regimes. It 
points to the reluctance of the state to engage with the real materialities of power related to, 
amongst others, political expediency, strategic (mis)calculation, and fear of negative investor 
sentiment. What emerges quite clearly is the yawning gap between rhetorical and actual 
commitments to constructing and establishing a developmental state (of sorts). But 
developmental states, as pointed out above, are not available on demand nor had to order, not 
least because of differing economic structures and conditions, political milieu and reform 
imperatives that affect particular constellations of economic interests.  
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Section Four 
South Africa is Different – Challenges and Opportunities  
We are not Asian Tigers  
Economists almost never question their ability to come up with general rules about 
society. In their eyes, a path of development that worked in Germany or Singapore 
must also apply in SA. This is methodologically dubious at best, since it is impossible 
to isolate economic factors and development strategies the way scientists can isolate 
an element or a reaction in a lab.119
The South African economy differs very markedly from other middle-income countries. It is 
one of the most inequitable countries in the world; it is dependent on commodity exports to 
an extent comparable to far less developed countries and is highly capital-intensive; it has 
unusually high levels of unemployment; consumes almost twice as much energy; and almost 
three times as much electricity as other middle-income countries.  
  
For much of the past 25 years, SA’s peculiar economic structure has been associated 
with low investment and slow growth [and high levels of unemployment]. In recent 
years, the international commodity boom has boosted overall economic expansion to 
about 4% a year. This is still slower than other middle income countries, however. 
Investment continues to account for less than 20% of GDP, compared to 25% in 
comparable economies. In short, the twin legacies of apartheid and mining still 
largely shape SA’s economy. In seeking to initiate shared growth, the challenge is to 
find ways to modify these deep-seated structures in sustainable ways towards broad-
based empowerment and greater social justice.120
Imitating the strategies employed by the developmental state would be extremely difficult 
given the rules of the World Trade Organization. But ‘there are possibilities in the current 
framework’, according to a 2005 interview with the Deputy of Minister of Trade and Industry 
who chairs an expert group on industrial policy feeding into government plans to push 
economic growth past 6% while reducing poverty and unemployment.
  
121
Changing deep seated economic structures in a rapidly changing international environment 
presents not inconsiderable challenges. But it is highly ‘unlikely that it is possible in the 
modern world for any society to make a speedy and successful transition from poverty 
without a state that in some senses corresponds to [the] model of a developmental state’ 
(Leftwich, 2000:169). ‘Without such states’, writes Leftwich (1995:421), ‘transitions [from 
poverty] may be slow but the human cost immense’. Thus, despite rising levels of 
government expenditure on social and economic services, the extent and depth of poverty in 
SA remains staggering (see Bhorat, 2001; UNDP, 2003;  Bhorat, 2004; Bhorat et al., 2005; 
  
                                                 
119 Makgetla in Business Day, 7 October 2005. 
120 Ibid.  
121 Interview, Mail & Guardian, 30 September–6 October 2005. 
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Bhorat & Kanbur, 2005; Bhorat & Kanbur, 2006; Bhorat, 2007; and various issues of 
SACN’s State of Cities Report[s]) .  
It is against this backdrop that the new democratic state has to achieve three major tasks, i.e. 
correcting the gross inequalities by undertaking broad based redistribution, promoting rapid 
economic growth and maintaining democratic stability. In other words, the South African 
class-compromised state has to negotiate the  
…structural contradiction between the conservative requirements of stable democratic 
survival [incremental, consensual and accommodationist politics] and the 
transformative logic of economic growth [that to be successful must transform 
economic and social structures and being a junior partner122
Pieterse and van Donk (2002:9) refer to this as the ‘insoluble contradictions of being an 
aspirant democratic developmental state’ which, labouring under a host of constraints 
associated with elite pacting and constitutional and political compromises, has produced slow 
growth rates and conservative economic/development praxis. The compromises and pact that 
underpin the democratic process ‘necessarily limit[s]’ (Leftwich, 2002:78) state autonomy to 
craft appropriate developmental policies and institutions to drive them. This is compounded 
by inexperienced leadership that frequently misjudges the balance of class forces, erring on 
the ‘side of caution rather than radicalism, as evidenced in the adoption of conservative 
macroeconomic policy choices’ (Pieterse & Donk, 2002:9).  
does not help this cause] 
which the new or old democracies must survive and ultimately transcend if they are to 
become effective developmental democracies (Leftwich, 2002:56–7). 
The contradictions emanating from balancing the structural imperatives of transformation 
within democratic frameworks have come in some post-apartheid institutional reform 
imaginaries to be polarised around the democratic state versus the developmental state. The 
former is associated with the amplification of democratic voice, participation in public policy 
formulation, greater inclusiveness of vulnerable groupings, and transparent decision-making. 
The latter relates to transforming the state via improving managerial effectiveness, 
technocratic efficiency, and the streamlining of procedures and processes for the delivery of 
goods and services. Fakir (2005:3) regards this polarisation as misguided:  
The need for a developmental state that emphasises performance, managerialism, 
technical and bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness, and institutional 
rationalisation and transformation must co-exist with the idea of a democratic state 
that creates a voice for the poor and marginalised, that promotes, enhances and 
protects the rights of citizen that accrue but pursues the obligations owed to it by 
citizens, and which inculcates diversity, responsiveness and representation and 
representativity, the institutional separation of powers and functions, transparent 
decision making, accountability and effective oversight.  
                                                 
122 The class compromise and the pacted nature of the settlement, asserts Terreblanche (2003), witnessed the co-
option of the present government as a junior partner in a compact of power wherein the (mainly white) corporate 
sector is the senior partner.  
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Leaving aside for the moment this rather limited understanding of real world developmental 
states, the evidence suggests that ‘regulated’ (e.g. limited popular sovereignty, low 
participation, state defined institutionalised channels of engagement) and consolidated 
democracies ‘appear to be have been more successful developmentally than those where 
greater political equality and participation have been the norm’ (Leftwich, 2002:74). The 
democratic deficit in our institutional structures and the shutting out of the poor (discussed 
below) may perhaps function to ‘make the authoritative decisions both to redress the 
inherited social and economic imbalances, and to compete in the global market place to 
ensure economic growth’ (Jenkins, 2002:114).  
Despite the government’s commitment to the establishment of a developmental state to 
transform the economy and redress past imbalances in a possibly ‘regulated democracy’, a 
crucial component of which resides in the utilisation of the ‘power of the state to discipline 
and direct capital’ (Vavi, 2005:22), it chooses to negotiate transformation on the terms 
dictated by conservative forces. All the while, government is cognisant of conflict that 
emanates from ‘democratising while keeping the structures of inequality within society and 
further entrenching them, a minority having monopoly of that access to these resources’ 
(President Mbeki, 2005b:8). Although the pacted democratisation ‘serves to define and limit 
the ways the new government can implement social and economic reform’ (Lodge, 
1995:195), ‘South Africa has fairly effective governance, in part a consequence of the state’s 
high degree of social autonomy’.  
For the most part, officials conduct their routine transactions with the public honestly. 
Tax collection is efficient, as is the financial management of most central government 
departments. Until the mid-1980s, government’s administrative reach was extensive, 
despite the breakdown of influx control… The state’s social presence is facilitated by 
highly developed communications. Until the late 1980s, government welfare 
provision was expanding and its expenditure today [1991] continues to exceed the 
budgetary allocation to security. State-sponsored research and development, though 
insufficient, still puts the country in a different league of technological and scientific 
capacity to the rest of the continent. Notwithstanding its bureaucratic shortcomings 
and the possible political hostility of many of its personnel, the state still represents an 
effective instrument for the implementation of reformist programmes (Lodge, 
1995:196). 
Social autonomy of the state, the legacy of an activist/developmental state (with tried, tested 
and proven forms of effective intervention)123
                                                 
123 It is interesting to note that many of the interventions effected by the apartheid (activist) state to build 
Afrikaner-influence and power in the economy (see below), are similar to the ones proposed by COSATU 
(2005), with some even practised and legislated by the ANC of today, albeit in a watered down/less aggressive 
manner. Under the National Party, the notion of ‘an activist state’ was put into play – a state that  
 and the ANC’s electoral strength endowed the 
...would actively and often forcibly intervene in social and economic affairs…The apartheid 
state…intervened to assist with the survival and creation of new Afrikaner-owned businesses, and to 
support the growth of Afrikaner interests generally. Through a concerted affirmative action programme 
it augmented the Afrikaner capitalist class and advanced Afrikaners in all spheres of life. Government 
bank accounts were moved to an Afrikaner-controlled bank, government contracts were handed to 
Afrikaner-owned firms, Afrikaners were appointed to serve in and head scores of state department, top 
bureaucratic and military posts, official boards and commissions. Cultural production by Afrikaners 
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new state, notwithstanding pacts and compromises, and with not insignificant power to craft 
an alternative development path. This finding is bolstered when combined with the insight (in 
hindsight) that the government ‘had more than enough opportunity to come up with 
alternatives’. ‘A more differentiated and strategic approach to South African business’ would 
have found a substantial ‘real economy bloc of industrialists, and those involved in 
construction, civil engineering and infrastructure quite prepared to support an expansionary 
approach’ (Gumede, 2005:94) buttressed also by writings of the International Monetary Fund 
(see Lachman & Bercuson, 1992), whose three policy scenarios for South Africa concluded 
that a rise in the fiscal deficit to 12% of GDP is sustainable because the higher growth pattern 
will gradually generate more public savings such that by the year 2000 the country will 
experience fiscal surplus (also see Edwards, 1998).  
But the dictating of ANC policy by the ‘financial bloc of the South African economy’ led to 
privileging of ‘financial stabilisation over any prioritisation of social development’ thereby 
restricting  
…key elements of local capital that would have benefited from a more robustly 
implemented redistribution and could have assisted in developing a consensus bloc 
around social transformation. For example, instead of cutting taxes by about R72 
billion in the first ten years, that amount could have been used to address the housing 
problem. The direct investment in infrastructure would have surely spun off a wide 
range of increased economic activity and indirect job creation, while at the same time 
generating increased tax revenues to compensate the fiscus (Gumede, 2005:94).124
At the base of the failure of the ANC government to chart an alternative course and bridge 
the gap between rhetorical and real commitment to installing a social transformation state is a 
misconceptualisation about how the developmental state is to be constructed and the motor 
forces driving it. On the one hand, one frequently encounters the senior ANC leadership 
decrying the market, globalisation and the ‘Washington Consensus’, and its inability to meet 
the needs of the poor (Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel at Commonwealth Finance 
Ministers’ Meeting, September 1998 and cited in Khan, 1999; President Mbeki, Summit of 
Non-Aligned Movement, September 1998 cited in Gumede, 2005; President Mbeki, 2005b). 
On the other hand, statements are encountered to the effect that the ‘private sector must and 
will play a central and decisive role in the struggle to achieve many of the [transformation] 
objectives’ (Mandela, 1999 cited in Gumede, 2005:79). In the ANC discussion document, 
widely understood to be inspired by Mbeki and unveiled a few months after GEAR 
(November) – The State and Social Transformation (ANC, 1996) – it is argued that the state 
should be a ‘neutral referee between business, labour and other social groups’ (cited in 
Gumede, 2005:89), and proposes the establishment of a dialectical relationship with private 
capital as a social partner for development and social progress (ANC, 1996: S 5.16). No 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
was encouraged and widely disseminated through a range of cultural bodies, festivals and publishers 
(Marais, 1998 cited in McKinley & Verriawa, 2005:16; also see Gelb, 1991).  
124 On the other hand, whether the state could spend the additional revenue is a point frequently trotted out by 
conservatives and progressives alike. But proponents of this view say little about the weakening of the state and 
its dismemberment orchestrated by GEAR and (associated) poorly thought through public service downsizing. 
This was recognised by President Mbeki in 2005 when he conceded the ‘failure of doing more with less’ (in 
respect of the downsized public service) (cited in Cape Argus, 14 February 2005). 
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reference is made in the document of the consequences (with respect to government action) 
that may follow should capital not co-shoulder transformation and reconstruction imperatives 
with the state. 
Section Five  
Misconceptualising/ Misunderstanding Developmental State Construction  
Underlying much of the global and SA thinking related to the developmental state is the 
‘assumption that national capitalists are a natural ally for initiating rapid development’ 
premised on ‘three [taken for granted] stylised facts’ about post-war development strategies. 
Firstly, centred on the idea of rapid industrialisation and catching up, governments strived to 
mould their policies around the successes of the previous generations of late developers that 
placed industry at the centre of their development strategies. This was to be accomplished 
through import restriction and heavy subsidisation of firms. Secondly, industrialisation was to 
be driven as a project between modernising political elites, state managers and domestic 
capital – with ‘some measure of inclusion for labour as well’. Thirdly, within the alliance 
between state and business, the state assumed the role of ‘senior partner’. But these strategies 
in many supposedly developmental states failed to deliver the results and the (over-
simplified) reason offered is that the state lacked the capacity to carry out the task of 
modernisation (Chibber, 2004:147–8).  
Although the lack of state capacity undoubtedly looms large in any assessment of poor 
performance, the more pertinent question is why the state did not purposively and 
deliberately build the necessary institutions and capacities for executing a developmental 
project? For Chibber (2004:149), the ‘main source of resistance to building strong and supple 
policy apparatuses turned out to be the national bourgeoisie itself’. While capitalists in many 
failed developmental states welcomed and benefited from protection and subsidies, they 
resisted attempts at capitalist planning, or what in technocratic language would be described 
as ‘system-wide economic management’. Industrialisation strategies and state management of 
industrial development (which the government planners and progressives saw as 
complementing each other) were actually in ‘deep tension with each other’. In other words, 
domestic capital wanted to reap super-profits and secure monopolies (through protection and 
subsidisation) but had ‘no proclivity to invest in those lines’ deemed by planners to be ‘best 
for long term growth’ and robust development. Over the years, public subsidisation and 
socialisation of the risks of accumulation gave these firms virtual monopolistic control of 
domestic markets but with little to no compulsion to innovate (for new value chains) and re-
invest to upgrade existing plant and equipment.  
Market dominance obviated the need to minimise costs. It made better sense, instead, 
to use the resources to start operations in altogether new lines and acquire a ‘first 
mover’ advantage there. What made this especially attractive was that industrial firms 
in the leading ‘late developing countries’ were typically part of large, diversified 
business groups, which had expertise in numerous sectors, and maintained diverse 
investment portfolios. For the national bourgeoisie, ISI [import substitution 
industrialisation] thus presented the possibility of enormous economic gains. The 
problem was that, in order to maximise these gains, it made good economic sense to 
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accept ISI’s subsidisation component, while rejecting the ambitions of state managers 
to control what industrialists did with the subsidies.  
In sum, whereas planners saw ISI and industrial policy as two sides of the same coin, 
for capitalists, ISI generated an incentive to reject the discipline of industrial policy. 
Those institutions intended to further the subsidisation process were supported by 
capital; but dimensions of state-building aimed at enabling planners to monitor and 
regulate firms’ investment decisions were stoutly resisted. At the surface level, the 
conflict between the national bourgeoisie and economic planners was not always 
apparent. It was common to find industrialists joining the chorus calling for planning, 
economic management and the like. But what they meant by this was a process in 
which public monies were put at their disposal, and at their behest. To them planning 
meant the socialisation of risk, while leaving private appropriation of profit intact. 
Business groups in these countries accordingly waged a campaign in which they 
called for, and supported, central co-ordination of economic policy while at the same 
time fighting strenuously against measures which would give the planners any real 
power over their investment decisions (Chibber, 2004:151, original emphasis).  
More research is required to assess the applicability of this argument to the SA context as 
apartheid created a peculiar industrial structure. The state did not intervene to push industry 
into a selected growth path. A ‘distance/dependency’ relationship existed between capital and 
state (see Box 2.7 below), with business today resistant to any form of state direction of the 
economy while at the same time continuing to ‘expect the state to secure for it lower labour 
costs’ and ‘ease micro-economic constraints on investment’. This ranges from the  
 …hassle of regulation, inefficient utilities, poor telecommunications, the price of 
insurance when crime is high, all the way through to the costs of moving goods 
around a congested city road network, [and]… a chorus around the opportunity costs 
of an exchange rate that does not allow for local goods and services to be priced at 
competitive international rates (ANC, 2005a:13).  
There is no doubt validity in many of these concerns, and they need to be addressed. But little 
is said in capital’s continued call for lowering labour costs and easing the constraints of the 
crippling costs to the economy and society of a large under-/un-employed population with 
respect to welfare, housing and health expenditure, as well as increasing crime and social 
unrest.125
                                                 
125 Many international investors are worried about the about social upheaval resulting from frustrated 
expectations, persistent unemployment and inequality (Business Day, 28 June 2001). 
 Once again, it seems as if capital expects of the state to carry this cost whilst 
simultaneously extending economic infrastructure and reducing labour costs. This amounts to 
nothing more than a continuation of the socialisation of risk and costs to support 
accumulation strategies that are out of kilter with job creation and poverty eradication 
objectives. Business’s excessive focus on lowering costs and addressing constraints is quite 
disingenuous in that it portrays them as ‘perfectly machined local firms…held back because 
of cost constraints imposed on them unnecessarily from outside’ (Ibid), when in actual fact 
they are lethargic and unimaginative, i.e. bereft of any competitive innovative capability and 
capacities. This runs the ‘risk that the local economy will be excused responsibility to invest 
in future economic growth drivers’ (Ibid). The challenge of redirecting the ‘local economy 
from a growth path established under apartheid’ (Ibid), towards one based on investment in 
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human development, stimulating sustainable demand, maximising job creation and 
investment in ‘future productive capacity, entrepreneurship, innovation’ (Ibid) is thus 
displaced.  
Box 2.7: Industrialisation in South Africa: Distance/Dependency 
Industrialisation in South Africa was based on import substitution, production for a small and 
buttressed white home market, and export of primary commodities. Trade policy was used as a 
vehicle to promote rapid output growth and industrial expansion by concentrating on consumer goods 
production. These industries thrived behind high protective barriers on ‘booming white incomes, and 
diversified into more complex durable products’ (Hirsch, 2005:22). There were low effective 
protection rates on capital equipment and intermediate goods, encouraging importation and actively 
discouraging local production. The latter was paid for by mineral exports. These policies facilitated 
rapid industrial expansion and growth but simultaneously increased the country’s fragile and 
unpredictable mineral exporting dependence on the world economy (Gelb, 1991). The wage relation 
was based on rigid apartheid differentiation, with social reproduction costs maintained at artificially 
low rates. Because the costs to the state of ‘serving African residents in under-developed townships 
were kept artificially low, industry costs of location and urban services were indirectly subsidised’ 
(ANC, 2005a:9). The success of state in regard to labour suppression and cost containment; the 
protection of domestic firms behind high tariffs and incentives; and the insulated domestic market 
provided industrialists with rich pickings for many decades but at the expense of the development of a 
robust employment-intensive export sector, a highly-capital intensive and inefficient manufacturing 
sector, and high unemployment (Nattrass, 1992). The relationship between the capital to the state was 
characterised by distance/dependency, i.e. the state protected national capital interest’s in ensuring 
cheap labour, provided cheap and concessionary finance (served through patronage networks as well), 
and protected the domestic market but attempted no radical restructuring of capital in order to ensure 
its international competitiveness. There was, unlike in the other developmental states, no interlocking, 
intermeshing and interaction between the state and capital (Morris & Padayachee, 1989:70–2). 
The post-apartheid government’s deployment of its incentive system to support and direct 
industrial transformation seems to date to have met with little success but have brought 
windfall profits to some manufacturers. According to the Deputy Minister of Trade and 
Industry (2005), the incentive regime is ‘seen to have been too broad’; ‘the criteria too 
general’; ‘little evidence that the right people have accessed them, or that we have seen the 
right conduct from those who have’, and ‘there is also the sense that the scale hasn’t been 
sufficient’.126
                                                 
126 Interview, Mail & Guardian, 30 September–October 2005. 
 The incentives have not arrested poor manufacturing sector performance with 
no measurable impact on aggregate total manufacturing investment, aggregate foreign 
investment in manufacturing, geographical location of manufacturing activity, and increasing 
the share of smaller companies in the manufacturing sector (Kaplan, 2003:2). In fact, the 
incentives have continued to ‘foster the capital intensity of production, at the expense of 
encouraging employment potential’.  
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As a result, the mainstream of the economy, i.e. the private sector, has remained on 
the same comparative advantage path as before, resulting in increasing capitalisation 
of production activities and corresponding direct job losses (UNDP, 2003:10).  
Increased capitalisation and rising unemployment has been associated with a falling share for 
labour in national income accounts. In 2002, remuneration accounted for 51% of national 
income, the ‘lowest level in any year since records began in 1946 except for 1980… Labour’s 
share fell particularly sharply in 1999–2002, [while] profits rose from 29% to 34% of 
national income’ (Makgetla, 2004:265). The possibilities of changing the relative shares of 
labour and capital and re-orienting the industrial path will no doubt be resisted. As 
demonstrated above, even mildly redistributive actions in selected areas of economic activity 
have been resisted by capital, eliciting ‘immediate reaction from investors…through the stock 
market and by voicing their dissatisfaction in the media’ (Mhone, 2003:49).  
The private sector is also well aware of the fact that the ANC’s renewed commitment to the 
developmental state will not lead to any real pressure being applied on it and will not impact 
too much on their business-as-usual approach. Confidence that the political economy will not 
be tampered with too much resides in assurances provided by the ANC’s top leadership that 
achieving transformation through a developmental state  
…does not mean importing models from other areas of development in other parts of 
the world. Rather, it means creating the capacity within the state to lead and direct 
development in the context of South Africa’s unique realities. Some of the 
developmental states in Asia pursued their vision of economic development in the 
absence of democracy. With powerful support of global powers, they were able to 
dragoon and coerce society towards their development goals... (Ngonyama, Head of 
Presidency of the ANC, 2005:2, emphasis added). 
If the national bourgeoisie in the late industrialisers worked to sink the developmental state, 
the state in alliance with industrialists were united in the belief that ‘national development 
could not be trusted to the labouring poor’ (Chibber, 2004:155) and went about actively 
demobilising civil society, focusing particularly on the labour movement either through their 
outright exclusion from the policy-making process and/or (selective) inclusion through 
corporatist frameworks. But this demobilisation worked to shift the balance of power in 
favour of business, ‘narrowing further the political space, and increasing the ability of capital 
to set the terms for policy and state-building’. While not lost to state managers that ‘an 
alliance with a mobilised labour force might have bolstered their leverage against a resistant 
business class’ (Ibid); they dithered acting upon it.  
And in this context, South Africa makes the same errors. Not only did the dominance of pre- 
and post-apartheid corporatist stances lead to the substantial demobilisation of civil society 
(Pieterse, 2002), but any questioning of the ANC’s economic policy direction by trade unions 
and other social formations have been met by fierce criticism and spirited rebukes by senior 
members of the ANC. Mbeki went so far in mid-1998 as to accuse COSATU of being 
misinformed and opposed to change when they criticised GEAR, threatening to deny them 
access to interaction with government ‘unless they changed tack’ (Gumede, 2005:94).  
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Centralisation of decision-making (a key theme of the Mbeki presidency)127 has tended to 
insulate economic policy-making from pressures within the alliance and public debate has 
been stifled128 by the labelling of dissenters as ‘ultra-leftists’ (Friedman, 2004c:179). 
Secretary-General of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi, has complained that business has more 
access to the state and has played a key role in the construction of economic policy. Labour, 
on the other hand, encounters a state that adopts a ‘hands-off approach’, ‘refusal to engage’, 
‘adoption of hostile positions’ and sometimes casting them as presenting a ‘threat to the 
transition itself’. This combination, remarks Vavi, has led to a ‘marginalisation of labour as a 
key partner in transition’ (Vavi, 2005:14).129
Centralisation of decision-making, the insulation of economic policy making from civil 
society, the vilification of dissenters, the deference afforded foreign business (through 
Mbeki’s hand-picked International Investment Council),
  
130 and the alienation of organised 
labour has produced a ‘public climate less favourable to growth [131
                                                 
127 Some analysts say that at the core of the conflict in the succession battle between Zuma and Mbeki is the 
latter’s centralising, aloof and autocratic management style. Constituencies have crystallised around Zuma (the 
ANC Youth League, COSATU and fractions of the Communist Party) longing for the ‘sympathetic, inclusive, 
tolerant and consultative leadership style President Mbeki so signally lacks’. Zuma is ‘popular principally as a 
rallying point for opponents of Mbeki’s leadership style’. As one ANC National Executive Committee member 
said: ‘Any decision Mbeki makes now is perceived with suspicion… We realise that we gave the president too 
much power and he abused it’ (Mail & Guardian, 7 October–13 October 2005; Mail & Guardian, 14 October–
20 October 2005; Mail & Guardian, 28 October–3 November 2005).  
] by depriving the 
governing party of an important asset – the support of its allies, labour most of all’ 
128 Mbeki has been accused of systematically shutting down opposition in both the Alliance and the country at 
large. He has accused perceived ANC rivals of plotting against him and his life. He has even had the ‘effrontery 
to tell towering figures such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu to shut up’ (Mail & Guardian, 28 October–
3 November 2005).  
129 As a Business Day editorial remarked on 18 October 2005: Mbeki’s ‘autocratic style of leadership has meant 
many people who should be key allies – such as COSATU’s Zwelinzima Vavi – have been left out in the cold, 
notably on policy decisions. Incredibly, Mbeki has never had a one-on-one meeting with Vavi, the executive 
head of the ANC’s biggest political ally’.  
130 The elite is more disposed to listen to and accommodate international business than its own grassroots 
supporters, alternative voices in the Tripartite Alliance, local development activists, and the parliamentary 
opposition. The considerable leverage exercised by foreign business over government – likely to increase, given 
the increasing internationalisation of South African businesses and increasing foreign ownership of domestic 
enterprise (Rumney, 2005:415) raises very searching and profound questions about nature of the 
democratisation project and the future identity of our politics. As Steven Friedman, ex-Director of the Centre for 
Policy Studies remarked in 2001:  
And so we have arrived at a situation in which the most effective check on a democratically elected 
government is not the voters who chose it but foreigners who own wealth. It should hardly need saying 
that, if the government is indeed showing a respect for foreign business interests that is largely denied 
locals, this is a problem for democracy… [G]overnment checked only by international business… is 
hardly guaranteed to always produce pressure for the government that is open, fair and meets the needs 
of citizens… [O]n pragmatic grounds as well as principle, democrats including those who favour free 
markets should see government willingness to lend an ear to foreign business rather than its own voters 
not as a solution, but as part of a serious problem (cited in Khan, 2003:6). 
131 For Rodrik (1998a), heightened political conflict and social instability through the discouragement of debate 
and the exclusion from policy making circles of those most likely to lose from economic reform harms growth 
prospects. 
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(Friedman, 2004c:186). The absence of a countervailing social pressure that allies of the state 
could apply to bring a recalcitrant business class to heel is lost in this scenario.132
The ability of the state in late industrialisers to play the role of senior partner in the 
restructuring process was not only rigorously opposed by capital and/or undermined through 
their resistance, but the state had little chance of ensuring enforcement due to under-
investment in institutional capacity building and the design of an appropriate regulatory 
infrastructure. Recalling Chibber (2002) above, the developmental states that failed were 
unable to establish internal cohesiveness, i.e. acting as a corporate entity with ‘broadly 
collective goals, rather than a sum of the individual strategies of the functionaries’. In many 
of the failed developmental states, the creation of powerful planning agencies to which all 
other state departments were accountable to, proved elusive, hastening the slide into 
predatory practices by sectoral departments and individual functionaries and the wastage and 
dissipation of resources through a lack of selectivity in development policies.  
 
The failure of the South African government to also put in place an agency that could lead 
and direct development was discussed above. It is now widely recognised that government’s 
attempt to transform the public sector to play a developmental role has not produced the 
desired results (see Ben Turok, ANC Member of Parliament, cited in Sunday Times, 4 
November 2007). This is not unrelated to the impact of restrictive macroeconomic policy 
which has not only – as pointed out above – ‘resulted in inadequate institutional and policy 
support to enhance the economy-wide net employment effects’ (UNDP, 2003:11) of the 
capital-intensive technology driven growth path but has decimated the public sector with 
retrenchments and rightsizing being the main causes of ‘overall formal job losses’. On the 
one hand, the public service responded to declining budgets after 1996 by freezing vacancies. 
Parastatals – the engines of the developmental state of the past – responded to 
commercialisation and increasing private competition by shedding jobs (Makgetla, 2004).  
Downsizing of the public sector in the context of the increasing integration into the 
globalising economy flies in the face of research on the relationship between economic 
development and the size of government sector. Rodrik (1996) reveals a robust empirical 
association between the extent to which an economy is exposed to trade and the size of the 
government sector. In short, the size of the government sector (consumption) actually 
increases as a country opens up to the global economy. This holds for both poor and rich 
countries. The author demonstrates that openness exerts a statistically significant positive 
effect on most types of government spending including general public services, education, 
health, housing, community amenities, economic affairs and social services, and that 
increases in government infrastructural spending have a positive effect on growth. 
Globalisation may in fact require big, not small government. Thus, scaling down 
governments through downsizing and privatisation may harm South Africa’s prospects of 
dynamic integration in the globalising economy, particularly if the objective is to construct a 
state committed to rapid infrastructure extension. Moreover, the loss of key experienced and 
skilled personnel to drive infrastructure provision and ratchet up government investment 
bodes ill for rapid and effective delivery as the country’s recent experience with voluntary 
                                                 
132 In 2005, the ANC’s National Executive Committee urged Mbeki to change his dismissive approach to 
COSATU and the SACP and be more responsive to grassroots voices (Mail & Guardian, 7 October–13 October 
2005).  
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severance packages demonstrates (see Khan & Bardill, 1998 for a discussion on the impacts 
of voluntary severance packages for government officials).  
The whittling away of state capacity and capabilities through non-negotiated downsizing is 
one reason for weak state performance. Another reason is that GEAR had the effect of 
shifting the public sector transformation programme into a ‘narrower, budget-driven 
paradigm’ (Bardill, 2000 & Swartz, 1999 cited in Pieterse, 2002:9) that effectively excluded 
the introduction of short term horizontal and fiscal imbalances to secure longer-term 
developmental gains. Drastic cost-cutting measures accompanied by poorly conceived and 
executed rightsizing interventions has (from experience elsewhere) been shown to undermine 
morale, commonality of purpose, and cross-sectoral co-operation and co-ordination so pivotal 
to poverty eradication efforts (Ibid).  
The portrayal of the public service by senior members of government ‘as bloated, as a burden 
on the public fiscus, as consuming huge resources into ‘unproductive consumption 
expenditure’, and workers being ‘lazy and corrupt’ has not helped matters. This has led to 
‘demoralisation and ultra-defensiveness amongst public sector workers’ (Vavi, 2005:18). 
Arguably, the most challenging tasks confronting the construction of a developmental state in 
South Africa, referenced to building the capabilities of the public sector and service, is the 
absence of an overarching national development strategy, bearing in mind the earlier 
contention that the institutional and political structures of the developmental state were 
developmentally driven, while the development objectives were politically driven. If the 
transformation of the public sector is not constituted on the basis of a clear understanding of 
developmental tasks, public service restructuring and their development efforts will remain 
dispersed, fragmented and overly dominated by the ‘project’ logic (Naidoo, 2004). The 
fundamental task thus confronting the state is the construction of a national development 
strategy incorporating both poverty eradication and economic development (not yet clearly 
stated (Public Service Commission, 2002:26)) and that elaborates a coherent narrative of 
socio-economic change, its engineering, its management and sustainability. Engineering 
internal cohesiveness around this development strategy is the related task. Successful 
accomplishment of both tasks confronts the ANC with its most difficult challenge. 
Section Six  
Rethinking the Developmental State in South Africa 
The vision of a developmental state here and elsewhere derives from numerous sources. It 
occupies a very influential place in the development imagination of progressives not least 
because it offers powerful empirical and analytical grounds to challenge neoliberalism. It 
demonstrates that strategic interventions by government do not necessarily lead to failure. 
‘Getting the politics right’, ‘getting the prices wrong’ and ‘bad policies’ can lead to greater 
industrial sophistication and inclusive growth. Secondly, the developmental state thesis also 
refutes the fatalism that integration into the world economy always produces dependency. 
Instead, the developmental state model opens up new ways of ‘seeing’, revealing multiple 
development pathways from the periphery. Finally, the developmental state paradigm has 
partly facilitated the revival of institutional thought and political economy – underscoring the 
primacy of politics and statecraft.  
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It is for these and other reasons (most notably those around the success of the developmental 
states in reducing poverty, increasing incomes and competitively positioning their economies 
in a brutal international division of labour) that the developmental state still captures the 
imagination of developing country elites. In the South African case, for example, some 
economists suggest that we have most of the ‘institutional components’ of the developmental 
state, albeit imperfect – a determined development elite, a relatively autonomous state, an 
economic bureaucracy whose competency is growing daily, non-state economic interests are 
managed (although quite patchy), and a state that can take unpopular decisions (like GEAR) 
and then manage the fallout (not unproblematically though) (Luiz, 2002).  
Sorely lacking though are the ‘bad’/‘good’ policies. In this respect, South Africa needs to 
establish an effective development strategy that benefits the majority and be geared to 
structural change;133
If left to its own devices, there is no reason to think that capital will react differently 
on another occasion…Indeed, …the resistance to state intervention will most likely be 
even stronger in future…Future national development strategies will have to generate 
a new kind of politics capable of extracting concessions that were rarely even 
demanded last time around…In an era where the political momentum is in precisely 
the opposite direction, this is no mean task. But that is not a reason to continue 
labouring under the influence of myths [stylised facts] that are demonstrably false, 
and with hopes that are sure to be dashed (Ibid).  
 provides comprehensive social protection to combat poverty, 
unemployment and support livelihoods; improves the income-earning and income-generating 
opportunities available to the poor by enhancing access to assets and skills; and ensures the 
substantive democratisation of governance, economy, polity and society. This list is more 
expansive than the East Asian development programme, which has traditionally equated 
development with narrow ‘economic growth’ targets – increases in per capita GDP without 
much ‘attention’ (a most generous interpretation considering the not infrequent suppression 
of human rights and denial of basic civil and political liberties) being devoted to 
empowerment, participation, and, the promotion of a vibrant public realm (presently deemed 
indispensable to effective poverty eradication efforts and programmes). However, to effect 
such a strategy implies a serious rethink of developmentalism, the developmentalist project 
and institution-building. In this vein, should the ANC government, as it has historically done, 
look to capital to spearhead the development project and continue to recycle the ‘three (taken 
for granted) stylised facts’ about the ‘dynamics’ and  ‘ethos’ and  ‘assumptions’ of late 
industrialisers, the outcome will probably be extremely disappointing. A ‘sober assessment’ 
of the developmentalist era, remarks Chibber (2004:245), suggests that ‘the last time political 
elites and the subaltern classes looked to the national bourgeoisie for spearheading a 
development project they got something less than they wanted, and much less than they 
deserved’.  
                                                 
133 Some instruments being mooted to effect this change include targeting, prescribed assets (which business 
takes a dim view of but was used very effectively by the apartheid state), responsive tariff policies, and 
aggressive (partly deficit-financed) investment in infrastructure. 
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Synthesis 
The gap between post-apartheid South Africa’s development policy objectives and outcomes 
is a function of multiple factors located, amongst others, in our political economy, strategic 
(mis)calculations, reluctance to challenge vested/status quo-preserving social forces and 
actors, and (mis)conceptualisations of developmental state construction. At the base of the 
poor outcomes lies an inability to get our ‘politics right’ and ‘prices wrong’ (the former being 
developmentally prior to the latter) that is piloted and engineered by a state whose internal 
cohesiveness is appropriately configured around a development strategy that is redistributive, 
poverty eradicating and socially inclusive.  
In the early 1990s, South Africa elaborated just such a strategy. This was a bold attempt to 
construct a developmental state committed to mild forms of ‘bad policies’ with the objective 
being to effect structural transformation as a precondition for sustained accumulation and 
social upliftment. The development strategy advocated was one premised on state 
intervention that envisaged the line of causality between economic growth and human 
development as running counter to mainstream thinking and conceptualisations.  
Pivotal to this development orientation was, according the state, a leading and enabling role, 
especially because the ‘market on its own’ was portrayed as unable to redress apartheid 
inherited development imbalances and social pathologies. South Africa was all set to 
challenge the ‘impossibility thesis’ in a novel way through a combination of both consensual 
and inclusive embeddedness – a significant advance over the conventional developmental 
state model.  
The shift to economic pragmatism, a few years before the election, scuttled the liberation 
movement’s harnessing of will. Soon after, the ‘market’ was accorded the main job of 
restructuring the economy with government’s main role being to facilitate the conditions for 
accumulation through ‘good’ (not ‘bad’) policies.  
The development programmes chosen to address the staggering social and human deficits 
sought to realise socio-economic rights through reliance on those social forces already in 
dominant possession of political and socio-economic power. Not unsurprisingly, 
development policy horizons and imaginaries became constrained and limited, and 
manifested in declining human development indices, growing inequality, increased poverty, 
and staggering unemployment. Well-intentioned institutional reforms to improve the 
efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of development programmes continue to fail to 
address citizen’s needs and priorities, and shutting out the poor from participation in political 
dialogue and development policy making plays no small part in fuelling social unrest and 
instability.  
But post-apartheid developmentalism has seeds within it that if properly nurtured could 
germinate into a more productive social transformation imaginery. The state’s high degree of 
social autonomy, the legacy of an activist state, a not incompetent bureaucracy, and the 
dominant party’s electoral strength are suggestive of alternative state futures and 
development trajectories.  
The installation and construction of a developmental state will need, however, a new type of 
scaffolding that begins to purposively engage with the ‘three (taken for granted) stylised 
facts’ about the dynamics of late industrialisers. The scaffolding required demands moving 
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beyond the exclusive modernist economic growth fixation of the developmental state to 
embrace wider issues of substantive democratisation of governance, economy, polity and 
society, thus working through the insoluble contradictions of being an aspirant democratic 
developmental state.  
The choice is not between democracy and development, but the recognition that the strategies 
employed for consolidating democracy have implications for state autonomy, institutional 
reform and development performance, and citizen and community activism. We must, 
however, be alert to the dangers of according capital a pivotal role in reconstruction and 
transformation and begin applying our collective minds to mining alternative conceptions of 
institutional reform, market manipulation and productive (re)configuration of state-civil 
society relations. If development is to mean more than simply ‘economic growth’ (e.g. 
empowerment, freedom, human capability building); and if societies are to negotiate 
globalization on beneficial terms in a post post-Washington Consensus format, another 
strategy must be championed, one whose contours – alluded to in Chapter Four and the 
Conclusion – are most probably not unknown to us. 
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Chapter Three: The Developmental State and Housing 
The View from Below 
Locating South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Housing Praxis in the Realpolitik of Developmental 
State Construction 
Introduction 
Where the preceding Chapter focused on the institutional, social and political dynamics of 
developmental state construction (housing from above – expression and component of 
development strategy), this Chapter turns to a discussion of housing – or, more appropriately, 
housing from below - so as to round off our engagement with the state construction/housing 
dialectic. Employing the developmental state literature and the discussions on developmental 
state construction, we delve deeper into the reasons accounting for the dissonance between 
noble policy intent and disappointing outcomes. This is done by spotlighting the limitations 
of present praxis as it relates to the policy’s problematic conceptualisation of housing within 
a particular macro-economic policy framework, its problematic relationship with the poverty 
reduction (a stated aim and goal of housing policy and strategy), and more generally, its 
problematic relationship with what will be referred to as socio-economic citizenship and how 
this has changed and expanded over time.  
Section One  
Housing and the Macroeconomy  
[There is a] disconnect between macroeconomics and housing research… Standard 
macroeconomics either treats housing as one of many consumption goods or neglects 
it all together. “Mainstream macroeconomics,” simply put, ignores the housing 
market… Conventional housing economics and urban economics research for its part 
virtually ignores interactions between and among housing markets and the 
macroeconomy. At best, some of the theoretical and empirical analyses for urban and 
housing economics include macroeconomic variables (such as inflation, economic 
growth, GDP, unemployment, etc.) as exogenous “control variables” (Leung, 
2004:250). 
The relationship between the macroeconomy and housing is the subject of a great deal of 
debate with most authoritative housing commentators arguing for housing to be included ‘as 
a facet of economic policy – as a productive capital good, a generator of wealth, a factor in 
labour mobility, and tool for deepening the financial system’(Keare & Angel, 2002:10). In a 
similar vein, Malpezzi (1999) of the World Bank points out that many people working in the 
shelter sector are ‘not used to thinking of investments [in the shelter sector] as productive’. 
This holds true, he states, of developing country analysts and previous socialist regimes, 
where housing was not counted in the gross national product. But shelter and infrastructure 
investments, argues Malpezzi (Ibid:1816), ‘are, in fact, by definition productive: they are an 
investment in an asset that yields a flow of services over time. To label such investment as 
“consumption”, is quite common, but incorrect’.  
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In the early 1990s, the thinking in ANC circles around economic development – associated 
with growth through redistribution and the mixed economy – envisaged housing to be a lead 
sector of the economy in two ways. Firstly, a lead sector is one that came to be defined as one 
in which a massive amount of resources are invested so that the sector becomes the central 
component of a sustained growth path (ANC, 1991:11). Housing in this sense came to be 
seen as a stimulus to growth in kick-start scenarios, with construction generating demand 
across sectors with high levels of employment-intensity, limited demands on the balance of 
payment and non-inflationary (depending on the availability of slack capacity) (MERG, 
1993:76). This understanding, for Hassen (2003), is based on government boosting aggregate 
demand in the economy through public investment that would stimulate forward and 
backward linkages. The Keynesian assumption that state intervention was needed to secure 
full employment and equitable distributional outcomes served as the rationale for this 
perspective.  
In the vision of the RDP, housing comes to be seen as playing a role in catalysing 
development and directing government spending. This is the second sense of the ‘lead 
sector’. Whereas in the first case, kick-starting the sector can ‘cause positive growth even 
though at that point the general trend in the economy is that no growth is occurring’ (ANC, 
1991:11); in the second sense, increased investment rides general economic trends – not 
counter-cyclical – but still with significant multiplier effects (ANC, 1991:11; Hassen, 2003).  
In the White Paper (RSA, 1994), higher investment in housing is contingent on increasing the 
rate of economic growth, rising per capita incomes, job creation and savings, reduction in 
government dissavings, and effective containment of the rate of inflation – all to be delivered 
through a ‘broad economic policy framework’ (Ibid: S 2.2.9). This is a classic example of the 
‘exogenous control variable argument’ as pointed out by Lueng (2004) above. Increased 
investment in housing is thus in the White Paper viewed as a ‘dependent outcome of 
macroeconomic performance’ and ‘a subordinate component of macroeconomic policy’ 
(Baumann, 2003:93).  
If housing policy is viewed as ‘subordinate component of macroeconomic policy’, and 
macroeconomic reform does not yield the required incomes and revenues to increase 
spending on housing, then, given constitutional and democratic consolidation imperatives, the 
housing policy must of necessity direct limited resources to maximum effect. This is 
recognised in the White Paper (S 4.6.2) : ‘until such time as the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme has started to make inroads on the problems of poverty and 
unemployment, the State has to accept the responsibility to meet at least the basic needs of 
these households’ (referring to households unable to access credit or accumulate savings to 
acquire housing). This strategy is, however, seen as ‘a short term’ intervention to ‘ensure that 
they are able to progress towards the realisation of effective right to housing’ (S 4.4.2). On 
the other hand, the ‘aggregate need for subsidies measured against fiscal constraints 
determines the level of subsidy benefits payable to qualifying beneficiaries’ (S 4.6.5) with 
government committed to ‘favouring width over depth in the provision of financial 
assistance’ (Ibid). There are numerous problems with this approach which have implications 
for urban efficiency and productivity; asset accumulation and (upward) residential property 
market mobility; household affordability and need responsiveness; and institutional viability 
and fiscal sustainability. These are briefly discussed here and selectively teased out in more 
detail in the following sub-section.  
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Firstly, the bundling together of the land acquisition, land assembly, service provision and 
top-structure into a small subsidy134
The inability of significant segments of the historically disadvantaged population to realise 
the exchange value of their properties; the continuing discriminatory practices of financial 
institutions; and the steep property gradients across markets (not unrelated to the speculative 
bubble) traps (potentially upwardly mobile) households in inhospitable and barren spaces.
 impacts negatively on dwelling quality, housing location, 
and is not supportive of urban restructuring imperatives. Densification, compaction and 
reconfiguration of spatial flows of goods, services and people through strategic deployment 
of residential and infrastructural investment (so vital to enhancing urban efficiency and urban 
productivity) are lost to spatially peripheralising, low-density housing investment patterns. 
The location of the housing investment, the public environment (resulting in poor investment 
grading by financial institutions and consequent non-extension of finance for property 
transactions, upgrading, economic activity and market expansion), and low incomes, amongst 
other things, militate against the development of robust secondary and primary markets in 
poor areas (see Shisaka, 2004 for a full discussion).  
135
Secondly, the overwhelming emphasis accorded delivery frequently obscures other aspects 
essential in addressing poverty and inequality related to issues of tenure diversity, levels of 
vulnerability as conditioned by life needs, and community-centred and controlled 
development. The lack of serious consideration to these aspects derives partly from 
conservative understandings of basic needs and a conventional imaginary of housing 
provision dominated by Western industrial construction techniques and methodologies. The 
emphasis of this housing delivery regime (informed by modernisation theory and the basic 
needs approaches of the 1970s) is the mass production of standardised outputs for nuclear 
families, with the state legislating appropriate levels and standards of housing, services and 
infrastructure; government establishing financial systems to capture savings and generate 
resources for the housing programme; official promulgation of regulations detailing division 
of the subsidy to land, services and top structure; the devising of policies to guide location of 
settlements; and the replacement of informal settlements by orderly (modernist) town 
planning layouts and formal housing. Whether this is affordable, culturally responsive, 
livelihood-supportive, attuned to shifting employment dynamics and associated processes of 
household consolidation and fragmentation are not concerns of this delivery regime (see 
 
Homeownership that does not translate into a stepping stone into residential property markets 
that offers improved access to consumption amenities, educational and labour market 
opportunities undermines socio-spatial integration and urban efficiency; asset accumulation 
and wealth generation (with negative consequences for socio-political stability); and 
economic growth (especially of the labour-intensive domestic demand-led type).  
                                                 
134 It is interesting to note that the apartheid government treated land and services as a separate subsidy category, 
i.e. it was not lumped together with the housing unit (Baumann, 2003). 
135 Shisaka (2004:46) holds that the ‘housing ladder’ – by means of which a household sells one property to 
purchase a better quality property – is ineffective, with limited movement between submarkets. Households are 
‘locked’ in less formal submarkets (informal, site and service and RDP submarkets) due to economic factors and 
there is ‘little evidence’ of households residing in RDP units moving upwards into the privately-developed 
formal submarket. There is some evidence of households living in old township housing (rental housing built by 
government in the period 1948 to 1960) and privately dominated submarkets moving out of the townships 
(Ibid). 
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Khan, 2003; also see Fiori et al., 2000), contributing in no small measure to the alienation of 
assets at great cost to the state, economy and household.  
Thirdly, weak institutional capacity, the pressures and strains of organisational restructuring, 
and the fiscal constraints confronting local government have impacted negatively on the 
housing programme. In order to meet infrastructure and top-structure standards, local 
government has been forced to supplement housing subsidies, which constitutes a significant 
drain on their resources (Royston, 2003). Coupled to this is that poor beneficiaries are unable 
to pay rates and service delivery charges (a theme revisited below). The net effect is that 
housing projects ‘tend not to be enthusiastically supported by local government officials, 
especially those responsible for financial management’ (Charlton et al., 2003:13) because it 
imposes more costs than generating or garnering revenue.  
Although seldom commented upon, the reluctance of local government to undertake housing 
projects cannot be divorced from a macroeconomic orientation that elevates cost recovery 
and restricts all forms of deficit financing, which worked so well in the past. In this regard, 
post-apartheid financing of urban development in general, and housing in particular, imposes 
heavy burdens on the poor and subsidises the wealthy. In the case of the development of 
middle to high-income areas, the municipality normally provides infrastructure upfront and 
recovers the costs via rates (Built Environment Support Group, 1999:29), usually over many 
years. This is not the case for low-income areas. In the latter, the infrastructure costs are 
financed from subsidies and full cost recovery is the norm. 
Put differently, in wealthy areas, capital costs are recovered over a long period (normally 
over 15 years); residential property rates have historically not been market-related; and 
service costs are cross-subsidised, given that these areas are well-endowed with commercial 
and industrial enterprises, and the poor spend large percentages of their disposable incomes 
in these areas. In poor areas, capital costs are recovered immediately via the bulk 
infrastructure subsidy, which requires poor households who are already struggling to cover 
the finance gap between the housing subsidy and construction costs to commit 7% to 13% of 
their (erratic, irregular and low) income to basic infrastructure (Jones & Datta, 2000:409);136
The subordination of housing praxis to macroeconomic policy has resulted in the downsizing 
of an expansive housing vision and objectives. The emphasis on width which comes to define 
the nature, size and shape of the housing ‘benefit’ or product, rapid scale delivery (the mass 
production of standardised outputs utilising modern construction and engineering 
techniques); and the institutionalised expenditure and budgeting regimes relayed by 
conservative economic thinking, conspire to establish or re-establish a path dependence. The 
 
service costs are market-related; and the prospects for cross-subsidisation are limited because 
of the weak or non-existent economic base and continued municipal allocation of the bulk of 
planning and development resources to wealthy suburbs. The bundling together of the 
subsidy, the differential urban development financing regime, and the continuing capture of 
public resources by the wealthy raises profound equity questions, which government has yet 
to recognise and deal with in a systematic manner.  
                                                 
136 While this subsidy is not available to wealthy households, bulk infrastructure costs are borne by the 
municipality and recovered through rates. Thus, there are no immediate demands made by local government on 
the incomes of wealthy households. 
 111 
 
outcomes of this path dependency are ostensibly negative as they relate to spatial 
restructuring; socio-economic integration; quality housing; citizenship; poverty eradication 
and, asset accumulation and wealth generation (Charlton et al., 2003). The development 
imprint of this path dependence harbours implications for the success of future policy reform 
and bequeaths a legacy of new settlements which, fundamentally at odds with stated policy 
objectives, are wasteful of scarce public resources and impose additional burdens on the lives 
of the poor, especially the poorest of the poor. Paradoxically, macroeconomic subordination 
and rightsizing of housing praxis generate contradictions which feed upon themselves. The 
‘short term’ intervention (which is supposedly designed to enable the poor to progressively 
realise their effective right to housing) introduces and cements long-term rigidities, anomalies 
and imbalances, and violates one of the key ‘basic points of departure’ of the White Paper 
related to the housing process, i.e. that it should be ‘fiscally, socially and politically 
sustainable in the long term’ (RSA, 1994:S 4.5.2). Contra the developmental state where 
‘short-term’ rigidities and inflexibilities were introduced to maximise developmental 
outcomes and catalyse systemic medium to longer term reform; in South Africa ‘short-term’ 
narrow ‘economistically’ determined interventions deepen and consolidate medium to longer-
term status quo, preserving rigidities and inflexibilities.  
In the developmental states of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea, housing provision 
had significance for the national economy. Housing was not merely an instrument to deliver a 
fit and productive workforce and/or a social overhead but a ‘productive sector in its own 
right’ (Yeung, nd cited in Doling, 1999:247). This recognition assumed the form of support 
in national (five and ten-years) plans (Ibid:247). 
The relationship between economic growth and human development was differently 
conceptualised in these states. Interventions in land, or more appropriately, the agrarian 
economy (see Box 3.1 below), and human capital formation in the early phases of their 
development paths contributed to sustained high rates of growth. In fact, it was only after the 
programmes of land reform, housing and education investments began to bear fruit that rapid 
economic expansion occurred. This holds true for the economies of China and Vietnam, 
South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. Important 
here to note is that although the components of the social wage may have differed with some 
countries placing more emphasis on and/or investing more in shelter provision and basic 
services than others, the sequencing and contribution to dynamic economic development is 
not in question (see amongst others Castells et al., 1992; Lupton, 1992; Campos & Root, 
1996; Watkins, 1998). 
Highlighted in the discussion above is the necessity of acknowledging the line of causality 
between growth and human development (including various configurations of the social 
wage) that runs counter to the conservative perspective encountered in the housing White 
Paper. In other words, investment in human development is growth-enhancing and that 
subordination of human development to the fortunes of growth is not only short-sighted, but 
inimical to macroeconomic growth itself. The East Asian meltdown of 1998 demonstrated 
this when thousands of families were plunged into poverty on account of the absence of 
social safety nets and almost 50 years of investment in poverty eradication hung in the 
balance (see Stewart, 1998; Ranis & Stewart, 1999).  
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Box 3.1: Land and Agrarian Reform in East Asia 
One aspect of the East Asian ‘miracle’, which has received insufficient attention, is that of agrarian 
reform. In Taiwan, for example, between 1949 and 1953, almost half of Taiwan’s land area was 
redistributed to the poorest rural households. The resulting redistribution of wealth from landowners 
to small farmers was equivalent to 14% of GDP. A broadly similar process of asset-redistribution 
occurred in South Korea. In both cases, land reform contributed to a reduction in poverty, increased 
savings and investment, and promoted the creation of dynamic economic inter-linkages between the 
urban and rural sectors, with the benefits of growth being spread equitably across society. By contrast, 
countries such as Zimbabwe, the Philippines, Brazil, and Mexico have built agricultural growth 
strategies upon the foundation of enclave economies dominated by powerful commercial interests. 
The vast majority of the rural poor are excluded from participation in global markets, except as 
labourers on commercial farms. For many experts on East Asian development, the evidence strongly 
suggests that far-reaching agrarian reform – which includes land redistribution, improved credit, and 
efficient marketing infrastructure – is a precondition for optimising the human-welfare benefits of 
agricultural exports. Access to land, credit, and marketing infrastructure enabled the rural poor to 
produce and invest their way out of poverty. In turn, redistributive reforms in these areas helped to 
unleash the productive potential of the poor, reinforcing the linkages between high growth and a 
widespread sharing of its benefits (Watkins, 1997) 
This finding is also borne out by a study of 67 countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa, 
which demonstrates that states with growth paths and investment patterns biased towards 
human development (education, health, social services) tend to enter a virtuous cycle wherein 
growth and human development (HD) feed off each other. Countries whose growth paths are 
strongly growth-oriented and with poor investments in human development - biased towards 
economic development (ED) - revert to vicious cycles (poor performance on HD tends to 
lead to poor growth performance which in turn depresses HD achievements). The vicious 
cycle thesis holds for all the 67 countries studied. This study further demonstrates that HD 
must be strengthened before a virtuous cycle can begin. Economic growth is not sustainable, 
it is argued, unless preceded or accompanied by improvements in HD. The lesson is that bias 
towards ED leads to vicious cycles and that it is not possible to move to a virtuous cycle by 
starting there. The GEAR logic of macroeconomic restructuring (which the housing policy 
subscribes to) leading to job creation, higher incomes, more government revenue to fund 
human development, redistribution and poverty reduction, is arguably an ED-biased strategy 
that is questionable in light of this finding (Ramirez et al., 1998).  
With poverty eradication ‘flowing from growth’ (at worst) or an ‘add on’ (at best), and 
coupled to the absence of ‘linkages between government’s main social programmes and the 
economic departments’ (Makgetla, 2004:268), South Africa’s poor performance on the 
economic development and poverty reduction fronts is not altogether unsurprising. The ‘lack 
of a coherent, national strategy for poverty reduction’, manifested in the ‘dearth of integrated 
and large scale programmatic interventions and preponderance of uncoordinated, piecemeal 
projects’ (Roberts, 2003:9) which is compounded by and feeds off (budget-driven) 
institutional deficiencies.  
Interestingly, the appropriateness of the ED-biased approach for South Africa was called into 
question by a prominent economist and senior government official as early as 1996, when he 
and his co-author asserted that improved and increased spending on human capital formation 
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are perquisites for growth, including the creation of an innovative, inclusive labour-absorbing 
economy (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996:253). Contesting the arguments of conservatives who 
posited that an HD-biased approach was not possible, given the structure of the globalised 
economy, some argued that ‘far from being totally constrained by the global economy, there 
are various possible development strategies’ (Harris & Michie, 1995:8) that place 
considerable emphasis upon a state programme of public expenditure to provide social and 
economic infrastructure:  
This forms part of the strategy to provide for basic [human] needs. The problem of 
how to finance such a programme is less acute than the formation of the political, 
social and institutional capacity to carry it out (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996:253). 
Section Two 
 Housing and Poverty  
Internationally, investment in shelter is considered ‘a basis for poverty eradication’ 
(Berrisford et al., 2003) for its income-generative potential (through construction, home-
based enterprises, rental) (e.g. Moser, 1998; Werna, 2001), and its contribution to health; 
safety; nutrition; household productivity; children’s physical, social and intellectual 
development, (e.g. Satterthwaite, 2002; Rakodi, 2002; Harpham & Grant, 2002). A less well-
known point of central import is that the exercise of civil and political rights is ‘closely 
dependent’ on the satisfaction of basic socio-economic rights (Hartman, 1998:226).  
Adding more weight to this assertion is the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on 
shelter and housing:  
Responses to the causes and consequences of homelessness need to draw upon key 
principles of international human rights law and practice: indivisibility of rights, 
gender equality and non-discrimination. The right to adequate housing has to be 
recognized as being linked to and congruent with the right to security of the person, 
the right to security of the home, the right to participation, the right to privacy, the 
right to freedom of movement, the right to information, the right to be free from 
inhumane and degrading treatment, and the right not to be arbitrarily detained [for 
activism and social mobilisation around socio-economic rights realisation] (Kothari, 
2005:19).  
The contribution of shelter to poverty eradication is thus of necessity embedded in a wider 
context than the narrow functionalist contentions of direct and indirect multipliers. The 
underscoring of adequate housing as one component of the right to an adequate standard of 
living and the exercise of civil and political rights as being closely dependent on the 
satisfaction of socio-economic rights comes to coalesce around ‘human development’ in its 
holistic sense. Given the ‘strong relationship between urban slum prevalence and low scores 
on the HDI [Human Development Index]’ (Garau et al., 2005:18), the ‘challenges faced by 
slum dwellers [and the homeless], parallel the overall challenges in human development’, or 
put differently, ‘slum prevalence [and homelessness] is not an isolated concern but is closely 
related to the overall development trends, and the concerns addressed by all of the 
[Millennium Development] Goals and targets’ (Ibid).  
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South Africa’s housing programme straddles both the narrow and broad definitions of shelter 
intervention. On the one hand, the Housing Code, the implementation manual of the housing 
White Paper (RSA, 1994), says that the housing programme ‘has a positive influence on the 
alleviation of poverty as well as contributing to the redistribution of wealth’ (DOH, 2000a). 
The subsidised home can be used to serve as collateral for credit for home improvements or 
other purposes such as the development of small business. On the other hand, the definition 
of ‘adequate housing’ (elaborated in the Code) is in line with international covenants 
(detailed below) that implicate the full gamut of rights. Sadly, the underlying premises of the 
housing programme (in particular, its difficulty in negotiating contradictions generated 
between conservative economic imaginaries - small capital subsidy, in particular; restrictions 
on deficit financing; public service right/downsizing - and poverty eradication), and the 
legalistic resolution of this contradiction by the judiciary, robs the programme of its 
redistributive, politically empowering and poverty-eradicating potential.  
Undoubtedly, the housing programme transfers to the poor an immediate asset with access to 
services that impact generally positively on health and welfare. Secondly, the bulk of the 
subsidies since 1994 have gone to the poorest segments of society (households earning less 
than R1 500 per month). Thirdly, the provision of a tangible asset furnishes a buffer against 
poverty and reduces their vulnerability to changing circumstances. On balance then, at the 
level of the individual household, the research suggests that state-provided housing has 
improved the lives of beneficiaries with respect to the delivery of basic services, security of 
tenure, fostering pride and dignity (Charlton et al., 2003).  
But the extent to which poverty is (measurably) significantly alleviated is highly debatable. 
The White Paper (RSA, 1994) identifies ‘affordability’ (which has two components) as the 
‘single most significant constraint to the housing delivery process’ (S 3.3.10). The first 
component of the affordability problem relates to state affordability; that is limitations 
imposed on government by the fiscus and macro-economic realities. The second component 
relates to the ‘grinding poverty’ experienced by a large proportion of the population. This, the 
White Paper says, ‘provides the single most important limitation on the housing programme’ 
(S 3.3.10). The ‘resolution of this problem’, the White Paper says, ‘is something that a 
sustainable housing programme can significantly contribute to, but not remotely seek to 
resolve on its own’ (S 3.3.10).Employment creation and rising incomes are seen to be what 
will enable households to access housing opportunities (S 4.1; S4.2)  
The constraint and the limitation above led the drafters of the White Paper to, in the ‘short 
term’ (DOH, 1994:S 4.4.2), ‘focus limited State resources on the poorest sections of [the] 
population’ (S 3.3.10), but ‘short term action should be structured in order not to frustrate 
medium to longer term interventions’ (S4.5.2). This was in direct tension with the MERG 
proposals and the developmental state strategies (i.e. short-term inefficiencies for long-term 
return). Given insufficient resources, investment will need to be attracted from outside the 
fiscus. A ‘fundamental pre-condition for attracting such investment’, is ‘that housing must be 
provided within a normalised market’ implying striking a balance between State intervention 
and the efficient functioning of the housing market with vigorous and open competition 
between suppliers of goods and services to end users’ (Ibid). Hence, a feature of the ‘subsidy 
system is its concern with ensuring that private sector delivery agents are not squeezed out by 
‘unfair competition’ from the public sector’ (Rogerson, 2001:351). 
Firstly, there is ‘virtually no historical evidence’ (Makgetla, 2004:280) for the crowding-out 
hypothesis in South Africa. Historically, public sector investment in South Africa leads 
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private sector investment (Krafchik & Robinson, 1998), potentially leading to larger output 
multipliers as (expanded) spending on social programmes keeps almost all the money in the 
country (Stiglitz, 1998). Judicious government expenditure can thus play an important role in 
reducing the social deficit, i.e. financing industrialisation strategies, job-creating public 
works programmes, and productivity-enhancing social and infrastructural projects. A well-
planned public expenditure programme can therefore initiate a virtuous circle of increased 
social investment which ‘crowds-in’ increased private investment, which in turn expands the 
tax base, thus allowing government to recoup previous expenditure through increased 
revenue collection (Horton, 1998).  
Secondly, the policy is premised on rising employment and incomes and is problematic on 
numerous counts. Firstly, research suggests that redistribution through job creation will not 
necessarily eliminate the problem of poverty. Analyses of anti-poverty strategies in Africa 
emphasise that employment, as currently defined, may provide less than the required 
compensation to sustain a livelihood (Ramirez et al., 1998; also see Torres et al., 2000; 
Bhorat, 2001; Bhorat, 2004; Bhorat et al., 2005; Bhorat & Kanbur, 2005; Bhorat & Kanbur, 
2006; Bhorat, 2007). Secondly, international development agencies warn that countering the 
inability to earn a sustainable livelihood cannot be tied to ‘indirect’ remedies such as 
economic growth. What is required is an ‘explicit, dedicated commitment on the part of 
governments to take direct action’ (Garau et al., 2005:xiv). Thirdly, the policy premise fails 
to take into account recent innovations in development thinking around poverty eradication. 
New perspectives on poverty eradication present fresh insights about the nature of the 
‘economy’ and ‘poverty eradication’, and the relationship between ‘economic growth’ and 
‘poverty’. 
With respect to the ‘economy’, policy makers understand the economy as comprising a 
particular distribution of assets, a particular set of power relations, a finite collection of 
cultural factors, a given set of institutions, and a specific productive logic. These structural 
factors define the parameters of growth and development. Within this framework, individual 
choices and capabilities determine the distribution of income. Poverty is the result of low 
incomes and the medicine for this is economic growth, productivity improvements, education 
and training.137
But the flows of resources necessary to sustain an individual or household emanate from various 
sources determined by a particular distribution of assets, productive relationships, gender 
dynamics, and class distinctions. Poverty, from this perspective, is more than a ‘lack of income’. 
Poverty exists when an individual’s or a household’s access to income, jobs and infrastructure is 
inadequate or sufficiently unequal to prohibit full access to opportunities in society. In short, the 
condition of poverty is caused by a combination of social, economic, spatial, environmental and 
political factors (Isandla Institute, 1999; Heintz & Jardine, 1998). Critical here to note is that the 
 Emphasised here are the ‘macro-level determinants’ (Cross, 2001:113) of 
growth and development – getting the prices right, low inflation and fiscal discipline. These 
economic fundamentals are seen as paramount in and of themselves and all government 
programmes must therefore conform to fiscal and monetary targets. Not unsurprisingly, 
sustainable development comes to be equated first and foremost with affordability and cost-
recovery (Hassen, 2000) rather than those of reducing vulnerability; building capabilities and 
capacities; promoting social inclusion, integration, and cohesion.  
                                                 
137 This is the logic of GEAR (Heintz & Jardine, 1998). 
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factors are not simply a function of public policy but connected to broader issues of 
democratisation, socio-economic empowerment, and institutional restructuring (these themes are 
discussed in the next Chapter dealing with the HPA).  
Some strands informing this thinking have come to be organised in the ‘asset vulnerability 
framework’ (AVF)/‘sustainable livelihoods’ approach, which takes as its starting point the 
livelihood strategies of the poor (Moser, 1998; Rakodi, 1995, 1999). These approaches seek 
to understand how households manage various assets (labour and human capital; productive 
assets which include land and housing; household relations; social capital; natural assets and 
financial assets) in pursuit of their livelihoods (Baumann, 2003). Poverty, according to the 
AVF, is not only an outcome of insufficient monetary income, a lack of assets and the poor’s 
inability to accumulate an asset portfolio, but also the ‘inability to devise an appropriate 
coping or management strategy’. The key issue in anti-poverty strategies resides in ‘building 
up the asset base of the poor, and increasing their capabilities to manage their existing 
package or portfolio of assets’ (Rogerson, 1998:8).  
Consequently, the objective of development programmes and projects as informed by this 
(microeconomic) livelihoods approach (in contrast to the macro-level perspective) strives to 
‘enter’ the locality not just through the ‘house and bathroom’ but through the ‘inter-
relationship between poverty, productivity and the environment’ (Moser, 1995:162). 
Effective poverty reduction must therefore simultaneously look at issues of income (derived 
from salaries and wages, subsistence and household economies, transfer payments, private and 
government sources, and self-employment); infrastructure (physical and social); spatial isolation 
(from employment and social opportunities) and environmental degradation; social exclusion 
and access to power and resources; and the livelihood strategies of the poor (Isandla Institute, 
1999; Heintz & Jardine, 1998).  
The inability of the housing intervention to locate itself in a livelihoods perspective, the effect 
of the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis, and the presumption that there is a binding macro-
economic constraint, combined to create a macroeconomic strategy that failed to see 
increased spending in human development as both a requirement for accelerated growth and 
a precondition for converting growth into poverty reduction (even at the expense of 
introducing short term imbalances). This prevented the poverty eradicating and redistributive 
impacts of the shelter intervention from becoming the central pillar of poverty eradication in 
post-apartheid South Africa that it should logically have been.  
Not unsurprisingly occupants can ill-afford maintenance and upkeep of the new homes; are 
spatially marginalised and peripheralised; lack access to the basic facilities and amenities to 
support their livelihoods; their constitutionally enshrined rights are violated even by the 
institutions that purport to uphold these rights; little to no consideration is devoted to 
alternative tenure forms that are potentially more appropriate to the their needs; and 
deficiencies in the design and implementation of intervention instruments impoverishes them 
further. These are briefly discussed below.138
                                                 
138 The ensuing draws from Rogerson (2001) and is supplemented by findings from elsewhere 
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Firstly, there is little to no protection of beneficiaries who cannot afford the obligations of 
homeownership, i.e. payment of rates and services139 witnessed in the ‘downward-raiding’ 
and the abandonment and selling of RDP houses. The movement of these beneficiaries and 
households back into shacks (‘downward trading’) swells the population of those who are 
informally housed140
In Cape Town, for example, media reports showed that desperate families – unable to pay 
rate and service charges and feed their families – were selling their new homes to shebeen 
owners and druglords. The RDP houses – which cost close to or over R30 000 – were being 
sold for as little as R500 in many cases. The top price was R3 000.
 and renders them structurally homeless as they are disqualified from 
accessing another subsidy given national policy that entitles once-off access per household. 
More disturbing are the social groups that ‘purchase’ the houses from the (abandoning) 
beneficiaries and the consequences of this phenomenon on community-building.  
141 Rows and streets of 
publicly-funded RDP houses snapped up by druglords and the like at bargain basement prices 
were then rented out or used for their nefarious and illicit activities. The debt recovery 
strategies of some municipalities to settle arrears (attaching and repossessing pensioner’s 
homes 142 and municipal auctioning of RDP houses143
Secondly, the subsidy places a ceiling on the various components (land purchase, land 
assembly, levels of service provision, etc.) of housing production. This inflexibility coupled 
to the income-subsidy ‘packaging’ of communities leads to the ‘reproduction of apartheid-
style ghettoes of the poor’ (Bond & Tait, 1997 cited in Rogerson, 2001:354) on the 
peripheries that are divided along class lines of the poor and not-so-poor. This strict 
separation and spatial marginalisation stifles the development of local markets and thresholds 
to support a range of goods and services. The development of dense, intense and vibrant local 
markets within settlements is lost through income stratification. Market development 
facilitated by cross-settlement transactions is rendered impossible by socio-spatial 
peripheralisation.  
) added further impetus to 
strengthening the grip of warlords and gangsters over poor communities. This is a very 
strange case of the government subsidising the illicit economy, unintentionally working in a 
morbid partnership with the latter to produce structural homelessness and thereby further 
eroding the battered social fabric of poor communities already overrun by brutal gangsterism 
and drugs.  
                                                 
139 In 2000, it was found that 56% of households in Cape Town were unable to afford the typical minimum 
monthly rates and service charges of R100 to R150 per month (Cape Metropolitan Council, 2000 cited in Khan, 
2003:18). Other reports, also cited by Khan (2003:19), state that close to 80% of residents in low-income 
housing estates cannot afford to pay for municipal services charge levied in these areas. 
140 Alongside declining family size, in-migration, and urban population growth, this is one of the reasons which 
account for the persistent growth of slum settlements and why the impressive delivery record of government has 
not succeeded in reducing the housing backlog in any considerable measure. Indeed, the South African Cities 
Network Report (2004) reveals that the increase in the amount of shack dwellings is almost equal to the total 
number of houses built between 1996 and 2001. 
141 Cape Argus, 10 April 2000. 
142 Cape Times, 25 March 2002; Cape Argus, 26 March 2002. 
143 Cape Argus, 6 March 2002. 
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The nature of the output (with respect to location, accessibility, habitability, etc.) can be 
construed as a violation of citizen’s rights if one takes into account the fact that the 
government included within the National Housing Code a definition of adequate housing that 
accords with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 
(ICESCR). The Covenant defines ‘adequate housing’ as measured by certain core factors:  
…legal security of tenure; the availability of services, materials, facilities and 
infrastructure; affordability; habitability; accessibility; location and cultural adequacy. 
South African housing policy concurs with this concept of housing (DOH, 2000a:7-
8).  
In the Grootboom case144, the Court ruled that S26(1) of the Constitution accorded citizens 
the right to access, which effectively limits the state’s obligation to housing provision, ‘but 
the exact scope of the right and the state’s duty is unclear’.145
The court’s justification is also questionable, as the court, in accepting an 
international norm, would not need to reassess the content of a minimum core 
obligation in the context of South Africa, as the Committee of the ICESR has laid 
down a minimum standard to be applied irrespective of local conditions. The 
minimum core obligation is not meant to be a flexible standard, but to “describe the 
minimum expected of a State in order to comply with its obligation under the 
Covenant”…To conclude: the court’s analysis of s26(1) and (2) is a fairly restrictive 
 Indeed, the judge dismissed the 
ICESCR interpretation and elaborated a position that is ‘more conservative than the 
interpretation given by the Department itself’. Furthermore, the Court’s interpretation of 
‘available resources’ (S26(2)) differed from that stipulated in the ICESCR, which states that 
government must take steps ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ to fulfil ‘minimum 
core obligations’ (defined by ‘adequate housing’ above) in order to meet the obligation. In 
other words, the state ‘must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources 
that are at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations’(McClean, 2003:153–4). This thrust was rejected by the Constitutional Court and 
is worrisome given that national policy conforms to the norms laid down in the ICESR.  
                                                 
144 A community in Cape Town invaded private land after departing deplorable living conditions of a previous 
settlement. The owner of the invaded land secured an eviction notice under the Prevention of the Illegal Eviction 
From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). The request by the community for assistance 
from the local authority met with a negative response, so the community sued the municipality in the Cape High 
Court, drawing on S26(1) of the Constitution (‘Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing’) and 
S26(2) (‘The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of this right’). The High Court ruled that the municipality must provide shelter for 
children and the parents. The state appealed the decision in the Constitutional Court. The Court issued a 
declaratory order to the effect that the state must put in place a reasonable plan to realise the right to adequate 
housing over time and within fiscal constraints, and that this programme must include relief for those who are 
destitute and homeless.  
145 The Court’s awarding residents the right of access to shelter, water and adequate ablution facilities meant 
that 263 families (390 adults and 510 children) were housed in temporary dwellings built from R200 000 worth of 
materials supplied by the authorities and serviced by 10 taps and 20 permanent toilets. 
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reading of the right, often ignoring a more practical and progressive understanding of 
the state’s duty in national legislation and policy documents (Ibid:155)146
The Court’s fairly restrictive reading of rights in Grootboom, together with two other 
prominent eviction-related cases (known as the Bredell and Alexandra cases) highlights the 
‘limitations of the judiciary as a route to democratic access’ (Huchzermeyer, 2003a:80) to 
societal resources and urbanity. When the poor call upon the institution tasked with enforcing 
their socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution and written down in government 
programmes, the judiciary is ‘reluctant to rule in [their] favour when the economy or investor 
confidence is at stake’ (Ibid). What is also perturbing is the Court’s underwriting of a 
particular interpretation of the materiality of the housing intervention (i.e. the constitutive 
elements of ‘adequate housing’, ‘reasonable and other legislative measures’ and ‘within 
available resources’) that effectively shields the state from assuming responsibility for 
resolving the contradiction between conservative macroeconomic management and poverty 
eradication. The independent Court, immune from state and public pressure, has resolved the 
contradiction for the state with profound implications for democratic consolidation and 
human development.  
 
If the Constitutional Court is unable to affirm and entrench the entitlements of the poor with a 
view to expanding their human-capability generating capacities (Sen, 2001), their rights to 
development, freedom and livelihood opportunities are further reduced or extinguished 
through the reluctance of government to regulate interventions in the land market so as to 
maximise the poverty-elasticity of growth in the economy as a whole and property 
development in particular (in other words, the capture and redistribution of development 
gain). The development of human capacities for poverty eradication will not broaden 
opportunities if, remarks the World Bank (2005), some people face unfair returns on 
capacities, unequal protection of their rights, and are denied access to the complementary 
factors of production. In this matter, the access to land is of paramount importance because 
the ‘location of new settlement[s] is a crucial element in determining whether or not the 
housing and related rights of residents have been violated’ (Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE), 2005:93). This is because ‘rights are geographical in several senses’:  
…rights are often about access to space or place; in liberal societies, geographies of 
private and public space shape access to rights;… and places are both defined and 
called upon in struggle for rights (Blomley & Platt, 2001 cited in Maharaj, 2005:133).  
Accessing land at reasonable prices for low-income housing, even on the periphery, presents 
practitioners and officials with serious dilemmas. Often the land the private sector used for 
housing delivery was purchased and ‘banked’ by the private sector, prior to the introduction 
of new housing policy, in ‘expectation of a huge upsurge in delivery to the poor’ (Tomlinson, 
2005:np).  
Intervention in urban land markets is vital because the activities of private landowners, 
wealthy developers and industrialists are also shutting out the poor from well-located land. 
The research suggests that the ‘supply of well-located land for the provision of housing to the 
                                                 
146 However, care must be to avoid pushing this line too far. While the Housing Code conforms to the ICESR 
strictures, South Africa has not ratified this Covenant (COHRE, 2005:99).  
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poor, is limited by collusion amongst private landowners, developers and speculators’ 
(COHRE, 2005:92). For example, the relocation of 7 000 people 10km away from the 
informal settlements of Alexandra to make way for the Alex Renewal Project was opposed 
by landowners of the identified site on account of the land being held on a speculative basis 
and the landowners fearing a decline in property values. Efforts to expropriate land did not 
receive the needed political support because the provincial government was ‘unwilling to 
tackle the property interests at play’ (Ibid). There is also evidence that ‘extensive land 
banking of well-located land has been undertaken by private sector developers assisted by 
planning agencies that often possess more information on state land holdings than the state 
itself’ (Engelbrecht, 2003:281).  
These developers then ‘tend to monopolise housing delivery activities and local authorities 
are loath to undertake the unpopular step of expropriation… Local authorities, have, 
however, successfully expropriated land from private developers, but this generally as a last 
resort’ (Ibid). There seems, says Marx (2003), to be a lack of political will to expropriate land 
in the public interest - as provided for in S25(2) and S25(4a and b) of the Constitution - and a 
‘narrow adherence to the protection of the principles of land markets on the part of state 
agencies…prevents the acquisition of well-located land for implementing a different urban 
vision’ (Ibid:303). Although expropriations are considered controversial, in Gauteng (for 
example), both the procedure and compensation payable were not challenged in a single case. 
This ‘bears testimony’, asserts Engelbrecht (2003:293),  
...to the considerable expertise residing in local government where the political will 
exists. The expropriation of land is technically simple once the political will and 
financial resources are established. 
The absence of measures to shape the land markets147
The social and economic benefits of well-located housing settlements ‘surely outweigh the 
short-term problems caused by tackling the vested interests of landowners’ (COHRE, 
 so as to optimise redistributive and 
poverty-eradicating outcomes is arguably frustrated by the unwillingness of the state to 
challenge historically established and new interests. While government has admirably 
equipped itself to address historical imbalances in rural land ownership patterns, a similar 
intervention in the urban land market remains to be articulated. Arguably, this policy lacuna – 
redistributive intervention in the urban land market – is not an innocent oversight. Indeed, 
this gap in the reconstruction and transformation agenda is ‘not unrelated’ to government 
having to confront the political backlash from historically established interests and those 
from the formerly excluded (black) middle class who now have substantial investments in the 
urban/suburban property market (Berrisford, 1999 cited in Hassen, 2003:137).  
                                                 
147 There are numerous ways to intervene in the land market, including compulsory acquisition (or 
expropriation); government purchase in the open market; statutory purchase in the open market; developers with 
delegated powers of compulsory acquisition, statutory authorities with power of compulsory acquisition, and 
land pooling/ re-adjustment. Most of these are: 
...permissible in terms of South African law, but very few of these used. Land pooling is not expressly 
provided for in South African law. With respect to partnerships, there is no need for additional 
legislation. Required is a coherent policy to guide programmes/project execution, especially in an 
environment of informality that is increasingly supplanting formal approaches to land development 
(Berrisford et al., 2003:23, 32).  
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2005:93). Failure to tackle vested interests ignores the social, environmental and longer-term 
economic consequences for poor households and the state, and flies in the face of poverty 
eradication and redistribution policy objectives. If spatial restructuring is intrinsic to 
widening access to poverty ameliorating and alleviating measures, then the praxis works to 
frustrate these goals. This is due to the fact that ‘much of post-1994 low-income housing has 
been developed on land purchased in the 1980s by the apartheid government for township 
development in accordance with its segregationist ideology’.  
Thus, many apartheid urban plans have been implemented unquestioningly by the 
post-apartheid government… Reinforcing the same urban pattern, the cheapest tracks 
of developable land recently purchased for low-income developments have been those 
adjacent to or beyond existing townships (Huchzermeyer, 2003b:212). 
Although infrastructure spending that connects up to existing bulk infrastructure is preferable 
to the increased capital and operating costs of new infrastructure in better located areas - this 
is excluded because of the macroeconomic commitment to deficit reduction and fiscal 
austerity (Marx, 2003) - the location of low-income settlements at considerable distance from 
employment opportunities and higher-order commercial and social facilities imposes major 
burdens on the state fiscus and household expenditure (Behrens & Wilkinson, 2003). For 
households, exorbitant travel costs weigh heavily on time and expenditure that could be 
deployed towards improving nutrition, health, education, incomes, and dwellings. For the 
state, it has been pointed out by Dewar (1999) that as of 1999, the annual bus subsidy in Cape 
Town (R3 300), accumulated over five years, is equivalent to the housing subsidy, and over 
20 years, it would be the equivalent of four subsidies. The CSIR (1997) argued that if the 
number of national subsidised bus commuters travelling longer than an hour (approximately 
112 761 commuters in 1995) were to be relocated closer to work (at a cost of R3.4bn), the 
yearly saving would be around R118.6 million. If central location enabled a switch to 
walking or other unsubsidised modes of transport, recouping the R3.4bn would take 
considerably less than 28 years (assuming, most critically, constant levels of subsidy and 
current land values). A study by Rensburg et al. (1992) compared full transport and 
settlement costs of Orange Farm with two hypothetical central housing developments in 
Johannesburg over a 20 year period. The study concluded that the societal costs of peripheral 
housing are greater (R11 993 in per dwelling unit (1999 prices)) compared to R9 741 and 
R7 100 in central areas (Dewar, 1999; CSIR, 1997 & Rensburg et al., 1992 cited in Behrens 
& Wilkinson, 2003:162). These figures above, albeit indicative, point to the societal and 
households costs of continuing with peripheral, spatially marginalising shelter development, 
which will no doubt be considerably larger if the ecological footprinting methodology is 
used, and also bearing in mind the additional costs associated with the various infrastructure 
and basic needs amenity deficiencies of new RDP housing estates, i.e. access to health, 
education and social development facilities.  
Thirdly, the overlooking of rental housing presents a serious gap in praxis. The White Paper 
paid scant attention to rental housing due in part to the assumption that most people wanted 
to become homeowners rather than tenants. This is most surprising especially because rental 
housing (which constitutes about two-thirds or more of housing stock in developing countries 
(Khan, 1993)) tends to offer better location, services and infrastructure than self-help 
housing, and supports, assists and facilitates labour mobility – an important survival strategy 
of low-income households (Gilbert, 1997 cited in Smit, 2003).  
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Unfortunately, the housing policy and the financing instruments are not sufficiently geared 
(except through the institutional subsidy and the hostels programme) to cater for the needs of 
this segment of the population. While the growth of new social housing institutions should 
further increase rental stock significantly, this type of stock is simply not appropriate for the 
lowest income groups. ‘Social housing’, according to the ex-Managing Director of the Social 
Housing Foundation, Arvinda Gohil, ‘is not aimed at the poorest of the poor, but at those who 
can pay for housing, but whose purchasing power is limited, making rental a necessary as 
well as desirable option’ (cited in Housing Southern Africa, February 1999).  
Significant more policy work needs to done with a view to supporting and strengthening 
private and public formal and informal rental housing market for low-income people 
(backyard shacks included) (see Khan (1993) for further details and discussion). Future 
initiatives will however need to break with ‘either/or’ options (public versus private) and 
focus on how to meet basic needs of the indigent and mobile workers for whom the need for 
this type of housing – a year after the release of the White Paper – was recorded as ‘dire’.148
Fourthly, there remain significant problems with the impact of the housing programme on 
informal settlements related to deficiencies in both the legislative and regulatory architecture, 
and the technologies and instruments of intervention. The main intervention (the resettlement 
of informal residents in new housing) has meant that the opportunities for in situ support or 
‘upgrading’ have been largely neglected.
 
149
Some preliminary studies suggest that the cumulative impact of this intervention regime may 
unwittingly have contributed to increased vulnerability and poverty. The relocation of 
households to greenfields development revealed a variety of negative impacts on poverty, 
related to the impact on households of changed location; the economic reconstruction of 
communities; changes to the status of housing assets; limitations on freedom of movement; 
reduced savings capacity; disruption of social and solidarity networks and institutions; 
increased insecurity; increased vulnerability to crime; inability to absorb or support the 
extended family; and reduced capacity to invest in social capital (see Baumann, 2003; Marx, 
2003).  
 Until recently, the key structuring elements of 
interventions in informal settlements tended to lead to the ‘projectisation’ of development; 
was narrowly focused on housing and infrastructure provision; reinforced the institutional 
bases of exclusion; and was co-ordinated very poorly in financial and sectoral terms.  
Undoubtedly, a great deal can be done to improve the effectiveness of the housing 
intervention with respect to maximising its effectiveness in attaining the objectives of poverty 
eradication and redistribution. But it is also of critical importance to repeat the observation of 
the White Paper that the ‘resolution of the [poverty] problem is something that a sustainable 
housing programme can significantly contribute to, but not remotely seek to resolve on its 
own’ (S 3.3.10). Impacting on poverty necessitates a ‘co-ordinated, multifaceted approach 
towards initiating and maintaining sustainable socio-economic development. Housing 
interventions by Government can at most be seen as part of an integrated approach to resolve 
the problem of poverty’ (S 4.6).  
                                                 
148 See Financial Mail, 9 June 1995. 
149 This situation is likely to change with the introduction of the Department of Housing’s Upgrading of 
Informal Settlements Programme. 
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This assertion is supported by housing experts, the most renowned being Angel (2000), who 
argues that the affordability problem is ‘first and foremost a poverty issue and not a housing 
issue. The solution to this problem must therefore ‘rely primarily on policies for the 
alleviation of poverty, and not on policies that aim at the provision of adequate housing’ 
(112). Citing Donnison (1980), he writes, that ‘most housing problems are really problems of 
unemployment, poverty and inequality’.  Angel (2002:113) says further:  
Keeping this in mind, we should restrain our expectations that the housing problem of 
the poor can be adequately addressed amidst persistent poverty. It simply cannot be 
done…There are two arguments, however, for state support in the form of direct 
housing subsidies, in addition to general income support or other redistributive social 
welfare programs that improve people’s ability to pay for housing. The first 
argument…[is] that housing is a ‘merit good’ – wherein the state intervenes to ensure 
that people consume adequate amounts of housing because it is in their long term 
interest and in the public interest. The merit good argument is strengthened by 
focusing on the externalities associated with the underconsumption of housing – its 
adverse (or beneficial) effect on the immediate neighbourhood, on the quality of life 
in the city as a whole, or on the social and economic stability. If such externalities 
were severe, the public would have an interest in making adequate housing available 
to everyone, regardless of their ability or willingness to pay…The second argument in 
favour of housing subsidies rests on the fact that housing-related poverty exacerbates 
and multiplies other inequalities…Inadequate housing is thus a source of poverty, as 
well as consequence of poverty…In the last analysis, there is therefore, indeed an 
inherent logic in incorporating housing subsidies in an overall subsidy regime.  
Angel (2000:112) also makes the point that ‘it is doubtful that housing subsidies in any form 
are an especially useful form of redistributing income or reducing social inequality’, citing 
low income elasticity of demand from the British housing policy experience as the main 
reason. The extent to which the ‘elasticity of demand’ argument is applicable in developing 
countries is debatable. This aside, he argues that there is ‘no a priori reason to suspect that 
housing subsidies would be an effective instrument for redistributing incomes’ (Ibid). This is 
not to dismiss subsidies as ‘they are an important part of any social policy’, it ‘depends how 
they are administered’ (personal correspondence with Angel, 3 November 2005). At issue is 
the weighting and location of the subsidy in a wider redistributive regime that encompasses 
both asset and human capital poverty reduction.  
Implicated here are questions about sculpting redistributive measures that work with the 
livelihood and coping strategies of the poor or the microeconomics of livelihoods, area-based 
and rooted demand-responsive interventions and deepening institutional access of the poor to 
resources and decision-making. In short, the redistribution of opportunities, capabilities, 
capacities and opportunities change the terms of trade between the poor and the state and 
have to be in concert with the housing and wider subsidy regime for this to reduce social 
inequality or redistribute incomes. Without these accompanying interventions, South Africa’s 
housing subsidy is unlikely to play a dynamic role in both redistribution and poverty 
eradication. 
Although redistribution of the type alluded to can potentially enhance outcomes, this is likely 
to be unsustainable until such time as the state rethinks the direction of causality between 
economic growth and human development. This rethink strikes at the heart of the 
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affordability thesis at both economy-wide and household level. At the economy-wide level, a 
great deal has been said about the modalities and mechanics of breaking path dependent 
development modes as demonstrated by developmental states across various ideological 
contexts. At the household level, rethinking of affordability would require re-evaluation of a 
housing intervention presently based on mass production of standardised outputs with 
freehold title for nuclear families.  
This intervention (seen in some influential policy circles as inflating the housing backlog and 
committing the state to unrealistic housing targets that far outstrip its available resources (e.g. 
Tomlinson et al., 2003)) is based on Western notions of functioning property markets 
(properties exchanged on open markets with the backing of financial institutions and also 
used as collateral). This is a crucial failing of the policy. What is not recognised, in contexts 
such as ours, is macroeconomic volatility and its impact on household incomes and spending 
patterns (high and fluctuating food prices being critical to household survival in this regard). 
Secondly, the bulk of the target population is poorly remunerated and unemployed and 
dependency ratios at much higher than they are in developed societies. Thirdly, locationally 
shifting employment opportunities impel poor households to establish multiple job-proximate 
residential bases (Charlton et al., 2003).  Fourthly, there is an absence of social welfare 
programmes to complement meagre incomes especially in times of household crises and 
shocks (death of the breadwinner, for example). Fifthly, the financial sector does not 
recognise the RDP house as collateral (see for example, Shisaka, 2004). Lastly, for a society 
ravaged by the AIDS/HIV pandemic wherein poor households to divert their scarce resources 
to securing medicine, water and nutrition, housing is not an immediate priority (R Tomlinson, 
2001).  
In short, the assumptions undergirding the housing intervention, which profoundly implicates 
questions of affordability, rights and citizenship, largely derives from countries with well 
developed social wage regimes (Satterthwaite & Tacoli, 2003);  macroeconomic stability 
and/or vast state resources and/or considerable policy manoeuvrability to soften socially 
debilitating blows of economic restructuring and economic instability; ‘tightly controlled, 
directed financial sectors’ (as recent as 1986 – see Buckley & Kalarickal, 2004:10); and 
formally employed, decently remunerated workforces, and not afflicted by major 
epidemiological crises.  
It is against this backdrop that affordability should be (re)defined as taking into account 
household size and cost of non-shelter basics, as opposed to the present Westernised notion 
of households allocating a fixed percentage of income (which amongst our target population 
is erratic and irregular). Thus,  
…the most a household should be required to pay for housing is that which leaves it 
able to meet non-shelter basics at a minimum level of adequacy. The larger the 
family, the more it has to pay for nonshelter basics, and thus the less it can afford to 
pay for housing; similarly, the lower the family’s income, the less it can afford to pay 
for housing; since nonshelter basics take up a higher percentage of income (Stone, 
1993 cited in Hartman, 1998:237).  
This has radical implications for SA housing praxis, especially for the poorest of the poor. 
The housing intervention for those without incomes, the irregularly employed working in the 
most marginalised sectors of the informal economy, specific categories of migrants, child- 
and women-headed households needs to be fundamentally reconceptualised. The levels of 
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subsidisation for these segments of the population with respect to addressing shelter poverty 
would have to be significantly higher, the tenure type made more flexible and appropriate, 
the social amenities of a higher quality, the location of the dwelling accessible and strategic 
(inner city or in close proximity), and the (municipal) financing regimes far more 
sophisticated than at present.  
Whilst the microeconomics of household survival and the rethinking of affordability 
complement each other most flatteringly, the intervention regime called for above reverts 
back to quite radical systemic reforms, a subject about which the sustainable livelihoods 
literature is silent. These are questions related to the political economy and mechanisms to 
link micro- and macro-level change processes, which the benign conceptions of localised 
livelihoods and asset manipulation tells us precious little about.  
The emphasis on redistribution and political economy so central to effective and sustainable 
poverty eradication implies paying attention to the ‘livelihoods of others who are not poor’ 
(Murray, 2001:14) and the strategies they deploy and will continue deploying to frustrate a 
redistributive, poverty-eradicating and empowering shelter development regime. Not 
surprisingly, the latest thinking in international housing praxis places emphasis on managing 
the sector as a whole, ‘including the formal and informal sector; the rich and the poor; the 
private, the voluntary, and the public sectors; the inner city and the suburb…[to] guide 
macroeconomic policy’ (Angel, 2000:28). In this regard, the developmental state model 
could greatly assist policy and decision makers.  
This brief discussion of the poor outcomes and developmental deficiencies generated by the 
economic calculus and distributional logic of the housing intervention can at base be ascribed 
to a policy that represents an awkward embrace of conservative macroeconomic thinking and 
a misconceptualisation of the developmental state as facilitator of private sector dominance 
rather than effective empowerment of the poor. The developmental state model suggests that 
investment in human development and poverty eradication is growth enhancing.  
The experience demonstrates that we would be better advised to aim primarily to foster 
redistribution and poverty eradication, get the politics right, deliberately get the prices wrong, 
and in this way promote growth. Delivery of this unholy grail cannot be entrusted to the 
private sector. Recalling Chibber (2004), ‘the last time political elites and the subaltern 
classes looked to national bourgeoisie for spearheading a development project they got 
something less than they wanted, and much less than they deserved’. The last decade of 
reconstruction and transformation bears (excruciatingly painful) testimony to this claim.  
Synthesis  
This Chapter turned to the materiality of democratic consolidation refracted through the 
shelter lens and the latter’s relationship to the macroeconomy and poverty eradication. Noted 
here are a myriad of problems flowing from its minimalism and the consequent entrenchment 
of a path dependence that frustrates its potential redistributive, empowering and poverty 
eradicating potential. Realising the potential would entail a fundamental rethink of the 
economic logic that underpins the programme and its very real impact on poverty. It is 
heartening to note that the BNG signals a renewed willingness and determination to grapple 
with these problematics coupled to a belated recognition by the Minister of Finance that the 
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line of causality between economic growth and human development ‘also runs the other way’ 
(Minister of Finance, 2005:2).  
The extent to which the Plan and this belated recognition will swing the socio-economic 
development policy pendulum the other way will in large part depend on the collective 
capabilities and capacities of society and the state to jointly scribe a transformative political 
economy score (‘brushing against the grain of history’) and skillfully choreograph the dance 
of an inclusive social coalition (‘getting the politics right’) that courts unholy and unorthodox 
(not ‘good’) institutional and governance reform, and heterodox (economic) policy 
experimentation (‘deliberately getting the prices wrong’).  
The ‘transcendence of the dominant form of state and society’ is indeed a ‘very perilous 
situation’ remarks Balakrishnan (2005:20), especially without ‘compelling alternatives to the 
governing norm’ and status quo. The ‘greatness of the thing’ (social transformation), to 
paraphrase Machiavelli, ‘partly terrifies men, so they fail in their first beginnings’ (cited in 
Balakrishnan, 2005:14). Reactivating radical causes, writes Balakrishnan (Ibid:17), demands 
disciplined and unpleasantly rough ‘strategic reckoning in the midst of …devastation, as 
preparation for a very long-term reconstitution of collective praxis through intellectual and 
material rearmament’.  
Staying with such causes in the midst of the prevailing ambiguous waning and waxing of 
status quo thought invites both social resignation and restoration. Returning to Machiavelli, 
we should stay with the cause because  
Men can second fortune, but not oppose it…they can weave its warp but not break it. 
They should indeed never give up, for, since they do not know its end and it proceeds 
by oblique and unknown ways, they have always to hope, not to give up in whatever 
fortune and whatever travail they find themselves (cited in Balakrishnan, 2005:19).  
Redeeming the hopes, aspirations and ambitions of yesterday’s progressive development 
planning regime demands a new form of trangressive political thought and action grounded in 
historical record, emerging practices and collective creative practices. State-mandated 
transgressive thought and action (dubbed the ‘developmental democracy’) is in its infancy 
and holds both promise and pitfalls for the poor. But the transgressive thought and action of 
the poor in our shanty towns (dubbed ‘democratic developmentalism’) presents a 
counterweight to state developmentalism; another pathway to shelter and human 
development that is arguably seductively more promising but nonetheless also ‘ambiguated’. 
This is the subject of the next Chapter – the story of the Homeless People’s Alliance.  
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Chapter Four: The Homeless People’s Alliance 
Purposive Creation and ‘Ambiguated’ Realities  
(circa 1991 to mid-2004)150
The state...is the coldest of all monsters...(it) lies in languages of good and evil; and 
whatever it says, it lies – and whatever it has, it has stolen…only there, where the 
state ceases, does the man who is not superfluous begin…(Nietzche, 1969 cited in 
Rose & Miller, 1992:173).  
 
Nowadays the ambition to ‘change the world’ meets with cynicism – because of the 
questionable record of several development decades, doubts over social engineering 
and rationalist planning as exercises in authoritarianism, and over modernism and the 
utopian belief in the perfectability of society (Nederveen, J-N, 2000:187). 
The past 10 years have witnessed a remarkable apparent confluence of positions in the 
…development arena. Barely any development actor could take serious issue with the 
way the objectives of development are currently framed. The new consensus is 
captured in a seductive mix of buzzwords. ‘Participation’ and ‘empowerment’, words 
that are ‘warmly persuasive’ and fulsomely positive, promise an entirely different 
way of doing business. Harnessed in the service of ‘poverty reduction’ and decorated 
with the clamours of ‘civil society and the ‘voices of the poor’, they speak of an 
agenda for transformation that combines no-nonsense pragmatism with almost 
unimpeachable moral authority. It is easy enough to get caught up in the emotive calls 
for action, to feel that, in the midst of all the uncertainties of the day, …institutions 
are working together for the good, and that they have now got the story right and are 
really going to make a difference (Cornwall & Brock, 2005:1043). 
In the old days, we lived in fine houses and shat in the bush. Now we shit in fine 
toilets and live in the bush (Patrick Magebhula, ex-President of the South African 
Homeless People’s Federation, describing public housing pre- and post-apartheid, in 
his address to Minister Joe Slovo at the first national meeting of the Federation in 
May 1994, cited in Baumann, 1998:2).  
  
                                                 
150 The author is indebted to Edgar Pieterse for his contributions to and editing of this Chapter, and accepts 
responsibility for any errors and mistakes. 
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Introduction  
The Favelas of Brazil, the villas miseria of Buenos Aires, the colonias populares of Mexico 
City, the Kampungs of Jakarta, the chawls and zopadpattis of Mumbai, the bustees of 
Kolkata, the katchi abadis of Karachi, the iskwaters of Manila, the shammasas of Khartoum, 
the umjondolos of Durban, the bidonvilles of Abidjan, and the baladis of Cairo, are the ‘fully 
franchised solution to the problem of warehousing the twenty-first century’s surplus 
humanity’ (Davis, 2004:13). The slum and shantytowns are at ‘once a dumping ground for 
the city’s byproducts – the (human) waste generated by its own development – and its 
products’ (Diken, 2005:307). The slum (as product) in its modernist representation and 
popular cognitive consumption is an aberration, a ‘state of urban exception’; the space 
‘outside the law and outside civilisation’ (Ibid).  
Accommodating 43% of the urban population of the all developing regions combined, and a 
staggering 78% in the least developed countries (2001 figures) (UN-Habitat, 2003:xiii), the 
slum, in reality, is ‘not outside the city’; it is screwed ‘within its very centre’. Contemporary 
urban space is ‘organised according to the logic of the favela’ (Diken, 2005:307). The very 
possibility and existence of the formal (recognised/acknowledged) space relies on its inherent 
transgression (Ibid).  
In our clinical and disciplined imaginations and imaginaries of development, slums are 
‘social wastelands’ – the physical manifestations of social inequality, exclusion, 
marginalisation and discrimination. They are the products of failed policies, ineffective 
governance, corruption, inappropriate regulation, exclusionary urban (economic) 
development and growth paths, poor urban management strategies, dysfunctional and 
inequitable land markets, discriminatory financial systems, and a profound democratic 
deficit. The ‘product’ and the human ‘waste’ (the aberrant and abhorrent) bear testimony to 
the failure (rather than an integral and structuring component) of contemporary 
‘development’ – a project designed and engineered by a malignant, malevolent and 
monstrous state. It is only ‘beyond the state’ (in the ‘free market’ and ‘civil society’) that true 
‘human flourishing’151
The human waste of development’s desultory landscape ‘rudely’ interject these sterile and 
impoverished debates, opening up the eyes of our deadened minds to an alternative 
possibility rooted in and inspired by a poetics of a political imagination inhabiting a realm 
located midway between purposive creation and determined resistance to injustice and 
exclusion (adapted from Robinson, 2004a). These residents participate in social movements 
akin to what Arturo Escobar (1992:396) defines as follows: 
 is perceived to be possible. Criticising the excesses, inefficiencies, 
and injustices of the state is what unites market fundamentalists and post-/anti-
developmentalists. In both cases, there is little room for ‘forward politics’; ‘development’ is 
only the ‘destructive power of social engineering’ (Pieterse, J-N, 2000:186–7).  
Today’s social movements are seen as playing a central role in producing the world in 
which we live, its social structures and practices, its meanings and cultural 
orientations, its possibilities for change. Social movements emerged out of the crisis 
                                                 
151 Human flourishing refers to the full development of a human being’s innate intellectual, physical and 
spiritual potential/s in the context of wider communities (Friedmann, 2000:46). 
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of modernity; they oriented themselves towards the constitution of new orders, and 
embody a new understanding of politics and social life itself. They result in the 
formation of novel collective identities which foster social and cultural forms of 
relating and solidarity as a response to the crises of meanings and economies that the 
world faces today. 
These social and cultural forms of relating and solidarity are distinctive because the state is 
not their starting point for existence and relevance. Instead, and provocatively, these social 
movements mobilise rather on the assumption that the state is unlikely to create the 
environment for and extend the opportunities to the movement and their members to 
substantially transform their material conditions through, for example, pro-poor resource re-
ordering and institutional restructuring. Sutured by the imperatives of everyday life, survival 
and solidarity, a determined series of social and political practices follows, implicitly setting 
the terms of engagement with the state. The uniqueness of the engagement is not solely 
derived from the priorities and the associational schemas of their cultural politics. Rather, 
and, once again, provocatively, the poor and their movements engage the state when they 
consider themselves able and ready (elaborated below). 
The socio-political practices are first and foremost about deconstructing, exposing and 
resisting the dominant culture, including the exclusionary and discriminatory meaning it 
produces, circulates and legitimates as the elementary and natural ‘constitution of our world’ 
(Gregory, 2004 cited in Roy, 2006:16). Challenge and resistance enacted through metaphor, 
ritual, rhetoric, public performance and spectacle, bolted together by the mobilisation and 
management of their (latent) resources breeds radically new social and relational economies. 
These economies – the ‘sites of radical possibility’ (Cornwall, 2002:17) – steadily break 
down the ‘atomization of slums’(SDI Bulletin, 15 December 2004:3), opening up and 
expanding opportunities for the poor to collectively strategise in the transformation of the 
inequitable and marginalising institutional and spatial ecologies of contemporary urbanity. 
The ‘social and cultural forms of relating and solidarity’ and the accompanying ‘struggles are 
at once economic, political, and cultural – and hence they are biopolitical struggles, struggles 
over the form of life…creating new public spaces and new forms of community’ (adapted 
from Hardt & Negri, 2000:56). Material upliftment, the restoration of rights and collective 
social inclusion are conterminous with productive reconfiguration of ‘technologies of self’ 
(discussed below).  
The political practice unifying the restoration of human dignity and self-affirmation with 
poverty eradication and inclusion is anchored in ‘deep democracy’,152
                                                 
152 Defined as people directing their own development initiatives and organisations through ‘active internal 
debate’ and a ‘commitment to transparency and inclusion’; the poor engaging key actors in the state and local 
administrations; and individuals and communities ‘achiev[ing] solidarity and [being] empower[ed] through 
horizontal connections’ to other individuals and groups (Wilson & Lowery, 2003:51). 
 an indispensable 
component of which is the nurturing and embedding of a specific cultural capacity, namely 
the ‘capacity to aspire’ (Appadurai, 2004:5), daily denied them by material poverty, routine 
violation of human rights, and socio-institutional practices of political and economic 
exclusion (People’s Dialogue, 2000). The project, then, is about ‘optimising the terms of 
trade between recognition and redistribution’ (Appadurai, 2004:5) through reclaiming the 
democratic right and power of the poor to choose, champion and implement their own 
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development path. Reclaiming their right and power revolves around institutionalising 
resource mobilisation strategies aimed at autonomy and self-reliance; adopting actions of 
‘high symbolic content’; pursuing ‘concrete objectives’; and forging ‘strong personal 
engagement of participants’ structured around local, city, national, continental and 
international networks (Ruggiero, 2005:299).  
The ‘capacity to aspire’ in the teeth of fierce opposition and resistance to reversing the socio-
institutional patterning of inequality and exclusion requires mastery of an intensely complex 
political calculus inscribed in templates of association whose repertoires span rejection and 
resistance; opposition and demonstration; complicity and subversion; and compliance and co-
operation. Shaped by the ‘contours of poverty’ (Anonymous (c) nd:2), the everyday practices 
of holding on and getting by, these templates and repertoires empower the poor to internally 
generate, mobilise and manage financial, institutional, political and organisational resources 
and capacities whose deployment simultaneously changes life and world.  
Cast differently, their development practice, particularly the definition and production of their 
own ‘solutions’ to pressing daily livelihood survival needs, contests and rejects the ‘passive 
object’ identity engraved in official development interventions and exposes their limitations. 
With contestation, rejection and exposure replaced by self-affirming and democratically 
empowering ‘solutions’, whose implementation reworks inequitable socio-institutional power 
circuits, the poor combine the militant poet Rimbaud’s injunction to ‘Change Life’ and 
Marx’s imploration to ‘Change the World’ (Ruggiero, 2005:299).  
Not easily comprehensible by conventional Western knowledge sets and ‘scientific’ or 
‘modernist’ development paradigms (with their constipated binary logics), the solutions, 
Swilling (2005:15) notes, ‘dissolve the assumptions underlying the solutions imposed by 
others’; crumbling the subject-object dualism as the ‘“objects” refuse to be the “objects” by 
doing what objects should not be able to do, i.e. think and act like “subjects”’. In this 
formulation, and drawing from transdisciplinarity (Nicolescu, 2002), the access of the poor to 
(endogenously-generated financial, institutional, organisational political and social) resources 
‘determines a strong affirmation of identity, whereas for others identity is forged because 
access to resources is denied’ (Ruggiero, 2005:304).  
The poor, then, are both rich and poor. The transcendence and dissolution of the subject-
object dualism hard-wired into solutions and, when implemented, constitute the foundations 
for the synthesis – again not easily comprehensible by Western knowledge sets – of reform 
and structural change, amelioration and transformation. 
Transcendence and dissolution, ameliorative transformation or transformative amelioration – 
is for many a ‘koan’ that even the postmodernists, postcolonial scholars and anti-
development ‘establishment’ would find hard pressed to explain. The poor through their 
templates and repertoires have come to plait together 
….strands of development knowledge that are normally compartmentalized into 
separate types of developmental practice: the key role of micro-finance in 
development; grassroots community-organizing to build collective solidarities; 
technical innovations aimed at doing more with less; challenging existing inequalities 
at the political level; pragmatic autonomism within civil society; the specificity of the 
city and in particular the socio-cultural context of the urban poor as a field of 
organizational practice; and subordinating professional knowledge and roles to the 
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organized chaos of community leadership. Unsurprisingly, as with any kind of 
synthesis, it makes everyone who has not seen the synthesis unhappy (Swilling, 
2005:12).  
The development practice combining recognition (capacity to aspire) and redistributive (deep 
democracy) struggles (to change both daily life and the world) defines a unique approach to 
state engagement. Best characterised as one of ‘bargaining at the top, pressure from below’ 
(Appadurai, 2002), the state is not perceived as a body to be ‘taken over’ and turned into an 
‘instrument of social change’ (Farhi, 2003:38). Rather, the manner of the state’s insertion into 
social, economic and cultural life, the organisational codification of the assemblage of actors, 
policies, programmes, and the associated technologies of rule that denies, inhibits and 
frustrates ‘human flourishing’ constitutes the focal point of struggle. In brief, the objective of 
the struggle is for the poor to ‘determine the conditions’ attached to development 
interventions within an ‘open and inclusive’ engagement process, ‘determined and controlled 
by the poor’ (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005:36, 56).  
Patience is the key organising frame of politics (Farhi, 2003) wherein a central place is 
awarded to accommodation, compromise, negotiation and long-term pressure instead of 
confrontation or threats of political reprisal (Appadurai, 2002:29). This type of political 
engagement (the politics of patience) is less about climbing or scaling the emancipatory 
peaks of the imaginaries of the contemporary development thinkers. Politics, in this frame, is 
‘not an event that happens once, a spectacular outburst of energy that overcomes the dark 
forces of oppression and lifts liberation into a superior state of perpetual triumph’ (Farhi, 
2003:39). Politics is the ‘very act of climbing, daily, tenaciously and incessantly’ (Ibid), 
advancing each day in ‘millimetre’ (President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, 2004 cited in 
Swilling et al., 2005b:1) and ‘centimeter’ (President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil cited 
in New York Times, 27 June 2004)153
The movement towards pro-poor outcomes via pragmatic negotiation of the uncertainties, 
instabilities and disequilibriums of the everyday renders this politics less-than-heroic. Indeed, 
it must of necessity be precarious, pragmatic and unstable. Breaking with dominant forms of 
politics founded on conflict between polarised opposites (communism/capitalism; left/right; 
state/masses); politics is grounded in ‘agonistic’ pluralism, i.e. ‘wrestling with the issues, 
contesting differences and diversities’ (Benington, 2001:202), embracing disagreement. As a 
politics of permanent provocation, partly consensual but respectful of disagreements, it 
comes into direct confrontation with the central paradox of modern democracy, namely the 
liberal and democratic tradition,
 towards sustainable pro-poor development policies and 
outcomes (points returned to in the Synthesis).  
154
                                                 
153 Available at 
 and, maybe even resolves or transcends the paradox.  
http://www.msu.edu/course/aec/810/Lula-Brazil.htm (accessed 11 April 2006). 
154 Modern democracy can be characterised in terms of the historical conjunction of two constitutive traditions 
(Mouffe, 2000). The liberal tradition is associated with the rule of law, individual liberty and human rights; and 
the democratic tradition is associated with participation, citizen equality and majority rule. The tension between 
the traditions are supposedly reconciled through the exchange of public reason (discussion and dialogue) by free 
and equal citizens. The inclusions and exclusions – a persistent and enduring feature of contemporary 
citizenship (Kabeer, 2002) and, more broadly, ‘the constitution of a people’ – is hereby effectively denied in the 
contemporary ‘consensus’ models of democracy, planning and social change. 
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The Homeless People’s Alliance can be counted as one of the worldwide social movements 
resonating closely with the conceptual lens of Arturo Escobar. Spanning the period 1991 to 
mid-2004, the focus of this Chapter is on narrating and analysing the genesis, rise, 
restructuring and consolidation of the HPA from a civil association to a civil-political 
movement concentrating solely on community mobilisation to gradually combining 
community work with political engagement of state actors at different scales (Millstein et al, 
2003). This is no small undertaking. The internal and external relational dynamics are dense, 
multi-faceted and complex entailing multi-pronged strategies of localisation and a shifting 
political strategy linking identity, territory and culture at different scales and spanning the 
globe (adapted from Escobar, 2001:163).155
Particularly fascinating about this movement, and its partners across the world, is that despite 
its grassroots preoccupation wherein it almost ignores the state, it ends up exercising a 
profound influence over the state and official urban development ambitions and programmes. 
Thus, in South Africa, by the late 1990s, the state appropriated elements of the community 
mobilisation methodology of the HPA – the People’s Housing Process (PHP) – 
mainstreaming it into government policy. The HPA’s seeming victory in making their 
ideology and praxis hegemonic, coupled to the powerful political role seized by and accorded 
them in the domain of urban development policy and debates about poverty reduction, was 
not without contradiction and challenge. Mediating the tension between effectively engaging 
the state and maintaining the movement’s core grassroots values and identity came to 
overshadow its growth, organisational identity, developmental impact and political practice.  
  
Tracing the origins, growth trajectory, ideological framework, organisational praxis and 
developmental impact of the HPA is the spine of this Chapter. The sophisticated ideological 
framework of the HPA and its unique engagement with the state is of particular significance 
therefore constituting a substantial focus of the case study. However, to fully understand the 
dynamic adaptability of this movement, a key episode in the life of the movement is honed in 
on – a major restructuring exercise in 2001 precipitated by a series of crises detailed later on 
(in Section Three). By adopting this approach, the aim is to explore the unique attributes of 
the HPA vis-à-vis other social movements, teasing out broader conceptual and political 
implications for understanding the unfolding dynamics between the state and civil society in 
democratic South Africa’s housing project and programme and developmental state 
(re)construction.  
Given the unique character and political ideology of the movement, considerable space is 
devoted to the ideology and identity of the movement (Section Two), which through a 
confluence of forces eschewed transitional and post-apartheid official and civil society 
discourses about appropriate community development processes in (amongst others) the 
shelter sector. However, this only makes sense if located in the over-arching political 
transition from apartheid to political democracy – the starting point in Section One. Across 
these two Sections, the unique approach of the HPA to the state is explored.  
                                                 
155 Unpacking the complexity and density of the relational dynamics is rendered more complicated by a post-
apartheid transformation project that combines – in varying amounts and varying over time – democratic 
developmentalism and developmental democracy. The state is on one day a friend of the poor; on the next a foe; 
and on another day both friend and foe. It is this dynamic constantly wrestled with in this Chapter and, more 
generally, in this thesis.  
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At the outset, it needs to be registered that the HPA is too large, complex, established and 
dispersed a movement to capture in (its full richness) within the confines of this Chapter. 
Supplementing the earlier detailed studies (for example BRCS, 2001, 2003; Marx, 2003; 
Baumann & Mitlin, 2002; Napier, 2003) are interviews conducted with strategic activists and 
practitioners during 2004. It is also critical to record that, since the latter part of 2004, this 
movement of the urban poor has radically reconfigured its identity, modus operandi and 
institutional infrastructure. In extremely broad strokes, the uTshani Fund has been 
recapitalised and its activities refocused with the most important immediate priorities being 
the recovery of old debt and bringing all existing projects to fruition. The NGO People’s 
Dialogue no longer exists. The national Homeless People’s Federation was disbanded and the 
individual federations have recently joined the Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP) (the 
successor to SAHPF), whose development thrust and orientation is not confined to the 
principles and practices of Slum Dwellers International (SDI) (discussed in the Chapter). The 
Urban Resource Centre – now the Community Urban Resource Centre (COURC) – has 
partnered the Fund. Although its engagement format is similar to the one that existed between 
People’s Dialogue and the SAHPF, it is also reportedly substantively different.  
To the extent that these changes portend the emergence of a different version of democratic 
developmentalism, the key concern in this Chapter is to elaborate the genesis, rise, content 
and mechanics of this particular version of democratic developmentalism (circa 1991 to mid-
2004) as counterweight to state developmentalism (of the first decade of democracy). This 
discussion will take into account the contradictory consequences flowing from (selective) 
state appropriation of the PHP, and the limits of a temporally-bound version of democratic 
developmentalism (that is, the rise and fall of the HPA, its tango/partnership/‘judo’ with the 
state, and the aftermath).  
The bulk of this Chapter then describes the inventive capabilities and capacities of the human 
‘waste’ in defining and constructing their developmental future. The unstable and precarious 
nature of their politics, local contingencies, and (internal and external) geometries of power 
corrupt most clear-cut definitions of what is going on and ‘complexify’ constructions of 
alternative futures. But the source of frustrated ‘futures’, it is opined, may derive more from 
the HPA’s complementary and conflicting discourses (empowerment and social 
responsibilisation, asset-based community development and supply-side citizenship) and 
social governance regimes underwriting HPA templates and repertoires (notwithstanding 
HPA’s subversive manipulation of established technologies of rule). ‘Ambiguated’ 
development practice and frustrated ‘futures’ - the latter being the outcome of the 
contradictions and complementarities generated by disarticulations and articulations of 
different yet similar governmentalities156
                                                 
156 In Foucault’s writing (1978), governmentality is a specific form of power with its target being the 
population; its primary source of knowledge being political economy; statistics its science; and the security 
apparatus its mechanism of control (in Gordon, 1991). 
 (state and civil society) - supports the insights of 
transdisciplinarity perspectives. These relate to an entity harbouring identities (HPA 
development practice and technologies) that simultaneously affirm and deny the entity itself, 
this being the so-called ‘included middle’ that makes it possible to transcend traditional 
dualism. Thus, in its attempts to craft and operationalise a politics  positioned midway 
between purposive creation and determined resistance to injustice and exclusion, the identity 
of HPA’s development practice (both ‘A’ and ‘not-A’) came to both contest and consolidate, 
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weaken and fortify inequitable resource endowments and institutional landscapes. This 
outcome was not inevitable. Despite this (debateable) identity and the possibility of its 
unstable stabilisation around transformative thrusts and real everyday applications, the HPA 
under-invested in institutionally consolidating its proclaimed counter-governmental self-
organisation. At the risk of over generalising, the poorest of the poor were not ready and able 
to effectively engage the state that managed to outflank and disorganise them through 
replacing/displacing the poor’s solution with an (officially) disempowering one. More subtly, 
but again at a high level of generalisation, the HPA misjudged the level of readiness and the 
(organisational) capabilities of the poor when intensive state engagement commenced. The 
deleterious consequences of this miscalculation were exacerbated when state-HPA 
partnerships were scaled up. Had the HPA devoted more time and energy to ‘getting the 
politics right’ through investment, entrenchment and institutional consolidation of the 
necessarily prior pro-poor relational fields of politics, the outcome could potentially have 
been substantially different.  
The Chapter ends by flagging the failings common to (this strain of) democratic 
developmentalism and developmental democracy alongside the need to recognise their 
interdependence and interconnection. Proposed here to overcome the failings and (re-) 
establish dynamic interdependence is reconnecting politics and economics through deepening 
democracy from the community level up and building redistributive mechanisms into policy 
making from the state down.  
Before commencing with this complex narrative, it is important to alert the reader that there 
are innumerable ways of telling this tale. The one narrated here draws on (and deconstructs) 
HPA and mainstream literature. The latter is probably correctly criticised for its ‘linear cause-
effect’ orientation, with one manifestation being a simplistic view of states and governments 
‘that for whatever reason’ ‘do not have the financial resources’ and tap into the savings of the 
poor to boost their legitimacy (‘without increasing their financial commitment’), and/or, at 
the same time, upsizing (in quite a novel way) the (declining) social wage.157
                                                 
157  
 There is 
without doubt a great deal of merit in this line of argument, but only if detached from the 
material and historical context.  
Throughout the Satterthwaite paper is the constant refrain about the way CBO-driven processes bring 
down the unit cost of housing and infrastructure, increase the number of beneficiaries...and improve the 
capacity for ‘cost recovery’ – these financial advantages being what has often enticed government into 
adopting this CBO-driven model... The savings resource that is built up by the CBOs from below is 
seen as useful both as a resource for investment in built structures and as process vehicle for delivering 
services. If this is seen from a broader political economy perspective it effectively means that states for 
whatever reason (neo-lib econ, kleptocracy, class capture, etc) do not have the financial resources find 
a way of benefiting from legitimacy without increasing their financial commitment. The poor end up 
using their sweat equity and savings that would otherwise go into food consumption or education for 
housing. This is a linear cause-effect analysis that ignores power and the dynamics of power embedded 
in the condition called poverty. In other words, it is very easy to identify the causes of poverty, but very 
difficult to determine what will eliminate poverty. The reason for this is because development can 
result in resource flows that simply run through communities without making a difference. The trick is 
how to build institutional and human capacity to capture resources so that the outcome is what could be 
called developmental (Swilling, 2005a). 
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In the South African case, for example, the adoption of the PHP into official policy was 
related to debates in the state about the financial sustainability of the subsidy programme, its 
long-term future, and its inability (in the face of spiralling land, building materials and other 
costs) to provide decent shelter. Indeed, across ideological divides, in state and civil society, 
there is agreement pertaining to the ‘bastardisation’ of the PHP, i.e. mainstreaming was 
driven in large part by the dominant view of the poor’s contribution to the housing process 
being little more than savings and sweat, coupled to the abandonment of the private sector 
from the low-income shelter sector because of (amongst other things) poor returns (see, for 
example, Rust, 2002; DOH, 2004a). The building of the human, social and institutional 
capital of the poor was not (and here there is broad agreement) a feature of the official 
People’s Housing Process. Secondly, and here connected to a state that is downsizing the 
social wage, is not only the general failure of the state to meet its financial obligation 
(specifically, non-capitalisation of the uTshani Fund). While the state may have furnished 
many legitimate reasons for not recapitalising the Fund (discussed below), the withholding of 
the subsidy to those who had built their own homes (via the HPA-PHP sweat-savings-small 
loans formats and schema) is arguably a very strong case for those who read subversive and 
repressive governmentality in the CBO-driven processes. Put differently, those who housed 
themselves via the HPA-PHP format in the belief that their hardship and sacrifices would be 
recognised and rightly compensated (a subsidy as per policy and with wider reference to the 
Constitution) were told afterwards that they were not entitled to a subsidy on the grounds that 
there were ‘technically speaking’ housed. In the state’s showcasing of its commitment to 
People’s Housing Processes, it is unclear if those who were effectively robbed of the subsidy/ 
stripped of this right, were excluded from government’s flashy brochures and annual reports 
of state-supported people-driven delivery. 
Finally, for those championing the undoubtedly powerful position of reimagining CBO-
driven processes (‘building institutional and human capacity to capture resources so that the 
outcome is what could be called developmental’ (Swilling, 2005a)) the South African chapter 
of the global SDI movement demonstrated little sign of this due to a host of factors, both 
internal and external. In sum then, the tale narrated here is contextually-specific, time-bound 
and informed by the writings of the HPA and mainstream authorities. It is left to others to 
write this tale from other developmental angles that they champion and advocate in the 
present and future.  
Section One  
Locating the HPA in the Transition  
Toppling the repressive regime, seizing state power and remoulding the state into a 
developmental apparatus defined the identity and politics of the dominant (majority) wing of 
the anti-apartheid movement. Armed with a democratic Constitution and developmentally re-
geared, the state was accorded an active, leading and creative role in redressing development 
imbalances and responding to the priorities of an awakened citizenry. In the march towards 
this (imagined) post-apartheid utopia, the mobilisation strategies, opposition discourses, 
political culture and elite (re)alignments gave cause for some concern related in the main to 
the constitutionalisation and institutionalisation of a pro-poor development dispensation.  
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If the mobilisation strategies, opposition discourses, political culture and elite (re)alignments 
gave little cause for hope that the (emerging) new dispensation would be a pro-poor one (see, 
for example Greenstein, 2003; Habib, 1998; Jenkins, 2002; Bond, 2002; Pieterse, 2002), the 
dynamics of political power at local level added further grist to the anti-poor mill. At ground 
level, petty bourgeois elements were (and still are) often in control of the party machinery, 
development forums and civic bodies. Economically better off and better educated than their 
neighbours in informal settlements and backyard shacks, the local political elite is under ‘no 
pressure to extend their socio-political reach to their poorest neighbours’ and are dissuaded 
from active participation in local politics (Everatt, 1999:27).  
Residents of backyard shacks are vulnerable to financial exploitation by landlords; landlords 
mediate access to basic on-site facilities; and they are not infrequently called upon to perform 
the duties of domestic workers in the landlord’s house. Tenants rarely involve themselves in 
political activities for fear of reprisals from landlords. Those living in informal settlements 
feel alienated from mainstream township life, including the political and development 
process, and are ‘regarded and treated as lower-class residents by their township neighbours’ 
(Ibid:17). The combination of poverty and exclusion feeds growing inter-group hostility but 
also alliances against newcomers (informal settlers and ‘illegals’). In a great number of cases, 
newcomers and illegals are routinely blamed for a host of problems including crime, 
unemployment, social exclusion and growing poverty, with often violent (and deadly) 
consequences. So while the ANC committed itself to delivery to the poor, local reality was 
(and continues to be) one of ‘shutting out the poor’ (Ibid:25) compounded by the fact that the 
ANC did (and still does) not have a ‘public language to deal with the[se] intense local power 
struggles’ (Jensen, 2001:107, 118).  
This accounts in part for why the HPA’s organisation of the poorest segments of society was 
initially viewed by both the ANC and civics as a ‘threat’. Tensions were skilfully defused by 
the HPA through working on a settlement-by-settlement basis, assuaging fears and building 
trust via underscoring the movement’s non-party political stance and orientation.158
In the beginning they were not sure if we are not starting another political 
organisation. They started to doubt us... but observed that this movement is not going 
to be one of the political… because we have organised people in the community 
saying that we are going to talk about the developments. It’s very sensitive. It is 
critical for you as an ANC member to stand up in a meeting of the ANC and say that: 
‘I am one of your members. I am coming as one of your members’. When you are 
there, you are there to negotiate. That is all. That we are a movement. You explain 
how we are working as a movement. That is all. You must always keep that you are a 
movement. You don’t even use the sweaters [and] all those kind of materials to 
present yourself... In some provinces there were [tensions and fights between the 
 Patricia 
Matolengwe, ex-General Secretary of the Inland Provinces (SAHPF) and former Member of 
Management Team (People’s Dialogue), explains how relationships were established with the 
ANC and civics:  
                                                 
158 Federations refuse to align themselves to and/or endorse political parties for three reasons. Firstly, to 
facilitate maximum inclusivity and openness to all sements/sections of the urban poor. Secondly, their 
independence is protected, which enhances their capacity for independent action. Lastly, it allows negotiations 
and facilitates working with those in power at all levels of government (d’Cruz & Satterthwaithe, 2005). 
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Federation and the ANC and civics]. But not real fights due to this understanding 
which I was talking about. Yes, in other provinces – even if they were not so visible – 
they started to have at the back of the mind that there is that tension. There were some 
at the beginning. Then we started to tell ourselves: ‘Let us go back. Let’s explain to 
the people. At the end of the day they will understand us’. It was not easy, especially 
for the civic bodies. For them, because we identify us as a movement, when we were 
explaining to them according to their constitution, they started to see that there is no 
difference to what the civic has to do… as they identify themselves as the ones who 
deliver for the communities. So it’s why they always doubted us. Now, it’s not a 
problem, in the sense that, as we were explaining ourselves, telling them it was 
difficult for us as an organisation to have a constitution… When we started to talk 
about the constitution, we realised that this constitution is going to contradict the 
constitution of the civic body… We are the individual members who join the 
movement in the communities who belong to the civic bodies. We rather agreed: Let 
us write the guidelines, so that we can work according to the guidelines; being bound 
by the constitution by the civic organization in the communities. The guidelines have 
not been produced as a document. This has been negotiated at every level. We started 
at the localities. And at the beginning, some of us started from the provincial body. 
Then we used the provincial body to influence the local (Interview, 2004). 
The alienation and marginalisation of the most vulnerable segments of society (the poorest of 
the poor) from political life and development processes through default, design and structural 
configurations was reinforced and deepened by the activities of other civil society 
organisations that at the time purported to service the needs of the poor. Whilst numerous 
NGOs working in the urban development sector were able, within the confines of (late) 
apartheid politics and the immediate liberalisation period in the early 1990s, to access 
government funded programmes to address the shelter needs of low-income communities, 
most of them worked through local civics which were not representative of all segments of 
the population. 
Section Two  
Ideology of the HPA and its Identity  
The Homeless People’s HPA is founded on a critical reading and analysis of South Africa’s 
political economy and the practices of the liberation movement. With respect to the latter, the 
main ideologues of the HPA – most notably those in People’s Dialogue – were ‘explicitly 
uncomfortable with the politics of the liberation movement’ even in the years of liberation. 
They were equally uncomfortable with ‘contemporary anti-communist ideas of [an] “open 
society”’ (uTshani Buyakhuluma, nd cited by Tweedie, 2003:5). The ideologues were 
convinced that the creation of an ‘open society’ wherein all individuals were autonomous and 
equal in the eyes of the law was not ‘a necessary and sufficient guarantee that the rights of 
poor were to be realised’.  
Also People’s Dialogue was one of the first organisations to be deeply sceptical of the 
state’s capacity to make interventions that would ensure meaningful resource flows 
into poor communities. At the same time, it recognised that many politicians and 
officials in Government had a genuine interest in addressing the needs of its largest 
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constituencies – the urban poor. However, without a common voice and collective 
action emanating from the poor themselves, it was certain that the state would 
mediate national resource struggles in ways that continued to benefit other social 
classes (Ibid:5). 
The new dispensation provided cold comfort to these ideologues. The early 1990s, they write, 
can be characterised as one of high expectations and ‘generous promises from politicians’. 
During this period of political liberalisation, the ANC and SANCO made explicit 
commitments to urban development to mobilise and win the votes of the urban poor. They 
however ‘envisaged a top-down “delivery” process’ wherein the ‘triumphant liberation 
movement would solve all the problems of the dispossessed’. To the ANC, the poor, they 
argued, were ‘objects of “development”’ (Baumann & Bolnick, 2001:109, original 
emphasis).159
In a document titled, Housing and the Urban Poor, posted on the website of People’s 
Dialogue, the following is recorded about the South African conjuncture, the political 
complexion of new regime and the poverty-amelioration potential of its policies, programmes 
and strategies:  
 With democracy envisaged as not much more than a ‘pantomime every four 
years’, and with people ‘abdicat[ing] their power to political parties over whom there is little 
control’ (Bolnick, 2005:8), the likelihood of reconfiguring the subject-object/benefactor-
beneficiary relationship were considered very slim indeed.  
South African society, by and large, still praises itself and still anticipates praise, for 
the miraculous political compromise that enabled it to evade an almost certain 
conflagration similar to the one that continues to bedevil the Middle East.  
The new South African Government continues to pride itself on its unfailing efforts to 
reverse poverty (that it often constructs as strictly an apartheid derivative) and to 
guarantee the social and economic rights of all citizens in the country. 
The reality does not quite coincide with this kind of imagery, but the full extent of the 
current problems facing the poor in South Africa is often underplayed or ignored. 
This is reinforced by an obstinate refusal to let go of consoling illusions. Throughout 
the world, people who fight for justice and human rights like to uphold South Africa 
as a shining example. Given the irrefutable ugliness of the old regime, it is 
predictable, although horribly naïve, to believe that those who have supplanted them 
are without blemish, or at best that the blemishes are only skin deep; that the ANC 
Government’s strategies of reconstruction and development is generally on course, 
that social and economic rights are being upheld and that poverty is on the retreat 
(Anonymous (a), nd:1). 
This deep scepticism of government is premised on sociological and historical beliefs that the 
interests of the poor and government seldom coincide (or more boldly put, ‘state and the 
market act in ways that are universally against the interests of the poor’ (Anonymous (a), 
                                                 
159 It is interesting to note that, a decade into the transition, this criticism still prevails in influential circles. In a 
brutally frank essay analysing post-1994 development trends and currents, Jeremy Cronin (2005:13), Deputy-
Secretary of the Communist Party, critiqued the ‘well-intentioned and often large-scale “delivery” interventions 
from the state’ as ‘top-down’, ‘technical’ and ‘technocratic’, something which demobilises, fragments, 
disempowers and atomises communities.  
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nd:1)). Thus, in spite of the installation of a popular democratic government, the founders of 
the HPA ‘understood that the needs and problems of the urban poor were not going to be a 
priority for the new government’ (Baumann & Bolnick, 2001:106). Pressure by existing civil 
society formations (e.g. SANCO) that could potentially be brought to bear on the new 
government to prioritise the needs of the poor admitted only pessimistic scenarios, not least 
because these formations developed an uncritical relationship to the ANC and were mostly 
led by men. The co-option of the leadership of the civic structures further weakened their 
ability to perform this function. NGOs, on the other hand, were equally ill-suited to this task 
(for the reasons outlined above).   
But the ideologues were not unsympathetic to the constraints confronted by the new 
government that inherited and wielded an apparatus of power ‘designed to be regulatory and 
not developmental’ and governing a ‘deeply authoritarian’ society, ‘controlled by a very 
aggressive and organised private sector’ (Anonymous (a), nd:3). With an eye on securing the 
best deal for the poor, the ideologues realised that it would be ill-advised to demonise and 
frontally assault a state commanding unprecedented levels of legitimacy (at home and 
abroad) but struggling to consolidate its democratic credentials and extend its hegemony 
under difficult material conditions. Pragmatic engagement, the ideologues decided, directed 
at securing working relationships with state (and market) institutions were likely to yield the 
most fruitful outcomes for the poor (Ibid).  
The structuring of working relationships around post-apartheid development programmes and 
interventions not considered pro-poor by the ideologues presented additional dilemmas and 
hurdles. Maximising the benefits for the poor through pragmatic engagement encompassed 
recognition of both the weaknesses and opportunities presented by government programmes, 
and devising strategies and technologies to deepen the access and benefits flowing to the 
poor. Thus, whilst the ideologues were most critical of the post-apartheid housing policy 
slated as ‘clearly dysfunctional, anti-poor and driven by the enlightened self-interest of the 
private sector’160 (Anonymous (a), nd:1–3), they chose not to challenge the policy.161
Enhancing and maximising access to the constitutionally entrenched entitlement extended far 
beyond the (traditional) claim-making strategies of mainstream human rights advocacy civil 
 For 
them, the subsidy was an ‘entitlement under law, based on the constitution’ and enhancing 
access to it by all means possible was to be encouraged (Baumann & Bolnick, 2001:106).  
                                                 
160 On a more fine-grained level, the policy was criticised on the grounds that it continued to ‘finance the orderly 
settlement of poor households on peri-urban land’ with its roots in the mid-1980s strategy of orderly 
urbanisation; reinforced and reproduced the existing inequitable structure of the South African city; impacted 
detrimentally on the urban poor; ‘perpetuate[d] systems of control via patronage and clientelism’; was a 
‘powerful instrument of socio-political control’; and ‘perpetuate[d] and deepen[ed] a culture of 
dependency…[with the result]…that democracy is never deepened beyond the ballot box’ (Anonymous (a), 
nd:1–2, 3) 
161 The Botshabelo Accord was signed by Rose Molokane on ‘behalf of the organised urban poor’ (People’s 
Dialogue, 2002:4). The key word in the quotation is organised. The period 1991 to 1994 witnessed the HPA 
undertake concerted mobilisation and capacity development programmes with the objective of creating and 
nurturing an organised and powerful political presence of the poor. Only in 1994, when the HPA felt some 
measure of confidence in the capacities/capabilities of the poor as an organised force, did the courting of the 
state begin in a purposive and concerted manner (discussed below). Regrettably, the partnership with the state, 
structured around the housing subsidy, was poorly founded and misplaced/misjudged .  
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society formations fixated on popular education and awareness-raising. People understanding 
their rights, in the words of one of the ideologues, is ‘not even half the battle won’. 
Organising and uniting people to ‘make those rights become realities’ is the real battle 
(transcript of interview with J. Bolnick & V. Mbeki, n.d.:6). Deemed necessary to triumph in 
this battle was the construction of new relational fields of politics, whose territories and 
boundaries are defined, delineated and patrolled by the poor themselves. A prerequisite for 
the construction and patrolling of this field is for the poor to command a ‘truly self-organised 
presence in the political sphere’ (People’s Dialogue, 2000:42).  
Because the poor are – borrowing a phrase from a recent ardent devotee of this view, the 
World Bank (2000a) – the ‘true experts on poverty’, effective solutions to poverty originate 
in their everyday practices. The challenge to contemporary development praxis, the HPA 
ideologues charged, is to respect, trust and appropriately support (as defined by the poor) the 
inventiveness, genius and energies of their (everyday) livelihood strategies (see Baumann, 
2003). In brief, the task was to invest in the poor and their solutions in formats empowering 
them to drive the expansion of the scale and scope of their solutions. Lasting poverty 
reduction, according to their logic, pivoted on an organised, confident and determined poor 
whose power derived from strong networked organisations articulating and championing 
their solution, and engaging the state on their own terms.  
This type of claim making differs radically from other civil society formations that, in most 
cases, work with existing government programmes, with all their imperfections and 
potentially anti-poor orientations, and adjust their conduct accordingly, which usually entails 
a narrowing of the democratic horizon. Examples of this include NGOs which have entered 
into partnerships with the state to deliver on government-formulated programmes. The other 
approach is where communities (often in partnerships with NGOs) lobby, petition, pressurise 
and protest to either ameliorate living conditions or alleviate the impacts of existing state 
development interventions using a rights-based discourse. The major focus of both strategies 
is on securing a state output, either through pushing the interpretive and real boundaries set 
by legislation or policy and/or the enactment and activation of new rights. The HPA’s 
strategy was one of initiating a ‘grassroots-driven, non-hierarchical process to reclaim the 
latent collective power of poor households and their communities, and use this to identify 
options and strategies to address their self-identified priority needs’ (Baumann & Bolnick, 
2001:106).  
This is an inversion of mainstream development praxis where the state designs and plans and 
invites the poor to participate in the execution of official plans. The HPA’s templates and 
repertoires were directed at the creation of a ‘self-conscious [organised] movement of the 
poor’ whose collective resources and capacities are mobilised to design and plan their own 
development intervention and thereafter invite the state (and others) to participate and invest 
in the implementation of their plans and programmes (Ibid). Recalling Swilling (2005), the 
empowerment of poor communities to define their own solutions (and leverage the resources 
for implementation) dissolves and transcends the subject-object/benefactor-beneficiary 
dualism that is ontologically (and historically) hardwired into ‘scientific’, ‘modernist’ 
development paradigms and praxis.  
Activating and mobilising the power residing in institutionalised (alternative) forms of self-
organisation thus rewires historical relations of power and could potentially usher in a 
development pathway situated midway between yesterday’s state-driven mass production of 
standardised outputs (which is socially totalising and homogenising) and individualised 
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market-driven/privatised production delivery (which is socially fragmenting and 
disorganising).162
Mobilisation ideology in practice 
 In short, the HPA approach could be called a Poor People’s Third Way 
(discussed below). 
Reclaiming the democratic right and power of the poor to choose, champion and implement 
their own development path is (at base) a struggle about dispelling deeply ingrained societal 
misconceptions about the inability of the poor to coherently articulate their needs, let alone 
generate solutions to satisfying them without external injections of professional technical 
expertise and resources.  
The prejudices of our age, class and culture, embedded in our value systems and knowledge 
sets, portray the poor as unsophisticated, unproductive and illiterate. The poor – here (see 
next Chapter) and elsewhere - are characterised or caricatured as unable to assume 
responsibility for their upliftment, deficient in capabilities, and seeking only hand-outs or 
hand-downs from the state with no obligations and responsibilities (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 
2005). Reversing this negative ‘vagabond’ definition and portrayal of the poor, the HPA 
creating a discourse premised on the assumption that the potential exists for them to restore 
their own dignity and affirm their own agency.  
This constituted the core thrust of the HPA’s activities in the first three years of its existence 
(1991 to 1994). The priority during this period was for the Federation to become a ‘rallying 
point for the urban poor, an institution in which the poor and homeless people could find a 
safe passage to decent and affordable shelter’ (People’s Dialogue, 1996).  
The foundations of subsequent HPA development practice were: building a critical mass; 
empowering the homeless (particularly poor women) to take charge of their own lives; and 
ramping up the capabilities of the poor to demonstrate that their housing process and 
solutions were best suited to effectively address the challenge of providing affordable 
housing at scale, with minimal external intervention and only appropriate support.  
In contrast to conventional claim-making strategies, the strategy of the HPA in their 
engagement with the state was underpinned by the belief that if official programmes were to 
benefit the poor they ‘need[ed] to be redesigned and redeveloped by the poor’ so that they 
‘work for them’, followed by negotiation with the state to obtain support for the 
implementation of their ‘solution’. The solutions proposed strived to strengthen long-term 
capacity and capability-building through (financial and social capital and solidarity) asset-
building; developing a knowledge of community priorities and needs and how best to meet 
them; accumulating and mobilising resources to test the efficacy and sustainability of the 
solution; and then engaging the state to support the solution engineered by the poor, without 
strangling the ‘life out of their organisations’ (People’s Dialogue, 1996:21; People’s 
Dialogue, 2000). This form of engagement is undergirded by three distinct but interlinked 
change processes:  
                                                 
162 For an insightful discussion of the phrases in parenthesis, see Watson (2006) on the politics, rationalities and 
governmentalities of traditional and present day liberalism. 
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(i) Organisation for Empowerment: The first change process focuses on creating 
organisational capability within poor settlements and linkages between community and peers 
through federating; networking and exchanges; and the savings and loan activities (elaborated 
below). These stratagems were crucial to nurturing and sustaining the participation of the 
poor in ‘demanding change, both within their communities as well as from the broader 
environment’ (People’s Dialogue, 2000:22). ‘Strengthening democratic organisation’ has 
numerous implications but is in the main the ‘most powerful legacy of any developmental 
intervention’ as it secures long-term sustainability of development interventions and 
processes (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005:54). This approach differs from other civil society 
organisations which structure their mobilisation strategies and organisation building efforts 
around the delivery of a tangible product (the standard ‘input-output’ model).  
The HPA approach avoids the pitfalls of the standard model that may deliver ‘products’ but 
often impoverishes the poor further (see Patrick Magegula’s criticism of RDP housing at the 
Federation’s first national meeting in May 1994 (epigraph)), and, after delivery, the raison 
d’être for the continued existence of the organisation falls away. In the HPA’s approach, the 
delivery of the product is the ‘entry point for mobilization, learning and changing 
relationships with external groups’ (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005:54).  
Sustainability and empowerment, the most powerful legacies of development interventions, 
derive from the poor being organised to define what is delivered, and, more crucially, the 
continued survival of the organisation (beyond the delivery of the tangible) to sustain and 
deepen empowerment. Empowerment of the poor, for the HPA, is thus a necessary 
precondition and outcome for sustainable poverty eradicating development processes and 
interventions.  
(ii) Community-Based Problem-Solving: The emphasis of this change process is to build 
skills, and locate and mobilise resources within and outside communities to solve problems. 
The mobilisation strategies in this process include enumeration, ‘barefoot collective town 
planning’, and house design supported by exchange visits between settlements and 
internationally (People’s Dialogue, 2000:24). Via these mobilisation strategies, the poor are 
capacitated to reflect collectively on both deconstructing the problems confronting them and 
identifying ‘solutions’. The HPA often provides grant funding to pilot activities whereby the poor  
…attempt to solve a problem, innovate decision-making and resource-allocating 
processes, test their solutions, and even fail and try again, if necessary. Even mistakes 
and failures are viewed by the HPA as sound investments in the evolution of 
sustainable change processes, and are considered more effective learning mechanisms 
than workshops or study tours… [C]ommunity exchanges provide a critical 
supportive context in which this learning can take place (Ibid, emphasis added). 
(iii) Learning to Negotiate: This change process is referenced to the development of the 
abilities of communities to negotiate with city and state administrations (and other actors), 
with whom dialogue and negotiation is necessary to scale up their solutions. The dialogue, 
negotiation and engagement with the state occur on terms determined and dictated by poor 
communities and their organisations.  
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The key thrust is to lead by example wherein communities pioneer and develop their own 
‘solution’; demonstrate its viability practically (precedent-setting); and then engage the state 
in an effort to transform official praxis.163
This is because the action-based focus of a people’s organisation is better suited to 
demonstrating how institutional arrangements fail to provide the support that is 
articulated in policy and simultaneously to demonstrate what shifts would be 
necessary to facilitate a people’s housing process. The attendant shifts in the 
institutional framework, if they are of some magnitude, will be bound to have a direct 
impact on policy (People’s Dialogue, 1996:21, original emphasis). 
 What is significant here is that the engagement and 
dialogue is not about pitting the ‘solution’ proposed by the poor against the state programme 
or lobbying directly for policy change (confirmed, for example, by the HPA’s engagement 
with the 1994 Housing White Paper) (see footnote 161). Rather, the approach is to influence 
institutional arrangements that determine the way policy translates into action.  
The modalities of engagement and dialogue with the state are extremely sophisticated; 
working underneath, with and beyond it. Joel Bolnick, Co-ordinator of the Urban Resources 
Centre and Shack Dweller’s International, captured the spirit of this engagement format most 
eloquently: ‘Don’t confront authority head on. Instead of storming the citadel, infiltrate 
it...Play judo with the state – use its own weight to roll it over’ (Interview, 2004). 
Accordingly, diverse spatial scales and territorial-administrative jurisdictions are straddled; 
the political and official divide is criss-crossed; deals are struck with progressive and/or 
conservative political parties; and different levels of government are played off against each 
other. These are dangerous games, which can easily go wrong and backfire on those who play 
them.  
The HPA’s approach is different from the conventional claim-making and engagement 
stratagems of other civil society formations. The HPA’s approach ‘forces communities to 
clarify exactly what they want’; ‘hones the skills of leaders’ who realise that successful 
negotiations are dependent on the strength of grassroots organisational formations; and that 
securing concessions are vital to sustain the commitment of the membership (Swilling, 
2005:16). Strategic practice of this type is rendered possible through multi-scalar 
organisation-building interventions.  
Commencing with each micro-community with a particular city, city-level federations are 
established, and then grown into federations that can claim to represent a particular 
constituency for the sake of negotiating. 
Following the formation of federations at city levels, the municipal administration is drawn 
into discussions about the needs of the federation and how they can be met. In a majority of 
cities, the federation’s first choice is to enter into a dialogue with officials rather than 
politicians. Ultimately, the bureaucrats are the agents charged with translating political and 
policy directives into action through the assembly of regulative and institutional regimes. 
                                                 
163 This shift of the organisations of the urban poor from issuing demands to designing their own solutions and 
demonstrating to government what they are capable of flows, in part, from the realisation of the poor that 
government systems are ‘too weak, ineffective or rooted in vested interests to deliver for them in conventional 
projects’ (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005:48). 
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Dialoguing with and influencing those charged with implementation has other advantages 
over and above their influence over political decisions, the decision-making process and 
institutional infrastructures.  
The experience of the SAHPF reveals that the education and inclusion of officials in 
Federation discussions and initiatives from the beginning delivers long and short term 
benefits and gains. Even when these officials are transferred or redeployed, they ‘take with 
them their experiences’ of working with the Federation that other federations can tap into 
later (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005:55) This process is replicated at regional and central 
government levels. Various departments of the state are made to recognise their clout and 
begin to dialogue with community groups.  
Finally, there is the international development community, which contributes resources for 
development and creates the multinational language and legitimacy for HPA interventions 
(discussed below). The Federation (together with other like-minded groups) strategically 
engages with donors to ensure that support is extended to community-driven programmes. 
Significantly, donor funds provide the flexibility for innovation (that is, mining new 
development approaches, community building and precedent setting) to leverage government 
funds and ensure optimal utilisation (Development Works, 2002). 
In sum, the linked change processes are focused on and directed at organising, mobilising and 
empowering the poor to ‘determine the conditions attached to projects – thereby enabling 
plans and processes to be better suited to their needs and capacities’. The pro-poor 
rightsizing, centred around their solutions, is effected through ‘an open and inclusive process 
that engages the many other groups’ relevant to the development process ‘within a process 
determined and controlled by the poor’, i.e. city-wide planning, negotiation and action. City-
wide engagement and action is deemed fundamentally important as it is only at this level that 
‘structural change’ (in laws, regulations, financing, standards, access to land) can be executed 
and poverty targets realised (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005:36, 56). The structural change 
feeds upward through regional and national ‘federating’ and state engagement processes, and 
through exchanges (discussed below), to other countries and internationally (d’Cruz & 
Satterthwaite, 2005:36, 56).  
Distinguishing Features of HPA’s Mobilisation Ideology and Practice  
People-controlled development that harnesses the energy, feeds off the genius, and 
strengthens the capabilities of the poor to champion and implement their solutions are the 
cornerstones of the HPA’s development approach and practice. The people-centeredness of 
people-controlled development is structured around empowerment as the pre-requisite, 
organising frame and outcome of development interventions and processes. The strategies for 
people-driven development (that is people-centred) cohere around localised problem-solving, 
experiential learning, and bottom-up formulation of development processes. The 
democratisation of development is also led by the people through their mobilisation, 
organisation and institutionalisation of collective capabilities, capacities and resources. 
People-controlled development, the HPA way, is (thus projected as) people-centred, people-
driven and people-led.  
This approach to development (and here being mindful of the complexity/real world- 
flattening consequences and implications related to the imposition of staid conceptual 
frameworks) is similar to what has come to be known as Asset-Based Community 
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Development (ABCD). This approach takes as its starting point the activation, organisation 
and mobilisation of existing strengths and assets of communities, particularly those residing 
in community-based associations and other social networks (Mathie & Cunningham, 2003).  
As a strategy, it is shaped by a distinctive set of principles, informing field-based methods 
and practices. Eschewing blueprints, the methods include detailed micro-investigations to 
identify hidden and unrecognised assets; asset mapping (wherein the full range of assets that 
the community can draw upon are comprehensively recorded and documented); community 
mobilisation; and a progressive ‘scaling up’ of activity as linkages to outside external 
institutions are called upon to invest in community-driven development initiatives. The 
scaling up of the HPA is organised around a ‘politics of patience’.  
This ideology of social mobilisation and organisation modelled around the livelihood and 
coping strategies of the poor differs radically from the supply-driven, technocratic, deficit-
driven development praxis of civics, government agencies and NGOs. In the next section, we 
delve into the evolution of the HPA; the technologies employed to fuel change processes; the 
components and workings of their shelter production regime; and state appropriation and 
subversion of the People’s Housing Process.  
Section Three:  
Walking the Talk: From Ideology to Mobilisation  
Planting the Seeds 
This social movement is the product of purposive political intervention in response to a direct 
challenge by residents of informal settlements to the Southern African Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference to assist them (Marx, 1992). In other words, unlike its Indian counterpart,164
A key actor in the formation of HPA was Joel Bolnick. Following the advice of the Jesuit 
priest Jorge Anzorena from Argentina,
 the 
HPA did not emerge gradually over a number of years from the convergence of autonomous 
grassroots and professional NGO processes. Although the Federation builds on traditions of 
mobilisation and consciousness originating in struggles of poor communities in the apartheid 
era, middle-class activists, who identified and formed partnerships with grassroots 
counterparts, forged the HPA through conscious intervention (BRCS, 2002:54).  
165
                                                 
164 The Mumbai Alliance comprises the Society for the Protection of Area Resources Centre (SPARC – an 
NGO), the National Slum Dwellers Federation (a CBO) and Mahila Milan. The Federation, which predates 
SPARC by a decade, consists of slum dwellers from cities throughout India. It focuses on community 
organisation and mobilisation with the goal of increasing the access of poor communities to resources at local, 
state and national levels. Mahila Milan is an organisation of poor women set up in 1986 with its base in Mumbai 
and a network throughout India. This gender-centred network is focused on urban poverty and especially 
concerned with local and self-organised savings schemes among the very poor. The Alliance operates on the 
understanding that members of the Federation and Mahila Milan ‘own’ the organisations, not the middle class 
professionals employed by the NGO. SPARC provides technical, managerial and organisational support to 
Mahila Milan and the Federation (Appadurai, 2002). 
 - whose work in housing contributed to the 
165 Incidentally, a second cousin of Che Guevara. 
 146 
 
formation of the grassroots Asian Coalition for Housing Rights - the cardinal pillar of the 
HPA became pro-poor organisation, mobilisation, teaching and learning resting on the 
foundation that ‘no one knows more about how to survive poverty than the poor themselves’. 
The goal then was for the ‘poor to “own” as much as possible of the expertise that is 
necessary to claim, secure and consolidate [their] basic rights’ (People’s Dialogue, 2002:6). 
Accordingly, the key informants guiding the establishment of the HPA coalesced around 
creating a ‘space’ to enable the poor to ‘learn from each other through dialogue among 
themselves about what does and doesn’t work’ and that ‘whatever emerged from the 
dialogue’ conducted in that space ‘belonged to the participants and was therefore the only 
possible outcome’ (Wilson & Lowery, 2003:52, original emphasis)  
In 1989, Bolnick was requested by Peter Templeton of the South African Catholic 
Development Agency to organise a housing conference for slum and shackdweller 
organisations along the lines elaborated by Father Anzorena. In 1991, Bolnick busied himself 
with organising a networking meeting of shackdweller organisations in South Africa. With 
the full knowledge that the network must be managed by the community-based organisations 
themselves, rather than NGOs, Bolnick allowed NGOs to attend only if they brought five 
shackdwellers along. Professionals, government officials and foreign delegates (from the 
Philippines, Hong Kong, Kenya, Zambia, Colombia, Thailand, Japan, Zimbabwe and India) 
were restricted to observing and recording proceedings. The homeless poor were the only 
ones allowed to speak in the ‘space’. In March 1991, 150 men and women from shacks, 
backyards and hostels gathered in Broerderstroom to ‘strengthen their positions as poor, 
homeless and landless people, by sharing their experiences’ (People’s Dialogue, 1996:4).  
The gathering found itself negotiating the (global) dilemmas of the political sociology of 
transition and democratisation, and the role of civil society formations and organisations in 
pro-poor democratic consolidation. On the one hand, there were the service-providing NGOs 
which mobilised communities around human rights, and generally maintained a 
confrontational posture towards government and the private sector. When working directly 
with poor communities, the tendency was to adopt a few settlements as pilots and work 
towards upgrading them according to their ‘professional imagery of development’. On the 
other hand, there were those who saw their function as supporting organisations of the urban 
poor in their efforts to design and sustain their own institutions through which they could 
determine development priorities and contest political space for access to public resources. 
This distinction was neatly replicated among the South African participants.  
During deliberations, the majority of the South African participants argued that with political 
liberation and the seizure of state power, the non-racial government would deliver social and 
economic rights to the poor. Any effort to organise autonomous institutions of the urban poor 
was rejected as reactionary and counter-productive. A significant minority was less 
convinced that political liberation and a democratic society would automatically or 
unproblematically guarantee a better deal and/or life for the poor. Democracy would simply 
open space for the poor to contest power and resources. For this minority, it was imperative 
to build and consolidate an autonomous organisation of the poor who, conscious of their 
basic rights and entitlements, would jointly with the democratically-elected government 
address poverty and underdevelopment. This view was undergirded by the belief that the 
realisation of human rights is dependent on collective action and organisation (see People’s 
Dialogue, 2000).  
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Amidst the heated exchanges of this creative chaos, a slum dweller from India stood up and 
shouted slogans praising both sides, followed by a powerful oration cautioning South 
Africa’s poor not to invest their trust in a democratically-elected government to respond 
positively to their needs; a mistake the Indians made 40 years previously when they decided 
to wait for the newly independent democratic government to meet their needs. The final vote 
was 55 to 45 to network, and the ‘seeds of the South African Homeless People’s Federation 
were planted’ (Wilson & Lowery, 2003:52). In sum, following Father Jorge’s advice, Bolnick 
assisted in creating a space for the poor to dialogue, let go of outcome, and, they made their 
own decision.  
Growing the Seedling 
After the 1991 meeting, the Catholic Development Agency spun off a sub-committee to 
sustain the initiative, and the People’s Dialogue on Land and Shelter was established with 
Bolnick as Director. Rather than delivering professional solutions, People’s Dialogue 
supported and facilitated the efforts of the poor through interfacing between formal 
institutions and the poor; helped secure resources for exchange programmes and capacity-
building activities; assisted in designing and developing strategies through which members 
could learn and exchange practice; and acted as the ‘custodian of the uTshani Fund’ 
(unpacked below) (Mitlin & Baumann, 2003:34; BRCS, 2002).  
At the outset, Bolnick’s immediate goal was to strengthen the emerging network and 
intensify connections between poor communities. After some measure of network 
development and consolidation, communities assumed responsibility for further network 
deepening and densification. The role of Dialogue thereafter was primarily to serve the 
Federation in network development and prise open additional space for contesting societal 
power and resources. Dialogue employed various methods to support the SAHPF and 
technically ‘kit’ or ‘outfit’ the technologies of change processes, i.e. collective planning, 
exchange visits, engendered leadership development, collective savings schemes (adapted 
and expanded from Tweedie, 2003). 
To appreciate how the HPA was grown over time, briefly described below is what each of 
these methods entailed.  
Community Mobilisation Through Collective Planning  
Community mobilisation commenced with the identification of settlements for training. This 
encompassed a settlement count and screening of the settlement context to assess the 
‘viability of the settlement to respond favourably to a Federation process and awareness 
building among informal settlement residents’ (Development Works 2003:8). Thereafter, the 
local leadership of the settlement is contacted and introduced to the history, aims, culture, and 
development praxis of the Federation.  
After accessing the settlement, the next set of activities ‘ignites’ the Federation process. The 
activities comprised the various rituals of the Federation: enumeration and mapping; 
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surveying; house modelling; and savings schemes establishment.166
Through these tactile activities, the HPA assisted communities to holistically assess their 
needs, set their development priorities and identify the (internal and external) resources and 
interventions required to fulfil their needs and priorities. In accord with the founding 
principles of the HPA – people-controlled development – it is only after this that 
professionals become involved.  
 These rituals can be 
grouped into one major event or dispersed over a longer period.  
Exchanges 
Exchanges (local, regional and international) are a powerful multi-dimensional community 
mobilising technology (and technique) and development tool. They are isolation-busters, 
confidence-boosters, option-expanders and network-builders, spawning a spectrum of rich, 
dense and expansive (geographic) associational economies.  
Apart from enabling poor communities to communicate with each other, examine their 
problems, set priorities and explore solutions and to use others as allies, the exchanges 
facilitate the development of collective vision and create strong, personalised and durable 
bonds of solidarity. These bonds of solidarity are of central import in combating the isolation 
and ‘atomization of slums’ (SDI Bulletin, 15 December 2004:3), re-inserting poor 
communities into the immediate urban fabric and the wider national and global urban mosaic 
(People’s Dialogue, 2000). 
Although most community exchanges are local, the international ones transmit signals to 
local politicians that shackdwellers possess cosmopolitan global linkages, which increases 
their prestige in local political negotiations. When leaders meet in another’s locality, they can 
raise difficult questions about social exclusion and inequitable power relations because they 
are ‘outsiders’. Such questions would not normally be raised by local leaders for fear of 
political reprisal. Furthermore, activist leaders struggling for recognition and space in their 
own localities may attract state and media attention in other countries; visiting as members of 
an international delegation sharpens their image.  
Media reports and images relayed back home raise their profiles, exerting additional pressure 
on decision-makers. But as foreign delegates, they also assist local leaders in their struggles 
with politicians as the latter may feel less threatened by visitors than by their own activists, 
and sometimes open up to new ideas because they come from the outside. Lastly, meetings 
between leaders from slum settlements spanning the globe permits them to make long-term 
strategic plans for funding and capacity building (Appadurai, 2002).  
Engendered Leadership Development  
An integral identity shaping aspect of the movement’s praxis is its substantive focus on 
housing and its material realisation for women – the ‘nexus where money, family, needs, 
                                                 
166 Saving schemes are normally established after enumeration and mapping; surveying; and house modelling. 
Practices differ in the various localities. Savings groups have often been operational for some time before the 
local federation requests implementation support (Development Works, 2002).  
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crises and responsibility come together’ (Anonymous (c) nd:12). Patricia Motolengwe sheds 
light on this nexus:  
In our guidelines we explain the role of the women. Women are the ones who are 
responsible for the lives of the family. They are the ones who do voluntary work. 
They have a strong spirit. They stand for what they want to achieve. For men: I don’t 
want to say that they are position mongers. This does not add any value. They are the 
people who don’t add any value sometimes. For women you know you have some 
people who add some value. We always put our trust in them…[Women] stand for 
what they are doing. And they make it a point that they want to achieve something 
(Interview, 2004). 
From the inception of People’s Dialogue, the gendered thrust was premised on the central 
role of women in the ‘creation, maintenance and well-being of the community’ (Anonymous 
(c) nd:12), which traditional patriarchal authority systems and practices devalue and deny. A 
core objective since then has been to ensure that all activities initiated by People’s Dialogue 
include women, empowering them to become equal and active participants in development 
processes and initiatives (Bolnick & Mitlin, 1999). Via saving collectives, for example, poor 
women are able to accumulate assets, secure societal recognition, and command leadership 
positions. In this way, women, over time, come to manage all the assets owned and controlled 
by the community thereby empowering them to renegotiate their relationships with other, 
more, traditional leaders.  
Crucial to the HPA’s engendered leadership development then is putting women at the 
‘forefront in community dealings with outsiders’, a role conventionally ‘reserved’ for men 
(People’s Dialogue, 2000:32). When Federation leadership want to share ideas, the HPA 
ensures that more women represent the Federation than men. In fact, ‘male Federation leaders 
promote this concept vigorously, and often demand it within settlements’ (Ibid). Processes 
are developed to ensure community meeting times and venues are appropriate to suit 
women’s practical needs and priorities. Very importantly, ‘new leadership opportunities are 
provided to collectives rather than individuals. In many low-income communities a 
collective approach appeals more to women than men’ (People’s Dialogue, 2000:32, original 
emphasis). 
Savings and Financing 
The gathering in Broederstroom recognised and underscored the need for community-
controlled systems of housing finance based on the belief that formal sector financial systems 
and instruments are inaccessible and ill-suited to the needs of the poor. In 1992, when the 
National Housing Forum was consolidating a housing policy based on capital subsidies 
delivered through a private sector dominated production regime, People’s Dialogue began 
mobilising the homeless poor into Savings and Loan Schemes for Housing. The first housing 
saving schemes were established in October 1992. Eighteen months later, there were over 50 
saving schemes in informal settlements and at the end of 1995 there were than 250 (People’s 
Dialogue, 1996:5) (see Figure 4.1 below).  
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Savings constitute the material spine of the HPA; the guardian and guarantor of the autonomy 
and independence of community organisations. Significantly, the guardians and sustainers of 
the savings schemes are women who daily save small amounts of money (one cent and 
upwards). The quantum of money 
saved is ‘staggering’, estimated by 
Maisel (2003:3) over a six year period 
to be in the order of over R100 000 
per month. Savings are locally banked 
and finance small-scale loans for 
household emergencies, crises and 
income-generation activities.167 
Interest rates differ depending on the 
use of the loan.168
The savings and loan systems designed and managed by the poorest of the poor is testimony 
to their inventiveness and resourcefulness, effectively dispelling contemporary widespread 
societal misconceptions about their ‘unbankability’ or ‘unbankableness’. Savings as a group 
effort enables the forging and affirmation of ‘identity’ and is a mechanism for collective 
mobilisation. Together, they constitute the basis for socio-economic inclusion and invaluably 
contribute to pro-poor socio-institutional reform.  
 Application and 
approval procedures for loans are 
informal and flexible, determined by 
need and not rules. All other matters 
related to financial management are 
determined locally and undertaken by 
treasurers, book keepers and collectors 
drawn from the membership (Bolnick 
& Mitlin, 1999).  
Secondly, savings furnish the poor with resources to fund the building and operation of their 
own organisations whose integrity and purpose do not come to be compromised by 
dependence on donor and state resources. The measure of self-reliance ensured by savings 
reduces the chances of the manipulation of the poor (and their organisations) by powerful 
establishment forces who over time may impose ‘solutions’ by virtue of their control over 
resources. Cast differently, the self-reliance/ independence nexus mitigates institutional 
capture thus strengthening the poor’s political-organisational capacity to design and 
champion their own solutions.  
                                                 
167 The savings are divided into three parts: (i) Daily Savings for consumer, production, and crisis loans. Each 
group is divided into smaller clusters for daily saving. Collectors visit members and collect whatever is 
available from one cent upwards. Savings are banked regularly, with individual and collective group savings 
recorded in separate books; (ii) The Granary is for larger production and enterprise loans. These are regional 
funds to which all groups make monthly contributions. These funds are managed by the regional federations to 
support individual and group income-generation activities; and (iii) Housing Savings, which are transferred to 
uTshani Fund in the form of deposits for uTshani housing loans. These savings are at the disposal of the savings 
scheme, the regional Federation and the national Federation (Anonymous (b), nd). 
168 Federation policy is that people who borrow money from the fund for emergencies are charged 1% per 
month on the outstanding balance, and those who borrow for income generation are charged 2% per month. 
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Thirdly, members through savings have a material stake in decision-making, management 
and deployment of funds. Participation and regular interaction in the activities of the 
collectives are generative of strong social bonds that fortify and sustain the savings-based 
social insurance system.  
Fourthly, the skills imparted in the administration and management of savings and loans 
equip the poor to decode and challenge the disempowering technocratic discourses of 
development agencies that frequently function to exclude them from accessing and securing 
public resources.  
Lastly, loans for income generation and housing contribute to alleviating and ameliorating 
income and asset poverty/insecurity.  
In sum then, savings have the potential to expand incomes and assets in alignment with and 
synchronised to the specific livelihood needs, coping strategies and household life cycles. 
Loans supporting families during emergencies and crises smoothens alignment and 
synchronisation (Anzorena et al., 1998; Bolnick & Mitlin, 1999; Millstein et al., 2003; 
Anonymous (b), nd). 
The remarkable feature of the saving and loan system relate less to exposing societal 
prejudices and misconceptions about the ‘non-thriftiness’ and ‘uncreditworthiness’ of the 
poor. It relates less to the poorest of the poor succeeding in areas where the sophisticated and 
globally competitive financial sector fails. It relates less to how it copies and modifies 
corporate strategy for the benefit of the poor, expanding it beyond the market’s narrow 
individualised, material and commercial emphasis to include community, solidarity and trust. 
It is most remarkable in linking housing development, community empowerment, poverty 
alleviation and self-reliance.  
The genius of the poor goes further in that while saving and loan schemes share certain 
common features, ‘each and every locality gives [them] a qualitative and unique expression’ 
(Anonymous (c) nd:4), calibrated to the local patterns and rhythms of everyday life. This 
local customisation is the brilliance of the system. The poorest of the poor have succeeded in 
designing and operationalising a microfinance programme with flexible, locally-responsive, 
and individualised options for (saving-loan) portfolio diversifications and spreads. The 
poorest of the poor have hereby, and once again, trumped the brilliant minds and collective 
intelligence of the prestigious, respected, well-resourced and electronically super-connected 
banking and insurance sectors of the globe.  
As a vehicle to ‘get the politics right’, savings is both the genius and failing of this social 
movement. Without the ‘organisational foundation’ (Swilling, 2005:17) of community 
mobilisation through daily savings, the entire change process is ‘little more than old wine in 
new bottles’ (SDI Bulletin, 15 December 2004:3).169
                                                 
169 The reason being: ‘[W]ithout it, the change process gives a second wind to the replication in slums of the 
exploitative and uneven social relations that govern society as a whole’ (SDI Bulletin, 15 December 2004:3). 
 Slum Dwellers International (see below) 
and its affiliates, harbour no illusions pertaining to the considerable investment and ongoing 
effort of socialising and institutionalising the savings ritual (Ibid). This is difficult, hard, 
pain-staking work.  
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In the HPA case, a series of external and internal forces and events actors resulted in a 
‘disregard for savings as a primary mobilisation tool’ (Bolnick, 2005:4). In the absence of 
this concerted and rigorous bottom-up community organising around self-managed savings 
and loans rituals (as a means to redirect inter- and intra-community financial flows and build 
social solidarities and trust), the injection of state housing funds exacerbated the weaknesses 
of the HPA’s ‘voluntarist approach’ (SDI Bulletin, 15 December 2004:4) in this sphere 
(revisited  below).  
Transition into the SAHPF 
From its humble beginnings in 1991, People’s Dialogue with a small staff complement was 
remarkably effective in building a network of community leaders, representing 200 
community groups. In 1993, when the majority of community leaders preferred to remain 
part of the network under the Dialogue umbrella, a few influential community leaders called 
for the formation of a separate people’s movement. In 1994, shortly before the first 
democratic elections, the groups joined to form a national organisation – the South African 
Homeless People’s Federation. The motivation for the formation of the Federation is 
brilliantly captured by Rose Molakane:  
The South African Homeless People’s Federation calls itself uMfelanda Wonye – ‘we 
die together’. It’s because if you are poor, no matter how good you talk English, no 
matter how good you can walk, but at the end of day, you are poor. And then if you 
are alone at a certain corner, you will be [sic] never come up with the ideas of fighting 
poverty. But now with the Federation, it is said: “For us to try and challenge this 
problem of poverty, homelessness and landlessness, it’s for us to come together and 
form a family and then when we are a family, every problem that comes we will 
challenge it together. If somebody wants to kill us, he will kill us together”. So it 
means forming ourselves into a family with a common understanding of what we 
want to achieve at the end of the day. So this is why we said we should call ourselves 
uMfelanda Wonye waBantu wesemijondolo – the Federation of the homeless people 
who are staying in the shacks around our country in South Africa (Interview, 
Molokane 13.05.04). 
By January 2002, the Federation was a nationwide network of about 1 100 savings schemes 
with approximately 100 000 members (85% of them women),170
The Homeless People’s Federation effectively formalised the network of autonomous CBOs,  
all of whom are involved in locally managed saving collectivities (the majority of whom are 
women), and all struggling for land, tenure security and shelter. ‘Federating’ enabled the 
‘scaling-up’ of confidence, knowledge and skills to undertake development; enhanced 
 in receipt of monthly 
incomes of less than R1 000 per month. The Federation’s leadership structure was flat, 
comprising a Core Group of nine national leaders supported by teams based in regional 
federation centres fulfilling key learning and administrative roles. The Federation maintained 
regionally pooled saving funds, financed by contributions from local collectives (BRCS, 
2002:12).  
                                                 
170 Rose Molokane estimated the number of savings groups in April 2004 to be in the region of 2 500 with over 
800 000 people having directly and indirectly benefited (Interview, 2004). 
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collective ability to resist anti-poor programmes and their imposition; and reduced the 
possibility of co-option and destabilisation by government and self-interested leaders. The 
cumulative effect, then, was a massive expansion in the capabilities and capacities of the 
organised and united poor to negotiate supportive policies with government and international 
development agencies (Anzorena et al., 1998; Bolnick & Mitlin, 1999; BRCS, 2003:55; Patel 
& Mitlin, 2002). 
According to the mainstream accounts of HPA ideology and practice, what is distinctive 
about the Federation is that it represented a different organisation model to other civil society 
organisations, most notably the civics, which imbued it with potentially different capacities to 
mobilise, exert political influence, and advance the political inclusion of the urban poor 
(Millstein et al., 2003).  
Firstly, whereas civics mobilised around local socio-economic demands to form a front 
against apartheid, the Federation strived for the realisation of socio-economic rights within 
the political context of the new post-apartheid democratic dispensation and state.  
Secondly, while the civics grew out of domestic experiences of oppression and exploitation 
under apartheid, the Federation - through exchange programmes - can also draw on local and 
international development discourses and practices.  
Thirdly, the Federation formalised the network but without compromising the unique 
identities and political autonomy of local groupings. The civics do not operate with this level 
of autonomy due to the close connection and political affiliations with the ANC through 
SANCO.  
Fourthly, there are distinct differences in organisational form. Every CBO within the 
Federation has a high degree of autonomy in both its decision-making structures and 
processes. Each group has its own informal constitution and systems of convocation and 
election (Anonymous (a) nd:11), with decision-making process based on equal participation 
of all members. Civics, on the other hand, are hierarchically organised with elected 
representative committees holding extensive powers to make strategic decisions and drive 
implementation.  
International links 
The Federation is an affiliate of Slum Dwellers International, a global network of poor 
people’s organisations from eleven countries of the South. As a ‘corporation of the poorest of 
the poor’ collecting ‘millions of cents and pennies from around the world’ (Anonymous (c) 
nd:18), SDI has a membership of approximately 650 000 people with affiliates ranging from 
a few hundred members in Zambia to more than 1.5m in India. The network comprises 
federations of community organisations linked to NGOs and groupings of professionals 
supporting federation initiatives.  
Differentiating the SDI from other transnational citizen networks is the locus of power – it 
lies and is kept in communities rather than in intermediary NGOs at national and 
international levels. This is partly because the SDI and its affiliates are not set up to influence 
global policy-making or lobby international financial institutions (though these roles are 
increasing). Rather, their aim is to promote practical solidarity, mutual support and the 
exchange of information about strategies and concrete alternatives among their members 
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(Edwards, 2001), and in so doing ‘automatically creating new nodal points of governance’ 
(Slum Dwellers International, 2002 cited in Robins, forthcoming:12).  
It is for these reasons that Swilling (2005) avers that it is inappropriate to call the SDI ‘a 
global social movement’. Instead, he argues, the SDI and its ‘associated initiatives could 
probably best be described as a new ‘developmental movement’ (with a small ‘d’) and 
includes within this ambit an emerging set of increasingly effective urban social movements 
and an embryonic theory of self-organised community-based development’ (Ibid:4).  
As a developmental movement, the SDI’s modus operandi in the arena of capacity building 
through, (amongst other things) technical co-operation and exchange interventions, is 
infinitely superior to those of the traditional well-resourced multilateral development 
agencies. This corporation of the poorest of the poor does not undermine the local capacity of 
its affiliates; distort their priorities; deploy expensive methods; disregard local priorities and 
demands; and overly fixate on targets and outputs. In contrast to the hierarchically organised 
and tightly controlled supply-driven agenda of the multilateral networks, the SDI network is 
open, participatory and demand-driven, thereby enabling rapid dissemination and 
transmission of development innovation (precedents and solutions).  The SDI appears to have 
engineered an approach to technical co-operation and capacity-building that is way more 
effective, efficient and responsive to the needs and priorities of its ‘clients’ than the well-
heeled money-guzzling and administratively top-heavy multilaterals.  
In the case of the federations, HPA exchanges and transfers around solutions accelerate 
policy and technology ‘turnover time’ but, with the locus of power remaining and kept in 
communities, the adoption of the ‘precedent’ or solution is filtered through locally-specific 
templates and repertoires. Thus, unlike the transnational neoliberal ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach (with inadequate and/or no local customisation, an obvious source of multiple 
weaknesses) SDI policy or technology or solution transfer, when locally filtered and 
customised, expands the scope for ‘creative (and self-renewing)’ socio-institutional learning 
and development innovation. Where the one-size-fits-all, monocropping approach restricts 
social learning and innovation, customisation, enhanced by the poor teaching other directly 
and not through NGO staff (or in the neoliberal case, through recruitment of technical experts 
and advisors) this approach enriches and diversifies the technology and policy ‘gene pool’ 
(adapted from Peck & Tickell, 2002:398–9).  
In sum, co-operative engagements between poor communities have, firstly, succeeded in 
overcoming the deficiencies of traditional multi-lateral development assistance programmes. 
Secondly, they have installed dynamic local and globalised pro-poor socio-institutional 
learning and innovation complexes.  
The Financing Arm: the uTshani Fund 
From 1991, members of the Federation demonstrated incredible energy, initiative and skill 
but lacked sufficient material resources to meaningfully transform their living and shelter 
conditions. In 1993, it was decided that the Federation, assisted by People’s Dialogue, would 
establish its own finance scheme. After an ‘unhurried period of capacity-development’,171
                                                 
171 Although not sufficient or adequate as alluded to above and discussed below. 
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including a major conference on housing finance in June 1994 which was also attended by 
the first post-apartheid Minister of Housing, uTshani began operations in January 1995 
(People’s Dialogue, 1996:9).  
Initially housed as a financial institution within People’s Dialogue, the Fund is the asset 
builder and asset manager of the Federation. It is a ‘community-managed revolving loan 
fund’ (Baumann & Bolnick, 2001:105) or ‘urban poor development fund’ (People’s 
Dialogue, 2002:4) capitalised by foreign donor funds and government grants.  
The main reason for its establishment is to obtain, consolidate, and deliver finance on a 
collective basis to the saving schemes affiliated to the Federation. The Fund is the primary 
partner of the Federation in their land, infrastructure, housing and economic development 
activities, and it shares joint responsibility with People’s Dialogue to partner the Federation 
in its savings activities. Its priorities include leveraging resources for development; 
promoting development for the most marginalised and vulnerable members within the 
Federation; facilitating integrated development, poverty eradication, innovation and best 
practice; and achieving results at as large a scale as possible (Development Works, 2002).  
The direct transfer of funds to organised communities of the poor represented at the time a 
significant departure from the mainstream housing delivery system in which subsidies were 
predominantly channelled to local authorities and the private sector. The Fund was thus a 
‘corrective’ in this respect, but whether the capital subsidy is supportive of a community-
driven housing delivery production regime was (and remains) another question. Indeed, the 
HPA is of the view that the subsidy is ‘simply not designed to seek out, identify, and take 
advantage of functional grassroots channels through which state housing resources can flow 
to produce adequate shelter for those who don’t have it’ (Baumann & Bolnick, 2001:108). 
This problem is revisited below.  
In any event, the Fund, in the words of those who conceptualised it, is a ‘powerful 
development mechanism’ enabling organisations of the urban poor to ‘tap development 
resources directly’ without bureaucratic interferences and conditionalities that dictate the 
shape and form of development in ways frequently at odds with their needs and priorities, 
and which undermines their capabilities. This ‘alternative’ approach (the Fund) ‘allows 
communities to decide and design various development activities by themselves, on a large 
scale, and later to link together into networks of learning and sharing of knowledge’ 
(People’s Dialogue, 2002:13; see Baumann & Bolnick, 2001:105 for a detailed discussion of 
the priorities and objectives of the Fund). 
The significance of the Fund to the achievement of the HPA’s goals and objectives was 
believed to be its contribution to the realisation of broader socio-political aims of effecting 
sustainable improvement in the lives of the most vulnerable and, in the longer term, 
redirecting the distribution and flow of public resources to benefit the poorest. At base, it was 
posited that the Fund (in combination with savings and loans) would power delivery of pro-
poor shelter interventions at scale with the overwhelming majority of beneficiaries 
(supposedly) being women.172
                                                 
172 Most housing loans are given to women but whether these have gone to female-headed households is 
difficult to assess because data is managed at savings schemes level (Bolnick & Mitlin, 1999:245). 
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The superior performance and quality output, in turn, would spur growth in Federation 
affiliates and savings collectives. Scaled-up delivery, scaled-up membership, and scaled-up 
savings would thus feed into scaled up power of poor communities ‘able to influence 
resource flows in towns, cities and provinces’ (Baumann & Bolnick, 2001:205). But the HPA 
may perhaps have been overly optimistic in assuming that the narrative, structure and logic of 
this ‘social transformation’ script was accepted by all; that all had rehearsed their parts and 
were familiar with their lines; and that all would, accordingly, stay true to the character and 
role allotted them in the shelter production drama.  
People’s Housing Process (PHP) 
The uTshani Fund specialises in revolving housing loans and bridging finance for the housing 
subsidy system. Federation members leverage a combination of the housing subsidy, a small 
top-up loan, and their own savings to address their shelter needs (BRCS, 2003). In most 
localities, this combination renders possible the delivery of a dwelling unit that outperforms 
developer-built subsidised housing in size, cost (per square metre) and quality. Until recently, 
the Federation was building cement block houses of between 42m2 and 48m2 in size at a cost 
considerably less than the standard 30m2 RDP house.173
House values of ‘three to eight times the cost of building materials and skilled labour have 
been suggested’ and ‘sometimes offered by potential non-Federation purchasers’ (Mitlin & 
Baumann, 2003:35). The increased value is a function of several factors. Federation members 
can tap into free unskilled labour for construction and overall management. Alternatively, 
they enter into negotiations with local artisans to secure skilled labour at reasonable cost or 
call on skilled family members or friends to assist. Secondly, discounts on building materials 
are secured through collective procurement. The re-use of materials from previous dwellings 
(windows and door frames) further reduces building costs. Thirdly, Federation self-builders 
pay more attention to quality than commercial contractors whose stock response to the 
declining subsidy value (eroded by inflation) is to cut the costs of production resulting in an 
extremely poor quality output. The combination of the subsidy, savings and loans into a 
flexible, locally-controlled financing package; oversight of the construction process by 
members themselves; and the (rapid transfer and) appropriation of innovative cost-saving 
building techniques (afforded through exchange programmes) were seen as pathways to 
delivering a high-quality output (BRCS, 2003; Mitlin & Baumann, 2003).  
 This translated into increased 
housing equity value for the same subsidy input.  
Attributing the superior performance of the HPA delivery approach to manipulation of the 
‘factors of production’ alone is far too simplistic. Quality outcomes are equally the function 
of the HPA’s production regime pertaining to the maximisation of beneficiary participation, 
choice and control. In contrast to the mainstream approach, the technology deployed (with its 
                                                 
173 Cement block houses of between 42 and 48 square metres are estimated to cost R10 100 (Anonymous, (a) & 
(b): nd). Another report notes that the ‘average Federation house’ is 55m2 with a metre cost of R403.30 
(People’s Dialogue, 2000:13), a total cost of R22 181. Bauman (1998:27) records the cost of a 55m2  ‘people-
built’ dwelling in Mossel Bay at R11 000 compared to a 15m2 ‘developer-built’ house (also in Mossel Bay) at 
R13 000. The variations in size and production cost (listed here) may (amongst other factors) be related to the 
declining purchasing power of the previous non-inflation indexed subsidy; geotechnical conditions; and 
arguably, the tendency of some in the HPA to exaggerate their performance record and achievements relative to 
state outputs.  
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emphasis on cost minimisation and rapid delivery) defines the scope of beneficiary 
involvement. The HPA approach, in line with their objective to democratise development on 
terms defined by the poor, have succeeded through empowering templates and repertoires to 
deliver sustainable developmental outcomes going beyond shelter provision:  
Firstly, PHP delivery results in greater beneficiary commitment and ‘ownership’ witnessed in 
the minimal degree of resale of subsidised housing.174
Vicissitudes of Mainstreaming 
 Secondly, case studies reveal higher 
levels of diversity of housing products and richer living environments than the private 
developer delivery route. Thirdly, there is significant empowerment, both in collective and 
individual terms. Skills development and employment creation (largely self-employment 
through dwelling construction) are common. Numerous beneficiaries, especially women, 
acquire important management skills thereby dramatically raising their status and profile in 
the community. Generally, social capital in the community (bonds of trust, reciprocity and 
interdependence) are strengthened. Fourthly, the most innovative examples of PHP delivery 
(rapid production of biggest houses) involves the ‘stokvel’ construction approach, reliant on 
mutual self-help in construction. This approach does not always involve beneficiary labour, 
but is an incremental building process in which collective resources are devoted to the 
production of a few quality houses at a time. Bonds of solidarity and reciprocity are hereby 
further reinforced. Finally, in case studies recording high levels of beneficiary self-
organisation, the burden of the housing process for the local state is considerably reduced, i.e. 
municipalities entering into partnerships with communities do not find it necessary to 
establish new departments or employ outside consultants and contractors. All they need do is 
provide the land and co-ordinators to oversee the project (BRCS, 2003:7–8).  
The benefits of the PHP were recognised by the government quite early in the 
implementation of their supply-side, state-facilitated and private sector-driven programme. 
Exposure of the HPA’s model to government through the hosting of an HPA-convened 
conference shortly after the 1994 elections; the acknowledgement of its sustainability (in 
contrast to the official programme) at the Habitat II conference in 1996 by the influential 
United Nation’s Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP); and the limited impact of the HPA’s lobbying on 
government policy-making led to the UNCHS, UNDP and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) lending support to the promotion of a housing approach 
based on self-help construction through housing support centres. The globally-funded 
approach was one of providing direct support to the South African government via the 
formation of a People’s Housing Partnership Trust based in the Department of Housing. The 
purpose of the Trust was ‘institutional capacitation and empowerment at the provincial and 
local spheres of government and among NGOs to support the people’s process. In May 1998, 
the People’s Housing Process (henceforth referred to as the official PHP (OPHP)) was 
formally introduced by the Ministry of Housing as a means of accessing that portion of the 
capital subsidy allocated to the top structure with considerable emphasis placed by 
                                                 
174 ‘Few Federation members have been interested in selling’ (Mitlin & Baumann, 2003:35) their homes, even 
turning down offers equivalent to the ‘suggested’ value, i.e. 3–8 times the cost of building materials and skilled 
labour.  
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government on community and beneficiary contribution to dwelling construction (‘sweat 
equity’). Combined then, the OPHP approach is mainly about people building their own 
houses using subsidised materials, with government focussing on infrastructure provision 
(Huchzermeyer, 2001:322–3).  
Government’s appropriation of the HPA model (with not inconsiderable adaptation) has over 
the years become a significant pillar of the official housing programme. The OPHP facilitates 
incremental housing by scaling up participatory processes and relying on self-help processes, 
communities’ resources, and empowerment. To strengthen community initiatives, the 
programme liaises with grassroots groupings in the shanties and slums. It sets up housing 
support centres to stimulate and assist self-help community efforts by passing on information; 
identifying and channelling subsidies; providing technical advice; and developing co-
operative arrangements to purchase construction material (Miraftab, 2003).  
The introduction of the policy was trumpeted by the HPA and progressive development 
practitioners as an ‘important victory’ (Wilson & Lowery, 2003:54) for those committed to 
people-centred development. But, and as usual, this victory was neither unqualified nor 
unambiguous. From the very beginning, serious concerns were registered about the efficacy 
and viability of the OPHP approach relayed by conservative macroeconomic policy and 
modernist-technocratic state planning orientations. From the HPA’s perspective, the state 
adopted the PHP in a partial and selective manner. The emphasis of government policy and 
subsidised housing implementation is on the delivery of products, while the HPA’s approach 
to people-led development is concerned first and foremost with process and building capacity 
or social capital formation and strengthening.  
With production narrowly focussed on outputs and strictly controlled by the state (discussed 
below), claim-making is straitjacketed into the ‘project’ format. Externally designed and 
implemented ‘projects’, posit the champions of the HPA approach, almost always (try to) fit 
the poor into ‘systems’ not designed for their conditions nor appropriate to their needs 
(d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005), leading to little improvement in their lives, ‘let alone 
creating anything sustainable’ (Malik, 2002:35).  
Unsurprising then is the equation of OPHP with ‘sweat equity’, individualism and cost 
reduction rather than collective beneficiary planning and decision-making, more productive 
housing delivery (Development Works, 2002; BRCS, 2003) and community empowerment. 
Indeed, according to almost all the prominent ‘stakeholders’ active in the People’s Housing 
Process – including the Trust, local government, and the Department of Housing – state 
adaptation, modifications and revisions have, ‘tendered [sic] to blur the true nature of the 
PHP and have served to bastardise its application’ (PHP Working Group, 2005:14–15) (a 
theme returned to in the synthesis).  
The People’s Housing Process was in the early 2000s re-emphasised by the Department as a 
‘way of helping the public housing programme’ (Rust, 2002:14) to cope with (amongst other 
things) the departure of the private sector from the shelter sector. The rediscovery of PHP 
derives from the realisation of the difficulties, especially for the poorest households, in 
combining the quantitative objective of mass private sector delivery with the qualitative 
requirement of a minimum house size of reasonable quality, conforming to national 
standards, and delivered at a reasonable pace. Cost reduction, better quality, leveraging 
beneficiary resources, speeding up land transfer and preventing alienation of the housing 
benefit is the rationale motivating the state’s (re-)embrace of the PHP as from 1998. A 
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question grappled with later is whether the state, riding on the tailcoats of civil society, is 
trying to enhance the legitimacy of its housing programme without increasing its financial 
commitment.  
In pursuit of these objectives, the local state has over the years increasingly tightened its 
control over the PHP through dominating all or most aspects of the shelter production 
process. These relate to choice of the support organisation (SO), house design and building 
material suppliers, relegating beneficiary contribution and involvement to labour (sweat 
equity). The OPHP delivery regime is a violation (at worst) and/or clearly at odds with 
almost every aspect of national PHP policy by eliminating beneficiary choice of the support 
organisation (guaranteed by the regulations contained in the Housing Code) and confining 
beneficiary input solely to the provision of unpaid labour (sweat equity).175
The obstacles to mainstreaming the PHP are formidable, something which even the state 
recognised as far back as 1997 (prior to the formal adoption of the policy):  
  
Efforts in supporting people’s initiatives have achieved considerable levels of success 
to date. However, the following constraints continue to impair support being 
successfully introduced: inability of the existing subsidy scheme procedures to 
disburse subsidies to beneficiaries in a simple and accountable manner; lack of 
appropriate capacity (understanding, recognition, skills and confidence) at both 
provincial and local government level;… resistance by vested interest groups to 
support people’s housing processes; insufficient support for skills acquisition and 
building of organisational capacity within community based groups; a general and 
widespread absence of trust and confidence by stakeholders in the ability of people to 
meet their housing needs (DOH, 1997:6).  
However, the obstacles are more deep-seated and related to the fundamentally contradictory 
motivational frameworks of state and beneficiary involvement with the PHP. The state 
prioritises loss avoidance and control over the highly standardised and inflexible capital 
subsidy instrument, thus undermining the indigenous and evolutionary processes of home 
building of poor communities and households (Rust, 2002:14). Secondly, the state perceives 
subsidised housing as a communal ‘capital’ asset outliving beneficiaries. Consequently, 
government tends to prioritise short- and long-term risk minimisation (financial control, 
norms and standards) over qualitative housing outcomes (larger homes, better construction 
and design, etc.) and/or the social aspects of PHP (empowerment, social capital and skills 
formation). Thirdly, the PHP’s sustainability and empowerment focus is not easily reconciled 
with the government’s prioritisation of speed and quantity through the project driven-route. 
The short-term logic of investment, accounting, reporting and assessment of the ‘project’ or 
                                                 
175 In Gauteng, all non-state forms of PHP were effectively forbidden. In Cape Town, only the City of Cape 
Town could be a PHP developer and recognised support organisation. House designs were standardised; norms 
and standards decreed; and building materials had to be sourced via SOs (most often private sector companies). 
Beneficiaries organised in their own SO were excluded from participating in the PHP unless they formally 
renounced these organisations. The Mpumalanga MEC responsible for housing unilaterally appointed SOs for 
PHP groups even if these groups were organised and already had competent support organisations, as in the case 
of the HPA. Limpopo decreed that it would be the SO in all instances and all building materials had to be 
sourced through the province. KwaZulu-Natal decreed that all PHP delivery must be via competitive tender and 
that only approved ‘implementation agents’ would be SOs (BRCS, 2003:51–3). 
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‘projectised’ approach to development is not conducive to PHP’s ‘slow learning and 
cumulative change’ approach (Appadurai, 2002:30). Finally, the local state tends to prefer 
working with individual beneficiaries as opposed to CBOs and/or NGOs.176
Influential commentators and PHP practitioners have come to conclude that the potentially 
progressive developmental outcomes of the PHP are unlikely to be realised as ‘the requisite 
policy, implementation, and institutional infrastructure remain weak, contradictory, 
underdeveloped, and systematically biased against it’ (BRCS, 2002:7).
 Beneficiaries, on 
the other hand, intent on securing access to high-quality housing, often prefer working with 
and through these organisations, given their proven track record in the delivery of large 
quality dwellings through maximising beneficiary choice and control (see BRCS, 2003).  
177 More recently, 
government has come to acknowledge that the OPHP framework is ‘vague’ and ‘gives raise 
[sic]’ to provincial and local government housing departments ‘interpreting the policy in a 
variety of ways that contradicts its original intention’ (DOH, 2005a:4). In a document 
produced by the People’s Housing Process National Forum,178
Section Four  
 both government and civil 
society agreed that the violation of the original principles and the contradiction of policy 
intentions derive from a state programme whose ‘emphasis has increasingly been on control 
and on protection’ with support being ‘too bureaucratic and/or too technocratic to work 
effectively’ (PHP Working Group, 2005:12). The creation of an enabling environment for 
‘successful delivery’, the document states, ‘will require an important balance to be achieved 
between the empowerment of people involved in PHP and government’s need to protect and 
control’ (Ibid).  
Tensions, Contradictions and Challenges  
The vicissitudes of mainstreaming are not simply confined to the subversion of the people-
engineered housing process. More damaging to the ideology, identity and praxis of the HPA 
                                                 
176 Not only is the state actively marginalising civil society formations with a proven track record in shelter 
provision through the PHP delivery route, it has not invested in institutions and capabilities championing the 
shelter needs of the most vulnerable. This is in stark contrast to the considerable government investment in 
strengthening institutions of delivery for the not-so-poor (those accessing social housing opportunities, for 
example) (Napier, 2003). 
177 This may account for the dismal delivery record of the PHP. Probably less than 3% of subsidised houses built 
since 1994 to 2003 can be called PHP products (BRCS, 2004:2). 
178 Convened under the auspices of People’s Housing Partnership Trust, the Forum brought together 
representatives of housing departments from all spheres of government, NGOs and PHP practitioners. Deriving 
its mandate from the Forum, the PHP Working Group – comprising a cross section of the main roleplayers – 
was tasked in October 2005 to ‘develop a common, preferred future and way forward for PHP’ (PHP Working 
Group, 2005:5, original emphasis). In November 2005, the Working Group generated a strategy document that 
‘builds on the views and perceptions of the members of the PHP community’. This document proposes the 
replacement of the PHPT by a national body ‘representative of all stakeholders in the PHP’ (Ibid:28), i.e. CBOs, 
NGOs, practitioners and government. In a ‘parallel process’ (Ibid:6), the National Department developed a 
Policy Framework and Implementation Guidelines for the People’s Housing Process (PHP) Delivery 
Mechanism (DOH, 2005g). The PHP Working Group is to ‘inform the further development and amendment of 
the current proposed Policy Framework’ (PHP Working Group, 2005:6) guided by its strategy document. 
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was the state not honouring its commitment in the ‘partnership’ arrangement that had been 
forged to support the people-driven housing delivery strategy. The resulting tensions, 
challenges and contradictions generated are products of a complex web of relationships 
between the strategies of Federation mobilisation, Federation leadership, People’s Dialogue 
and the uTshani Fund, on the one hand; and the failure of the state to deliver on its housing 
obligations, on the other. Problematic internal relational dynamics and the state not 
honouring citizen’s constitutionally-enshrined rights to the housing subsidy precipitated 
major crises for the HPA, which it attempted to address through a restructuring exercise in 
2001/2002. 
The HPA’s strategy to access and manage subsidy funds evolved over time. In the 1995–
1996 period, the HPA used uTshani Fund loans in select communities to pilot its shelter 
approach 179 with a view to attracting government support (subsidies) and equity injections. 
From 1997 to 2000, the HPA used the uTshani Agreement180
The HPA’s success in the construction of large, high-quality houses with uTshani loans 
coupled to the rapidity of loan release -  indeed, loans accessed through the people’s process 
is said to move considerably faster than the delivery of state funds (Baumann & Mitlin, 2002) 
- encouraged explosive growth in membership. New groups expecting to benefit from the 
Fund and numerous Federation leaders began to encourage this entitlement (the loan), rather 
than daily savings, as a way to build the movement (violating core organisational and 
mobilisation principles – discussed below). The deposit to access the loan (5% or R500) was 
seen as a way of purchasing the loan, and members who would otherwise save more than this 
in the savings collectives, quickly accumulated R500 to access the R15 000 loan at a 
repayment rate of R120 per month (see Figure 4.2).  
 with the national Department of 
Housing that permitted it to access subsidies directly from government. The Fund could 
either provide bridging loans before accessing subsidies and then claim the money back from 
government, or disburse subsidies up-front to members for housing construction. 
While the cost of building materials increased due to inflation, the subsidy amount remained 
static. The loans were therefore insufficient for members to construct dwellings of the 
previous size and quality. Shifting member’s consciousness from the dream of large homes in 
line with changing material resource constraints proved difficult. This fuelled a tendency for 
members to ‘overbuild’ (lay out large foundations for houses) producing ‘unfinished homes’. 
This placed pressure on the Fund to release further loan finance to protect the HPA’s 
reputation and uninterrupted access to government subsidies. The extension of additional 
loans for housing consolidation pushed these already financially over-committed members 
into further debt and increased overall ‘systemic risk’.181
                                                 
179 The uTshani Fund was initially capitalised by northern donors to the tune of R4m (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 
2005:20). Lending for housing construction through group-based finance commenced in April 1995 and over 
700 housing loans were approved (Bolnick & Mitlin, 1999:227) 
 Additionally, the promise of large 
180 The uTshani Agreement was approved in 1995. The Agreement recognised the latter as a legitimate conduit for 
subsidies to Federation members (Anonymous (b) nd). 
181 The number of homes delivered through the PHP route is thus contested. BRCS (2003) reports that 12 000 
homes were delivered using the subsidy, members’ savings, bridging loans and other resources. In the interview 
with Rose Molokane (13.05.04), she estimated that 14 000 homes had been delivered. In a proposal to the City 
of Cape Town motivating a partnership between the City and the HPA around enumeration, it is stated that 
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homes contributed to the tendency to recruit better-off members who could top up their Fund 
loans and subsidies with non-Federation savings.  
 
Figure 4.2: Growth of loans per region (1998–2001) 
The extension of additional finance to members who over-built and the recruitment of the 
better-off contradicted core principles of the HPA’s development practice. On the first score, 
the Federations and their supporting NGOs, writes d’Cruz and Satterthwaithe (2005), 
distance themselves from conventional agencies’ lending practices that strive to maximise the 
size and number of loans. In sharp contrast, ‘good practice’ loan programmes aim at 
supporting people to avoid loans or accessing the ‘smallest loan’ required thus reducing 
repayment periods and minimising interest charges (Ibid:22). On the second score, 
federations are distinguished from other civil society formations for experimenting and 
innovating around ‘supporting the poorer or most vulnerable members’ (Ibid:70). Although 
the HPA constantly strived to maintain equity considerations at the forefront of the housing 
finance programme (requiring, for example, that half of all loans be small and affordable to 
those in receipt of lower incomes) the extension of (larger) loans to the better-off suggests 
that recipient households may have been in receipt of dual incomes (Bolnick & Mitlin, 
1999:245).  
The contradiction of core principles can possibly be traced back to the HPA over-estimating 
their level of organisational strength and/or readiness of the poor as an organised autonomous 
force to engage the state on their own terms and values. In retrospect, the ‘unhurried’ four-
year period of ‘capacity building of the poor’182 to equip and ready the poor with the strategic 
and tactical capabilities for (amongst others) state engagement may have been insufficient 
with a devastating impact on the goals, values and practices of the movement.183
                                                                                                                                                       
between 1995 and 2000, the Federation constructed over 15 000 houses in all nine provinces (People’s Dialogue 
and Homeless People’s Federation, 2004). 
 In a 
182 From 1991 to the HPA’s first substantial engagement with the state in 1994 and enshrined in the state-HPA 
partnership agreement of 1995.  
183 Care must however be exercised to not overgeneralise the cause and impact of, and response to, the crisis 
related to local contingencies and resource endowments, and the resulting localised calibrations/adaptation of 
HPA repertoires and templates, i.e. locally-determined financial management frameworks, locally specific need-
mediated (versus rule-governed) loan application and approval procedures, age and maturity of saving groups, 
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nutshell, the introduction of the financial-institutional innovation of uTshani resulted in the 
rapid (re-)/displacement of the purportedly sufficiently socialised and institutionalised core 
mobilisation and organisational strategies of the HPA, especially the savings-loan ritual and 
the ‘tangible’ not being the sole purpose of organisation. Instead, with uTshani’s 
introduction, attention was increasingly diverted towards accessing and securing housing 
opportunities and loans. Time spent on daily savings-loan repayment rituals was de-
emphasised as a criterion for obtaining housing finance. With the leaders and members over-
focused on the ‘golden egg’ of housing without the proper nourishment of the proverbial 
golden ‘goose’ (core rituals) (BRCS, 2001:54–6), the already weak link between savings and 
loan repayment was severed.  
This meant that, after houses were built, ‘beneficiaries’ were ‘not locked into sufficiently 
strong daily savings and repayment routines, resulting in declining loan repayment levels’ 
(Swilling, 2005:18), which in turn blocked further circulation and redirection of financial 
flows within communities and eroded community solidarity along the fault line of those with 
the ‘golden egg’ and those still nurturing the ‘goose’. The former secured the ‘prize’ at little 
expense or savings commitment, and after securing it, abandoned those still saving with no 
relief in sight. Non-beneficiaries had ‘no incentive to pressurize’ beneficiaries to repay 
because of there being no direct relationship between loan repayments to a centralised 
national fund (uTshani) and localised savings and loan activities, i.e. ‘[v]ertical financial 
flows had broken the horizontal flows of social capital’ (Ibid).   
The centralised nature of the Fund’s financial management and decision-making produced 
another series of dilemmas. Risks associated with uTshani’s bridging loan strategy were 
transferred to People’s Dialogue and the Federation leadership, with local leaders shielded 
from having to make difficult decisions around resource allocation. Although some 
Federation leaders and members were aware of financial sustainability problems, they 
continued to recruit members with the objective to access more subsidies and capital, further 
compromising the Fund’s viability.  
The sustainability of the Fund was, however, most severely compromised by the slow release 
of state subsidies. Not all provinces accepted the uTshani arrangement and PHP approach 
and, even where it had been adopted, there was no guarantee that provincial officials would 
approve HPA subsidy applications. Even when approved, subsidy release was more often 
than not delayed. A combination of bureaucratic inertia, differing provincial policies and 
local government reluctance and/or inability to engage with community development 
processes translated into non-delivery of subsidies owed to the HPA. For the HPA, the 
subsidy system – which is supposedly an entitlement under law, based on the Constitution – 
was as good as ‘not there in practice’ for the majority of Federation members, hurling the 
Fund into crisis. On a more sinister level, if a household built its own dwelling through a 
diversity of non-official funding sources rather than waiting for a subsidy, it is classified as 
‘housed’, and therefore ineligible for further assistance. In other words, the initiative of the 
poor effectively disqualifies them from the subsidy (Rust 2002:14). Sandra van Rensburg’s 
words, then the uTshani Fund Co-ordinator (Gauteng, North West and Mpumulanga), are 
apposite here:  
                                                                                                                                                       
nature of the relationship between local chapters of the HPA and the state, and geographical variations in loans-
savings combinations. 
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What is happening is that we are putting in proposals for the loans made and houses 
completed and people [are] living in these houses for up to eight years. And 
government is saying: “How can we pay for houses that have been built 
already?”…We cannot be carrying the Department of Housing anymore….And what 
they are walking into are 100 square meter houses, face brick, the minimum is 56 
square meters. And people have done a lot of improvements once they moved there. 
Some of them have even sold their houses already and they are still trying to get the 
subsidy for it. It is going to be a mammoth task…For instance on the East Rand: we 
have given 400 loans. And we have put in a new proposal for new consolidation 
subsidies, and the councillors - because you need the Councillor’s support for the 
proposals - say: “We can’t give you subsidies because the last houses you built you 
haven’t completed”. So we did the audit and we said: “Of the 400, 31 are incomplete - 
which is 7% - and these are the reasons: the supplier ran away with the money, the 
house is too big, the member overcapitalised on basic things and she cannot put the 
roof on, small things, so and it is not things that cannot be dealt with”…So we say: 
“These are not problems we cannot deal with. But the other 93% we would like that 
subsidy. It is not that you will not get benefit, because you can add it to your numbers 
as houses built” (Interview, van Rensberg 29.04.04). 
Without the housing subsidy, the HPA remarks, it would ‘never have considered uTshani 
Fund lending on the size and scale it has actually undertaken: sustainable, large, long-term 
loans to the poorest of the poor for complete housing is wishful thinking and certainly not the 
business of the HPA’ (BRCS 2001:76). With the subsidy ‘not there’ in practice, the Fund was 
in an increasingly tenuous situation as the de facto creditor to a large group of the poorest 
South Africans, who could not be expected to repay large housing loans and who did not 
believe that this was what they had agreed to do. The state on the other hand, not the 
Federation (notwithstanding declining loan repayments), became the Fund’s largest debtor. 
As of early 2004, R54m was owed by the government in subsidy money to HPA (Interview, 
van Rensberg 29.04.04).  
It is worth noting that, prior to the crisis, People’s Dialogue attempted on numerous 
occasions to force on the Federation a restructuring of the Fund. In response to the state’s 
failure to deliver the subsidy, the declining value of the subsidy and low repayment rates of 
members, People’s Dialogue proposed to limit Fund loans to R6 000. Federation leaders, 
under the pressure of members, found this unacceptable and refused to implement the 
proposal. It was argued by members that limiting access to the R10 000 loan would ‘kill the 
Federation’ – compelling support for the view that mobilisation around uTshani Fund 
resources had replaced mobilisation around better allocation of state resources’ (BRCS 
2001:56). By late 2000, the overall rate of repayment to the Fund was so low that the HPA 
leadership was left with little choice but to suspend lending and embark on a process of re-
evaluation and restructuring. Thus, from 2001 onwards, the HPA suspended bridging loans 
and shifted its focus to accessing subsidies up-front.184
                                                 
184 As of 2003, the Fund had a portfolio of approximately R65m, the bulk of which accounted by its loan book 
that reportedly financed nearly 9 500 houses (see BRCS, 2003:13). 
 Thereafter, the Fund concentrated on 
helping the Federation to identify land and acquire development rights; secure subsidies to 
 165 
 
retire bridging loans and/or fund new projects; manage, co-manage and support projects; and 
provide support to income generation activities (BRCS 2002:22). 
The crisis confronting the HPA in the late 1990s was shaped by the long-run tendency to 
transform the Fund from a communal resource of the Federation into an ‘avatar of the 
subsidy entitlement itself’ (Baumann & Bolnick 2001:112). The expectation that the Fund 
would deliver an entitlement is incompatible with a financial system based on a revolving 
fund model. The reasons for the poor performance of the Fund are in large measure a 
function of the state reneging on the Agreement and not fulfilling its obligations. More 
fundamental, though, is the question of whether the HPA created solid foundations and 
nurtured empowering conditions for efficient and effective revolution of funds. Even if the 
state honoured its commitments, rapid and misdirected mobilisation around the ‘golden egg’; 
the corrosive effect on social capital and solidarity of poorly structured vertical and 
horizontal financial resource flows; weak savings records; and low repayment levels, 
cumulatively point to the HPA’s failure in ‘getting the politics right’ for effective circulation, 
rotation and redirection of financial flows between and within communities.  
Tensions Beyond uTshani 
The tensions and contradictions were not only limited to the Fund and housing delivery. 
‘Getting the politics right’ via the installation of developmental (pro-poor) relational fields of 
politics had to negotiate a series of internal organisational dynamics. At the risk of 
misrepresenting a complex and locally differentiated reality, highly centralised decision 
making structures; populist frameworks of accountability; gate keeping; patronage; alignment 
to and endorsement of political parties; and subordination of Federation networks to the 
power-mongering of political parties were not particularly helpful in inducing the appropriate 
conditions for ‘getting the politics right’.  The discussion now turns to these dynamics. 
Until 2002, leadership emerged in the Federation through self-selection, based on a degree of 
active involvement, but with no strict lines of accountability to communities. The 
‘constitutionally loose (almost populist) framework of accountability’ (Swilling, 2005:18) 
and self-selection subverted (further) the core organisational principles and values, and the 
slowly evolving (and preferred) modes of state engagement.  
Firstly, the creation and maintenance of a static national, and particularly regional Federation 
leadership, rooted in key savings schemes (through and to which significant proportions of 
HPA resources were channelled) appeared to ‘structurally’ encourage patterns of ‘undesirable 
behaviour’ (patronage, mobilisation through promises of loans, corruption and bribery), and 
discouraged more ‘appropriate conduct’ (discipline, implementation of systems, tough 
resource allocation decisions, clampdown on poor repayment problems) (BRCS, 2001).  
Secondly, the national leadership contributed towards highly centralised decision-making 
structures running contrary to the non-hierarchical and decentralised political structure within 
and between the Federations. This was particularly evident in the Western Cape, where the 
leadership resisted relinquishing control over ‘junior’ and maturing federations. This 
spawned the consolidation of local hierarchies, power cliques and patronage networks, with 
certain individuals acting as gatekeepers and powerbrokers (Robins, forthcoming).  
Thirdly, disregarding key Federation rituals, the Cape Town Federation (again) came to rely 
on ANC ‘patronage as a means of mobilization’, with alignment to particular factions of the 
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party, adding further degenerative elements to gate keeping. This ‘impacted negatively’ on 
the ‘Federation at large’, the ‘urban poor as a social class’, efforts to ‘facilitate change at 
community level’, and the ‘relationship with the state’ (Bolnick, 2005:3–4). In return for 
ANC patronage, numerous Federation leaders (ANC Women’s League veterans deeply 
involved in national, regional and local ANC networks and thus less inclined to criticise the 
dominant party and its leadership) were prepared to allow Federation networks to be used as 
ANC political resources (Robins, forthcoming).  The deployment of federation networks as 
party resources violated the principle tenets of the HPA’s mode of engagement with the state, 
particularly the movement’s non-party politics stance (referred to as ‘politics without parties’ 
by Appadurai, 2002:28).  
With the authority, legitimacy, responsiveness and competency of the leadership in serious 
question, restructuring commenced with regional, local and neighbourhood organisations 
electing representatives to attend a national meeting in 2002. The leadership group of the 
Federation ‘stepped down and an interim national leadership group oversaw the meeting’. 
The interim national leadership group ‘proposed a representative form of leadership from 
Federations throughout the country’. Existing regional leaders relinquished their positions 
and new ones were elected by the regional networks, rather than being appointed by the 
national core leadership group. The regionally elected leaders would henceforth serve in a 
voluntary capacity, with no stipend (a previous source of tension), and would be accountable 
to those who elected them. The elected leaders, ‘in conjunction with People’s Dialogue’, 
would identify staff needs, and a competitive process would be utilised to select and hire 
employees under public contracts. The employees included mainly existing Federation 
leaders because of their experience and accumulated knowledge and skills. Rather than being 
political leaders, they would become employees ‘fully accountable to the Federation (instead 
of the People’s Dialogue)’. The delegates at the national meeting ‘overwhelmingly’ approved 
the restructuring proposals to make elected leaders fully accountable to the membership and 
to refocus on the core strengths and rituals of the HPA (Wilson & Lowery, 2003:55).  
People’s Dialogue was also restructured as attention and activity of the HPA increasingly 
shifted away from housing delivery (as a principal means of combating poverty and 
marginalisation) towards land tenure, the provision of basic services and the people-centred 
management of built environments. This shift required building the capacity of People’s 
Dialogue to forge deeper political connections for brokering deals; higher levels of 
professionalisation to improve engagement with the state around policy and institutional 
arrangements; and clearer divisions of roles, functions and responsibilities. To this end, the 
Fund became an independent organisation charged with its own financial management. 
People’s Dialogue retained its core functions of building bridges between the Federation and 
national government; dealing with community organisation issues within the project 
preparation cycle of the Fund; and lending support to Federation activities related to 
lobbying, mobilising and learning through exchanges. The HPA also initiated an agency, 
under the umbrella of Dialogue, called the Urban Resource Centre (URC), to sharpen its 
focus on the development of a culture of learning, participation and transparency. The Centre 
was responsible for scaling up internal processes of research and documentation in the HPA; 
engaging with external role-players pertaining to matters of landlessness and homelessness; 
and harnessing resources to build a social movement of the poor. An initiative in social 
movement building was the establishment and nurturing in 2004 of the Coalition of the 
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Urban Poor in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Nelson Mandela and Durban. The Coalition 
brought together several hundred different community-based initiatives of the poor185
Section Five  
 based 
on the principle of ‘autonomy within federating’. This organising principle is not without its 
problems – a point returned to later. 
Conceptual Intimations 
Staking Out New Terrains of Struggle 
For a developmental social movement - whose main aim is reclaiming the democratic right 
and power of the urban poor to choose, champion and implement their own development path 
– engaging the state and other social forces through the ballot box and the liberal democratic 
frame186
The HPA experience demonstrates that attainment of alternative activist development praxis 
directed at transforming the political-institutional ecology and tilting the balance of power in 
favour of the poor demands another form of politics. This type of politics embraces 
dissensus, disagreement and contestation or viewing democratic politics as an ‘agonistic 
confrontation’ among adversaries. Here, the illusion that a rational consensus can be achieved 
between freedom and equality, for example, is eliminated. There is a realisation that pluralist 
democratic politics consists in pragmatic, precarious and necessarily unstable forms (Mouffe, 
2000) that are continuously in search of provisional compromises.  
 is unlikely to yield the desired outcomes, especially given the latter’s status quo-
maintenance orientation. For a movement committed to a politics of deep democracy (a 
critical component of which is nurturing the capacity to aspire) established institutional 
mechanisms and channels for negotiating difference (primarily, multi-stakeholder corporatist 
forums) ‘mask abuses of power and more structural, enduring inequity’ (Edmunds & 
Wollenberg, 2001:232). Consensual decision-making anchored in spaces of participation 
initiated by powerful groups ‘restricts the possibility of “thinking outside the box”, 
reinforcing hegemonic perspectives and status-quo reinforcing solutions’ (Cornwall, 2002:5).  
Accordingly, a pluralist democracy, in the mind of HPA, is one that allows the expression of 
dissent and conflicting interests and values. Because antagonism cannot be eliminated, the 
task is to ‘domesticate it to a condition of agonism’. By this is meant a ‘relationship which is 
at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which 
                                                 
185 The aims and objectives of this initiative included enabling the emergence of a platform of urban poor 
groupings in five South African metropolitan areas; facilitating and supporting a hub of professionals and 
community activists dissatisfied with the current development trajectory and committed to engage civil society, 
the state and the market in a quest for dynamic and innovative alternatives; creating a professional research, 
documentation and media component to develop city-wide poverty and development profiles, backed up by case 
studies, newsletters, posters and videos; and conducting forums for discussion on planning and urbanisation 
issues in ways that bring together communities, NGOs, academics, officials and politicians (extracted from 
http://www.courc.co.za./Coalition1.htm) (accessed 19 April 2004). 
186 Referring to the rule of law, individual liberty and human rights (as derived from natural law) (Mouffe, 
2000). 
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paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation’ (Foucault, 1982 in Gordon, 1991:5). For 
this approach to work, ‘passion is mobilised constructively towards the promotion of 
democratic decisions which are partly consensual, but which also respectfully accepts 
unresolvable disagreements’ (Hillier, 2002:35).  
This perspective should, arguably, be understood by the HPA, recalling here Bolnick’s 
refrain of playing ‘judo’ with the state. Implied here is the deconstruction of the ‘frame of 
existing politics’ – technical practices, forms of knowledge and institutions (Barry, 2002) - 
which ‘domesticat[es] hostility’ in the pursuit of the creation of ‘unity in a context of conflict 
and diversity’ (Mouffe, 1999). The regulative and performance implications and 
consequences of these stratagems and technologies are demystified and deconstructed by the 
HPA, exposing their anti-poor orientation. And it is here where HPA strategies and tactics 
constitute a direct challenge and (possibly) present an ‘alternative’ to the ‘frame of existing 
politics’ (referred to the introduction of this Chapter as the ‘dominant culture’). 
The HPA realised that particular ways of thinking about society and social change are 
engraved in the organisation and occupation of participatory spaces, and that every space has 
etched into it the traces of its ‘generative past’ (Cornwall, 2002). In this context, the HPA 
chose not to ‘insert’ the urban poor into a pre-defined space and assimilate the associated 
(emerging) mainstream state and civil society discourses about ‘appropriate’ community 
development. Instead, the HPA chose to develop alternative capacities to negotiate with the 
powerful through the enhancement of people’s capabilities to claim their entitlements and the 
right to shape the contours of the shelter production regime (its organisation, functioning and 
output). This witnessed the HPA initiating and creating new spaces for citizens to act 
‘without (both outside, and in the absence of [the state]) and on it’ (Ibid:20, original 
emphasis). These chosen spaces constitute ‘sites of radical possibility’ (Ibid:17), where the 
excluded find a place and a voice to defend their interests. This is a site constituted by 
participants themselves, rather than one created for the participation of others.  
These spaces normally emerge organically from sets of common concerns or identifications; 
come into being as a result of popular mobilisation (around identity or issue-based concerns, 
for example), or may consist of spaces wherein people of similar minds join together in 
common pursuits (the ideologues of the HPA). The site constructed is a relatively durable 
institutionalised space from which citizens and communities practise self-provisioning of 
credit to satisfy needs; participate in networks that go beyond the boundaries of the nation-
state; and engage in governance by influencing public policy through advocacy and 
modelling alternatives. As such, they also constitute and contain sites wherein citizens and 
their intermediary organisations ‘assume some of the functions of government’ (Cornwall, 
2002:20, 21, 17). Although these sites are relatively autonomous from the state, the HPA’s 
sites were also connected to government (directly and indirectly) in different aspects of 
shelter provision. 
 Discursive Currents in the Mainstream Development Model 
Despite the considerable strides made by the HPA in optimising the terms of trade between 
recognition and redistribution, the alternative discourse and practice in combat and co-
operation with the existing frame of politics could not escape corrosion, contamination and 
corruption. Strides and successes aside, there were (and still remain) a series of problem to be 
coherently and purposively negotiated (and not sidestepped by the HPA). These problems 
relate in part to the deficiencies of planning praxis; the hegemony of present-day supply-side 
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citizenship and community development; the narrowing of the development and participatory 
horizons by shifts in party-society relationships; and the increasing marginalisation of the 
most vulnerable in the transformation project. 
With respect to the first, notwithstanding the commitment of critical planning theory and 
practice to the more expansive democratic tradition,187
Nowhere is this more clearly reflected than in ‘neoliberal’ and ‘Third Way’ ‘supply side 
citizenship’ (de Beus & Koelble, 2001) approaches.
 the ‘operation of power’ within the 
dominant existing consensus-making processes and multicultural planning paradigms 
remains problematic and/or not recognised (Watson, 2003:403). This is related to 
‘Habermasian’ assumptions regarding the achievement of consensus and the possibility of 
suppressing power (as commented on in an earlier Chapter). How the contexts of planning 
are structured by various forms of power, conceptual dominations of/by planning experts, 
institutionalised economic criteria and organised political interests are not particularly well 
addressed in contemporary critical planning theory and practices (Mantysalo, 2003:31). It is 
simply assumed (and is not at variance with our planning frameworks) that properly 
structured and shepherded dialogic processes will deliver better politics and content 
(Maxwell, 2005). More importantly though is how ‘community’ comes to be defined and 
constructed in our planning frameworks which, as mentioned before, hinges on non-
conflictual narratives of society and societal change. What is involved in creating ‘proper’ 
communities through planning praxis (and HPA mobilisation and change processes) is not 
just a technical and managerial task; it is also a ‘moral and political task’, i.e., a citizen is a 
person who exercises their rights through established channels in a prescribed and lawful 
way, and on the basis of a pre-defined political-economic programme (Watson, 2003:397).  
188 Supply-citizenship denotes and 
elevates personal autonomy, self-reliance, social initiative on the basis of ability to pay, 
equality of opportunity, volunteerism, workfarism, no rights without responsibility, 
procedural justice.189
Those seduced by the Third Way see in supply-side citizenship the possibility for the 
reinvention of the ‘social’ (declared dead by Thatcherism and the New Right (Rose, 1996; 
1999)) as highly stylised versions of community-building, trust, mutuality and collaboration 
re-emerge in public policy. For this group, the market emphasis on enterprise, self-
determination and innovation means that the shackles of passive welfarism and elitist 
professionalism can be discarded and replaced with the concept of ‘dynamic self-determining 
communities’ (Kenny, 2002). There are those who invoke the ‘fused discourses’ for strategic 
purposes, i.e. demonstrating a commitment to innovative projects and thereby winning 
 Supply-side citizenship further represents a curious admixture of the 
operating frameworks for community development. It emphasises the market rationale of 
private initiative and enterprise; the activist rationale of mutuality and trust; the welfare 
industry rationale of a state safety net for those who ‘cannot help themselves’; and, where 
necessary, bureaucratic regulations and charity for the ‘deserving poor’.  
                                                 
187 Associated with participation, equality and majority rule (see Mouffe, 1999; 2000). 
188 Shift of emphasis from the state to the individual to take responsibility for his or her life chances and 
development. 
189 The ANC government has embraced Third Way principles with an emphasis on individual responsibility, 
self-reliance and personal autonomy (for an elaboration, see de Beus & Koelble, 2001:191–2). 
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influential friends and accessing pots of gold from donor agencies. Then there are those who 
perceive the new discourses of community development as ‘Trojan horses’ – to shepherd and 
discipline society and community organisations to the dictates of the market and socially 
exclusionary development paths and trajectories (Ibid).  
Optimising the terms of trade between recognition and redistribution is further complicated 
by the struggles within the ruling party as it battles to (re)define its ideological commitment 
to internal democracy as a political value and cultural practice. The nature of the party list 
formulation process, an integral component of the proportional representation electoral 
system, reinforces a hierarchical culture in the organisation alongside an upward-looking 
accountability orientation (as opposed to the reverse). Suspicion of opposition (‘you are with 
us or against us’) and the determination of the organisation’s leadership to keep crucial 
national debates about the economy, political reform and developmental issues outside the 
political domain (Pieterse, forthcoming b) present added obstacles.  
In sum, the democratic-accountability deficit; suspicion of opposition; insulation of debate 
from the public domain; and, since GEAR, increasing levels of state control over 
development projects (see Lyons et al, 1999), collectively exercise a negative impact on 
policy and its implementation – the state’s PHP being a case in point. These dynamics are 
clearly relevant to the HPA.  
The alternative proposed by the HPA was the grounding of community development in an 
activist frame with its emphasis on solidarity, mutuality, political mobilisation and advocacy, 
undergirded by a strong commitment to furthering the politics of equality; giving voice to the 
disadvantaged and vulnerable; and deepening democracy.  
But to what extent is the ‘alternative’ sustainable and durable when state engagement 
intensifies, introducing all manner of pollution and poison? To what extent is it viable as it 
constantly struggles to juggle the calculus of contestation and compromise when in (both cold 
and hot) pursuit of public resources? To what extent is it an ‘alternative’ at all versus a novel 
synthesis of a Poor People’s and neoliberal Third Way? Most fundamentally, to what extent 
does it constitute the imposition of a frame of politics that reproduces liberal or authoritarian 
‘rationalities of rule’; wherein the core rituals regularise the conduct of the social and 
economic life of the urban poor through the ‘creation of locales, entities and persons able to 
operate a regulated autonomy’ (Rose & Miller, 1992:173)? To what extent is the HPA’s 
‘aesthetic’ or ‘aestheticization of poverty’ a ‘heroic narrative’ of neoliberal freedom (see 
Roy, 2006 for a full discussion) and/or a counter narrative of radical democracy? Can it be 
both at the same time?  
Implications of the HPA’s Alternative to the Mainstream Model 
The core ‘rituals’ of the HPA (‘echoing’ those of the state) include enumeration and 
mapping, surveying and house modelling, as well as exchanges for lateral learning. Savings 
is the main instrument the Federation uses for mobilisation. It is variously described as the 
‘cement that binds people together’, the ‘goose that lays the golden egg’, and ‘the means that 
creates space for the poor to identify, understand and articulate their own priorities’. Savings 
are fundamental to the Federation’s strategy, as social movement, of mobilising the urban 
poor through their own resources, experience and capacities in order to transform their 
relations between their members and state institutions.  Jockin Appurtham, the President of 
the Indian National Slum Dwellers’ Federation, employed savings as a principal tool for 
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mobilisation in India and central strategy for entry and relationship-building in South Africa, 
Cambodia and Thailand. He sees daily savings as the bedrock of every other activity of the 
Federation. When the President and others in the HPA speak of savings, they see it as ‘the 
breath of life, the pulse, the lifeline’ (Jockin Appurtham), a ‘moral discipline’ (‘gives life to 
people’, ‘breathing that keeps you alive: inhale savings, exhale credit’), which builds a 
certain kind of political fortitude and spiritual discipline (cited in Appadurai, 2004:11–2; 
Anonymous (c) nd:6). In another vein, savings could also be potentially viewed as a criterion 
for localised (HPA-based) citizenship (‘our family’, in the words of Patrick Magebula, cited 
in Anonymous (c) nd:6).  
The combination of self-enumeration, self-regulation and the notion of savings as ‘spirit’ or 
‘moral’ discipline (the foundations of a potentially inclusionary citizenship) could cogently 
be presented as a form of ‘autogovernmentality’. Whilst those in HPA would prefer to see 
their rituals as a method to fashion and dictate their own social and political legibility, rather 
than have one imposed on them by the state; an exercise in counter-governmentality; the 
combination of rituals is ‘truly insidious in its capillary reach’ (Appadurai, 2002:36).190 If 
governmentality is accepted to mean the complex array of techniques, programmes, 
procedures, strategies and tactics employed by non-state agencies and state institutions to 
shape the conduct of individuals and populations; if governmentality extends from political 
government right through to forms of self-regulation, namely ‘technologies of self’;191
The similarities in the repertoires and templates (the techniques and technologies of 
governmentality) deployed by the HPA and those of the state and private sector, although not 
 if 
governmentality (in its present guise) centres around social responsibilisation, a matter of 
personal provision and self-empowerment (Lemke, 2001), then some serious questions need 
to be asked about the nature and content of the HPA’s contestation of the ‘existing frame of 
politics’.  
                                                 
190 This type of inscription – making people write things down and count them – is itself, argues Rose and 
Miller (1992:187), a kind of government of them, inciting individuals to construe their lives according to such 
norms. Through these mechanisms, authorities can register and act on those distant from them in the pursuit of 
various objectives without encroaching on their ‘freedom’ and ‘autonomy’. These mechanisms assume 
considerable importance in modern modes of government. In the case of enumeration – dubbed the ‘instant 
messenger connection technology’ – data collected informs of various aspects of slum dwellers’ lives including 
‘religion, hobbies, foods’; and exposes ‘selfishness, intolerance, corruption’ (Wahomeh, nd:3). In the case of 
‘savings’, an important question is the extent to which it constitutes the foundations of a potentially 
exclusionary citizenship, especially when touted as ‘building an economic commonality amongst the 
shack/slumdwellers’ (Anonymous (c) nd:19); ‘collecting money’ being equated to ‘collecting people’ (Anon. (c) 
nd:6)/ ‘giving us a family’ (Anon. (c) nd:10); and the savings book being referred to as the ‘ID card in the 
Federation’ (Anon. (c) nd:3).  
191 Within liberal regimes, subjects are constituted as active agents seeking autonomy and assuming 
responsibility for their life outcomes. Rationalised as agents of power, governmental objectives are to be 
secured not through direct intervention, but through ‘realignment’ of subjects’ identities and by implicating self-
regulation within governmental aims. Processes of liberal government therefore entail the ‘conduct of conduct’, 
focused on ‘technologies of the self’ as governance attempts to shape subjects’ conduct around a moral 
discourse of ‘responsible behaviour’. These technologies represent governance at a distance, rather than a 
reduction in government. While subjects are constituted as active and autonomous agents, this freedom is 
regulated through implicating subjects in deeper and wider relations of power (see Flint, 2003:612–4). The 
savings collectives and politics of the HPA can be read as communities that are responsible for their own self-
regulation and well-being (a theme revisited below). 
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comprehensively unpacked in the Chapter, are striking. The harnessing and employment of 
‘existing frame’ techniques and technologies are, purportedly, subversively modified by the 
HPA to further a pro-poor agenda, i.e. a counter governmentality. On the other hand, this 
subversion does not completely evacuate the status quo-maintaining techniques and 
technologies of their disciplinary characteristics and qualities. This is rendered particularly 
acute in the present context of hyper-marketisation that stresses greater self-provisioning; 
higher levels of social-individual responsibilisation; and more sophisticated and invasive 
forms of social surveillance (Hardt & Negri, 1994). Subversive modification of these 
technologies, without serious consideration of their evolving architectures and geometries - 
and the ‘politics’ they ‘demand’ or ‘permit’ or ‘admit’ or ‘engender’- can potentially blunt 
their transformative potential. In other words, the (subversive) frame and techniques of the 
HPA can (unwittingly) lend legitimacy to a multiplicity of existing social governance 
regimes, including, or not ruling, out disciplinary neoliberalism.  
With reference to the point about (potentially) lending legitimacy to existing social 
governance regimes, a repeated refrain of the mainstream literature championing the 
community-driven approaches is the frequent praise-singing of their efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. When government supports the solutions of the poor, they are reportedly ‘more 
effective and far more cost-effective than conventional government programmes’ with unit 
costs generally being ‘much lower’, levels of cost-recovery ‘much higher’, and ‘many more 
local resources are mobilized’ (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005:10). Joint planning and 
collaboration, it is argued, is conducive to the design and implementation of flexible service 
and infrastructure provision interventions in that the instruments are a great deal more suited 
to fluid settlement dynamics and the fragile livelihood patterns of poor (especially the most 
vulnerable). Partnering, co-operation and collaboration also furnishes additional dialogical 
spaces for negotiating better societal distributional outcomes in projects that impact on the 
poor but who may not be the prime beneficiaries (e.g. new roads, industrial area 
development, tourist facilities etc. for higher-income groups) (Ibid:70–1). In this sense, the 
development practice of this movement and the associated state engagement formats, builds 
and strengthens the capacity of the state ‘as an integral part of [its] localised, grassroots 
work’ (Whaites, 1998:346, original emphasis). Rather than the state being demeaned and 
vilified as a monstrous ‘monolithic ‘other’’ devoid of any ‘positivity’(Stokke & Mohan, 
2000:260), successful engagement through this developmental imaginary and practice, in 
effect, enhances and improves the development performance of the state.  
There is certainly no reason for governments throughout the world not to actively court, 
support and promote a development process that reduces the unit cost of services and 
infrastructure; benefits more people; increases the capacity of the poorest of the poor; 
improves the quality of the output; and perhaps most importantly, improves the prospects and 
capacity for cost recovery. But the question before us is the extent to which the savings of the 
‘entrepreneurial poor’ is perceived by the state as both a resource for investment in built 
structures and as process vehicle for delivering services in ways that enhances the legitimacy 
of the state without government having to increase their financial commitment. The poor, in 
short, are short-changed, ending up using their sweat equity and savings to subsidise the state 
and enhance its legitimacy (Swilling, 2005a). The entrepreneurialism of the poor is hereby 
opportunistically seized upon by the ‘minimalist state’ struggling to fulfil the requirements of 
its ‘minimalist social contract’.  
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Indeed, in the literature that celebrates and is critical of the motivating factors for government 
adoption of the PHP, nowhere is it noted that the declining housing budgets from 1994 to 
1998 (a trend believed at the time to be showing no signs of abating) led the Department to 
start considering strategies to downgrade its shelter commitments. In early 1998, the 
Department began searching for alternative ways of promoting housing delivery no longer 
dependent on the subsidy. This was confirmed in an interview with the Director-General, 
Mpumi Nxumalo-Nhlapo, who said: ‘the subsidy scheme will not continue indefinitely … 
[T]here are more creative ways to finance housing than dishing out R15 000 to each family’ 
(Housing in Southern Africa, 1998:10).  
Explicit in the postulation above about the short-changing of the poor (and here recalling the 
critique of the mainstream literature plus the radical ambiguity of engagement with a state 
that is both friend and foe of the poor in a single and multiple moments) is an inequitable 
cost-benefit weighting and balance. Developmental tipping of the balance through improved 
capture of benefits by the poor is dependent on building the latter’s ‘institutional and human 
capacity’ (Swilling, 2005a). The analysis above proposes that the HPA’s over-estimation of 
the ability and readiness of the poor to engage the state on their terms and the under-
investment in the institutionalisation of core mobilisation strategies potentially precluded 
developmental tipping. Below it is argued that the selective appropriation of the PHP and 
state capture (or, better put, official bastardisation) of the instruments powering the social 
economy of the poor enabled the state to shift responsibilities for adequate shelter provision 
onto poor communities themselves.  
Returning to the theme of the ambiguity of subversion, the subversive modification of 
‘savings’ to one with ‘profound ideological, even salvational status’ (Appadurai, 2000 cited 
in Anonymous (c) nd:1) and ‘tool’ for collective social cohesion has to repeatedly negotiate 
and reconcile the many tensions embedded in the multiple (evolving) objectives of the ‘tool’ 
itself and the difficulties encountered in inducing a local ‘politics’ demanded by this 
necessary unstable reconciliation. Distinct from microcredit movements, the contemporary 
dressing up of ‘microfinance’192
In its conventional guise of ‘technique for improving financial citizenship for the urban and 
rural poor throughout the world’ (Appadurai, 2000 cited in Anonymous (c) nd:1), could not 
the SDI’s not insignificant subversion of savings lay the foundations of a potentially 
exclusionary citizenship, thereby creating divisions within the poor (problems arguably 
 in the old and new discourses of entrepreneurship, 
empowerment and poverty relief have been, in multiple mutations, deployed in this hyper-
marketised environment as a tool for improving (supply-side) ‘citizenship’; off-set income 
security; advance the neoliberal project of intertwined local, national and global financial 
sector liberalisation; counter social unrest and/or defuse any potentially socially organised 
destabilising threat to the neoliberal political project; and ameliorate the consequences of 
rampant commodification and marketisation (de-commodification) (see Weber, 2004 for a 
full discussion of the inter-related nature of microfinance, financial sector liberalisation, 
social governance regimes and ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’).  
                                                 
192 Referring to the provision of a range of financial services, credit and saving opportunities, microfinance is 
broader than microcredit (i.e. supply of small loans to individuals normally directed through groups). 
Microfinance is akin – albeit not precisely – to the SDI notion of ‘savings’, particularly the opportunities and 
services components.  
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encountered with its mainstream deployment)? Indeed, it is conceded by authorities and 
practitioners connected to this movement that there is the ‘possibility of unintentional 
selection in the recruitment of Federation membership’ (Huchzermeyer, 2001:315), 
especially related to savings. This is an area that the Federation itself concedes has not been 
investigated (Ibid). Moreover, two of the main praise-singers of the SDI approach (one of 
them a respected and engaged practitioner and the other an academic) admit there exists a 
‘danger’ of SDI community-driven processes introducing divisive new ‘“clique[s]”’ within 
the urban poor’ (d’Cruz & Sattertwaithe, 2005:67, original emphasis). Encountered elsewhere 
are references to saving collectivities achieving the ‘same kind of meta-identity and cohesion 
as a secular organisation within the domains of religion, caste, tribe and ethnicity’ 
(Anonymous (d) nd:4), offering this clan or caste the funds required to ‘manage problems in 
an [sic] neoliberal context’ (Bolnick, 2004 cited in Anonymous (c) nd:17), ‘alleviate the 
immediate problems of poverty…pay for shelter, medical care, school fees, whatever is 
desperately required’ (Bolnick, 2004 cited in Anonymous (c), nd:18).  
The intention here is not to be dismissive of the socio-political empowerment of the poor 
through savings and its systemic transformative potential. It serves merely to underscore that 
contemporary strategies associated with sustainable modern day progressive and counter-
hegemonic politics are infernos powered by subversion and complicity. The 
institutionalisation of ‘grassroots power relations structured around seemingly reformist 
apolitical methods’ (Swilling, 3 February 2006, personal correspondence)193
If it is conceded that the inferno is both destructive and creative, the ‘frame of politics’ 
demanded by the SDI strategy is sometimes dismissive of existing realities and modalities of 
livelihood politics (despite HPA’s claim of its politics being moulded and following the 
‘contours of poverty’). In one interpretation of this development practice, ‘captur[ing] the 
institutional territory of the state’ (Anonymous (d) nd:2) is considered central to the ability of 
affiliate federations to impact positively on legislation and influence the institutional 
arrangements of governance. Crucial here is to ‘seize the functional role of the state in its 
formal practices, in short; to become the state in the places where the state cannot reach and 
operate’ (Ibid:6). In the SDI imaginary, ‘formal practices’ are subversively appropriated, the 
‘frame of politics’ is structurally organised around localised economic republics or 
federations with the savings collectives comprising ‘fundamental cells’ (Ibid:2) affiliated to 
an international socio-economic republic (SDI).  
 requires paying 
attention (both by social movement leaders and the research community) to their ambiguity if 
‘getting the politics right’ is a priority. Sustaining the right politics through the rapid and 
effective deployment of the techniques and technologies renders recognition of and 
engagement with the ambiguity as un-reflexive deployment can compromise and/or destroy 
the capacity for collective action and redress. This is precisely what happened with the HPA. 
The power base of the poor was not sufficiently and ‘appropriately’ institutionally and 
financially consolidated resulting in ritual manipulation and abuse (members saving just 
enough to cover the deposit for accessing uTshani funding, abandonment of savings schemes 
and non-repayment of loans), ritual re/(dis)placement (from ‘goose’ to ‘egg’), and the state 
relegating and reducing beneficiaries to nothing more than the providers of savings and sweat 
equity.  
                                                 
193 E-mail communication of 3 February 2006. 
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Retaining SDI linkage demands that national aggregated cells adhere to the social process of 
saving. But in parts of Southern Africa, the process falls apart, with savings degenerating into 
a ‘site of plunder’ and loan defaulting, ‘possibly reflecting’ the ‘specific historical-material 
legacy of the region, which has reified a culture of entitlement and authority, both of which 
are fundamentally antithetical to the ethos of the SDI’ (Anonymous (c) nd:7). With these 
negative tendencies overwhelming the ‘positive aspects of the savings process’, the SDI 
‘confronts the ‘deviant strain’, ‘de-link[ing]’ from the ‘defaulting Federation groupings 
thereby ‘forc[ing] a ‘crisis of allegiance and practice’, the ‘dialectics’ of which supposedly 
advances processes ‘toward the desired point’ that bring them ‘back into line’. SDI re-linkage 
is thus conditional on regrouping around the ‘social process of saving’ (Anonymous (d) 
nd:7).  
The introduction of ‘positive’ SDI politics must combat and transform the ‘deviant’ culture 
with expulsion from the SDI state ensuring compliance to its social governance regime. 
Postponing for a moment considerations about the imposition and regimentalisation of a 
politics that permits no other engagement and mobilisation formats, the portrayal of parts of 
Southern Africa’s material legacy and accompanying culture may be one of the many reasons 
why ‘Africa works’ (borrowing the title of the famous book by Chabal & Daloz, 1999; also 
see Swilling et al., 1998). The daily livelihood struggles of the poor and the modalities of this 
‘deviant’ politics are orderly and disorderly, organised and disorganised, spontaneous and 
planned, structured and unstructured. They range (and this is not the entire gamut of the 
struggle formats) from quiet and hidden encroachments to open protest to purposive 
trespasses and transgressions to pragmatic engagement in the established social demarcations 
of inclusion and exclusion, formal and informal, public and private, legal and illegal, social 
acceptance and rejection. (see for example Bayat, 1997; Scott, 1997). These multiple 
modalities are both reflective of and responsive to the ‘severe lack of bargaining space within 
African cities’ (Simone, 2004:5), evidenced in the poor employing survival and coping 
mechanisms (risk management) that draws precisely on the so-called ‘negative’ or ‘deviant’ 
cultures or tendencies of entitlement and authority, i.e. trading long-term human capability-
building and empowerment strategies for short-term immediate security (Wood, 2003). 
Loyalty to existing inequitably structured organisations (formal and informal, legal and 
illegal) and entitlements (guaranteed through patronage, clientelism, corruption.) deliver 
goods to just survive rather than to long-term savings, which substantial categories of the 
poor may be unable to sustain. The ‘correlative’ duties that patronage, clientelism and 
corruption impose on the poor, translates into them remaining poor. Termed the ‘Faustian 
bargain’ – wherein to stay secure means also to stay poor (Ibid) – is the stuff of real life 
politics: survival, holding on, getting by.  
Before us then stands an organisation that arguably can be praised for wanting to break the 
self-reinforcing cycle of poverty and disempowerment of ‘Faustian bargain’type politics; to 
empower people to get ahead. In the same breath, simplistic dismissal of the legacy and 
culture of the ‘dark’ continent’s poor and/or the pejorative labelling of the other poor’s 
survival politics as ‘deviant’; expulsion from the great SDI republic and its superior legacy 
and culture; and being yanked ‘back into line’ towards more advanced and cultured politics; 
leaves one with the impression that SDI ‘positive politics’ is the only or optimal type of 
productive politics to combat poverty and powerlessness, i.e. the ‘one and only alternative’, 
‘the only true, real and superior game in town’.  
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Manifestations of SDI politics as being the ‘only game’ is evidenced, for example, in Joel 
Bolnick’s dismissal of intellectuals supporting social movements combating evictions in 
eThekwini, as nothing more than ‘middle class activists’ who with their ‘self righteous 
indignation’ engage in the ‘usual activities of protest that middle class activists regard so 
highly: write articles in the newspapers and the usual left wing rags, send e-mails of protest, 
and boycott dialogue with the Metro’ (personal correspondence, 26/01/2006).194
We are not asking [the] Poor People’s Movement, SANCO or even LPM [Landless 
People’s Movement] groups to join the Federation. We are saying: “You retain your 
autonomy, but you come together under this umbrella [Coalition of the Urban Poor]. 
And you share experiences under this umbrella. What the Fed offers you is savings, 
exchange programmes, international links, enumeration, and instruments to engage 
the state. What do you offer?” Quite frankly, no one else is offering anything 
(Interview, 07.04.04).  
 Or when he 
spoke of the problems associated with building coalitions with organisations outside the SDI 
frame:  
The ‘only game’ outlook and the tactics to induce and nurture SDI ‘positive politics’ 
(regardless of local contingencies and specificities that undergird the risk management 
strategies of the poor) transmits dangerous signals to those fearful of frame imposition and 
punitive regimentalisation of politics. In fact, the central ideological foundation, basic 
premise, and reason for neoliberalism’s acceptance (by even the victims and casualties) was 
the idea that ‘no other alternative’ existed to the present status quo. Replicating this, the HPA 
also say that their Poor People’s Third Way is the only alternative.  
The extent to which there could possibly be an imposition and regimentalisation of politics 
(not in and of itself necessarily negative) begs the question of its ‘exclusionism’ and 
performativity, i.e. its track-record or appropriateness and effectiveness in modern times 
relative to other formats of resistance politics (mentioned above) and its social basis. Those 
promoting the SDI’s ‘politics of patience’ as delivering to the poor more enduring, 
sustainable and empowering results counterpose it to the weakness of radical (erstwhile 
‘left’) revolutionary paradigms195
By contrast, lasting transformation in the locally rooted and globalised ‘patient politics’ 
frame of accommodation, compromise, negotiation and long term pressure is less-than-
heroic; it is about modest adjustments catalysing and snow-balling into immodest (systemic) 
change. The interconnected dual ‘change processes’ of life and world (recalling Rimbaud and 
Marx above) is slow and painstaking; and time and resource intensive. It demands of the poor 
to be ‘patient’; to refrain from action that is confrontational; and to stay the path of small 
incursions that ‘ultimately’ and ‘in the end’ will deliver. The spiritual, moral and political 
 evinced in easy containment of protest, rebellion and 
struggle; the limits and limitations of narrow fixation on the ‘seizure of state power’ as 
ultimate goal; and the problematic performance record of this course of social change.  
                                                 
194 E-mail from Bolnick to author on 26 January 2006. 
195 Premised on the ‘vertical siloisation of power relations’ – state versus masses; capital versus masses; state 
versus capital (Swilling, personal correspondence, February 2006). 
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diet dispensed to stay this course in the face of failed partnerships and development deals,196
Sometimes I sit in a meeting and I look at these people, and I think: “They are twice 
my age and they still have no house and they still come to save”. And I am thinking: 
“Are you people really relying on me to pull this one off?" When your metro is not 
interested in meeting, neither with me nor you; and sometimes you find that militant 
group that wants to march, and I am saying, “Listen guys: I am not going to stop you. 
If you want to go and march, go and march”. I can’t. Because that is not the 
Federation’s style to have public demonstrations. Because they are always told that 
they are an exclusive group, they don’t do such things; they don’t invade land, they 
don’t toyi-toyi, they don’t evict people. You know they [HPA] got invasion on their 
land. On their own land! And they don’t want to [evict] the people, because it is not 
their value. They don’t invade land, they don’t evict, they don’t toyi-toyi. They [rank 
and file members] are slowly becoming very militant…They are talking to others’ 
(Interview, 29.04.04).  
 
is (dis)ingenious with repeated invocations of this ‘community of the organised poor’ 
constituting an ‘exclusive group’, distinguished from the rabble of the disorganised, 
disorderly and (militantly unproductive) lumpen poor. Sandra van Rensburg’s words ring 
loud here:  
Drip-fed into this cocktail, one ventures to ask if the ‘politics of patience’ amidst 
development debris, betrayal and disillusionment works as a ‘status quo-maintenance’ shock 
absorber, confining opposition to that which is socially ‘acceptable’ within the broader 
development horizon of existing social governance regimes and their unilateral restructuring 
by the state. In short, there is perhaps an idealisation of self-help/ABCD by the HPA that 
allows the state (utilising the very same HPA ideology of self-help and the poor doing it for 
themselves and then robbing them of the subsidy) to shift responsibilities for adequate shelter 
provision onto poor communities themselves.  
The HPA’s non-confrontational ‘politics of patience’, with its emphasis on exceptionalism 
and exclusivity, blunts potential resistance by, arguably, discouraging (united) opposition 
with the lumpen unsophisticated toyi-toying, land-invading masses.197
                                                 
196 Arising from (amongst other things) frequent, rapid and unpredictable changes in the organisation and 
management of the state (its resources, structures, programmes and administrative protocols) and the 
unravelling of formal/informal alliances struck by the HPA with influential (and often opportunistic) state 
functionaries. 
 Moreover, the 
technologies of self-governance or remaking of self (associated with ‘patient politics’), 
potentially serves as the legitimating psycho-social handmaiden. The technologies assist, 
facilitate, support and enable the state to achieve its (elusive) shelter objectives (at no extra 
cost) and manipulate the poor’s alternating and fused narratives and repertoires of 
(neo)liberal freedom and radical democracy in the government’s unilateral downsizing of its 
shelter programme and its abiding efforts to minimise further the contents and output of the 
minimum social contract.  
197 People’s Dialogue is not supportive of land invasions. Instead, a formal 24-point plan was drawn up for 
organised groups to follow in their quest to secure land (see Isandla Institute, 2001). 
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This is indeed not such a far-fetched idea, especially given the enthusiastic (re-) embrace of 
the People’s Housing Process in the recent re-jigging of the national shelter programme 
(Khan, 2004). In the new revamped policy, the PHP is the only housing route that does not 
require a cash contribution which is (un)wittingly pushing most beneficiaries (and therefore 
provincial and municipal housing authorities) to opt for the PHP route. In the state’s 
imagination, the PHP is about sweat equity and savings applied to a state-driven housing 
delivery drive, whose subsidy programme is geared increasingly towards upward 
redistribution, i.e. for the poor there are to be serviced sites and PHP, while the rest who can 
pay the R2 479 contribution (the condition to access the housing subsidy) will access better 
quality housing in possibly less peripheral and more central locations.  
On the other hand, the renewed PHP emphasis is partly to arrest the selling and abandonment 
of RDP homes by beneficiaries insofar that sweat equity and savings supposedly generates a 
sense of ownership and ‘responsible’ asset management. With no extra financial commitment 
by the state, enhanced developmental outcomes are made possible by tapping into the 
resources of the ‘entrepreneurial poor’; their novel ‘aesthetic’ or ‘aestheticisation’ of poverty; 
their heroic narrative of freedom (engraved in their templates and repertoires), and 
reassurances of their own leadership that they constitute an ‘exclusive group’ different and 
apart from unorganised masses and undisciplined lumpen. Arguably, the much-needed 
systemic reforms in the planning, financial, institutional, construction and land sectors to 
rectify the deformities and enhance the developmental outcomes of the post-apartheid shelter 
project are hereby deflected and/or postponed indefinitely. 
And it is here that we arrive full circle in the debates about auto-/counter-governmentality 
(dis)articulations. How is it that the HPA’s victory in making their ideology and praxis 
hegemonic came to be subversively appropriated, bastardised and domesticated to serve state 
priorities and needs? If developmental tipping was precluded by over-estimating the 
readiness and capabilities of the poor (and the resulting underinvestment in core mobilisation 
strategies) the ideologues of this strain of civil society developmentalism failed to ‘get the 
politics right’ through not rigorously engaging with the mechanics and modalities of 
government, governance and governmentality. The very essence of liberal government, 
governance and governmentality is about drawing on the processes, modes of regulation, 
values and expectations that are located in civil society. In other words, liberal government 
models its interventions on the forms of regulation, expectations and values that already 
operate in civil society.  
This state manoeuvre involves a three-layered folding process: the unfolding of the formally 
political sphere into civil society (linkages, partnerships and networking – the uTshani 
Agreement of 1995 to 1996/7 and informal appropriation through pilot projects); an 
enfolding of the regulations of civil society into the political domain (entrepreneurialism, 
consumerism – the [selective] formal appropriation [1998]/ creeping bastardisation, maybe); 
and a refolding of the real or ideal values and conduct of civil society onto the political 
(supply-side citizenship, deregulation, workfarism – the complete bastardisation, 
domestication and contemporary re-embrace, perhaps) (Dean, 2002:45).  
It is in this sly and subtle colonisation of civil society that state ambitions were achieved. 
Without concerted investment in fortifying and protecting the autonomous institutional 
spaces of the poor, and building their capacity and capabilities to capture benefits, the state 
will continue to achieve and secure its quiet but effective hegemony.  
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Synthesis 
Pathways to developmental shelter outcomes, as earlier stated, inhabit a realm situated at 
intersection of the ‘inventiveness’ of civil society and ‘intervention’ of the state (see 
Robinson, 2006 for a more detailed discussion). In common with other intersections, the PHP 
has invigorated and transformed the traditional RDP housing intervention, offering 
opportunities to revitalise praxis and reinvent governance in ways that could potentially 
bridge the gap between policy intent and outcomes. In contradistinction to various other 
incarnations of state-civil society partnerships (Cranko & Khan, 1999; Khan & Cranko, 
2002), the HPA approach provides a point of intersection that is constructed and patrolled by 
the organised poor and their organisations. This construction and patrol is rendered possible 
through the institutionalisation of autonomous grassroots power; a necessary precondition for 
the assembly and configuration of a ‘networked governance regime’ (adapted from 
Benington, 2001).  
To the extent that the HPA approach is portrayed by their protagonists as an exercise in 
counter-governmentality, this Chapter recorded some important similarities and continuities 
with dominant (neoliberal) rationalities of rule and disciplinary politics, including the 
regimentalisation of politics, the blunting of potential opposition to processes of socio-
economic exclusion through the delegitimisation of other formats of resistance, and exclusion 
of the other poors. Disciplinary politics, it is argued, comes to assist, facilitate and enable the 
state’s enduring attempts to downsize the post-apartheid government’s shelter commitment 
and programme. Thus, the politics may come to bolster the legitimacy of government to 
deliver on their downgraded and ‘downgrading’ shelter obligations without increasing their 
financial commitments.  
The poor then come via the mobilisation of their sweat and savings to deliver their own 
shelter and, if lucky enough to score a subsidy, compensate for its declining real value by 
removing profit and most labour costs from the housing construction process and offsetting 
the corrosive effects of inflation. Witnessed here, then, is the shifting of state responsibilities 
for adequate shelter provision onto poor communities themselves through the uncompensated 
and subversive appropriation of the resources of the poor in the official orchestration and 
execution of (further) social contract minimisation (with due respect here to friends from the 
neoliberal school of ‘Development as Freedom’ – also see Sandbrook, 2000).  
In the same breath, and when set against the backdrop of the limited reach and capability of 
the state and/or state failure, the HPA, by assuming ‘some of the functions of government’, 
imposes a ‘frame of politics’ which is not too different from the existing frame and/or 
services the existing frame in an admirable manner, i.e. self-responsibilisation, 
aestheticisation of poverty, and the heroic narrative of the ‘freedom’ of the entrepreneurial 
poor. Ironically, the counter-governmental frame both delivers on and supersedes the 
proposed and envisaged outcomes of the existing frame. Self-provisioning, self-help and self-
upliftment – the structuring pillars of supply-side citizenship – needs little official 
manipulation in the delivery of the aims, goals and objectives of the White Paper, and even 
goes beyond it. The state facilitated, market-driven approach comes nowhere near the 
delivery of a product that the existing (White Paper) frame aims at. The HPA delivers to the 
White Paper frame the key ingredient missing from the subsidy regime pivotal to achieving 
its envisaged shelter outcome, i.e. the savings and loan contribution to the subsidy. Self-
provisioning by the poor comes to the financial rescue of a government programme with 
none of the overly generous guarantees and concessions afforded the private sector through 
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the ROU and/or the inordinate institutional capacity building and heavy subsidisation of the 
not-so-poor social housing beneficiaries. Secondly, self provisioning and self 
responsibilisation comes to address a host of problems associated (directly and indirectly) 
with the state-private sector production route, i.e. abandonment and sale of RDP houses, 
shoddy construction and downward raiding. Again, White Paper objectives in these areas are 
admirably served through HPA technologies wherein the poor’s own investment and labour 
contribution promotes and nurtures, in the words of the ex-Housing Minister, a much needed 
‘culture of responsibility’ and ‘respect’ (cited in Mail & Guardian, 25 June–1 July 1999) 
amongst the poor and impoverished  with respect to state entitlements. So much for the 
ideologue’s claims that the solutions dispel myths about the poor as parasitic, unproductive 
and shouldering no responsibility for uplifting themselves. Finally, the ‘politics of patience’ 
admirably serves the government’s objective of releasing serviced land for orderly housing 
delivery precluded by the ‘deviant’, ‘impatient’ politics of land invasions.198
Democratic developmentalism’s ongoing struggle to optimise the terms of trade between 
recognition and redistribution has to constantly negotiate the fine line between resisting the 
colonising ambitions of the state (reactionary ensnarement by the monstrous monolithic 
other) whilst simultaneously building the capacity and strength of the state as an ‘integral part 
of [its] localised, grassroots work’.  If the ‘narratives’ of radical democracy and neoliberal 
freedom inherent in the SDI politics frame is not recognised, the negotiation of the fine line 
between reactionary ensnarement of civil society and developmental capture of the state will 
become increasingly difficult given the ‘governmentalisation [
  
199
Accordingly, this Chapter addressed itself to the strengths of democratic developmentalism 
and highlighted its limitations and ‘ambiguations’ flowing from its conflicting discourses in 
the contemporary (neo)liberal era. These limitations and ‘ambiguations’, it is posited, were 
recognised and ‘manipulated’ by the state (following Dean, 2004) to facilitate downsizing of 
its policy, moderate community expectations, postpone systemic reform, and, partially rectify 
the deformities of the dominant status-quo maintenance delivery route. From a civil society 
perspective, it is argued that poor institutionalisation of autonomous grassroots power 
prevented transformative/sustained mining of co-operative partnering with a state that for a 
period of time appeared to be responsive (uTshani Fund).  
] of the state’ which has 
rendered possible, in the words of Benington (2001:206), the ‘continual definition and 
redefinition of what is within the competence of the State’, and what is public and private. 
This, he adds, is ‘why and how the techniques of government have become the only political 
issue, the central arena for political struggle and contestation’ (Ibid).  
In their attempts to developmentally transform polity and economy, both state 
developmentalists and democratic developmentalists share a common failing. State and civil 
society as separate, conjoined and networked entities do not seem to be able to ‘get the 
politics right’, which as demonstrated earlier is a necessary precondition for pro-poor 
developmental outcomes.  
                                                 
198 Legal access to land, not even to speak of well-located land, is identified as one of the main barriers to the 
progression of the Federation’s house-building programme. Up until 1999, the Western Cape Federation was 
not able to access any state-owned land for housing (Isandla Institute, 2001) 
199 The ‘governmental state’ that emerged from the eighteenth century onwards is different from previous state 
forms privileging control over population/citizens and less so territory (Benington, 2001:206).  
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The failure of the SA state to re-order the existing distribution of socio-political and 
economic power (via re-orientating the vertical - political economy - axis of governance) has 
deepened (asset and income) poverty and inequality. Without this axis re-orientation, 
institutional transformation will not arrest growing immiseration.  On the other hand, the 
inadequate institutionalisation of autonomous grassroots power that endows the poor with the 
capabilities to link in virtuous cycles ‘structural’ social capital (institutions) with social 
capital (norms and values) (see Malik, 2002:33), coupled to the absence of an enabling (post-
apartheid) pro-poor legislative and regulatory environment, robs the poor of the capacity to 
meaningfully re-organise the horizontal axis of governance (networks and partnerships 
between public, private, voluntary and community organisations). Without this capacity and 
empowering environment, coupled to problematic internal relational dynamics, the top-down 
injection of funds rapidly eroded their unity and stripped them of the ability and power to 
exercise collective agency to durably reconfigure the horizontal axis of governance.  
The lack of alternatives to present development praxis around which to developmentally 
reconfigure axes of governance is the essential premise around which neoliberal policies are 
accepted, even by those clearly impoverished or disadvantaged by them. This premise 
‘constitutes a central ideological foundation of neoliberalism’ (Ziai, 2004:1049). But ‘we find 
it unimaginable’, remark Comaroff and Comaroff (2000:335), ‘that innovative forms of 
emancipatory practice will not emerge to address the excesses of neoliberal capitalism’. And 
so it is that the residents of the slums and shantytowns of the world stand proudly amongst 
the ‘newly assertive social movements’ who are beginning to ‘pursue common cause on a 
global scale’ to forge alternatives (Ibid). The ‘alternatives’ are not without their problems but 
they signal a politics of transformation of robust, creative and dynamic associational 
reconnection of state and society, polity and economy, and the local and the global.  
In our age, the productive reconnection of politics and economics or ‘getting the politics 
right’ to ‘get the prices wrong’ is to recognise and acknowledge the reality that state 
developmentalism and civil society developmentalism are interconnected and interdependent, 
i.e. they rise and fall together. In this light, the failings of HPA democratic developmentalism 
may be a tale about the state reneging on its financial obligations and its reluctance to alter 
the balance of power at policy and institutional levels through subsidy customisation, 
revamping norms and standards, revising its overly technocratic and bureaucratic regulatory 
regime, facilitating land interventions supportive of community-managed and driven shelter 
programmes, and addressing the democratic deficit in planning frameworks.  
If there is emerging a consensus on the imperatives of simultaneous re-orientation along 
vertical and horizontal axes, and their complementary reconfiguration, there are also 
divergences in strategies for associational reconnection of local-global and polity-economy 
but similarities in the state-society realm. Of central import though, is not that divergent 
strategies appear to produce similar outcomes (i.e. improved economic growth, job creation, 
poverty amelioration and reductions in inequality) and/or that the key protagonist is courted 
but many a time abused, but the solid consensus pertaining to the art of reconnection.  
Amazing here is the convergence of views of Lula da Silva and Chavez, presidents 
respectively of Brazil and Venezuela. Both were schooled in the grand metanarratives of 
democratic centralism, vanguardism, revolution, and seizure of the state power, but when in 
political office both appear to endorse a pragmatic, less-than-heroic politics of small steps, 
small adjustments and small incursions:  
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I believe it’s better to die in battle, rather than hold aloft a very revolutionary and very 
pure banner, and do nothing ... That position often strikes me as very convenient, a 
good excuse ... Try and make your revolution, go into combat, advance a little, even if 
it’s only a millimetre, in the right direction, instead of dreaming about utopias 
(President Chavez, 2004 cited in Swilling et al., 2005b:1).  
What is new here about what we are doing?...The novelty is that we do not want to - 
and we will not - introduce a Lula Plan. Brazil cannot have another president who 
invents a new plan, achieves a certain amount of success for the first year and then 
leaves us paying the bill for 10 years after…What we want is to do things in a 
sustainable fashion. Each day, even if we advance a centimeter, we are going forward 
- without any miracles…simply doing what needs to be done (President Lula da Silva, 
2004 cited in New York Times, 27 June 2004).200
Both the ‘vilified apostle of class warfare’ (President Chavez)
 
 201 and the President of 
‘tremendous heart’ (the praise Lula received from US President Bush) 202
But the ‘poor’ – as was argued many times before - have little voice, influence and/or power 
in development praxis. Under ‘Mbeki’s presidentialism and the ANC predominance’, civil 
society is ‘much smaller and less active than through the 1980s’; ‘far more people probably 
discussed politics then…than now’; the overwhelming majority do not participate in civics; 
and there is ‘much evidence’ that ‘civil society is no longer an independent critical voice 
relative to government, but merely is its appendage, perhaps a partner with government in 
delivery’ (Good, 2003:166–7).  
 are saying to us 
that the difference between yesteryear’s developmentalism and today’s developmentalism is 
that they are both top-down and bottom-up. Both the vilified and celebrated are saying to us 
that the driver, guardian and guarantor of systemic transformation is an empowered civil 
society. Both the vilified and celebrated are saying to us that the future does not arrive all at 
once.  
The Ten Year Review (Presidency, 2003a) recognises that the ‘poor lack formal organised 
power at the local level outside of the formal political processes’ (Ibid:14) and, that the many 
existing formal civil society organisations ‘lack mass involvement of especially the poor and 
marginalised’ (Ibid:16). But little is said about how this situation is to be addressed other than 
restating the ‘need to involve communities more in decision-making, especially in poor 
communities’ (Ibid:14) and the deployment of community development workers whose tasks 
include contributing to ‘improved service delivery by taking services directly to the poor’ and 
‘also’ to ‘assist the poor to develop the capacity to organise themselves and participate in 
decision-making’ (Ibid). 
Participation and engagement is further narrowed by the view in government that progressive 
policies are in place and that the critical challenge is one of implementation. This is despite 
the finding that ‘development policy repeatedly reflects misreading of preferences and social 
                                                 
200 Available at http://www.msu.edu/course/aec/810/Lula-Brazil.htm (accessed 11 April 2006). 
201 Barry Bearak, staff writer for the New York Times, calls Chavez this – Available at 
http://www.msu.edu/course/aec/810/Lula-Brazil.htm (accessed 11 April 2006) 
202 Ibid. 
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realities among the grassroots poor’ (Friedman, 2005:20).  Sometimes spontaneous and/or 
organised by social movements, the protests and organisations are vilified and criminalised 
by government (including infiltration by state intelligence agencies and apartheid-style ‘law 
and order crackdowns’ (arrests, assaults, imprisonment) (McKinley, 2006)) and it has been 
said that accommodating and responding to people’s demands articulated in this way would 
be a ‘perverse incentive’ (Joel Netshitenzhe, November, 2005).203 Little does the state realise 
that social movements ‘representing and organising the disadvantaged and marginalised are 
more likely to be prone to out-of-system outbursts of mass anger’ than those who are more 
‘privileged’ that have the ‘luxury of engaging in in-system collaborative interactions’ 
(Ballard et al., 2006:409). 204
If Second Decade developmentalism is still to properly locate civil society in and its 
contribution to the construction, architecture and workings of the ‘strong and redistributive 
state’ (Mail & Guardian, 12 December 2003),
 
205
...entail much more than just extending the provision of sufficient indispensable 
services and amenities to all. It requires transforming society by deliberate 
interference with public and private operations (Burger, 2006:np). 
 the discussion above suggests that 
government should perhaps begin questioning its ‘what it knows works’ mantra as it clearly 
is not working for that constituency with whom close social ties are needed if development is 
to be possible at all and powerful recalcitrant forces disciplined. Effective engagement and 
contribution, a seasoned observer straddling the disciplines of policy and institutional reform 
and (the tactics of) governance notes, would   
Accordingly, in the Ten Year Review, the state’s role is projected as harnessing the ‘totality of 
social networks’ to the ‘developmental effort’ via ‘central co-ordination and leadership’ to 
‘ensure’ that ‘externalities of many separate activities become complementary to the 
development project’ (Presidency, 2003a:9). Government intends making use and 
participating ‘within the social network but not as an equal partner’ (Ibid). Touting the need 
for a ‘framework of encompassing interest’, the ‘framework’ is to ‘provide a vision and 
coherence to the activities of civil society’ (Ibid:104). If the activities of the informal 
networks of civil society (which ‘play a significant role in promoting enterprise and ensuring 
survival of rich and poor communities’) are not ‘harnessed to the development project of the 
nation, they could increasingly become sites of contestation between government and civil 
society’ (Ibid:105). Thus the compact containing this ‘framework’ is intended to assist 
government to integrate its diverse activities, harnessing the ‘efforts of support of civil 
society to realise the national development objectives’ (Ibid:106), ‘reinforcing’ the present 
‘high levels of pride, ‘ensuring a sense of belonging and hope’, ‘improving investor 
confidence’, ‘encouraging vuk’uzenzele (reflected in part in the spirit of self-help, self-respect 
and initiative’, and, promoting ‘social values that accord with the spirit of caring and 
                                                 
203 Joel Netshitenzhe’s comment on the violence related to citizen protests around dismantling of cross-border 
municipalities (cited in InfoUpdate, 36, 2 December 2005). 
204 Interesting here to ask whether the ‘politics of patience’ are a form of civil society engineered ‘in-system’ 
containment politics?  
205 Available at http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspx?articleid=41937&area=/insight/insight__national 
(accessed 24 April 2006). 
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responsibility’ (Ibid:105–6). In sum, the role of the state seems to be one of providing 
services and helping create an ‘appropriate environment’ for development, and as ‘leader’ to 
forge ‘common cause among the variety of actors’ (Ibid:9). Giving leadership to social 
interactions, it is asserted, stems from the capacity of the state to ‘pre-commit’, i.e. ‘ability to 
articulate long-term but conditional public development objectives that enables a nation to 
achieve economies of scale from the co-ordinated effort of many individual actors’ (Ibid).  
The question is whether this will deliver a pro-poor growth path? Although the ANC points 
to the limitations of a purely market-friendly policy in meeting the needs of the poor; there is 
an incredible ‘enthusiasm in government for engineering exercises which do not antagonise 
business’ (Friedman, 2005a:16) (a point returned to in the Conclusion). Given this ‘frame’, 
the state devalues the labour movement, antagonises the many segments of organised and 
disorganised civil society, and has failed (failed to try) to develop close ties with the poor. 
Thus, while government asserts that it is a ‘developmental state’, it cherry-picks the 
constituencies to be served in a development equation wherein some are more equal than 
others.  
It is this model of embeddedness – the ‘business model’ (Ibid:18) alongside government’s 
self-portrayal as the agent representing, vocalising and protecting the interest of all 
constituencies that prevents social compact formation and axes re-ordering and recalibration 
(a point picked up in the next Chapter). Moreover (and connected to this model), any 
challenge to its all-encompassing representivity, voice, and ‘correctness’ of its development 
path/programme/projects is hastily rejected and harshly attacked (often through naked and 
brutal suppression) thereby driving further divisions and distances between state and society.  
Both civil society and state are left worse off in these acrimonious exchanges.  
The Latin American examples demonstrate that nurturing, promoting and encouraging pro-
poor civil society organisation and mobilisation and democratising decision-making is critical 
to the success of horizontal axis re-orientation without which any top-down 
developmentalism is bound to fail. This is because participatory decision-making and 
participatory political institutions, in particular, are ‘meta-institutions’ that elicit and 
aggregate local knowledge and thereby help institutions work better (Rodrik, 1999:19). Thus 
in Latin American developmentalism, the state extends and deepens civil society or 
supersizes civil society as a ‘supercivil society’ (borrowing from Rodrick, 1999:20–1), 
characterised by a diversity and multiplicity of civil society organisations. These 
organisations, initiated, supported and empowered by the state, then utilise the formal 
democratic spaces and opportunities to push for deeper institutional reforms, to which the 
state responds by further strengthening the mechanisms for power-sharing, decentralisation 
and democratisation, and so virtuous circles of synergistic relations are catalysed with 
reforms permeating upwards thereby dramatically altering the relationship between polity 
and economy.  
With the socio-economic and institutional balance of forces tipped in favour of the poor via 
legislative reform, regulatory rightsizing, and (the accompanying) changes in the distribution 
of assets and capabilities, these government can more easily instantiate redistributive, 
poverty-ameliorating, inequality-reducing, employment-generating growth strategies through 
top-down axes re-orientation. Put differently, the centre-left governments of Latin America 
backed by an active and vibrant civil society, are empowered to restructure organised social 
blocs opposing transformation by either suppressing or accommodating interests, and 
assembling productive coalitions to support the developmental project. Vertical axis re-
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orientation facilitates more intensive horizontal axis re-organisation that, in turn, facilitates 
the attainment of more sophisticated complementarity reconfiguration thereby generating 
improved developmental outcomes and tilting further the balance of power in the direction of 
the poor. And so, the virtuous circle kicks in again, initiating, catalysing, and sustaining 
systemic transformation. Without recognition of this dynamic, South Africa’s 
developmentalism will continue to mis-specify the identity of the initiator, driver, guardian 
and guarantor of Second Decade developmentalism with debilitating consequences for 
employment creation, asset and income distribution, democratic consolidation, and the 
transformation project in general.  
If state developmentalism and democratic developmentalism are interconnected and 
interdependent to effect productive associational reconnection of politics and economics, the 
question before us is Breaking New Ground does indeed break new ground: Does it present 
an empowering and egalitarian alternative and elaborate ‘appropriate’ techniques and 
technologies and stratagems to re-order and re-orient the axes of governance?  
This is the subject of Chapter Six wherein we explain how the policy was produced; its main 
components; its advances over and/or enhancements of present policy; and the problems 
likely to be confronted in implementation. Foregrounding this Chapter is another whose 
purpose is to contextualise the evolving housing strategy in the contradictory currents of 
Second Decade developmental state construction and policy reform. The focus here is more 
on the corporate and bureaucratic incoherence of the state and its multiple pathologies, to 
which BNG has to respond and which it must negotiate. 
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Chapter Five: Prospects and Prospecting for Pro-Poor Futures in the 
Contortions, Distortions and Abortions of Pragmatism and Dysfunctional 
Developmentalism  
Now we are living a real reality…For a long time, the two opposites, the ideal world 
and the real world, are going to form the basis of a very strong articulation on the part 
of writers. I am in the fortunate position that I understand how the state machinery, 
the so-called bureaucratic machinery, works. I can see the gulf between that 
machinery and the perceptions of need and the reality of ordinary people outside all 
that… Our challenge is to narrow that gap (Solberg – Interview: Mongane Wally 
Serote cited in Sole, 2001-2:39). 
Present day black political leaders appear too hungry for status to be angry, too eager 
for acceptance to be bold, too self-invested in advancement to be defiant. And when 
they drop their masks and try to get mad, their bold rhetoric is more performance than 
personal, more play-acting than heartfelt (Cornel West cited in Business Day, 18 
September 2006)  
The old oppositions between urban and rural, public and private, residential and 
business, black and white merge in indistinguishable new combinations; boundaries 
are porous… The normalisation of this spontaneity, in the interests of good 
governance, is no longer possible – the scale of the intervention required and the 
management of its consequence lie beyond the scope of the democratic, neo-liberal 
state (Kozain, 1992 cited in Sole, 2001-2:48). 
Like the characters in a classic French play, some of our policymakers seem to care 
more about whether their policies are fashionable than about whether they work. The 
play by Moliere, had a group of doctors insisting that it did not matter whether a 
patient died as long as the “right” cure was administered. Their goal was to pursue 
professional fads, not to heal the sick (Steven Friedman, Business Day, 28 September 
2005)  
For the moment, then, we completely lack the intellectual tools necessary to envisage 
in new terms the form in which we might attain what we are looking for…[T]he crisis 
that we are going through…has given rise to nothing interesting or new…It would 
seem that a sort of sterilization has taken place there: no significant invention seems 
to have emerged…If it is true that the present malaise puts in question whatever may 
be on the side of state institutional authority, it is a fact that the answers will not come 
from those who administer that authority: answers ought rather to come from those 
who are trying to counter-balance the prerogative of the state and who constitute 
counter-powers (Foucault, 1983:166-167). 
Introduction 
Nothing interesting or new emerging in the sphere of social and economic policy from the 
first half of the twentieth century! Bereft of intellectual tools! Foucault’s condemnation of 
social policy in 1983, observes the renowned social anthropologist James Ferguson, ‘remains 
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true more than twenty years later’ (2005:45). And so we are delivered – the mighty, the rich, 
the victors, the elite, the educated, the intellectuals - ‘on the millennium stoop, pants around 
the ankles [with] shirt pockets bulging’ (Sylvester, 1999:711) contradictions, ambiguities and 
deficits. Knowledge and appreciation of the incontrovertible evidence and fact of the tyranny 
of present ‘alternatives’ and that the ‘master’s tool will never dismantle the master’s house’ 
(Lorde, 1984)206 renders incomprehensible, and daily mocks, our society’s enduring 
confidence and persistent faith in rational comprehensive planning and government entrusted 
and state-directed transformation programmes and projects – the ‘ultimate solution’ (BNG 
description in GCIS, 2004:1).207
If the South African transformation project pedals against the global tide of this 
contemporary deep-seated pessimism of will and crushing pessimism of intellect, the captain 
and crew of our makeshift raft are confused and conflicted about both a journey and a 
destination, which is portrayed as a hybridised flexible social African model of East Asian 
developmentalism and West European welfarism (Gumede in Sunday Independent, 24 July 
2005) and/or a mix of (hosed-down) East Asian developmentalism and a Blairite Third Way 
(Gumede, 2002; Koelble, 2004; Harrison, 2006).
 How then to understand our society’s development and 
transformation imaginaries?  
208 The crew – an asymmetrical power 
alliance of the dominant political party, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and 
Communist Party – bicker incessantly, and now and again, one hears sabres rattling and 
occasional odd threat of mutiny by the weaker partners. But the farcical alliance (‘marriage’) 
continues and ‘will continue’ (Dale McKinley in Sunday Independent, 6 August 2006) on 
terms and conditions that have no truck with history’s lessons. In the meantime, the 
passengers – the frequently hapless majority – are buffeted by the peaks and troughs of policy 
(ir)rationality 209 and institutional (un)certainty, 210 substantive (ir)rationality 211 and 
substantive (un)certainty, 212 (ill)liberal and (un)substantive democracy, and passive and 
active citizenship.213
                                                 
206 A phrase borrowed from the late Audre Lorde, American poet, teacher and activist (1934–1992) – Extracted 
from 
  
http://en.thinkexist.com/quotation/the_master-s_tools_will_never_dismantle_the/162466.html (accessed 
07 August 2006).  
207 http://www.buanews.gov.za/view.php?ID=040913122451003&coll=buanews04 (accessed 29 May 2006). 
208 For Joel Netshitenzhe, the Third Way is market-led growth and a more distributive government (cited in 
Landsberg, 2004:26).  
209 Policy rationality is assessed by the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness (Booysen, 2006:172).  
210 Institutional certainty refers to the ‘rules of the game’, i.e. formal systems, structures and legislative-
regulatory regimes (Habib, 2004:6).  
211 Substantive rationality focuses on the legitimacy and responsiveness of policy and questions of social justice 
(Booysen, 2006:172).  
212 Substantive certainty refers to the ‘outcomes of the game’, i.e. ‘perceptions of ruling political elites in a 
democratic system on whether they will be returned to office’ (Schedler, 2001 cited in Habib, 2004:06).  
213 In the former, the state defines and delivers goods and services with varying degrees of societal/community 
consultation, participation or input. Passive citizenship ‘amounts to a permanent system of political de-
mobilisation and dis-empowerment – a process of fundamental de-politicisation of the majority’ (Neocosmos, 
2006:16). Active citizenship is ‘not about subjects bearing rights conferred by the state, but about people who 
think… becoming agents through their engagement in politics as militants/ activists’ (Ibid:12).  
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‘Doing the wrong things’ for the ‘right’ reasons would require of our leaders to address 
‘illegitimate asymmetries of power and opportunity’ via a ‘double-sided policy process’ 
directed at ‘alleviating the conditions of the least well-off while restricting the scope and 
circumstances of the most powerful’ (Held, 1987:295). What, in short, are the prospects for 
this outcome in the contortions, distortions and abortions of pragmatism; the rationalities and 
irrationalities of democratic consolidation; and the vicissitudes and vagaries of 
developmental state construction? Is it possible to secure a better deal for the poor in this our 
Age of Hope (pinched from Hirsch, 2005)? It is this question that the remainder of the 
Chapter addresses by discussing the forces, factors, faces, fabrications and fantasia shaping 
and sculpting the identity, ideas and ideals of Second Decade developmentalism. In the 
absence of a ‘single ‘insider’ account of democratic government…since 1994’, writes 
Calland (2006:xii–xiii).), ‘very little is really known about how politics, and government in 
particular, works in practice’ 
Without such accounts, it is hard for ordinary citizens to understand what is going on. 
The absence of knowledge in the end represents a shortcoming in the democracy as a 
whole; in darkness, rumours prosper, and often unflattering accounts of power 
predominate (Ibid: xiii). 
It is in this spirit that a great deal of this Chapter is penned, offering ‘myself’ – to borrow 
from Calland (2006:ix citing Anthony Sampson) – ‘as an informal guide to a living museum, 
describing the rooms and the exhibits as I [find] them, giving basic hard facts and frequent 
quotations from [influential] others, but not hesitating to add my own comments’. I make no 
apologies for this tone and refrain as my resorting to them is but an indication of my 
frustrations about the limitations of contemporary scholarship and commentary on the state of 
the nation and our politics. Irony, indignation and incredulity, crude and raw, are the tools 
here deployed to hopefully push the boundaries of existing scholarship, exposing the 
irresolutions, inconsistencies and incompleteness of ideologically pre-packaged agendas as 
they scour reality to affirm their superior ontologies, epistemologies and axiologies over 
others. Naturally, victim I will become of the limitations of existing scholarship and stand 
accused of the very same myopias and mystifications given my use of the scholarship as basis 
(in the absence of more sophisticated writing and analysis) to understand and comprehend the 
contemporary state of the nation. With this caveat, this Chapter, serving as backdrop to the 
next, directs itself to macro-issues of political economy, development strategy, governance, 
and governmentality to expose the sloth and froth of the illusions and delusions of state craft 
and policy reform. 
Section One 
 Our Legacy and Our Continuing Legacy – ‘Doing the right things’ for the ‘right 
people’: Development Policy, Development Strategy and Deracialisation 
South Africa’s dominant political forces, comprising a ‘tightly-knit elite of black 
businessmen, ex-politicians and public servants, bureaucrats and ANC leaders’ (Freund, 
2006a:20), are so bent on ‘doing the right things’ for reasons they deem ‘right’ that after a 
decade of democracy, the country does not have a clearly articulated development agenda 
and programme. This is in contrast to the ‘developmental states of Asia’ (Ibid), which 
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prioritised ‘economic growth, production, full employment and redistribution, and 
introduc[tion] [of] wholesale changes to its macroeconomic policies’ (Gqubule, 2006 in 
Business Times, 3 September 2006). Hamstrung by a ‘conception of transformation’ that does 
not proceed ‘beyond the question of racial identity’ (Freund, 2006a:20), the ‘development 
project’ contains various forms of ‘cronyism’ including, although not limited to, the ‘outright 
creation of black capitalists’ (Ibid). This outright state creation of black capitalists via, for 
example, major BEE deals is not an inconsequential outcome of crisis surrounding the state’s 
‘capital reform project’ and its non-integration into ‘macroeconomic policies’ (Gqubule, 
2006 in Business Times, 3 September 2006).214
Against this backdrop, the identity of the transformation project, policies and statecraft are 
deeply schizoprehenic. So while Joel Netshitenzhe bemoans the decade long management of 
‘macroeconomic realities in a manner that seeks to perpetuate rather than to improve what we 
inherited’ (Sunday Times, 25 June 2006), President Mbeki, who with the introduction of 
GEAR in June 1996 defiantly stated ‘Call me a Thatcherite’ (Sunday Independent, 11 June 
2006), insists on the correctness of government’s economic programme, and the need to 
expedite implementation of ASGISA (President Mbeki, 2006c, 2006d; Business Day, 28 
August 2006), a ‘continuation of GEAR’ (in the words of President’s economic advisor, 
Haroon Bhorat cited in the Mail & Guardian, 26 May–1 June 2006). This is the very same 
President who while repeatedly and severely criticises market fundamentalism, the 
materialistic values generated,
 Private sector leadership in both regulated 
and unregulated economic sectors and the capturing of capital reform rents by white capital 
(without reciprocal obligations, as in East Asia, to further national development strategies) 
has slowed down the pace of economic transformation quite dramatically, spawning a 
‘parasitic bourgeoisie’ and frustrating broad-based empowerment (Ibid). The characteristics 
of (East Asian) developmental policies and statecraft rarely feature or make guest 
appearances in South Africa’s reform arsenal; namely a combination of growth and 
redistribution strategies, coherent industrial policy, the integration of capital reform into 
macroeconomic policies, decisive government intervention in ‘strategic sectors of the 
economy to transform power relations’ (Ibid), the re-organisation of socio-political blocs, and 
‘bad’ developmental governance. Instead, with the constitutional enshrinement of the New 
Public Management strictures of good governance, NPM-inspired post-apartheid public 
service reform and public management, the ‘firmly pro-business policy framework’ (Beall et 
al., 2005:689), the partial and incomplete institutionalisation of state-civil society linkages 
(Ibid:687), and insulated elite-driven policy reform processes, South Africa’s social, political, 
economic and institutional ecology is accurately described as ‘fragile’ and ‘stable’. More 
precisely, it is a ‘fragile stability’ encompassing ‘both stabilisation and destabilisation, both 
regime consolidation and the maintenance and reinforcement of historical social divisions’ 
(Ibid:697).  
215
                                                 
214 In a document prepared for COSATU’s 9th National Congress, the point made is that the black bourgeoisie is 
therefore tied to and dependent on white capital and the state (via procurement) for its development and 
reproduction (see Sunday Times, 3 September 2006).  
 and the poor as not presenting themselves as an ‘appropriate 
object of attention’ in this ‘neo-liberal/conservative political ideology’ (Mbeki, 2003 cited in 
Fraser-Moleketi (Minister for Public Service and Administration), 2004:10), drives a policy 
that, according to the Financial Times, is ‘labelled the Washington Consensus’ (reproduced 
215 See for example his 29 July 2006 Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture. 
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in Business Day, 22 February 2005); a strong variant of market fundamentalism so labelled 
by the (then) ANC’s policy chief (Jeff Radebe) (see Sunday Times, 22 May 2005) and by the 
leader of COSATU in the Western Cape.216
‘Achievement of post-apartheid objectives’? What exactly are the ‘objectives’ and 
‘achievements’, and who defines them is presently the subject of intense debates. Not too 
long ago, (the then Deputy-) President Mbeki posed this very same question and answered it 
as follows:  
 It is this GEAR strategy that President Mbeki, 
approvingly citing the Governor of the Reserve Bank, claims delivered the healthy economic 
fundamentals undergirding progress towards the achievement of post-apartheid objectives 
(cited in Business Day, 28 August 2006).  
The right and obligation to set the national agenda rests with the democratically 
elected bodies of our country… It should also bring in the public at large, utilising all 
representative organisations, including non-political forces, from within which our 
people as a whole can state their own views on the matter… We are, in other words, 
calling for the involvement of civil society in… debates of national importance… so 
that it too becomes part of the process of setting the national agenda (17 March 1995) 
(Mbeki, 1998:108). 
Whether the national agenda was and continues to be defined and set in this manner is 
fiercely contested. Of particular importance at this point in South Africa’s history – the 
‘second decade of liberation’- focused on the transformation of economic and social 
relationships with the ‘main vehicle….[being] black economic empowerment’ (FW de Klerk, 
2005 citing various editions of ANC Today during 2005) 217 and ‘affirmative action’ (Thabo 
Mbeki, ANC Today, 7–13 January 2005)218 – is the (President’s fury around and 
‘denouncement of [these vehicles] as being nothing more than the perpetuation of 
entrenchment of “crony capitalism”’ (Ibid). This is a time when mountainous heaps of 
research documents the exclusion and marginalisation of civil society (through both civil and 
political apparatuses) in defining and shaping the transformation agenda. While government 
and the dominant party claim to ground and derive the existing agenda from the founding 
documents of South Africa (amongst others, the Freedom Charter, RDP, Constitution) and 
their democratic authority and mandate conferred by their overwhelming electoral support 
endorsing various Election Manifestos, the contents of the transformation agenda, its 
mechanics, outcomes, and, more fundamentally, the ruling party’s moral authority is now 
under fire. The disturbing feature is not so much the issuing of these devastating critiques by 
the partners of the ruling alliance (the SACP and COSATU) and/or the moral icons of the 
struggle,219 and the government’s unjustifiably hysterical and harsh counter-responses, 220, 221
                                                 
216 Tony Ehrenreich – Cape Argus, June 2006 (date not available). 
 
217 De Klerk, FW writing in the The FW de Klerk Foundation: Newsletter, 30 January 2005 
(http://www.fwdklerk.org.za/download_docs/05_01_30_Setting_National_Agenda_A.doc) (accessed 18 
September 2006).  
218 See (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2005/text/at01.txt) (accessed 18 September 2006).  
219 Bishop Tutu’s Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture and ex-President Mandela’s critique of South Africa’s 
response to HIV/AIDS come to mind here. 
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David Lewis, Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal, contesting the views of those calling 
for limitations on economic deracialisation because of its pivotal contribution to democratic 
consolidation, has raised similar concerns. A critical challenge, he reportedly said, resided in 
the state establishing institutions that ‘constrain the power of the private sector’ because 
‘massive concentrations of private economic power overwhelm the authority of the state, the 
repository of public power’ (Lewis, 2006 in Business Report, 4 May).
but that senior government officials recognise the weaknesses of the existing transformation 
path. For example, Netshitenszhe is reported to have said that although black economic 
empowerment should be accelerated, he cautioned against the creation of a ‘bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie reliant solely on state patronage’ (cited in Business Day, 28 June 2006). 
222 The extent to which 
this concentration undermines consolidation is not the point here. Nor is the point about the 
how the private sector ‘specifically attempts to shore up its position in the new democratic 
regimes by introducing powerful supporters of the latter into the management and 
shareholding of powerful private corporations’ (Ibid) and/or how business and political 
linkages223
Civil society organisations, including the ANC’s rank and file, are now increasingly 
interrogating and scrutinising this ‘intimacy’ and the various other ‘disintricacies’ and 
disentanglements between the state (top ANC leaders) and party. With regard to the latter, 
speaking at the ANC’s General Council meeting in Limpopo, Secretary-General, Kgalema 
Motlanthe,
 subvert transformation objectives. Rather, a concern of quintessential importance 
is the ‘potential’ of economic programmes aimed at democratic consolidation – BEE and 
‘privatisation sales’ -‘favour[ing] the regime’s new supporters’ and ‘setting up an unhealthy 
intimacy between big business and the state’ of which, he said, ‘there can be little doubt’ 
(Ibid).  
224
                                                                                                                                                       
220 President Mbeki’s response to Tutu’s Nelson Mandela lecture where he called this internationally renowned 
and respected humanitarian a ‘charlatan’ (Sunday Independent, 3 September 2006); a ‘liar’ (Business Day, 18 
September 2006), a ‘creation of [the] white media’ (Business Day, 18 September 2006).  
 whose role, subsequent to professionalisation of this position, was reduced to 
administrator, accused Thabo Mbeki’s Cabinet of unilateral decision-making (i.e. no 
consultation with the party); deviating from agreed positions adopted by Alliance without 
accounting (this included deviation from ANC policy decisions taken at government level); 
and not implementing decisions agreed to at party and Alliance level. Conceding that 
deviation is sometimes not disassociated with the task of governing and that the ANC ‘cannot 
micro manage government’ (although ‘those in government are accountable to the ANC and 
221 In mind is the ex-President Mandela’s critique of the government’s approach to HIV/AIDS and the 
venomous attacks that followed.  
222 See http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=553&fArticleId=3230221 (accessed 18 September 
2006).  
223 With respect to poor control, regulation and oversight of the rent seeking activities of politicians, officials 
and even prominent members of the judiciary, Cape Judge President John Hlope is a good case in point. 
Without verifiable (written) permission from the Minister of Justice, Judge Hlope, in clear violation of the terms 
and conditions regulating service conditions, was from 2002 in receipt of monthly payments from a private 
company. He is also being investigated by the Judicial Service Commission for receiving financial assistance 
from a private law firm to pay his son’s tuition fees (Cape Times, 14 September 2006). 
224 The statements of Kgalema Motlanthe below are extracted from Sunday Independent, 1 October 2006; 
Sunday Times, 1 October 2006; and Cape Times, 2 October 2006.  
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they take direction from the ANC’)), without consultation and accountability, service 
delivery could suffer and lead to a further decline in the already tense and problematic 
relationship between party and state (dating back to 1994). In this context, deviations and 
unilateralism, community- and citizen-alienating government protocols (spawning a ‘social 
gap’), the ‘indirect bribing’ of politicians, and BEE ‘cronyism’ together contributes to and 
reinforces perceptions of an unresponsive party and pro-rich state. The authority of the 
agenda writers and the integrity of the contents is but one side of the identity and morality of 
the transformation project coin. The other side of the coin is how this politician-technocratic-
business nexus can be transformed. Is it amenable to transformation?  
Section Two 
 The ‘Economy’, ‘Development’, ‘Poverty’, Unemployment’, ‘Inequality’, and the 
‘Achievement of Post-Apartheid Objectives’  
Over and above the difficulties and dilemmas surrounding progressive agenda-setting and 
imprinting is the state’s interpretation of and response to ‘post apartheid development 
objectives’ in the critical spheres of economic development and poverty alleviation. In other 
words, if poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods in the government’s eye hinges on 
expanding ‘productive employment opportunities in the economy, providing people with 
capabilities to engage in the economy’ and ‘at the same time’ combating the ‘worst aspects of 
poverty and malnutrition’ through the extension of a social safety net (Manuel, 2003:2); the 
basic question revolves around the state’s conception of the function and contribution of its 
‘economic’ intervention (both directly and indirectly) 225
Quite frankly, notwithstanding the improvements in the quality of people’s lives and the 
strides in service delivery, government has, at best, ‘tended to downplay the failure to 
improve the economic situation’ of the majority’ (COSATU, 2006:3). At worst, its 
‘intolerance’ of criticism and ‘masking of failure’ (Ibid) – including selective and highly-
stylised statistical (mis)calculations, (mis)representations and/or (manipulated/mis-) 
configurations and trivialisation of acute crises is suggestive of a government in the grip of 
‘denialism’ (Ibid). So while Minister Manuel speaks of the budget ‘prioritising the needs of 
the poor’ (Minister of Finance, 2006:2),
 to poverty alleviation, employment 
targets, and reversing systemic patterns of underdevelopment inhibiting human capability and 
opportunity expansion. What is meant by President Mbeki, the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank, and Minister Trevor Manuel when they speak of ‘macro-economic correctness’ and  
‘sound economic fundamentals’?  
226
                                                 
225 Direct reference could be made here to the 2015 Plan and whether government has and remains true to 
‘restructur[ing] the economy fundamentally’, which – to cite the Plan – ‘requires that it does more to manage 
capital’, and ‘define an effective strategy to lock capital into a national agenda, through incentives, regulation 
and discipline’ (cited in COSATU, 2006:87). Indirectly, reference could be made to Manuel’s 2004 Budget 
Speech in which he quoted Joseph Schumpeter’s description of a national budget as ‘a powerful index of a 
society’s values’. 
 and his Bohemian-style invocation of Sen and 
226 For example, the ‘rise in the share of social and economic services in total non-interest expenditure’ over the 
years, with social services in the 2006/07 budget accounting for 56.9% of allocated expenditure (Treasury, 
2006:104–5). 
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Schumpeter,227
…one consideration is whether or not social insurance policies facilitate or impede 
the adjustment of individuals and communities to new forms of economic activity. 
The microecomics of the problem is how and to what extent the precise social 
insurance policies or instruments incentivise individuals to choose between 
remuneration and non-remunerative activities (Minister of Finance, 2003a:3).  
 this is the same Minister who ‘repeatedly’ questions the ‘sustainability of 
social grants’ (Friedman in Business Day, 28 September 2005; Cape Times, 25 August 2006). 
In classic Third Way parlance (see Meth, 2004a) and citing the President’s well-known 
critique of social grants cultivating a ‘culture of dehumanising dependency’ (Weekend Argus, 
21 February 2004), government’s refrain is to ‘increase the number of people in society who 
depend for their livelihood, not on social grants, but on normal participation in the economy’ 
(Minister of Finance, 2004:5). From a ‘macroeconomic perspective’, Minister Manuel writes:  
With research findings by the Economic Policy Research Institute (and other studies)228 
confirming the developmental value of grants and exposing the ‘vacuity’ of the ‘assumptions 
underlying the grant-dependency myth’,229
Then again, what do these specialists know about poverty eradication? The ‘intellectuals of 
the ruling coalition, particularly those in the Treasury and DTI who, after the adoption of 
GEAR, found themselves in the economic decision making pound seats,
 this kind of vilification of social grants spawning 
dependency and a culture of entitlement flies in the face of the real/actual contribution of 
grants to poverty alleviation, employment creation and human development. On the other 
hand, muses Friedman (Business Day, 28 September 2005), the dependency-entitlement 
thesis of government may perhaps be related to something other than the ideological 
predispositions of the political elite (discussed below). Perhaps, the ‘specialists’ on poverty 
and slaves to development fads (officials and politicians) projections of poor grant recipients 
as unsophisticated are not able to see that money over which the poor have total control and 
discretion better enables them to satisfy their (most) basic needs, and encourages them to 
‘take the innovative actions policymakers say they value’ (Ibid).  
230 were raised on an 
‘intellectual diet’ of industrial policy and macroeconomic modelling with its ‘corollary of 
poverty reduction and social development through first economy job creation’. No small 
surprise then why, on the flip side, the Second Economy is a ‘mystery’ to them. Their 
‘ignorance of the developmental issues of the second economy’ results in them proposing 
market ameliorative ‘welfare’ interventions that ‘has shaped and continues to shape policy 
and practice in crucial areas [of] housing, financial services and microfinance’.231
                                                 
227 Budget as ‘expressing the collective spirit of our people…chart[ing] a way forward in extending the frontiers 
of freedom, of human fulfilment, of creating a people-centred society’ (Minister of Finance, 2004:19). 
 The 
228 See Sunday Times, 24 April 2005 and Cape Times, 25 August 2006 for reports on this work.  
229 The ‘poor have a choice between employment and social security and they choose social security over 
employment’ (Sunday Times, 24 April 2005). 
230 The nexus of economic decision-making shifted decisively to the finance and trade and industry ministries, 
particularly after the announcement of GEAR in 1996 (Independent Online, 2 July 2000) (Available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=qw962536156742D236 (accessed 26 September 
2000). 
231 For those privileged enough to live, work and play in the (First) growing ‘modern industrial economy’ (Alan 
Hirsch of the Presidency, 2003:4, paraphrased), government interventions are directed at ‘raising the rate of 
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supply-side programmes of the (Second Economy-confined) developmental state (see Hart, 
2006); building bridges between the First and Second Economy; supporting initiatives that 
would enable the poor and marginal enterprises in the Second Economy to graduate into the 
ranks of the ‘structurally unchanged first economy’ (above extracted from Baumann, 
2004:2,4); and the promotion and nurturing of the ‘heroic entrepreneur’ narrative (see 
Chapter Four); are the remedies proposed by the elite to cure the beer-guzzling, bribe-prone, 
work-averse, grant-dependent degenerates. In the meantime, the deepening of the existing 
very effective poverty ameliorating strategies and the introduction of other instruments (the 
proposed Basic Income Grant, for example) – championed by respected experts and 
government-appointed commissions of inquiry, weaned on another ‘diet’- are rejected by 
‘intellectuals’ of the ruling coalition as they, according to Manuel’s logic, further affirm and 
entrench the ‘entitlement’ culture and dependency (see Sunday Independent, 24 July 2005) 
and will bankrupt the country (Cape Times, 25 February 2005).  
Critics contest these assertions as ‘lack[ing] any foundation’ and is ‘prejudice, masquerading 
as values [that] should have no place in the decision-making process’ (Meth, 2004:14, 24) of 
a society wherein 40% live in abject poverty (Cape Times, 25 August 2006) and the proven 
potential of the basic income grant to ‘close about 70% of the poverty gap’ (Meth, 2004a:2). 
The ‘poverty gap-closing contribution’ finding will no doubt be of informational utility to 
Minister Manuel who asked for ‘someone… to explain how R100 a person would make a 
difference to the lives of the poor’ (cited in Business Report, 25 August 2003), and to 
President Mbeki who reportedly said that giving R100 a month ‘will not make a difference’ 
(cited in Mail & Guardian, 1–7 August 2003). While these findings may possibly confirm 
Bauman’s contentions (summarised above) about the ‘ignorance’ of ruling coalition 
intellectuals on matters of poverty, the arrogance and prejudice underpinning government’s 
rejection of BIG is based more on a ‘philosophical approach [that] is different’ (Netshitenzhe 
cited in Sunday Times, 28 July 2002) from its advocates as it ‘lacks the leverage for instilling 
in its recipients the ‘correct attitudes and aspirations’ (Hart, 2006:26) of the self-styled 
experts on poverty and growth. These ‘experts’ hold that the role of the state, in the words of 
the MBA graduate Minister Didiza, is not about doling out ‘hand-outs’ (cited in Business 
Day, 14 August 2004), but ‘enabl[ing] people to help themselves’ (Meth, 2004a:11 citing an 
ANC discussion document prepared for its 51st
This ‘consideration goes a long way towards explaining a remark by Alec Erwin (former 
Minister of Trade and Industry) that ‘the problem with BIG is not the money but the idea’ 
 National Conference).  
                                                                                                                                                       
investment for job creation through infrastructure development’ (DBSA, 2005a:5) and black economic 
empowerment. Interventions in the Second Economy – ‘which is probably more separate today than it was 
under apartheid when there was a small measure of interaction’ (Hirsch, 2003:4, original emphasis) – is targeted 
at those ‘who will never be integrated [into the modern economy] and those who have the potential to 
contribute’, namely the ‘unemployable’ and unemployed (Ibid). Together they comprise a figure greater than the 
40% to 45% of the population that is poor, and to whom the growing industrial economy has delivered little or 
no material benefit. For them ‘nothing much has changed’ (Hirsh, 2003:4, paraphrased). Although social 
transfers have provided ‘some relief’, ‘levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment have not improved’; 
‘unemployment... goes beyond structural unemployment’ (‘a sinister form’); and ‘many households [‘in spite of 
social programmes’] escape effective incorporation’ (Ibid) into economy and society. Interventions for those 
households/ individuals who can and ‘cannot’ engage in economic activity, the latter being especially in ‘need 
[of] welfare’ (Minister of Finance [Trevor Manuel], 2003:3), ostensibly focus on expanded public works 
programmes, strengthening the welfare safety net, small enterprise development, land reform, agricultural 
development and urban renewal (Fraser-Moleketi, 2004:12). 
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(see Hart, 2006:26). So while the ‘intellectuals’, true to their training, philosophical approach 
and prejudices effect major tax cuts favouring the wealthy and corporations in the belief that 
this ‘would trickle down to the poor as promised’, they simultaneously claim that the ‘lack of 
money in the fiscus’ is the reason ‘why we cannot provide the unemployed with a mimimal 
amount of R100 per month to blunt the edge of poverty, until we can provide them with 
employment opportunities’ (Tony Ehrenreich in Cape Times, 6 July 2005).  
And here we come full circle, returning to the function of the ‘economic’ intervention and/or 
the relationship between ‘sound fundamentals’ and development objectives. So while the 
technocrats in the highest and least accountable executive branches of state trumpet the 
correctness of the economic policy adopted, and the strides registered in the ‘achievement of 
post apartheid objectives’ – not here unrelated to maintaining investor confidence – the 
economic policy, in the words of a member of the President’s economic advisory team, has to 
date ‘yield[ed] no change in national poverty levels’ (Bhorat, 2006 in Mail & Guardian, 26 
May–1 June 2006).  
Similarly, reducing unemployment appears not to be an objective because unemployment is, 
in the reported words of the President, not as deep a crisis as portrayed by some (cited in 
Business Report, 15 May 2005). Indeed, even by the (narrow definition) 26% unemployment 
rate (2006), President Mbeki, almost a year later, said:  
This is such a large number of people that nobody could possibly have missed the 
millions that would be in the streets and village paths actively looking for work in all 
likely places of employment (cited in Business Times, 12 February 2006).  
If they do not exist and/or are not visible, they number too many to have not already 
overturned and toppled the social order. Reportedly rejecting the 40% expanded definition 
unemployment figure as too high and ‘just not true’ (cited in Business Day, 25 February 
2005), Minister Manuel said if it were true, ‘we will have a revolution’ (cited in Cape Times, 
25 February 2005).  
Section Three  
Running Double Speed but Remaining on the Same Spot: The ‘Missing Society’  
In the midst of the mayhem, confusions, contradiction and contestations, the consensus in 
government around the need to ‘redirect’ this development trajectory (most succinctly 
expressed in government documents like the Ten Year Review (Presidency, 2003a) and the 
Macrosocial Report (Presidency, 2006)) underpins a large part of the recent thinking that 
now accords the state a more direct role in the economy to respond to the needs of the poor, 
unemployed and unbanked. Referenced in the main to bridging the gap between the first and 
second economy (without which ‘both sides [rich and poor] face a bleak future’ 
(Netshitenzhe cited in Mail & Guardian Online, 5 February 2004)), and a socially inclusive 
growth path, policy reform and statecraft re-engineering has come to re-focus on ‘delivery’ 
through improving on and enhancing existing implementation, management and monitoring 
frameworks.  
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There has been a retreat from new policy production. But President Thabo Mbeki’s view that 
‘there should not be new policies or White Papers’ (Pillay & Tomlinson, 2006:313) is 
difficult to square with the growth and distribution patterns of the existing policy regime and 
Netshitenszhe’s comment prior to the July 2006 Cabinet Lekotgla – the discussion of the 
Macrosocial Report being on the agenda – that should ‘new insights emerge [from the report 
and discussions] that warrant policy (shifts) [including the ‘macro-economic programme’], 
government will be amenable to it’ (cited in Weekend Argus, 24 June 2006).232
Netshitenzhe’s statement on rethinking policy and programme are in direct contrast to the 
Minister of Finance’s assertion on 2 June 2006 (at the World Economic Forum’s Africa 
Summit), where he, like in 1996, reiterated that GEAR remained ‘non-negotiable’ (cited in 
Business Report, 5 June 2006) as the state of the economy confirmed the ‘correctness of our 
decision to implement Gear as the macro-economic strategy’ (Manuel in Sunday 
Independent, 20 August 2006). Additionally, by reiterating policy continuity between GEAR 
and the RDP
 He did, 
however, make a plea for policy rethinking not to assume an ideological trench warfare 
format: ‘It would be better if we could leave all our ‘isms’ at home when rethinking policy’ 
(Ibid). The South African Communist Party’s riposte to Netshitenzhe was: ‘We need to be 
practical, but being practical does not mean being merely pragmatic, still less anti-
intellectualist. Theory does matter, and we do need to constantly re-visit our ‘isms’’ 
(Netshitenzhe and SACP cited in Business Day, 21 July 2006).  
233 via his assertion of it being ‘intellectually dishonest to argue that any element 
of Gear, either on paper or in implementation, contributed to the culture of materialism’ 
given that GEAR ‘did not deal with black economic empowerment at all’ (Minister Manuel 
in Sunday Times, 13 August 2006),234
If GEAR’s mistake was its failure to secure buy-in from everyone (Deputy President cited in 
Business Report, 28 June 2006), then Minister Manuel’s statement that we ‘stay the non-
negotiable course’ is deeply problematic. Even by his own logic, in April 2002 the Minister 
 the Minister craftily reconstructed the moral link 
between growth and development. This enabled a discounting of any need for changes to 
macroeconomic policy that alternative policy performance indicators may imply, namely 
social cohesion, social inclusion and social transformation.  
                                                 
232 Netshitenzhe’s statement here is a little at odds with the report’s chief recommendation that there will not be 
any change in policy. The report calls instead for an ‘overarching vision for the country’ (Steven Friedman in 
Business Day, 12 July 2006). 
233 See Manuel in Sunday Independent, 20 August 2006; Manuel in Sunday Times, 13 August 2006. 
234 Strangely, although Manuel, with respect to his reference to intellectual dishonesty and the culture of 
materialism, has in mind COSATU and the SACP, it is noteworthy that Joe Seremane, Chairperson of the 
Democratic Alliance – the party being an advocate of the free market and defender of GEAR – criticises the 
findings of the Macrosocial Report as ‘failing to link government’s policy failures to undesirable social 
outcomes’ and the report’s ‘crude binary caricature of market and state’ with the ‘former reproduc[ing] 
inequalities and reinforc[ing] the status quo’ and the latter portrayed as ‘progressive and transformative’; and 
striving towards ‘equitable development’ (Seremane in Sunday Independent, 2 July 2006). But the state, he 
writes, has ‘hardly cultivat[ed] a compassionate persona’ (especially towards the vulnerable, evidenced in 
‘excessive delays in the processing of social grant applications and refusal to confer back pay on social grants’) 
(Ibid); the many cases of corruption and rent-seeking (e.g. the arms procurement debacle, Travelgate, social 
grant pilfering by state employees, etc.); and the use of political contacts and connections to secure lucrative 
state tenders. 
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(cited in International Development Economics Associate, 2002)235
The strands, as weaved together by Manuel and ‘favoured’ by the national Treasury in its 
conception of the ‘developmental state’ (see Minister of Finance, 2003; Sunday Times, 15 
May 2005), is informed by works of Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom who espouses 
the components of the developmental agenda comprising freedom from tyranny, economic 
exclusion and social deprivation. Stripped of its eloquent and seductive prose, Sen’s work is 
however an embrace of ‘pragmatic neoliberalism’, i.e. the humane adjustment of individuals 
and societies to the exigencies of market competition (see Sandbrook, 2000:1072) and, is 
underwritten by instrumentalist conceptions of democracy and citizenship, i.e. the poor are 
interested ‘in bread, not democracy’ (Gumede, 2005:4, paraphrasing Sen). ‘Bread then is 
adequate compensation for citizen/community loss in the ‘democratic participation stakes’, 
which also incidentally secures their loyalty (Ibid). The rationale and logic of this outlook is 
not inconsistent if accelerated service delivery is government’s lodestar, and if it sees its main 
task as governing (Gumede, 2005 citing the Minister in Presidency, Essop Pahad), both of 
which could come to be compromised by extensive consultation and participation. The bread-
democracy trade-off rationale of government are in line with the findings of some influential 
purveyors of policy that see citizens place an instrumental value on democracy (Butler, 
2004), and the view that extensive consultation can ‘bog down’ rapid policy implementation 
and service delivery.  
 lamented the ‘few’ 
rewards flowing from South Africa’s ‘very substantial macroeconomic reform’ as 
conventionally recommended by World Bank economists, with South Africa awaiting the 
payoff. In 2005, he termed the macroeconomic stability achieved since 1994 as ‘not 
sufficient’ to ensure sustained growth in job creation and service delivery, and pointed to the 
need for a ‘discourse on how to think through fundamental problems’ such as the ‘immense 
inequality’ in South Africa (cited in Business Report, 25 May 2005). He maintained that the 
challenge for government was to bring together the strands of market and the developmental 
state which, in the process, would have to ‘tilt its policies’ in favour of the poor (Ibid).  
It is at this point where the accelerated delivery of ‘bread’, breaking the culture of 
entitlement, improving the performance of state and market pragmatic neoliberalism merges 
into a deadly combination. This is evidenced by the ANC government’s repeated and 
ceaseless attempts over the last two decades to deliver and restore human dignity via the 
establishment, extension, entrenchment and empowerment of Third Way/Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism (at some distance from its preferred portrayal in the opening paragraphs of this 
Chapter). It is to an elaboration of this troubled and fraught nexus that this narrative turns to 
now, exposing a state of schizoid proportions that comes to hijack and sabotage itself. The 
intention here is to foreground the BNG discussion on development praxis shot through with 
the indeterminacies and complexities of market-mediated and -mediating developmental state 
construction.  
                                                 
235 See http://www.networkideas.org/news/apr2002/news29; and http://lists.www2.epinet.org/pipermail/gpn-
announcements/2002-April (accessed 10 May 2006)  
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Section Four 
Wrestling with the Market: Service Delivery, Entitlement, Human Rights and Capital in 
a Single Moment, Movement and Momentum  
From the very dawn of the birth of the new democracy to the present, ‘service delivery’ 
constituted the central pillar in the establishment of democracy and statecraft. The words of 
ex-President Nelson Mandela ring loud here:  
Democracy will have little content, and indeed, will be short lived if we cannot 
address our socio-economic problems … (Nelson Mandela, 1994 – Foreword of RDP 
Base Document).  
My government’s commitment to create a people-centred society of liberty binds us 
to the pursuit of the goals of freedom from want, freedom from hunger, freedom from 
deprivation, freedom from ignorance, freedom from suppression and freedom from 
fear… These freedoms are fundamental to the guarantee of human dignity. They will 
therefore constitute part of the centrepiece of what this government will seek to 
achieve, the focal point on which our attention will be continuously focused... The 
things we have said constitute the true meaning, the justification and the purpose of 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme, without which it would lose all 
legitimacy (President Nelson Mandela, 1994). 
The new Constitution obliges us to strive to improve the quality of life of the people. 
In this sense, our national consensus recognises that there is nothing else that can 
justify the existence of government but to redress the centuries of unspeakable 
deprivations, by striving to eliminate poverty, illiteracy, homelessness and disease 
(President Nelson Mandela, 8 May 1996).  
Simultaneously competing, and ‘umbilically’ connected to, this seductive pro-poor discourse 
is one of the state adjusting citizens to market imperatives, which includes breaking the 
culture of entitlement, dependency and so forth but without imbibing the culture of 
materialism. Recall Mandela’s statement in the USA, shortly after his release: the ‘ANC will 
reintroduce the market to South Africa’ (cited in Sunday Independent, 30 July 2006). In a 
joint meeting of the US Congress in October 1994, Mandela said that market economics is 
the ‘magic elixir’ to dismantle racial hatred and deliver prosperity. Mandela reportedly said 
that the new South Africa would advance the very principles on which the US was founded, 
i.e. ‘the elevation of every person, anywhere in the world, to the position of a free actor in the 
marketplace’ (cited in Business Day, 7 October 1994).  
Macro-economic adjustment of the conservative type (in the period 1993 to 1998), notes a 
recent International Monetary Fund publication, focused on ‘building policy credibility’ 
(Horton, 2005:80), which Netshitenzhe describes as ‘compromises’ specifically intended to 
reassure the markets and ‘communicated as if they were fundamental policies of the ANC’ 
(cited in Sunday Times, 15 May 2005).  
On the issue of entitlement, President Mandela’s Address on the Occasion of the Opening of 
the Second Session of the Parliament (17 February 1995) bears relevance:  
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It is also appropriate that on this occasion we draw the attention of the country to the 
actual reality that the government has extremely limited resources to address the 
many and urgent needs of our people.  
We are very keen that this real situation should be communicated to the people as a 
whole. All of us, especially the leadership of political organisations and civil society, 
must rid ourselves of the wrong notion that the government has a big bag full of 
money. The government does not have such riches.  
Because we have started the process of changing spending priorities, we do realise 
that the process of restructuring the budget, so that it is directed towards addressing 
the needs of the people, is no easy matter. This is especially so in the light of the 
contractual obligations that bind the state as well as carry-over expenditure which 
cannot be avoided.  
We must all absorb this reality into our thinking in a cold and dispassionate manner. 
We must not allow ourselves to be seduced into a world of false hopes leading to 
unrealistic actions… 
It is important that we rid ourselves of the culture of entitlement which leads to the 
expectation that the government must promptly deliver whatever it is that we 
demand….(President Nelson Mandela, 1995). 
Not surprisingly, post-apartheid development policy in the first and second decade, is 
characterised by (repeated) attempts to (re-)embed/(re-) introduce the market in a jaundiced 
Third Way format centred around the (re)-creation of citizen and community in the modernist 
frame (Freund, 2004) with significant fallout and tensions. In the shelter sector, for example, 
the 1994 White Paper conceived of housing delivery as a ‘welfare function’ and ‘remedial 
intervention’ until such time as the economy produced employment and housing would then 
be accessed through the market. In 1995, the Director-General of Housing, Billy Corbett, 
asserted that the major challenge confronting housing was the ‘introduction of fierce, 
vigorous and open competition in the South African housing market’ (New Nation, 6 October 
1995, cited in Pottie, 2003:135) - a point returned to in the Conclusion. 
BNG follows a similar line of thought. So an aim of Minister Sisulu’s Plan is to allow market 
forces free rein at the lower end of the market (see This Day, 3 September 2004) with 
government commitment to backing the private sector when low-income people fall to the 
‘down-side of the market’, i.e. default on their housing loans (Sisulu cited in Sunday Times, 
12 September 2004). In 1994, a housing department spokesperson made a similar statement 
that people would be thrown out of their houses if they expected to get something for nothing 
(paraphrased in Sunday Tribune, 11 December 1994).  
Although ex-Minister of Housing Joe Slovo called the eviction of people from their 
mortgaged homes ‘tragic’, providing housing assistance, he said, came with increasing 
financial responsibility and there will thus ‘have to be law enforcement’ (cited in Business 
Day, 8 December 1994). For those unable to access housing through the market in the second 
decade (the hard-core poor), Minister Sisulu issued a warning that the culture of entitlement 
must end and that government was no longer going to give away houses for free 
(Weekend/Saturday Argus, 19 May 2006).  
Appropriating and tapping into the destructive and constructive creativity of the market gives 
rise to both market ‘crowding in’ and ‘crowding out’ state responses, market intervention and 
regulation, human rights violations and citizen and community redress (through appeals to 
the judiciary), admonition and praise of the poor, and voluntarism and aided self-help for 
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direct provision. Thus in 1998, for example, the Department announced the development of a 
five-year housing plan premised on greater state assertiveness and the reduced involvement 
of the ‘profit-driven private sector’ (Director-General, Mpumi Nxumalo-Nhlapo cited in 
Business Day, 18 March 1998). Then there was the introduction of the R2 479 beneficiary 
contribution (applicable to all households) to access the housing subsidy, which is now 
applied only to beneficiaries falling in income categories above R1 500 (among other 
criteria). This will have a crippling impact on the rate and scale of delivery. And now, there is 
the emphasis on market enablement which wrestles uncomfortably with state provision of 
subsidised rental accommodation for the poorest (see Sunday Times, 12 September 2004). At 
the same time, the City of Johannesburg’s Inner City Regeneration Strategy (which turned a 
welfare problem into a property one) threatened to affect the lives of thousands of poor 
individuals living in squalid conditions through summary and often unlawful eviction. The 
High Court ruled the local government intervention as unconstitutional on the grounds of the 
municipality failing to give ‘adequate priority and resources to people in the inner city who 
were in a crisis situation or in desperate need of accommodation’ (see Fraser, 2006 in SA 
Delivery, May/July 2006:58).  
In 2004, when South Africa entered the Second Decade of Democracy, Mbeki highlighted the 
enormity of the reconstruction project, a challenge which government could not shoulder 
alone. Facing the ‘entirety of our people’, this  
…is a national task that calls for the mobilisation of the whole nation into united 
people's action, into a partnership with government for progressive change and a 
better life for all, for a common effort to build a winning nation… The Government 
therefore commits itself to work in a close partnership with all our people, inspired by 
the call – Faranani! – to ensure that we draw on the energy and genius of the nation to 
give birth to something that will surely be new, good and beautiful (President Mbeki, 
2004:10).  
Three months later in his Budget Vote Speech (23 June 2004), the President launched a 
blistering attack on market fundamentalism and endorsed a ‘left’ project founded on the 
resuscitation of the public realm and an activist public sector. The focus turned to ‘improving 
the effectiveness of the system of governance’, which he said,  
…must accordingly and necessarily go together with an intensification of our 
campaign to draw the masses of our people into the accelerated process of change that 
will be represented by the effective implementation of our government’s programme 
of action. This makes it imperative that we strengthen all processes intended to 
intensify the interaction between the government and the people, to activate the 
people to play a meaningful role in the struggle for a better life for all, and to increase 
the transparency and accountability of government (President Mbeki, 2004a).  
Does not the 23 June 2004 statement lend credence to the observation of consensus-building 
and social mobilisation around a state plan whose hegemony is supposedly projected as 
uncontested via its percentage of electoral support? The 2005 State of the Nation Address 
bolsters this claim with its emphasis on implementation of a national programme to ‘entrench 
the ethos of Letsema and Vuk’uzenzele among all our people’ (President Mbeki, 2005) 
thereby ensuring permeation of these values across the board.  
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Amazing here is also the invocation of the 1950s apartheid housing intervention also dubbed 
‘Vuk’uzenzele’, meaning ‘stand up and help yourself’. The Vuk’uzenzele project, which 
evolved from a self-help site-and-service housing delivery project intervention in which 
Africans were expected to construct their own homes on sites laid out by the state, ‘provided 
the foundations for government-commissioned building contractors [to] erect the now famous 
rows of uniform matchbox houses that characterise the Soweto landscape’ (Parnell & Hart, 
1999:378).  
The politics and project of pragmatic neoliberalism may to date have served the ‘staying’ and 
‘altering’ reform logic splendidly. In the longer term though, the promiscuity and 
schizoprehenia witnessed in policy and implementation spheres – marked by both continuity 
and discontinuity – has rendered, and continues to render, it extremely difficult for society to 
read a telos of progressive change and discern a momentum suggestive of forward 
transformative movement. However, it is sheer folly to believe that policy and institutional 
reform can be anything other than messy and confused. Working with ‘impure resources’ and 
disarming millennium knowledge-sets, reform is difficult labour and even the power brokers 
have to work with unknowns, surprises, little agreement, fluidity and complexity that are 
aggravated by the compromises of yesteryear which the ANC Eastern Cape leadership says is 
hampering transformation:  
Overall, the state we inherited was the same (as the apartheid government). Those 
who ran the country before us are still running it, although we are running it on behalf 
of them. We are participating in an agenda of those who were running it in the past 
(Gugile Nkwinti – Provincial Executive Committee cited in Cape Times, 24 July 
2007).  
Section Five 
 A State that Hijacks and Sabotages Itself: Market Discipline and ‘Bad Development’  
In the shelter sector, the 1994 government inherited a backlog comparable to the post-World 
War II housing crisis (Parnell & Hart, 1999). After almost a decade of delivery, the backlog 
is worse than in 1994. The housing backlog was conservatively estimated at 1.5m in 1994 
and 2.4m in 2005 (Mail & Guardian, 21 December 2006–4 January 2007). At the current rate 
of delivery (200 000 a year),236
                                                 
236 This delivery figure is debateable. In 2006, housing delivery was 20% down on the figure three years ago, a 
decrease that Minister Sisulu ascribes to increased attention being paid to location and ‘factors beyond her 
control including skills and material shortages’ (paraphrased in Mail & Guardian, 21 December 2006–4 January 
2007).  
 the backlog in ten years, said the Minister, would be the same 
as it is today (see Business Day, 10 July 2006). In the long-range view then, despite the 
dispensing of 1.9m subsidies (Minister Sisulu cited in Business Day, 10 July 2006), the 
present housing crisis is worse than in the post-Second World War period and will grow 
worse over the next decade. On the very same day that the newspaper screamed out: Aid of 
R37bn fails to meet housing needs (Business Day, 10 July 2006), President Mbeki, in Berlin, 
signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the European Union pertaining to the World 
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Cup, was asked whether it was justified to spend billions on hosting the World Cup when 
millions needed jobs and houses. His response:  
Sure, we absolutely need houses. We need to work very steadily to end informal 
settlements. That’s very crucial. But we can do both and we will do both (Cape 
Times, 10 July 2006).  
What is the moral calculus at work here? With a government in power that cannot stem the 
growth of informal settlements and has, in the words of Minister Zola Skweyiya, ‘actually 
promised to look into the interests of the poorest of the poor’ (cited in Sunday Times, 10 
September 2006), should we rather spend the budgeted R5bn on stadium construction for the 
World Cup or direct it at the housing crisis which could provide more than enough houses for 
340 000 people rather than 340 000 stadium seats (computation derived from Business Day, 
10 August 2006)?  
More penetratingly posed, should the World Cup money be directed rather to save some of 
the lives of the 10 children under five years who die every hour in South Africa from 
‘poverty’ (Cape Times, 22 June 2006), a mortality rate that, says a World Health 
Organisation report (2005), has been rising since 1995 to levels not seen for a decade (cited 
in Cape Times, 20 June 2006)? These children die from preventable diseases of poverty – 
diarrhoea and respiratory infections, with malnutrition being the underlying problem in 60% 
of deaths (Ibid). In a country where 7m people live on less than R5 per day (Business Day, 10 
August 2006) and with no basic food provision programme in place to alleviate the plight of 
families in long-term food crises (Sunday Times, 23 July 2006), UNICEF [the UN Children’s 
Fund] says the poorest people can be saved by fortification of their staple foods at a cost of 
about R1.50 per person a year (Cape Times, 3 May 2006). For those who may think the scale 
and extent of the infant mortality rate as morally and ethically repugnant, more numbing is a 
national deficit (1.5% as set in February 2006) well below the global benchmark (3%) 
(Business Report, 22 September 2006) with steady movement towards a balanced budget. 
The deficit in December 2006 was less than 1% of the national GDP (Business Day, 27 
December 2006). This should, arguably, be the context for discussing the developmental 
state. 
Criticism of government from this ‘radical’ perspective is potentially misguided because it 
fails to consider what Netshitenzhe termed the practicalities faced by most governments in 
the world (cited in Cape Times, 18 July 2006). Minister Mufumadi, a member of the SACP 
central committee and one of the founders of COSATU, defended the ANC’s contested 
policy positions and vocalised the ANC senior leadership’s discontent about the radical 
resolutions emerging from the COSATU August 2006 Congress related to nationalisation 
(amongst others),237
                                                 
237 For the sociologist Devan Pillay, COSATU’s assertiveness on economic policy issues – versus the previous 
hedging of resolutions so as to appear ‘not to be too militant’ (Pillay’s exact words) – is a consequence of 
‘[f]rustrations with high and growing inequality and poverty levels, as well as nationalisation in Venezuela and 
Bolivia, had encouraged the union to put nationalisation’ on the table. Nationalisation for COSATU, according 
to Pillay, translated into ‘greater worker control and public ownership of production, rather than more state-
controlled private entities’ (Pillay paraphrased in Mail & Guardian, 22 September–28 September 2006).  
 by blasting delegates for their ‘fantastic analysis of the world’. Jeered 
and heckled, he responded to COSATU’s grievances about the ANC neglecting workers in 
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favour of business as them not understanding the changing (global) economic and political 
circumstances dictating ANC policy choices: 
Our convictions about what we intend to achieve would be constant and the 
application should be adjusted to specific conditions that exist in the world and in our 
country… You cannot move from the fantastic analysis of the world – it has to be a 
scientific analysis (cited in Cape Times, 22 September 2006)  
What is at play? How to fathom the extension of generous government support to all manner 
and kind of (mega)projects with highly contestable to no discernable economic development 
rationale, questionable poverty eradication credentials and dubious political-business 
linkages? 238
From inside government, and at the highest levels of the executive, is the criticism of the 
housing programme reproducing apartheid settlement patterns, creating extensive poverty 
(traps), whose price tag drains state coffers (ongoing transport subsidies), rules out socio-
economic integration (with attendant consequences for long term fiscal sustainability of 
service delivery), and works at cross purposes to maximising returns on public sector 
infrastructure investment. The negative economy-wide impact of this production regime, 
remarks ASGISA, results in upward pressure on wages and unit labour costs associated with 
high transport expenditure (Presidency, 2006). Ending this spatially and socially 
peripheralising housing intervention along with rapid movement towards greater social and 
economic integration has ‘become a clear call from the presidency downwards’ (Napier in 
Business Day, 25 August 2006). The acquisition, assembly and speedy release of ‘suitably 
located land’ (Minister of Housing, 2006b:7) for housing is thus receiving attention from the 
Presidency downwards, who identified the availability of land being a problem with respect 
to the ‘deracial[ising] settlement patterns’ (President Mbeki, 2006d:7).  
 What is at play to explain how government manages to hijack itself by 
corrupting and subverting programmes and projects that, unlike others, are not as hemmed in 
by the burden and weight of the past, less constrained by resources, and amenable to be cast 
in progressive moulds? Why is it that in instances where spaces to manoeuvre and innovate 
present themselves, government ends up frustrating its own agenda, or worse still, frustrates 
even the emergence of a progressive agenda? An example from the shelter sector bears 
testimony to this dynamic of policy and substantive (ir)rationality.  
Breaking New Ground states that the ‘objective of spatial restructuring demands a more 
decisive intervention in land markets’. Proposed interventions include ‘[a]ccessing well-
located state owned and parastatal land’ and ‘[a]cquisition of well-located private land for 
housing purposes’. Private land ‘will only be acquired’ (through ‘negotiated purchase’ and 
‘expropriated as a final resort’) ‘where there is no appropriate state-owned land’. ‘Public land 
and land held by parastatal organisations, where deemed suitable for housing purposes’, 
states BNG, ‘is to be transferred to municipalities at no cost’ (DOH, 2004a:13–4).  
                                                 
238 The involvement of two Cabinet ministers in the consortium building and operating of the Gautrain is a case 
in point. When COSATU and other civil society groupings expressed alarm and dissatisfaction over this, the 
President accused them of racism (see Sunday Times, 7 January 2007).  
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In 2005, an intergovernmental agreement was concluded with the South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) and municipalities 239
Alas, the stage in late 2006 is a mess and the saboteur is none other than government. Firstly, 
we learned that from the media briefing of the Minister’s budget vote speech in the National 
Assembly (2006) that the intergovernmental agreement around the moratorium is ‘voluntary’ 
(Minister of Housing, 2006a:5). She congratulated municipalities that have ‘passed 
resolutions to freeze the sale of municipal owned land’ and ‘appeal[s] to the remainder of 
municipalities to act responsibly by delaying the sale of land assets and prioritise housing 
development that supports our vision of truly integrated human settlements’ (Ibid:8). This 
‘appeal’ took place in the context of the increasing reluctance of municipalities to deliver 
housing to the poor owing to no financial return, and ongoing, crippling maintenance costs. A 
second bigger and related problem to the financial disincentive, is that cash strapped 
municipalities, particularly in the Eastern Cape, the Minister said, were selling-off the ‘family 
silver’ for short term economic benefit to ‘an income group beyond the reach of many South 
Africans’ (cited in Sunday Times, 26 November 2006). Referring here to the sale of prime 
coastal land to rich South Africans and foreigners – at a time when government is 
investigating the possibility of slapping a moratorium on the sale of land to foreigners – 
Minister Sisulu said that once the municipalities ‘have sold the land it would be very difficult 
for us to recover it [as]… the cost would be prohibitive’.  
 around a moratorium on the sale of 
municipal land and Cabinet gave ‘its consent to the disposal of land by the State Owned 
Enterprises under the Department of Public Enterprises’ (Minister of Housing, 2006b:7–8). 
With respect to the latter, the Minister of Housing said that ‘housing is the major beneficiary 
of this move’ and envisaged acquiring additional ‘suitable state land in the hands of the 
Department of Public Works’ (Ibid). With the cost of suitable state land being zero, the 
funding of land acquisition, more generally, no longer forming part of the housing subsidy 
(DOH, 2004a:14), the creation of a special purpose vehicle at national level to ‘identify, 
acquire, hold and transfer well-located land and landed properties on behalf of the 
Department of Housing, to fast track delivery’ (President Mbeki, 2006d:7) and the 
introduction of ‘fiscal incentives (and disincentives) to support the development of well-
located land’ (DOH, 2004a:14), the stage is now rigged to improve the prospects to achieve 
the ends of social, economic and spatial integration and affording accommodation for the 
poor that is potentially better attuned to their livelihood and survival needs and patterns.  
Hearing the Minister condemn this practice as a major reason ‘behind government 
shortcomings in reversing racial housing patterns’ (Ibid), how is one to rationalise the 
motivation for an agreement so pivotal to restructuring the built form being premised on 
‘goodwill’ (Ibid) and knowing full well of the (reported) inability of the Department of 
Housing to monitor reneging municipalities? Compounding this absurdity, the biggest 
problem of this state sabotage of itself is the subversion of a potentially pro-poor land-shelter 
intervention on the altar of black economic empowerment. And so we learned from the 
Minister of Public Enterprises:  
                                                 
239 Close to 200 municipalities signed an agreement that ‘required them to consult the Department first when 
they sought to sell land to see if it could be used for housing development, especially for the poor’ (Sunday 
Times, 26 November 2006). 
 205 
 
[The] disposal of non-core properties, as part of the process of making SOE more 
focused and streamlined, is an enabler of black economic empowerment and local 
economic development. The non-core properties have been classified according to 
various disposal options namely, sale, housing, transfer and development…Properties 
for sale have been identified based on their relative location, size, market demand, 
topography and potential. Sales, such as with the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, will 
be an open and competitive tender process. Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) guidelines have been developed to ensure that the disposal 
process contributes to transforming the property sector. For smaller property holdings 
the guidelines include stratified preference for people who reside in the area in which 
the property is located to allow for a more equitable geographic spread of economic 
ownership…The department will further play a catalytic role in negotiating with 
relevant departments to fast track the transfer or development of SOE properties, 
which can contribute to government’s broader socio-economic objectives in respect of 
social, residential and industrial development. Information sharing sessions between 
DPE [Department of Public Enterprises] and the Department of Housing have already 
begun. The department is also working closely with affected municipalities to ensure 
the optimal utilisation of targeted property (Minister of Public Enterprises, 2006a). 
For a policy such as BNG in which land, in the words of the Minister of Housing, is one of 
the ‘fundamentals’ and ‘pivotal to [its] success’ to ‘help reverse the trend’ of housing 
development on the ‘periphery of cities and towns [with]…limited access to services and 
social facilities’ and ‘transport costs to employment and retail opportunities the highest’ 
(Minister of Housing, 2005b:2–3), one is indeed hard-pressed to rationalise the actions of the 
state. If the Ten Year Review attributes poor developmental performance to ‘weaknesses in 
areas that are least dependent on direct government action’ (Presidency, 2003a:102), some 
serious rethinking is required here. On what moral authority can a state that is rhetorically 
committed to the poor admonish and cajole the private sector into setting aside 20% to 30% 
of the total project value in the housing subsidy category to low-income people (discussed 
below) but at the same time dispose of societal assets in a manner not dissimilar to the private 
sector (the biggest return calculus) and at the (likely) expense of the poor? The violation of 
Cabinet approved BNG land provisions that public and parastatal land deemed suitable for 
housing be transferred to municipalities at no cost (versus DPE’s position of payment at book 
or market value) is very serious. More perturbing is that the state land being sold to the 
housing Department is on the periphery, while the best land – that which holds enormous 
prospects for sustainable asset accumulation and wealth generation by the poor - is reserved 
for BEE. This translates into the subsidies for the poor being used to pay for their own 
marginalisation. 
If the BNG embraces conceptions of strong and weak versions of sustainable development 
(referring to state strength and social justice (Westendorff, 2002:9)) these state actions tip the 
balance towards the weak versions and dilute them even further. Ironically, this point is 
recognised by government, but ‘follow through’ is problematic. It is recognised in Minister 
Sisulu’s comment about eradication of the contradictions and impediments to shelter 
provision (Minister of Housing, 2005e - see below) and her statement at the Financial Sector 
Transformation Conference (July 2005):  
As indignation and open revolt continues to characterize the impatience of those who 
do not have houses it will no longer be possible to explain the continuation of poverty 
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and homelessness when the source of these challenges is to be found in the failure of 
those with power and influence to appropriately co-ordinate and work together 
(Minister of Housing, 2005c:4).  
It is unfair to single out Minister Erwin as the only villain and saboteur. The author of South 
Africa’s fiscal morality, Minister Manuel, has effected no small measure of damage in 
perpetuating the frauds, betrayals and deceptions. With a housing budget that has historically 
hovered around an average of 1.8% of total government expenditure from 1995 to 2005 
(Pottie, 2003 and own calculations), and 2–3% of total expenditure since the post-2002 
developmental state policy shift (2002–2005), it would be plausible, ceteris paribus, to 
attribute some blame to the (re)production of dysfunctional post-apartheid settlements to 
inadequate money. Yet, Minister Manuel whose department is frequently said to constitute ‘a 
government within government’ (Calland, 2006:55) and with a (demonstrated) propensity 
and willingness to ‘impose its authority on all policy making’ (Calland, 2006 paraphrased 
and cited in Sunday Times, 24 December 2006) – sees himself as shouldering no blame in the 
installation of a state housing delivery regime whose limitations and productions are in large 
part a function of the historically shoe-string shelter budget.240
We cannot in good conscience build dormitory suburbs characterised by neglect, 
settlements that have no sports facilities, entertainment, business opportunities, social 
or policing infrastructure (cited in Bua News, 25 February 2005).
 Similar to the unemployed 
who, in his imagination, do not exist, one could perhaps forgive the Minister for having not 
noticed the decade-long state production of dormitory suburbs, given their distance from his 
opulent working and living environments. Some event, both cataclysmic and cathartic, led to 
the discovery of a ‘conscience’ spurring him to declare in 2005:  
241
Whether the damage caused by cutbacks in spending in the period 1997 to 2001 are 
reversible is contested by COSATU’s Zwelinzima Vavi.
  
242 Indeed, although capacity 
constraints, declining financial returns on municipal housing programmes, and corruption 
account, amongst numerous other factors, for slow and poor quality housing delivery, the 
subsidy quantum (plus the other incentives offered to the banks), have historically failed to 
deliver to the private sector the profit margins they deem worthwhile. On the other hand, 
some now argue that, with adjustments to the subsidy brackets, the spike in the housing 
budget (‘the biggest percentage increase of all the departments’243
                                                 
240 Indeed, and if only the yardstick of targets/outputs is used, some argue that the RDP’s aim of mass housing 
provision/production (300 000 houses per annum) ‘was a non-starter from the moment that stringent budgetary 
cuts became a key feature of the new government’s macroeconomic policy’ (Michie & Padayachee, 2001:193). 
This was the precise moment that the implementation infrastructure started to function (a point underscored in 
Chapter Six). 
) from R5.2bn in 2005/06 
to R6.9bn in 2006/07 (DOH, 2006:14), plus the de-linking of the land costs from the housing 
241 Available at http://www.southafrica.info/ess_info/sa_glance/social_delivery/update/budget2005-housing.htm 
(accessed 7 October 2006) 
242 GEAR ‘set us back many, many years in terms of what we could have been achieved [for the poor]….The 
damage [resulting from the lack of spending] of that period of 1997 up to 2001 is huge. Some would say it was a 
necessary compromise, but it was a compromise’ (Vavi in Sunday Independent, 13 August 2006). 
243 Bua News cited by First National Bank. 2006. Budget underlines shift from welfare to responsibility, 16 
February (available at http://www.sagoodnews.co.za/search/tax/901891.htm) (accessed 7 October 2006). 
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subsidy, sets the stage for private sector re-engagement. However, there are some doubts as 
to whether, in the context of a property boom, the private sector will be enticed to shift 
production from double digit profit margins associated with wealthy commercial and 
residential development to the single digit margin associated with low-income housing 
production. However, public sector upgrading and capacity-building interventions and 
(hesitant) re-entry of the private sector is no guarantee against under-expenditure. It is un-
nerving that, when housing appears as the first of six priorities in the 2006/07 budget policy 
framework (see Treasury, 2005:49) with some of the necessary enticements in place for 
private sector re-engagement, that the prospects for success seem so gloomy. The damage 
wrought to the institutional infrastructure by budget-driven rightsizing; the loss of 
institutional memory by the departure of senior officials in the national Department; 
inexperienced senior managers (47% of senior managers in the public service have less than 
two years’ experience in their current posts,244 with the figure being far lower in the 
Department of Housing245
In a slight corruption of Minister Manuel’s response to recommendations contained in the 
IMF’s Article 4 Consultation report for 2006 (cited in Business Report, 10 September 2006) 
); and critical staff shortages in the civil engineering, project 
management and planning departments of municipalities, government does not have the 
capability and capacities to regulate a re-engaged private sector and to deliver its part.  
246
Synthesis 
 and the ‘damage’ alluded to by Vavi above, if the (compromise) medicine administered in 
the past is deemed to have worked, the patient (institutions and the poor) did nevertheless die. 
There is no certainty that the alleged miraculous qualities of the post-stabilisation medicine 
will both resurrect the dead (via the intended intervention of reconstructing dysfunctional 
post-apartheid housing projects) and heal the remaining ill and critically ill patients, 
especially given the perpetuation of apartheid created spatial inequalities via local 
government budgeting (Seidman, 2007a); the ‘general lack of accountability’ of 
municipalities to the ‘voting public’ (Atkinson, 2007a:64); participation mechanisms that are 
‘intrinsically hostile to the effective participation of the poor’ (Friedman, 2006a:3); and the 
billowing of corruption and crony capitalism, especially at local level, under Mbeki’s 
stewardship. Building capacity and increasing subsidies for infrastructure may alleviate 
poverty by some margin, but under these conditions, they ‘seem unlikely…to build 
sustainable communities [and human settlements] in the longer run’ (Seidman, 2007a:162). 
It is in this confused context of fragile stability, substantive and policy irrationality, state 
capture, state sabotage, betrayal and fraud that Breaking New Ground is being attempted. It is 
a strategy that attempts to negotiate and respond to the inherited and self-induced contortions 
and distortions that marked developmental policy making in general since 1994. Presently 
more firmly rooted in reversing and redressing (inherited and) inequitable spatial 
                                                 
244 Department of Public Service and Administration survey findings, 2006, cited in Cape Times, 13 November 
2006. 
245 Personal communication with Department informant, 13 November 2006. 
246 Implementation of specific IMF recommendations, he said, increased the risk of South Africa finding itself in 
a position wherein ‘the medicine has worked but the patient is dead’.  
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morphologies, BNG is now presented as key strategy for poverty-alleviation, job creation, 
asset and wealth creation and empowerment, combating crime, promoting social cohesion, 
dismantling and bridging first and second economy divides, and leveraging growth in the 
economy.  
Prioritised in the budget by way of a drastically increased fiscal allocation (rising from 
R4.2bn in 2003 to R9.5bn in 2008/09 (Minister of Finance, 2006)), a figure which will 
increase over the MTEF cycle, shelter provision post-2004 is to be driven by the latest 
institutional innovations and legislative-regulatory approaches associated with the most 
recent thinking on the Second Decade developmental state. The tools include inter-ministerial 
committees, institutional compacts, and inter-governmental development protocols and 
agreements. Housing delivery that is demand-driven is set to animate initiatives presently 
referenced to a reconfigured institutional and social ecology (domestically and 
internationally) akin to the developmental state, including refocused housing public entities, a 
state construction arm, a dedicated housing bank, a special purpose land acquisition and 
assembly vehicle, re-organisation of the domestic social realm through charters/compacts 
with not insignificant performance obligations demanded and extracted from the private 
sector (financial, property and developer sectors), and contestation and re-definition of the 
global neoliberal human settlement agenda through intra- and inter-continental government 
treaties. The housing sector is also now the testing ground for new strategies of institutional 
restructuring and capacity building (direct national government implementation and local 
support) and is the pilot for improving planning, alignment, co-ordination and investment 
prioritisation referenced to the NSDP and a Housing and Settlements Delivery 
Implementation Protocol.  
How will BNG fare and what are the prospects for its success in the Age of Hope/Despair 
(fragile stability)? How will those charged with design, implementation, monitoring, 
oversight and evaluation negotiate and engage with the inter-related un(certainties) and 
(ir)ationalities of post-apartheid governmentality and the vagaries, vicissitudes and violence 
of post-Cold War statecraft? Both produce chameleon-like state forms and shape-shifting 
policies, or what some academics call ‘highly complex non-linear dynamics’ (Swilling et al., 
2005b:18). In the absence of prescriptions and road maps in the developmental (and) 
democratic re-engineering of state and policy, negotiation of and engagement with these 
dynamics does not unsurprisingly appear like ‘muddling through’ (Ibid) the contradictions 
and tensions generated by a state that runs a ‘dualistic framework’ of ‘macro-economic 
stabilisation’ alongside ‘ameliorative interventions’ (Ibid). Whether Breaking New Ground, 
representing an example of a ‘rethink’ of ‘big D’,247
                                                 
247 For Hart (2001:650), ‘big D’ development is defined as the ‘post second world war project of intervention in 
the ‘third world’ that emerged in the context of colonisation and the Cold War, and ‘little d’ or the development 
of capitalism as a geographically uneven, profoundly contradictory set of historical processes’. The ‘big D’ 
includes state-led, neo-Keynesian Developmentalism, neoliberal structural adjustment, the post-Washington 
Consensus, basic needs strategies, the various assortments of poverty eradication/reduction/alleviation strategies 
(supporting livelihoods, asset vulnerability/ coping strategies, for example), safety nets, informal sector 
development, and emergency funds. The instabilities and pressures spawned by development of capitalism 
(‘little d’) calls forth ongoing interventions in the name of ‘big D’ (e-mail from Hart on 10 August 2006). It is 
the ‘little d’ that has forced South Africa’s ‘rethink’ of ‘big D’ (GEAR, for example) in the form of ASGISA, 
BNG, land reform, social security (amongst others). The question is whether (new) emerging generation of 
South Africa’s ‘big D’ ‘open up new possibilities’ (Ibid) to arrest (rising) poverty, inequality and unemployment 
in the context of a deeply depoliticising statecraft orientation.  
 can more effectively deal with the 
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housing backlog and shelter poverty, is debatable in the context of a largely technical 
conception of the economy (sound fundamentals) (discussed below), and the depoliticised 
‘bifurcation’ of the developmental state (along First and Second Economy markers) (see 
Hart, 2006). In other words, will the goals, ambitions and objectives of BNG be thwarted by 
government’s continuing failure to alter patterns of inequity and poverty, which constitutes a 
‘social crisis’ that is ‘acute but is in large part depoliticised’ and ‘severed’ from the economic 
question (Freund, 2006a:06), and which marches to the drum beat of a hybridised version of 
Third Way-Anglo-Saxon capitalism?  
It is these questions that the following Chapter turns, focusing on the genesis and evolution of 
BNG and its prospects for success. The Conclusion wrestles further with these questions 
refracted through the debates of developmental state construction.   
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Chapter Six: Breaking New Ground: Prospects and Prospecting 
(Partial) Possibilities and (Pragmatic) Advances 
Introduction 
This Chapter hones in on the genesis, birth and evolution of BNG; its intentions and 
objectives; its weaknesses and limitations. Parallels between macro-management of the 
inconsistencies and incoherencies of developmemental state construction (discussed in 
Chapter Five) and those pertaining to BNG are drawn to help surface the infection and 
infusion of the sectoral by the macro and vice versa (although not as prominent for reasons 
explained below). Accordingly, and given the present focus of developmental state 
construction using housing as the fulcrum, the main theme of this Chapter gravitates around 
the difficulties of activating and realising the progressive agenda and thrust of the revamped 
‘big D’ (BNG) with the complex non-linear dynamics of statecraft. The first section discusses 
the evolution of BNG, its genesis, rationale, main components, and weaknesses. The second 
section hones in on two key instruments that have come to support programme 
implementation (the Financial Sector Charter and Social Compact) and their place in 
statecraft. The final Section makes some preliminary remarks about the prospects of BNG’s 
success located in the alternative conceptual and praxis frames inherent in the pragmatic 
radicalism and radical pragmatism orientations of our evolving transformation project. 
At the outset, it needs to be said that BNG’s scope is broad and the coverage extensive. It is 
near impossible to present, discuss and dissect its numerous faces and facets in this Chapter 
as much of it (since its implementation in April 2005) is still under construction and heavily 
contested both within and outside the state. ‘Provisional assessments’, remark Pieterse and 
van Donk (forthcoming), ‘suggest that the sustainable human settlement agenda is in deep 
trouble largely because BNG is undercooked and the institutional readiness of the 
Department of Housing (at national and provincial levels) is simply not in place to implement 
a policy that is both under-developed and highly ambitious’. For them, the institutional 
reform of the multiple departments implicated in the execution of the BNG (its underlying 
philosophy and approach) have ‘not been conceptualised let alone implemented’; political 
statements around ‘slum eradication’ and, I might add, its coupling to subsidised social 
housing provision, muddies the waters by ‘confusing policy elements and intentions of 
BNG’; the necessary ‘financial modelling’, costing and ‘adjustments’ to render the ‘multi-
departmental large-scale programme’ workable ‘has simply not been done to a sufficient 
degree of detail’; and the ‘requisite land-use management reforms’ are still to be coherently 
elaborated and institutionally wired. State promotion of this ‘undercooked’ and ‘half baked 
policy’, they say, ‘has been damaging’ to the ‘credibility and legitimacy’ of government 
(Ibid), especially if the outcome of the leading pilot (N2 Gateway) is any yardstick.  
This is a stinging criticism about institutional, programmatic and financial readiness of state. 
Conceded though by Pieterse and van Donk is that it may be a tad too soon to condemn the 
bakers and the recipe too harshly, especially because of the experimentation and experiments 
it has inspired and provoked in various localites, provinces and those that are nationally 
initiated, piloted and driven. Further cooking and baking animated by increased state 
assertiveness at diverse levels/spheres invites optimistic scenarios and futures.  
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Section One 
 Parentage, Birth, Birth Pangs, Growth and Evaluation: Past Presents and Past Futures 
in ‘Old’, ‘Interregnum’ and ‘New’  
At the unveiling of BNG on 2 September 2004, the Minister of Housing (2004b:2) said:  
The Plan’s necessity stems from the fact that at its inception the Housing Policy and 
Strategy (1994) focused on stabilising the environment to transform the extremely 
fragmented, complex and racially-based financial and institutional framework that 
was inherited from the previous government, whilst simultaneously establishing new 
systems to ensure delivery to address the housing backlog. Therefore, whilst 
government believes that the fundamentals of the policy remain relevant and sound, a 
new plan was required to redirect and enhance existing mechanisms to move towards 
a more responsive and effective delivery.  
BNG adds to this:  
The new human settlements plan reinforces the vision of the Department of Housing, 
to promote the achievement of a non-racial, integrated society through the 
development of sustainable human settlements and quality housing (DOH, 2004a:7).  
Eleven days later, the Government Communication and Information Services (GCIS) issued a 
statement (titled: Housing plan to end SA’s housing woes) which paraphrased Thabo 
Mokgola, presumably a DOH spokesperson, ‘who thinks that if the Comprehensive Housing 
Plan…is anything to go by, the country might have just found the ultimate solution’ 
(paraphrased in GCIS, 2004:1)248
The structural limits of apartheid spatial engineering, which rendered our human 
settlements dysfunctional at three levels (socially, economically and ecologically) 
were deep and enduring. It was made more complex by the demands placed on us by 
the processes of globalisation and the need to retrofit our policies and strategies to the 
conform to the requirements of the Constitution and the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (DOH, 2005:6–7).  
 presumably responsive to the ‘significant socio-economic, 
demographic and policy shifts’ (DOH, 2004a:7) over the last decade. The policy shifts 
include the NSDP, the numerous urban strategies and urban development frameworks, urban 
renewal and rural development strategies, strategic development initiatives, the Expanded 
Public Works Programme, provincial development frameworks, and the integrated 
development planning (IDP) regime. The ‘overwhelming task of ensuring a sustainable 
human settlement environment, through the provision of shelter’, wrote the Minister, 
‘required revisions and adjustments’:  
Whether adequate retrofitting actually occurred in the incremental adjustments and so-called 
‘enhancement[s]’ (numbering twelve from 1994 to 2000 (see DOH, 2000:1)) is debatable 
considering the numerous Constitutional Court rulings against the Department of Housing; 
                                                 
248 http://www.buanews.gov.za/view.php?ID=040913122451003&coll=buanews04 (accessed 29 May 2006). 
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the perceived displacement of the RDP by GEAR; selective government appropriation of the 
First and Second Task Team Reports (DOH, 1995; 1996); and the scuttled ‘Second White 
Paper’ initiative (1999–2000), 249 later downgraded to a ‘Strategy’. Remarkable though is the 
similarity in the discourse of BNG (and its broad strategic thrusts250
Wasting no time [referring here to the target of 1m homes in five years], Government 
set about the task of carrying out its new policy believing its basic tenets to be sound, 
while acknowledging that policy enhancements would be needed as implementation 
got underway (06)… For all practical purposes implementation of the 1994-White 
Paper on Housing has been completed. Although the basic tenets of policy appear 
sound, there are still various gaps. Policy outcomes have not fully met expectations 
and the full spectrum of housing needs have not been met in the most economic, 
efficient and effective manner possible. Various policy instruments are still relatively 
new and their impact is still to be felt, especially in rural areas, where development 
has been retarded on account of tenure uncertainty and capacity constraints. The 
absence of a housing strategy soon after the adoption of the White Paper in 1994, 
robbed the country of an opportunity to direct and guide development programme 
more closely... Although the focus shifted from policy making to delivery, housing 
policy enhancements and refinements continued as an ongoing process that was 
informed by the dynamics of housing provision and the need to improve performance 
in the housing sector ... In the year 2000 and beyond, Government will pursue the 
National Housing Vision with rigour and renewed commitment. It will enhance and 
expand sustainable housing delivery, broaden and facilitate access to sustainable 
housing and promote quality of life in a sustainable built environment (DOH, 2000:10–5).  
) and the Draft Housing 
Strategy for the New Millennium (March 2000).  
The movement from Second White Paper (‘new’ policy) to ‘Strategy’ and now ‘Plan’ is a 
story to be returned to shortly. More relevant at this time is the government view that the 
White Paper’s 1994 fundamental tenets were deemed ‘sound’ in 1995 (by defect), 1996, 2000 
and 2004 with various ‘enhancements’, ‘adjustments’ and ‘refinements’ to address, amongst 
other things, ‘constraints’ (1995), ‘risks’ (1996), ‘gaps’ (2000) and ‘shifts’ (2004). This is 
incredible! The fundamentals of a policy developed in the early 1990s (with all the defects 
and deficiencies registered in previous Chapters) is, more than a decade later, still considered 
‘sound’. If the first decade policy priority was institutional and regulatory overhaul and 
‘improving the delivery process so that more and better value is obtained’ (Minister of 
                                                 
249 The previous Minister announced the Second White Paper initiative as one of the Department’s seven five-
year priorities. The other priorities were establishment of five housing plans from local to national level; a rental 
policy and programme; enhancement of the housing subsidy progress payment system; broadening access to 
housing subsidies; measures to prevent subsidy fraud; and the phasing out of previous subsidies.  
250 Measures proposed included promoting equitable access to housing opportunities for vulnerable groups; 
planned land release and informal settlement upgrade; expanded tenure options (rental and social housing); 
monitoring of the economic and social housing trends and analysis of their impact on housing provision (‘for 
instance the HIV/AIDS pandemic and population migration trends’); improving ‘market equilibrium through 
judiciously targeted interventions’; to ‘guide the development of appropriate human settlement patterns through 
housing development’; to ‘increase competition subject to a fair and equitable system of affirmative 
procurement’; to normalise the lending environment and establish fair lending practices; to expand consumer 
choice; to transform public service delivery; to combat fraud; to promote human settlement renewal (inner city 
renewal is specifically mentioned); to ‘enhance the quality of living environments’ (DOH, 2004a:5).  
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Housing, 1999:4), ‘accelerat[ing] the nation-wide delivery of low-cost houses, while 
eliminating blockages within the system’ (Director-General, Mpumi Nxumalo-Nhlapo cited 
in Business Day, 12 August 2006), BNG’s goal is ‘rapid delivery of sustainable human 
settlements’ (Minister of Housing, 2005d:3) embedded in ‘more bolder [sic] interventions’, 
especially in context of the ‘scale of the housing challenge’.  
[I]n the context of seeking ways to break new ground in housing delivery, we have to 
consciously use as our backdrop the deep rooted history of dispossession in this 
country as we discuss the housing challenge facing us. We have to be concerned 
about the eradication of the basis of the contradictions that presently characterise our 
country which is manifest across all areas. We must, in addition, be concerned about 
the widespread difficulties in the form of blockages and inefficiencies that continue to 
plague our housing delivery chain for us to rise to the challenge of breaking new 
ground in housing delivery. 
In declaring itself against everything that the previous government stood for, our new 
government has put in place policies for the eradication of all impediments standing 
against access to housing by everyone. Because of the scale of the housing challenge 
faced by this country we however need more bolder [sic] interventions to bring about 
rapid delivery of sustainable human settlements (Ibid:2–3).  
The state projection of the flexibility and responsiveness of the ‘sound fundamentals’ to 
sculpturing and re-sculpturing and/or to the changing multiple objectives of the housing 
‘strategy’ over the years is astounding. The sound fundamentals are amenable to reshaping 
according to the dictates of supply-side and demand-led strategies; quantity and quality 
objectives; market-driven and state-led approaches; poverty alleviation (the central objective 
in 2000) and (presently) poverty alleviation plus job creation plus asset creation.251
                                                 
251 Echoing BNG, and included in the Draft Strategy (DOH, 2000), are shifts to a demand-side approach 
(discussed below), ‘qualitative’ (Ibid:11) and ‘sustainable delivery’ (Ibid:15), ‘holistic integrated development’ 
(Ibid:12), ‘sustainable built environment’ (Ibid:15), ‘elimination and prevention of slums’ (Ibid:13) coupled to 
higher levels of state intervention for more effective implementation of an (elevated) ‘poverty’ focused agenda 
thus privileging the poorest of the poor (Ibid:9). The summary of the recommendations of the Strategy 
elaborated in the conclusion of the document reads like a carbon copy of BNG.  
 This 
against the backdrop of the findings of Department-commissioned research informing BNG 
policy formulation, but not coherently or adequately factored into BNG (for reasons 
discussed below), that the ‘administration of the South African housing programme will have 
to change fundamentally if it is to really make the shift from supply to demand led subsidies’ 
(Synthesis Report) (Development Works, 2004:40). The Synthesis Report – summarising 
existing and state of art praxis of five reports (discussed below) – asserts that the shift 
required is not a tweaking of subsidies and/or ‘adding on new subsidy programmes’. It is 
‘more suggestive of a re-thinking of the housing policy, or aspects of it’ (Ibid:43), 
considering the multiple interconnected crises, discussed in the five reports, of 
unemployment, poverty and inequality; declining housing incomes, the HIV/Aids pandemic 
(amongst others) impacting on and shaping migration patterns and household composition; 
survival strategies; residential demand, need and supply; the rate and patterns of government 
aided and unaided shelter consolidation; households’ post-occupation shelter retention and 
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maintenance strategies; sustainability of municipal infrastructure and service delivery; and 
informality (amongst other things). This very same conclusion of the need for shelter 
‘solutions’ to respond to ‘issues’ (of unemployment, poverty, declining investment in housing 
and so on) ‘compounding’ rather than being the starting point of ‘solution’ formulation (see 
DOH, 2007:7), was alluded to in the 2000 Draft Strategy 252 and spoken to very directly by 
the Minister in 1999.253
The enhancements, amendments and refinements targeted at the ‘eradication of the 
impediments’ to accelerated housing delivery/rapid delivery of sustainable settlements
  
254
The future of our civilisations rests on how we determine our way forward. We shall 
not be identified as the civilisation of great poverty, that cannot define us, we who are 
proud inventors of everything that had culminated into our launching into space to 
seek answers about what lies beyond. Perhaps, this is a justifiable deflection as we 
remain unable to solve problems that lie at our feet. Intellectually, one of the best 
periods of recorded history, but morally very wanting. The consciousness of the rich 
closed to the poverty that surrounds them (Minister of Housing, 2006f).  
 is 
substantially different from ‘eradication of the basis of the contradictions that presently 
characterise our country’ (see Minister of Housing, 2005e:2). This much the Minister 
acknowledged in her address at the Conference of the Slum Dwellers International and the 
Federation of the Urban Poor in 2006:  
The state’s inability to solve the problems that ‘lie at our feet’ exposes the limitations and 
prejudices of a transformation project proposing, on the one hand, the wielding of the 
‘collective instrument of state’, to (amongst others) ‘eliminat[ing] the basic causes of the 
national grievance wherever and in whatever form they manifest themselves’ (Netshitenzhe, 
May 2006:47), but on the other hand, delimits the wielding to reconfigured utilisation of the 
                                                 
252  
The challenge the government faced in 1994 was to undo the harm caused and to reverse the legacy left 
by the apartheid regime. Conservatively estimated at 1.5m dwelling units in urban areas at the time of 
the 1994 Housing White Paper, the housing backlog for the country, as a whole, now appears to be 
closer to three million dwelling units, despite government having made considerable inroads over the 
past five years. According to one source the housing backlog may be as high as 3.7m units (DOH, 
2000:7).  
However, the housing problem is not merely a question of numbers. Solutions must place particular 
emphasis on the quality of the built living environment. Compounding issues, which are being 
addressed, include the extraordinary high levels of poverty among the urban and rural masses, rife 
unemployment, a serious lack of social stability, a highly destabilised housing environment, a lack of 
access to even basic municipal services in many instances, limited or no access for the poor to housing 
land or goods and services provided in the market place, a culture of dissaving, declining investment in 
housing and an extremely fragmented urban structure (extracted from DOH, 2000:7; Minister of 
Housing, 1999:3). 
253 In a 1999 media briefing dealing with Department priorities over the following five years, the Minister made 
reference, in the context of poverty alleviation, to ‘[a]dopting a differentiated approach to meet the specific 
needs of the poor including tenure requirements, migratory patterns, household size and affordability levels’ 
(Minister of Housing 1999b:2). 
254 Not unquestionable themselves, bearing in mind the similarities between the recommendations of the aborted 
Second White Paper and BNG. 
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‘fiscus and state capital’ through a ‘a strategy, a programme and institutions consciously 
developed and promoted by the advanced members of society’ (Ibid:48) (a theme returned to 
in the Conclusion with reference to ‘wise men’). Proceeding from this premise, and mindful 
of the (frequently exaggerated perceived) pressures and constraints of globalisation on policy 
manoeuvre, the ‘conscious activity to construct new political and economic relations’ 
(Ibid:48) – ‘swimming against the tide’ (Ibid) – is for the ‘advanced members of society’, the 
‘intelligentsia’ – restricted and confined more to ‘impediment’ elimination versus the 
espoused ‘contradiction’ elimination, reflecting their training and the practicalities and 
pragmatic imperatives.  
Similar to our primary development planning instrument, the IDP,255 BNG, ‘developed and 
promoted by the advanced members of society’, continues to travel the straight and narrow, 
i.e. an ostensibly market ‘incentive’ and ‘enticement’ weighted frame (enablement in 
partnership and co-operation formats).256
Over and above the widespread belief in the state that structural problems can be 
administratively fixed through improved planning and co-ordination,
 Rather than mining the full gamut of strategies 
implicated in the ‘recognition’ by the ‘ANC and state’ of ‘relat[ing] to all of capital in a 
dynamic of unity and struggle, incentive and coercion, enticement and regulation’ 
(Netshitenzhe, 2006:47); BNG (with slight modifications) continues underwriting the 1994 
housing scheme subsidy premise, i.e. ‘public subsidies matched by private finance’ 
(Treasury, 2004:128).  
257 BNG’s emphasis on 
normalising the market through the ‘product[ion] of clients [citizens] that financial 
institutions can trust’ (GCIS, 2004:1)258
                                                 
255 Central to the developmental state architecture in both decades but ‘steering well clear of radical 
interventions that would be needed to alter deeply entrenched patterns [of social and spatial inequality]’ (Mabin, 
2002 paraphrased in Harrison, 2006:203) via addressing the ‘legacy and systems of power that reproduce the 
apartheid city’ (Pieterse, 2002 cited in Harrison, 2006:203). 
; citizens being educated that ‘paying for their home 
[is] the right thing to do’ (Minister Sisulu cited in Cape Times, 3 September 2004); 
‘instill[ing] within black people the fact that a house is an asset’ (Minister Sisulu cited in 
Cape Times, 3 September 2004); ‘plant[ing] into the heart of every disadvantaged South 
African’ the ‘nobler’ spirit of doing it for themselves (Minister of Housing, 2006f:3); and 
256  
At the national housing summit held in November 2003, the Minister of Housing (2003a) confirmed 
that government remained committed to the principles of partnership that have underpinned the 
housing programme from the outset. The 1994 Housing White Paper acknowledges that government 
cannot undertake the task alone. Housing policy involves a range of enabling measures to encourage 
greater participation by the private sector in the delivery of housing to low-income households on a 
sustainable and equitable basis. The 1994 National Housing Accord defined these partnerships with the 
objective of fostering greater collaboration and building more enduring partnerships between 
government, the private sector and communities. Key partnerships take place through self-help 
processes, the construction industry and other private sector initiatives (Treasury, 2004:128). 
257 Related to the internally-oriented corporate-objective benchmarked performance management regime of state 
developmentalism and executive increasingly moving away from quantitative targets to output at least cost in 
the accelerated service-delivery ethos of the second decade (Mail & Guardian, 12 August–18 August 2006). 
258 Government Communication and Information Services. 2004. Housing plan to end South Africa’s housing 
woes. Bua News, 3 September 2004 (Available at http://architectafrica.com/bin1/news-bua-housing-southafrica-
001.html) (accessed 29 September 2004).  
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admonishments of protesting homeless citizens and communities coming to learn and 
understand that the existing delivery regime ‘is as good as it gets’ (Minister of Housing cited 
in Cape Times, 3 September 2004), one is left sometimes disarmed when trying to decipher 
BNG’s scale-balancing of social cohesion/social inclusion/citizenship/redistribution/equity 
(on the one hand) with entrepreneurship/ deracialisation/responsibilisation/asset creation/ 
redress (on the other). Pitched differently, biasing the strategy in favour of the poorest of the 
poor competes with discourses about ending the culture of entitlement/dependency/non-
payment and enabling beneficiaries to house themselves through the inculcation of the spirit 
of savings and Vuk’uzenzela (amongst other things). In contrast, there is a deafening silence 
on the ‘culture of privilege’ (Mayekiso, 1995 cited in Ruiters & Bond, 1996:4)259 in which 
the ‘better off in society’ received ‘more accessible’ and ‘better quality’ services than the 
‘poor and low-income households’ (see Khosa, 2002:46–7), the ‘abnormal subsidisation’260
Adding further insult to injury is the exacerbation of ‘dysfunctional relationships between 
citizens and government’ by officials ‘view[ing] citizens as unwilling and unable to solve 
their own problems (‘recent’ IDASA research paraphrased in Nemeroff, 2006:16); the dis-/ 
re-placement of the ‘citizen[ship]’ by the ‘consumer[ism]’ in the wake of conservative 
macroeconomic-stabilising cuts in grants and subsidies to municipalities and support for 
privatised delivery (McKinley, 2007); and recourse to the ‘kind of self-help development 
approach that existed during the colonial period’ (McKinley in Sunday Independent, 2 
October 2005) (Vuk’uzenzela, for example). Blaming society for development failure 
(citizens unwilling to help themselves, immorality and inadequate responsibilisation related 
to the contraction and spread of HIV/AIDS (see Cape Times, 28 August 2006)) and/or 
government’s explanation of the factors sustaining the high levels of social fabric crime;
 
of the racially based policies of the past that ‘unjust[ly] discriminated against the Black 
majority’ (DOH, 2000:9, 7) (for which this government is still paying); and the revolutionary 
finding of a new study that the so-called ‘culture of dissaving’ (Minister of Housing, 
1999a:3) may be because the majority of South Africans ‘can’t afford to save… because the 
cash is required for survival’ (survey undertaken by Alexander Forbes Financial Services 
cited in Sunday Times, 3 September 2006). 
261 
ignorance of society of official resource constraints and the (related) ‘practicalities/ 
pragmatics’ of government; market-instilled values of greed/consumption/individualism/ 
‘get-rich’262
                                                 
259 South Africa Report, 11, 3 April 1996 (available at 
 (paradoxically separated from the preferred state promoted market social 
http://www.africafiles.org/printableversion.asp?id=3892) 
(accessed 12 August 2006). 
260 The Draft Strategy notes: Previous state ‘low-cost housing programmes provided their full capital needs 
from state resources, whereas subsidy and repayment facilities offered to purchasers and tenants in the public 
sector were so generous that very little of state’s outlay was ever recovered’ (DOH, 2000:9).  
261 While there is a recognition of connection between poor social conditions and the incidence of contact 
crimes, no mention is made of poverty as one of the major drivers of this phenomenon (Presidency, 2006:68), 
and no attempts to overhaul conventional policing methods through dedicated investment in community-
building are mentioned in the Ten Year Review (Presidency, 2003a:27). High levels of social fabric crime, it 
appears, are attributed to citizen mentality, attitudes and morality rather than, for example, high unemployment 
and poverty; underdeveloped, poorly structured, poorly resourced and poorly maintained public environments; 
inadequate safety and security infrastructures; and a weak criminal prosecution system (amongst other things).  
262 All features and by-products of market fundamentalism (see Presidency, 2006:91–2) are thought to work at 
cross-purposes to the humane values of the transformation project, thus preventing the socialisation and 
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entrepreneurship and Calvinist-Protestant thriftiness); plus passing the development buck to 
society, is how the state achieves its objectives of faulting the patient for its continued poor 
health by not seeking out the recommended doctor, rejecting the (substandard/second-best) 
‘good as its gets’ medication and its method of administration or delivery, and, then giving 
the patient a ‘klap’ (Ibid) now and then to bring the patient to his or her senses.  
The answer to why second decade state developmentalism bears striking similarities and 
continuity with both apartheid and first decade (Foucaultian-like biosociological) regulatory 
mechanisms and measures associated with the disciplinary technologies of housing and 
settlement layout (see Foucault’s 1976 lecture in Bertani & Fontana, 2004) is partly due to 
the vicissitudes of post Cold War statecraft and (real and discursively constructed) constraints 
imposed by a globalising economy. Featuring prominently on this canvass are the political 
economy contours of a reform project that have to balance the political, social and economic 
transformation imperatives whose interconnected dynamics repeatedly militate against a 
more progressive articulation between basic security (shelter) and independence (individual 
and community autonomy) (terms borrowed from Foucault, 1983) other than through 
integration and dependency (both traits of passive citizenship).  
Imperative reconciliation of disjunctive dynamics at sectoral and system-wide levels, reflect 
themselves in the various shelter production praxis controversies conditioned, as usual, by the 
forces of market and bureaucracy, historical legacy and ‘practicalities’ or ‘scientific analysis’ 
(see Pottie, 2003). Consequently, strategic development imperatives and governance 
imperatives often tug in opposite directions, both opening and closing the space for 
comprehensive and incremental policy reform. The transparency of the reform process and 
the social accountability of the reformers is in great measure influenced by the substance, 
depth and deviation from established praxis and governance frames, codified in legislation 
and regulations enshrining power balances between market, bureaucracy and private capital. 
In this context, assertions of policy continuity and incremental reformism serve multiple 
purposes including maintaining market confidence and executive control and domination 
over a fiscally-overdetermined policy trajectory. The presentation of policy shifts in 
piecemeal dosages – as amendments, refinements and revisions to improve implementation 
of a socially accepted (housing) plan and therefore requiring little to no public consultation 
(Boyle in Sunday Times, 15 May 2005) – preserves the pillars of state developmentalism, i.e. 
economic stability, executive dominance and passive citizenship.  
Accordingly, the maturation of the strategic development imperatives of shelter production 
from 1994 to 2004/05 were punctuated by a series of incremental reforms to address the 
‘constraints’/‘risks’/‘gaps’/‘shifts’ of the initial 1994 market-driven/state-facilitated 
quantitative approach. Thus in 1998, the change in the procurement regime signalled 
movement towards a state-centred/state-driven approach (Charlton & Kihato, 2006).263
                                                                                                                                                       
enforcement of an encompassing framework (see Friedman, 2006b). This is a position seriously taken to task by 
the main opposition party (see Seramane in footnote 234 above).  
 Also 
in 1998, the Director General reportedly pronounced on the need for a new approach to 
housing delivery, based on ‘specific strategies emanating from past experiences’ 
(paraphrased in Business Day, 6 January 1998). The ‘housing strategy’, she said, would focus 
on rental housing provision, greater emphasis on the poor, and increased government 
263 Charlton and Kiharto (2006) point here to the preferential procurement regime.  
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intervention. Government was to play a far greater role in defining the terms of housing 
delivery, with the state, for example, specifying development designs, determining the price 
of products, providing guidelines for development costs as well as proposing and guiding the 
sort of developments that were suitable in particular areas (Ibid). The enduring legacy of the 
1998 strategy was the procurement regime (whose heavy burden municipalities are still 
unable to shoulder) and the OPHP.  
Since 1999, in line with the 1999 ANC Election Manifesto that ‘placed housing as first item 
on its five-year programme for change’ (Khan & Ambert, 2003),264 the Department began 
‘shifting housing policy from shelter provision to promoting sustainable human settlements’, 
with greater emphasis placed on ‘transforming apartheid settlement patterns’ and attracting 
private investment in areas where subsidies…[were] allocated’ (DOH, 2003c). This ‘policy 
shift’ (which in a sense affirmed the aims of the Election Manifesto and its emphasis on 
quality and previously articulated in the 1997 Urban Development Framework (DOH, 
1997a)) 265
These shifts reached their apogee in late 1999 when the Department hosted meetings to 
launch a new Housing White Paper process (Khan & Ambert, 2003) that drew on the ‘lessons 
from the past five years’ so as to ‘catapult housing delivery to greater heights’ and ‘offer 
 was, however, ‘inadequately translated into action’ (Ibid). Thus, ‘[d]espite’ the 
Framework, settlements continued to grow on the periphery for reasons of high land cost in 
central locations, historical patterns of investment in land and infrastructure, the ‘practice of 
“shack farming” and NIMBY’ (DOH, 1999:9). Additionally, drawing on research insights, 
concerns were registered from senior DOH officials about whether, from an ‘economic point 
of view’, the compact city form was more ‘cost effective than sprawl’ under all conditions 
and its practical implementation ‘given the fixed nature of the built environment’ (Ibid). 
Notable though in the Framework (DOH, 1997a), repeated in BNG and in MERG, is a 
conception of housing (and infrastructure) investment as ‘critical’ to poverty alleviation 
(providing basic needs), reversing inequities, ‘ensuring viable communities and sustainable 
human settlements’, creating ‘economic opportunities’ (job creation), stimulating backward 
and forward industries, and raising household productivity (Ibid:16). Housing, most 
importantly, is categorised as a ‘productive asset’ and, lying at the core of the RDP, an 
‘engine of the economy’ (Ibid:22). The Framework, like BNG, proposes flexibility in tenure 
and delivery options – a ‘variable application of subsidies at delivery level’ (Ibid:23) that is 
supportive of upgrade, rental accommodation and urban densification executed in ways not 
dissimilar to the N2 Gateway Project.  
                                                 
264 The aim is to ‘leverage additional finance’; ‘develop housing on well-located land’; ‘improve and speed up 
the subsidy programme’; construct more rental stock’; and support the PHP (Khan & Ambert, 2003:v–vi). 
265 This Framework was supposedly guided by the ‘basic tenets’ (DOH 1997a:ii) of the RDP and was intended 
to elaborate the ‘necessary’ urban initiatives to lend substance to, amongst other programmes, GEAR. Priorities 
included overcoming the separation between spatial and economic planning and embedding economic 
development targeting depressed areas; planning-driven spatial reconstruction; and clarifying intergovernmental 
relations (Ibid:iv). Four programmes were to drive implementation. Firstly, city integration entailing 
reconstruction and upgrading townships and informal settlements; higher density land-use; and reforming land 
and planning systems. The second programme focused on improving housing and infrastructure through 
upgrading and dwelling construction; addressing health hazards; ‘encouraging’ investment and increasing 
access to finance, social development, safety and security interventions, designing ‘habitable communities’. 
Promoting urban economic development and creating institutions for delivery constituted the third and fourth 
programmes.  
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more options for the poor’ (Director General, Mpumi Nxumalo in Reconstruct, September 
1999). In contrast to the prevailing socially insulated and bureaucratic unilateralism 
associated with piecemeal and incrementalist reform, the idea of a (new) White Paper, 
specifically the socially inclusive participation and consultation process normally entailed in 
problem identification and solution, generated considerable interest and enthusiasm from 
those who had long been calling for a re-opening of the housing policy debate. However, 
policy reform powered in a manner akin to the NHF negotiation process was not on the cards. 
The policy review, agenda- and priority-setting and the policy formulation processes which 
commenced in1998 once again excluded civil society from the deliberations, as recorded in a 
media statement penned by the National Housing Co-ordinator for the Urban Sector Network, 
Fazila Farouk, in her personal capacity. Farouk pointed to two problems with this 
Department’s policy reform process. Firstly, the socially excluding, state (official)-driven 
policy process would ‘throw up some problems for our community partners and ourselves’. 
Secondly, ‘there is wide acknowledgement that white paper 1 had failed as a policy 
instrument to provide housing for the very poor in a sustainable manner’ associated with the 
‘market mechanism’ (enshrined in the fundamentals of the policy) ‘that exploits and 
marginalises people’. 
The formulation of new housing policy provides us with a unique opportunity to 
reverse debilitating development patterns. Nevertheless, the opportunities for 
redressing critical policy flaws may be missed through an exclusive and pre-
determined policy agenda. In this case, not only is the new policy governed by the 
fundamentals of white paper 1, it is also informed by an exclusive problem 
identification process conducted by the department itself. 
Thus, a fairly rigid framework is already in place, making it very difficult for any 
external organisation wishing to substantially influence the outcome of white paper 2 
to do so, using normal channels. Policy feedback channels are incredibly narrow and 
they are diminished even further by ridiculously short time frames (National Housing 
Co-ordinator for the Urban Sector Network, Fazila Farouk in Reconstruct, September 
1999). 
The Department’s Director-General responded quite negatively to the USN’s statements, 
accusing them of being ‘armchair critics’ who ‘want discussion documents to criticise 
without adding value to the debate of what creative solutions are required’. Assuring 
‘stakeholders and citizens’ that the ‘consultation process’ around the White Paper would be 
‘open’ to ‘comments, proposals and input’, the Director-General additionally contended that 
the Department had the ‘capacity to formulate policy’ and is ‘guided in policy formulation by 
the constitution, the manifesto of the ANC, the presidential address and the programme of 
government, as well as the priorities identified by the minister of housing and members of the 
provincial executive councils responsible for housing’. Non-governmental organisations, 
amongst others, she asserted, have a right conferred by the Constitution to ‘compliment, 
criticise and comment on government operations’ but they should bear in mind that 
‘government understands and is in touch with its broad constituency and the various 
representative formations’ and those without an ‘understanding of, and insight into, basic 
housing issues’; release ‘irresponsible…and incorrect statements in public media without 
doing some basic research’ [into the pro-poor nature and pro-poor outcomes of housing 
policy]; ‘who are not in touch or do not represent any constituency and yet have an agenda 
will always be questioned’ (Director General, Mpumi Nxumalo in Reconstruct, nd, 1999).  
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The Second White Paper, which made its appearance as a ‘Strategy’ in March 2000, was 
never made public for ‘comments, proposals and input’ from ‘stakeholders and citizens’. Its 
circulation was strictly controlled and limited to a few individuals for comment and review. 
In the case of one reviewer, the author was informed that the ‘Strategy’ document was 
delivered and thereafter retrieved with instructions not to make copies.266
The Department’s tendency to insulate and control policy form, content and trajectory is not 
only confined to the exclusion of civil society. Indeed, the executive displays the same 
contempt for elected structures, to whom they are accountable to and that are supposed to 
exercise oversight over, in the policy reform process. The historical marginalisation of 
Parliament in housing policy debates and reform processes; the co-option of the ANC-
appointed Chair of the Housing Portfolio Committee into Department determined and 
controlled reform processes (First [DOH, 1995] and Second [DOH, 1996] Task Teams); and 
strict party discipline has limited the ability and capacity of politicians to influence debates 
and processes.
 The critique of the 
Strategy by two reviewers is devastating and, given its similarity to BNG, they apply with 
equal force then and now (this is revisited below).  
267
At the risk of a slight, but necessary detour, the Department reproduces and reinforces 
inherited patterns of subordination and domination between state (executive) and civil society 
(legislature) within government. In general, the executive’s monopoly over law-making [and 
policy-making] ‘has remain unchallenged since 1994’ (Habib & Schultz-Herzenberg, 
2005:173) attributable, although not exhaustively, to the ANC’s current leadership possessing 
‘no special attachment to representative democracy’ (Butler, 2004:110)
  
268; an emasculated, 
weak and ‘reactive’ Parliament (Butler, 2004:91);269
                                                 
266 Personal commication with informant, early July 2005. 
 and party control of the allocation of 
seats to members of Parliament, officers of parliamentary caucus and parliamentary 
267 These themes are further elaborated in the Conclusion. 
268 ‘The liberation movement’s democratic tendencies co-exist with democratic centralist and hierarchical 
conceptions of legitimate authority’ (Butler, 2004:110). 
269 As early as 1994, the former Head of the ANC Policy Unit (from 1997 onwards), Tito Mboweni, now 
governor of the Reserve Bank, wrote: ‘Parliament thinks it can make policy on behalf of people. This is not so. 
[Parliament’s] role is to implement ANC policy’ (cited in Booysen, 2006:179–80). Take also into account that 
since 1994, ‘in theory’, members of Parliament (MPs), whose seats are held by the party and are therefore 
subject to party discipline, ‘have had to sign a code of conduct…in which they would undertake to refrain from 
any “attempt to make use of parliamentary structures to undermine organisational decisions and policies” as 
transmitted from Shell House’ [the ANC’s headquarters] (Mail & Guardian, 16 September 1994 cited in Lodge, 
1999:21–2). As a matter of interest, in the latter part of 2006, the ANC’s Chief Whip in Parliament, Mbulelo 
Goniwe made a bid to make ruling party MPs sign a pledge of allegiance to President Mbeki who was under 
heavy criticism from both COSATU and SACP. Goniwe, it is reported, failed in this attempt (Sunday Times, 3 
September 2006). The power of Shell House has dwindled over the years. As the grip of President Mbeki on the 
reins of government tightened, so ‘ANC capacity dwindles’. ANC officials in party headquarters have been 
downgraded to ‘managers, dealing with organisational matters such as errant branches and building election 
machinery rather than political issues’ (Chothia & Jacobs, 2002:154). This was in line with the way Mbeki’s 
overall grip on the party was firmly consolidated, especially at provincial level, as the national office 
increasingly imposed its authority (Butler, 2004:123).  
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committee chairs, Premiers, and mayors 270(and now appointment of ‘entire management 
teams271). If the ‘normal channels’ for influencing the housing policy debate and reform 
processes were in 1999 perceived by some NGO leaders as already ‘incredibly narrow’, they 
have no doubt been further ‘narrowed’ during the Mbeki Presidency compounded (perhaps) 
by the exile-moulded politics of three housing ministers (Slovo, Sankie Mthembi-Mahayele, 
Sisulu); the declining power of Ministers in the management and administration of their 
portfolios;272 and increased presidential control over the Directors-General.273
If the politics of the policy reform process excludes civil society and elected assemblies, the 
new governance system and the implicated officials limit the policy imaginaries and 
implementation horizons of the party, politicians and civil society further. Of particular 
importance here is the over-determination of the implementation possibilities in the new 
governance format by personnel drawn from the inherited bureaucracy who (unlike their 
allies in the moderate new guard) are skilled in the writing and promulgation of the 
regulatory regime underpinning the products of the ‘practical’, ‘scientific’ incremental reform 
process.  
  
The shelving of the Second White Paper came to reflect once again the imperatives of new 
governance. Shelved on the grounds of its potential to ‘disrupt the housing development 
process as well as planning and create a sense of uncertainty in the market’, it was  
…decided to rather embark on a progressive policy development and revision process 
and to implement new and/or revised policy and strategy in a phased programme, 
maintaining the existing consultation structures and processes (DOH, nd:12).  
As part of the revision process, the DOH in 2002 began responding to a series of ‘gaps’ and 
‘new challenges’ identified as inadequate participation of the financial sector in housing 
delivery; ‘withdrawal of the large construction companies…due to low profit margins’; 
provincial under-expenditure; local government incapacity; limited integrated development; 
poor budgetary, and programmatic alignment between the three spheres; absence of a 
secondary market; and beneficiary abandonment of RDP houses (DOH, 2003b:1). The 
response, which was in line with the shift towards quality, included, and echoed in the Draft 
Strategy, ‘linking medium density housing to transport nodes, appropriate commercial 
centres and employment opportunities coupled with urban renewal’.  
The medium density and linked social housing programme (spearheaded by the Job 
Summit [rental] pilot projects) aimed at supporting the Government’s Urban Renewal 
Programme, and the requirement that beneficiaries should contribute to the cost of 
                                                 
270 The National Working Committee of the ANC ‘appoints officers of the parliamentary caucus and the 
parliamentary committee chairs, while insufficiently disciplined regional structures have been dissolved, and 
provincial premiers have been appointed against the wishes of provincial parties’ (Butler, 2004:123).  
271 Business Day, 12 August 2006. 
272 Ministries are now required to ‘refer all new policy documents and draft legislation to officials located in the 
Presidency, who ‘decide whether proposals fit in with the government’s broader policy framework, and whether 
the fiscal implications are acceptable’ (Chothia & Jacobs, 2002:153). 
273 Directors-General ‘now sign contracts with the Presidency rather than with their own ministers’ (Chothia & 
Jacobs, 2002:153), raising important accountability questions, especially in the new governance regime.  
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their houses [R2479 contribution] towards the goal of Sustainable Human 
Settlements (DOH, 2000, original emphasis).  
Along with these initiatives, and the introduction of the National Home Builders Warranty 
Scheme, the goal of the delivery of Sustainable Human Settlements was portrayed to be in 
sight (see Sigodi Marah Martin (SMM), 2003:i). But the strategic policy shift towards 
sustainability required a more complex response entailing a ‘demand-led approach to housing 
delivery, targeting the creation of housing units as an asset, restoring human dignity and 
giving particular attention to the quality of the dwelling itself’ (Ibid:vii). During the latter half 
of 2002, the Housing MINMEC decided to ‘engage with the broad stakeholder community to 
obtain its views on the way forward for housing’, which entailed ‘reviewing existing policies 
in terms of its [the Department’s] legal framework, financial components and its technical 
capabilities’ (Ibid:vii–viii). 
During the period November 2002 to February 2003, a series of workshops followed, 
informed by a national perspective that ‘confirm[ed] the housing principles as contained in 
the White Paper’; elaborated an international context; spelt out the trends and challenges 
confronting housing; and the strategic responses of government over the years to the trends 
and challenges (Ibid:iii). Arising out of these workshops, four problems were identified274
The Deputy-Director of Policy and Research and Chief Director of Research operated from 
the assumption that a National Housing Summit would be the culmination of the research and 
workshop consultation process (2002/03), as well as the preliminary findings of the out-of-
the-box SMM 2003/04 USAID-funded research initiative, through which a second generation 
housing programme and policy would be unveiled and the policy and research agenda 
discussed and refined. Indeed, the stakeholder workshops addressed themselves, in the words 
of the Minister at the Summit, to ‘strategic policy gaps and proposed policy-related remedial 
interventions’ (Minister of Housing, 2003a:11), and the Terms of Reference of the tender 
documents for the USAID-funded research (six reports) recorded the ‘purpose’ of the 
investigation as one of undertaking studies for the generation of a new housing policy and 
research agenda’ (early September 2003), as a ‘statement of strategic policy direction’ that 
the Department would embark over the second decade, to be released for public discussion’ 
at the Summit. This was confirmed by Minister Mbandla in her maiden May 2003 Budget 
Speech:  
 
and the solutions offered centred largely around better instrument utilisation, programmatic 
and alignment, institutional co-ordination, and information and education dissemination. The 
solutions were largely couched within a framework of improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the existing policy.  
Our commitment to eradicating the backlog we inherited is unquestionable. In order 
to respond positively to the ever-changing housing environment, we have decided to 
continuously review our housing programme. We initiated a broad consultation 
process, which included 15 stakeholder workshops countrywide. All housing and 
development related stakeholders had an opportunity to table matters of concern 
regarding housing development and these were debated in an effort to formalise 
                                                 
274 Limited integrated development, housing not regarded as an asset, limited participation of the financial 
sector, underspending (SMM, 2003:v)  
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possible policy interventions or adjustments… [M]y Department is using the results 
as a basis to identify a development and research agenda for our medium term policy. 
This will lead to a housing summit… The results will also inform provincial housing 
development plans and, ultimately, it will culminate in the finalisation of the national 
housing multi-year development plan (Minister of Housing, 2003:6).  
If the Second White Paper was aborted on account of governance imperatives (to avoid 
disrupting delivery causing market uncertainty), the ‘downgrading’ of the Summit from one 
intended to deliver a second-generation policy to a ‘listening process’ (Interview: Mark 
Napier, Chief Director Research, October 2004 cited in Charlton & Kihato, 2006:261), was 
reflective of the same imperative. Factors contributing to the decision to postpone the 
unveiling of a new policy in 2003 related to not wanting to rock the boat shortly before a 
national election and not to pre-empt the release of the Presidency’s Ten Year Review.  
More critical though was the depth of the crisis of under-expenditure and the fear in the 
Department and the nine provinces that unless ways were devised to ‘speed up the delivery of 
housing’, ‘Treasury [would] institute measures’ to address the problem (SMM, 2003:xiv). 
From 2000/01, the rollovers per annum started to increase above 10% of the voted amounts; 
in 2002/2003, the under-expenditure amounted to R1bn (23% rollover); and in 2003/04 
provinces had only spent 48% of their allocation by the end of December. The crisis, which 
both the Treasury and Presidency engaged the Department about, was exacerbated by the 
rising cumulative number of stalled housing projects. With over 600 000 units in stalled 
projects275
This expenditure history undermined any further requests for additional funding in 2004/05 – 
the year that BNG was unveiled. Although the crisis was partially addressed through the 
reassurance provided to Treasury and the Presidency of the Department’s ability to turn 
around the parlous financial predicament and poor delivery rate via the generation of a 
Turnaround Strategy (DOH, 2004), which contained the ‘seeds of a new policy direction’ 
(Interview paraphrasing Mark Napier, Chief Director Research, October 2004 cited in 
Charlton & Kihato, 2006:261), it was not implemented. Amendments were however effected 
to programmes and business plans that assuaged the fears of Treasury.  
 and over R5.1bn committed, targeted interventions plus additional finance would 
be required (to compensate for inflation) to unblock these projects.  
The appropriateness of the policy fix to the ‘external’ challenges is debateable, a point 
returned to below. Relevant to minimalist re-orientation is organisational conservatism and 
the power of internal system maintenance forces whose strength and durability resisted 
repeated attempts by both the Director-General and Deputy Director-General to effect a 
developmental bureaucratic coalition between regulators and innovators (inside the state and 
between the state and the wider praxis community).  
Differently worded, progressive rightsizing aligned to a new policy direction was blocked 
because the Strategy represented to the Department, and more particularly, the Director-
General, an indictment of her and her failure to deliver on the housing mandate: ‘The DG was 
unhappy with the Turnaround Strategy because it said she failed’ (Interview paraphrasing ex-
                                                 
275 Of the 2.4m subsidies approved (and the 1.6m housing units listed as completed or under construction), 
640 972 units were in projects that had stalled (DOH, 2004:6).  
 224 
 
housing official, 18 October 2006). The Director-General’s sensitivity to criticism evidenced 
in her tendency to micro-manage and/or assign critical tasks to those she historically trusted 
(reformed Chief Directors); her known discomfort (including those of her old guard allies) to 
entertain and implement new ideas and innovations, and the implied deferral to others 
(outside the favoured discourse coalition) for expertise and technical input; and her poor 
confidence in the Department’s ability to deliver on a changed or revised mandate precluded 
by the new governance bureaucratic coalition militated against comprehensive rightsizing 
(Interview: Ibid).  
Incremental rightsizing – a function of administrative conservatism, institutional 
sedimentation and bureaucratic inertia – is one side of minimalist praxis retooling. Fiscal 
imperatives further excluded robust retooling and, arguably, strengthened internal system 
maintenance forces. So just when the Department was on the precipice of a new strategic 
policy shift in the early years of 2003/04 (discussed below) based on a wide-ranging 
consultative process, the ‘imperial minister of finance’ Trevor Manuel intervened in a way 
not dissimilar to his actions in 1998/99 – also the year in which the Department announced a 
new approach to housing delivery whose components were very similar to BNG.  
Confronted by a massive rollover of R1.76 billion, partly related to the lead time in housing 
projects hovering between 12 and 24 months (1998 figure in Business Day, 20 May 1998), 
the Department’s 1998/1999 budget (R3.6bn) was 23% lower than the 1997/98 (R4.7 bn) 
allocation (a difference of R1.1bn). The latter year was the one in which housing budget was 
at its highest level of government expenditure since 1994/95 (pegged at 2.4%), and the 
delivery rate was the highest it had been since 1994/95, and when the rudiments of the 
institutional implementation infrastructure were in place and beginning to be institutionalised 
(see Pottie, 2003:435; DOH, 2005b:18; Business Day, 20 May 1998).276
The readiness of the implementation infrastructure to increase delivery and its thwarting by 
the budget cut was confirmed by the Minister in her 1999 address at the Institute for Housing 
in South Africa Conference, which was the runner-up to the release of the Second White 
Paper: ‘[O]nce the process [housing delivery] had really begun to pick up speed funding was 
unable to match potential progress, the ambitious target of a million houses in five years, that 
Government had set itself, was not attainable’ (Minister of Housing, 2000:4). This budget cut 
– contrary to the previous commitment ‘agreement’ of Treasury to boost the budget by R1bn 
when delivery took off to meet the 1 million house target (Director-General cited Business 
Day, 21 May 1998) – resulted in government abandoning the target, as the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) had allocated an amount equivalent to the 1998/99 budget 
for the next three years (Director-General, Ibid). The response of Treasury was: 
  
Flip Rademan, deputy director-general of the state expenditure department, put a 
different spin on the agreement. He said the housing department did not use the funds 
originally allocated and the allocation was suspended for other priorities. In 
subsequent annual budgets, the final allocations were approved by cabinet according 
to national priorities. “The responsibility then vested in accounting officers to adjust 
                                                 
276 The cut in the budget also related to stinging criticisms of the ANC in February 1998, for being soft on 
corruption and financial mismanagement (Picard, 2005:339). This may have been related to a desire to ‘stem 
financial mismanagement in the provinces’ (Ibid). 
 225 
 
and manage programmes within allocations through reprioritising specific projects to 
stay within available funds”. He said that the medium-term expenditure framework 
allocation for the next three years reflected government’s commitment to housing 
programmes (Ibid).  
The decision to cut the budget raised a host of complex issues related to the priority accorded 
to housing, the impact on the capacity of the Department to fulfil its mandate, and 
governance more generally. With respect to priority, the budget cut prompted housing and 
industry analysts to argue that it appeared as if housing had fallen off the national agenda. 
Government, they reportedly said, had to decide whether it wished to limit the programme 
just as it was beginning to succeed (Business Day, 20 May 1998).  
Indeed, with deep real cuts in provincial budgets (Gauteng for example needed R1.3bn in 
1998/09 but only received R725m), provincial boards halted/put a freeze on new subsidy 
applications and projects (Business Day, 21 May 1998) as approval for new projects in 
1998/99 could only be funded out of the 1999/2000 budget (Director General cited in 
Business Day, 20 May 1998). Moreover, the honouring of (then) existing annual housing 
obligations was rendered problematic through provinces having to re-prioritise projects, 
compounded by inflationary pressures contained in each sequence of the traditional housing 
(and infrastructure) project management delivery cycle of Planning-Servicing-Building-
Occupation (see Berner, 2002) and their potential to generate stalled projects which require 
additional finance to unblock.  
With respect to capacity, in their submission to the Portfolio Committee hearings on the 
budget vote, the then Banking Council’s Mary Tomlinson said that ‘insufficient expenditure’ 
was going towards building the administrative capacity ‘necessary for expanding and 
smoothly implementing the housing policy’, including knowledge of how to spend money. 
With the delivery of 10 000 housing options per month during that period, it would ‘take over 
30 years to address the 3-million backlog - not including new household formation’ (cited in 
Business Day, 7 May 1998).277
The Department’s ability to maintain the existing delivery figure was already being tested to 
the hilt and the budget cut was another spoke in the wheel. In fact, already in 1997, the 
Department confronted a staffing crisis with the reported loss of the Director-General and 
approximately four highly skilled Chief Directors (three of whom had taken a voluntary 
severance package), and 55 of the 221 posts vacant, prompting leading analysts to conclude 
that the departure of so many top managers (reportedly 18) was ‘likely to affect significantly 
the management of the low-cost housing programme’ (Business Day, 14 October 1997).
  
278
                                                 
277 The point was reinforced by the Director-General three years later during the Portfolio Committee hearings 
on the housing budget when she stated that the 2001/02 budgetary increase of 8%, in the context of new 
household formation through migration, made it impossible to eliminate the problem of informal settlements 
(Business Day, 1 March 2001). 
 
278 In 1996, the number of posts were increased to 246 from 226 the previous year. Due to the restructuring 
process in the public service during 1997 and 1998, and the implementation of voluntary severance packages, 
the Department abolished 25 posts. A further eight posts were abolished during 1999 as a result of officials 
taking voluntary severance, leaving the Department with 231 posts on 1 April 1999 (DOH, nd:2). This is 
discussed in more detail below. 
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From 1998 to 1999, ‘vacancies fluctuated between 30-32%; by August 2000 it was 37%; in 
April 2001, 34%; in April 2002, 27%; and currently 28% (DOH, nd:92, original emphasis).  
With respect to governance, the cut in the 1998/99 budget demonstrated the dominance of the 
Ministry of Finance over sectoral budgeting and development priority definition (in 
particular), and the legislature (more generally). With reference to the legislature, the 
Chairman of the Housing Portfolio Committee, Titus Mafolo, declared the 1998/99 budget 
‘inadequate…There is no way it can meet the housing needs of this country’. The request by 
the Committee to have the budget increased – intended to be a, reportedly, ‘strong signal’ by 
the legislature to the executive – was supposed to be tabled in Parliament shortly afterwards 
with the Committee also expressing a determination to take the matter further by calling for a 
review of the MTEF baseline figures for housing. Although Committee members, it is 
reported, said that ‘throwing money at a problem’ was not the answer, it asserted that 
government was, ‘obligated to provide resources for its policy positions’ (paraphrased in 
Business Day, 7 May 1998). Nothing was heard afterwards. Strangely, if the Department 
showed little respect for the legislature in policy reform and programme execution, Treasury 
dismissed both.  
Lastly, while more research is required here, it can be conjectured that the budget cut had 
consequences on the construction sector when ‘fears’ were expressed about the effect of 
diminished spending whittling away capacity built up in the construction and associated 
professions over the past few years to sustain ‘recent high levels of delivery’ (Business Day, 
20 May 1998). Given the departure of some 40% to 50% of small and medium-sized 
enterprises from this sector between 1988 and 1994, and those remaining, through 
downsizing, cutting their capacity by more than 50% (25% of firms) while a further (40%) 
reduced capacity by between 20% to 50%, industrial concentration (standing at 20–30% of 
home building, general construction and civil engineering accounting for 80% of output in 
1994) could, with the budget cut, have potentially contributed to further entrench their grip of 
the big players on low-income housing production (Business Times,2 October 1994), 
considering that 54% of total new housing stock produced between 1996 to 2001 was 
government shelter (DOH, 2004:3).  
Over the period, 1994 to 1999, there was a decline of 36% of employment in the construction 
industry (a loss of 130 000 jobs), increased informalisation and casualisation (in 1997, 72% 
of self-employed workers in the construction industry were informal), and by 2000, 14% of 
firms were responsible for 75% of total production in the construction industry (figures 
extracted from, Hassen, 2003:125, 128, 129). The more damaging effect of the capacity 
shortfalls and resulting concentration, it was argued in 1994, would be dramatic increases in 
material prices, which even before the adoption of the White Paper, was perceived as a 
serious constraint on affordable housing delivery. The University of Stellenbosch’s Bureau 
for Economic Research predicted building costs would soar over the following years (cited in 
Business Times, 2 October 1994, and see Financial Mail, 21 October 1994). ‘Without drastic 
restructuring of the construction industry as a whole’ and ‘supply-side interventions’ - wrote  
Andrew Merriefield of the University of Natal’s Construction and Economics (Financial 
Mail, 21 October 1994) - ‘the industry will in the short-term only be able to return to mid-
1980s levels in the low-income sector’ (Merriefield in Business Times, 2 October 1994).  
While the elimination of the backlog (of 1.8 million plus 200 000 new households formed 
every year) over ten years would require, according to Land Investment Chairman, Selwyn 
MacFarlane, the construction of ‘a house every two minutes’ (cited in Business Day, 26 
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October 1994), the building sector in 1994 was geared to build a maximum of 70 000 houses 
a year (Business Day, 21 October 1994). The production of homes in the low-income bracket 
would be further reduced with the up tick in the property market from 1994 (see Business 
Day, 4 January 1995) worsening the emerging ‘serious imbalances between the supply of 
housing and effective demand…[pricing] housing…out of the reach of the majority of white 
buyers and…other population groups’.279
Since 1998 to 2005, the housing budget as percentage of total expenditure remained below 
the 1997/98 figure with negative impacts filtering through directly and indirectly into 
capacity building, executive-legislature dynamics, the property market and construction 
sector, and asset generation and accumulation by the poor. The cumulative impact of these 
forces in the policy reform initiative of the second decade, when the state, partly in response 
to under-expenditure, was on the precipice of a robust policy shift to address programme 
deficiencies and aligning its institutions and resources accordingly, Treasury cut the budget 
again. And this time round, the budget had to contend with a market more fierce than in the 
1990s. This was evidenced in astronomical rises in building costs (85% between 2000–
2006)
  
280; and construction sector cartelisation, which, The Economist remarked, ‘has made 
entry into the industry difficult for newcomers, especially black companies, resulting in a 
plethora of fly-by-night outfits’;281 and a housing boom which since 2000 saw house prices 
rise 182%, outperforming Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States (Hale, 2006:28). 
South Africa’s ‘leader[ship]’ in the ‘world housing boom’ (in2perspective, 15 December 
2004)282 which in 2003/04 witnessed house prices jump 35%, outperforming even Hong 
Kong (31%) (Ibid), may be related to the stability brought to the market by the RDP housing 
intervention, but these gains have been captured and monopolised by an affluent 30% of the 
market (DOH, 2004a:4). Moreover, ‘rising house prices have helped to produce a current 
account deficit’ (Hale, 2006:30), with implications for monetary policy and savings rates 
(declining to 0.3% from 1.5% a few years ago and 4.5% during the mid-1990s (Hale, 
2006:30)) – and escalations in construction costs and land prices283
                                                 
279 According to Financial Mail (5 May 1995), only 15% of total households could afford houses in the R65 000 
to R100 000 bracket. 
 are now coming to 
280 Building costs in the period 2000 to 2006 – including building materials, labour, fuel and contractor profit 
margins – rose by 85%, way above the overall pace of inflation (as measured by the producer price index and 
the consumer price index). This rise in tender prices, which according to the University of Stellenbosch’s 
Bureau for Economic Research rose more rapidly than input costs, was driven by the rising momentum in 
activity in the building and construction industry as contractors found themselves in a better position to widen 
their profit margins (‘[i]nversely, during a recessionary phase in the industry, tender prices rise less rapidly than 
input costs’). Increases in individual materials prices averaged around 60%. Examples of price increases which 
exceeded the average included stock bricks, which increased by 99%; face bricks, 87%; cement, 99%; structural 
steel products, 75%; and cement building blocks, 108% (Property 24, 23 March 2006 – Available at 
http://www.property24.com/Property24/hub/ConstructionIndustry_Full.asp?articleid=3070) (accessed 19 
October 2006). 
281 Economist Intelligence Unit – see 
http://store.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=show_sample&product_id=30000203&country_id=ZA (accessed 14 
October 2006). 
282 See http://www.in2perspective.com/nr/2004/12/south-africa-leads-world-housing-boom.jsp) (accessed 14 
October 2006). 
283 According to Absa Bank, a stand that cost R46 000 in 2003 cost R93 000 in June 2006 (Sunday Independent, 
10 September 2006).  
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frustrate Financial Sector (FSC) commitments to deliver housing opportunities to those in the 
R1 500–R7 500 income bracket (discussed below).  
The negative consequences of the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon economic model (speculation 
and hyper asset inflation) arguably undercut BNG’s objective to promote and deepen the 
housing market. On the eve of a major housing rethink and policy shift in 2004/05, and 
confronted by similar but intensified market forces and under-expenditure by the Department, 
the post-2002 developmental state behaved in very much the same way as it did in 1998/99, 
potentially compromising BNG. Asset creation (as component of the anti-poverty strategy 
(Cross, 2006)) in the context of South Africa ‘ignoring its asset inflation because of central 
bank’s new obsession with restraining the exchange rate’ (Hale, 2006:29), the declining 
savings rate, and affordability constraints expose the limits of a housing programme that to 
date has been budget-driven and which historically eschews comprehensive reform (see 
Worker’s World, 2005). The ‘medicine’ Manuel administered in the late 1990s and in early 
2000s may have been correct in his mind, ‘but the patient’ was paralysed in both instances. 
This is another instance of the idiot looking at the finger when it points to the moon. Or less 
sarcastically, a case of a government department hijacking and derailing the transformation 
project of developmental state’s high priority programme.  
Manuel’s intervention not only resulted in the late-1990s new programme and policy shift in 
housing being aborted. He contributed in large measure to the further weakening of the 
capacity of state, especially at regional level, which Picard (2005:333) notes were ‘in serious 
administrative disarray and vulnerable to corruption’. The failure of the provinces, a ‘major 
problem during the Government of National Unity’ (Ibid) occurred against the backdrop of a 
‘stagnant economy’ and a public sector characterised by ‘increasing competition over 
salaries, an evolving and expanding patronage system and increasingly widespread 
corruption’ (Ibid:19). The rapid promotion of ‘black people’ into the bureaucracy who began 
to adopt the ‘core values, systems and policies of the “old” public service’ (Ibid:334) and the 
‘increasingly centralised control and top down management with a ‘civil service ethos and a 
disempowering work ethic’’ (Ibid:340) could potentially have continuously contributed to 
both (bureaucratic) ‘system maintenance and conservatism’ (Ibid:8). An organisational 
culture fixated on the expansion of the ‘state system’ (Ibid:12) and bureaucrat(ic) 
reproduction is naturally ‘risk adverse’ (sic) (Ibid:16) and is likely to resist ‘systematic efforts 
by new regimes to uproot prior forms’ (Ibid:14) of institutional sedimentation. In other 
words, with a ‘continuity of policy with regard to the structures and processes of government’ 
that ‘reflects ANC conservatism at a policy level’ (Ibid:368), this bureaucracy, which does 
not see itself as part of the institutional system (this includes state-social relations), ‘once 
installed, is difficult to change’ (Ibid:361).  
The ‘formidable capacity for its own reproduction across time and in the face of systematic 
efforts by new regimes to uproot prior forms and new blueprints’ (Ibid:361) inevitably pushes 
towards a ‘crisis management mode’ (Ibid:360) of governance. The failure to invest in 
‘institutional strengthening’ (Ibid:368) and/or institutional hobbling through budget cuts 
which fuels the limited post-apartheid new governance agenda, scuttling progressive 
initiatives and exacerbating rent-seeking is arguably one more symptom of our iatrogenic 
development praxis crises, i.e. the physician injecting the patient with the disease.  
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Birth and Evolution of BNG  
In his address to the first joint sitting of the third democratic Parliament, President Mbeki 
spoke of the intensification of the housing programme through the generation of a 
comprehensive programme within three months (President Mbeki, 2004c). The backdrop to 
this included:  
• A growing housing backlog (the result of population growth and a decline in 
household size); 
• Increased levels of urbanisation and associated poverty; high levels of contact/social 
fabric crimes; ‘stubborn growth of informal settlements’;  
• Poor quality of human settlements that continued to exacerbate urban inefficiencies;  
• The misalignment of national and provincial programme objectives with local 
objectives;  
• Slow down in delivery rates and subsidy approval and under-expenditure;  
• Land availability, assembly and delivery problems;  
• The withdrawal of the private sector from housing construction and credit extension;  
• Limited financial services offered to low income households;  
• Mismatch between subsidy allocation and physical delivery (units on the ground); and 
• Inflexibility of the subsidy to respond to diverse locational and tenure preferences; 
and ineffectiveness of housing institutions to fulfil their mandate (DOH, 2004; 
2004a).  
In addition to these internal and external challenges, identified by Treasury (2003a) were a 
series of intractable problems related to weakness of the urban governance regime to effect 
integration through consensus and co-operation; contradictions between ‘government’s long 
term visionary approach to sustainable urban development and its demand for visible short-
term delivery’ (Ibid:4); cost barriers (especially high land prices) inhibiting socio-spatial 
integration; political economy of urban construction; the spatially marginalising outcomes of 
private investment; the inability of social housing to reconcile needs (of the poorest) and 
affordability; and the ‘subsidy quantum which is too small to attract private lenders’ (Ibid:6).  
The President’s injunction to produce a comprehensive human settlement plan was met by 
the newly appointed Housing Minister, in two months (July); approved by Cabinet in 
September 2004; and implementation set to commence in April 2005. In her first budget 
speech to the National Council of Provinces, the Minister provided some insight into the 
‘central tenets’ that would determine the ‘new direction to break new ground in housing’.  
Resting on five pillars, these comprised a shift from quantity to quality housing; accelerated 
delivery; addressing corruption and maladministration; supporting black economic 
empowerment companies; development of medium-density housing including rental stock; 
and, most controversially, ‘eradication of informal settlements’ (Minister of Housing, 2004a). 
The comprehensive programme, unveiled in September 2004, represents a ‘holistic approach’ 
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(DOH, 2005:9) to housing development comprising the following components: access to 
homes in ‘well-designed, serviced and located human settlements’ with delivery driven by 
need and demand entailing greater flexibility and responsiveness to area-specific needs; 
collapsing of the subsidy system and the inclusion of a R3 500–R7 000 income bracket; 
broadening of tenure choice to include rental accommodation; a revamped social housing 
programme together with the social housing policy; support to informal settlements in a 
phased approach; deeper and more sophisticated engagement with the financial sector via the 
Charter Process; measures to stimulate and enhance the secondary market; inner city 
regeneration and densification; revision of the legislation and codes to bring them into line 
with objectives of the Plan; and institutional and programmatic integration, realignment and 
co-ordination with municipal development plans and local government playing a crucial role 
in the delivery of both housing and the Plan (above extracted from DOH, 2004; DOH, 2005; 
Minister of Housing, 2004b).  
Birth Pains/Complications and Deformities  
Reserving commentary on the contents of the Plan for a later stage, and its many similarities 
with the approaches and recommendations of the DOH’s Sustainable Human Settlements 
Framework (March 2003) (DOH, 2003), what is significant about Framework and Plan is the 
attempt of both to ‘marry’ and integrate sustainable human settlement with the activities of 
Department. Stated as an explicit aim in the Framework (DOH, 2003:7), Charlton and Kihato 
(2006:259) argue that despite the envisaged research and consultation-driven Comprehensive 
Plan formulation process, the BNG document ‘originates out of an amalgamation of 19 
different business plans from various sectoral programmes within the national department’. 
These plans were handed by an embattled, ‘intellectually bankrupt’ Director-General284
The imperative for this instruction was the Director-General’s intention to reinstate her 
control and that of her guardians and protectors (the old guard) over the marginalising BNG 
policy reform process. With the breakdown of the relationship between the Deputy Director-
General and the DG, and via association with the Chief Director of Research, she ‘shut out’  
the new age officials from following through on the Presidential injunction.
  ‘too 
scared…to apply any new ideas or concepts’ (‘risk averse’) – to old style bureaucrats (mainly 
Chief Directors) with the instruction to assemble it into a Plan.  
285 An old guard 
chief director tasked with the production of the Plan failed to deliver to the satisfaction of 
MINMEC, resulting in the DG then employing a ‘consultant with links to the World Bank to 
consolidate into a more rational document’, with the consultant then ‘letting [new age 
officials] in again via the back door’.286
                                                 
284 Personal correspondence: ex-Department of Housing official, 16 October 2006. 
 The extent to which the substantive integrity of BNG 
Plan may have been compromised by these internal organisational dynamics is a tale that 
remains to be narrated. The existence of the Turnaround Strategy and the involvement of the 
new age officials in the drafting of the Plan were fortuitous in ensuring some level of 
alignment between in- and out-of-the box thinking.  
285 Personal correspondence: ex-Department of Housing official, 16 October 2006. 
286 Personal correspondence: ex-Department of Housing official, 16 October 2006. 
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As to whether this alignment was adequate and/or the Comprehensive Plan charts a new 
direction is the subject of heated controversy (a discussion returned to below) as the forensic 
laboratory is still to disseminate its findings on the DNA and fingerprints lifted from the 
pages of the BNG and its associated business plans. The names of the parents registered in 
BNG’s birth certificate will be controversial, and a few are busy already writing obituaries. 
Cross (2005),287 for example, writes about ‘unemployment-induced poverty’ ‘undermining’ 
the housing delivery strategy resulting in abandonment of homes by families unable to meet 
basic service expenses and their movement from formal dwellings to informal settlements 
with the ‘worst case scenario’ being the ‘permanent entrenchment of shack areas’. Her 
proposed solutions are for all sectors to work together to create sustainable jobs (Ibid), and 
more recently, enhancing the affordability of state rental and home ownership options (which 
to date have not been reduced or offset by product innovation, social welfare grants and 
indigency policies). Further recommended is rapid delivery of ‘dirt cheap accommodation at 
point of need’ (Cross, 2006:12, original emphasis) underpinned by flexible decentralised 
community controlled allocation procedures catering for diverse livelihood circumstances; 
‘institutional clean-up’ (21) or bricolage;288
Decommodification and commodification, formalisation and informalisation, regulation and 
deregulation, sustainability and speed are the substance of the controversies surrounding 
BNG as sectoral project and pillar of the developmental state. Not unsurprisingly, it mirrors 
the contradictions in the larger reconstruction agenda of staying or altering the course, 
pragmatic radicalism and radical pragmatism. It is these dynamics and its grounding in the 
fundamentals of White Paper that has led some to argue that the BNG lacks a ‘unifying 
conceptual foundation which offers policy direction into the future’ (Charlton & Kihato, 
2006:259). There is some merit in this finding, given the littering of the BNG document with 
references to details being contained in various Department Business Plans that were, prior to 
the generation of BNG, tweaked along the lines of the in-the-box log framing exercise of 
Department’s November 2002 to February 2003 policy reform initiative. In a sense, BNG 
was retrofitted or made to gel with already existing but modified programmes of the first 
decade policy. A case of the programme directors in possession of solutions to gaps/ 
weaknesses/problems awaiting problem definition; or as some Department officials’ selective 
appropriation of bits, pieces and fragments of the BNG into existing programmes to accord 
with BNG’s ‘form’ but not its content and thrust.  
 (fast-tracking) the provision of good settlement 
locations and extension of tenure security; and more careful balancing of the asset-
accumulation thrust (as component of the anti-poverty strategy) with commoditisation, its 
embedding and the mechanics thereof.  
Efforts to re-define existing programmes and effect regulatory reform, consistent with the 
content and thrust of BNG, confronted high-ranking reformers with formidable challenges, 
the obvious being ‘bureaucratic fatigue and incapability’ (DOH, 2006a:7). More challenging 
though was the underfunding of the strategic centre of power occasioned by Treasury’s 2003 
                                                 
287 Cited in Le Roux, M. 2005. Housing delivery strategy an expensive gamble (Available at 
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?area=/breaking_news_national/&articleid=255383) (accessed 1 
November 2005).  
288 The expansion of ‘governance’ beyond conventional decentralisation, improved accountability and 
transparency to include its mediation and conditioning by community and familial 
arrangements/norms/practices/relationships. 
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decision to deny funding for further capacitation of policy and programme branches and the 
DG’s office. With capacity stretched at the apex of the organisation (a consequence of which 
was inadequate attention being devoted to leading and directing substantive policy and 
regulatory reform) Treasury’s 2003 decision to reprioritise funds ‘within the baseline’ 
(Treasury, 2003b)289
Keeping an even keel in chartered waters, versus exploring unchartered and potentially 
choppy waters, witnessed programme directors sailing close to the shoreline. The captain of 
the barge (Acting-Director-General Ahmedi Vawda) could do little to change the course of 
the ship because that power was vested by state edict and regulation in the hands of 
programme directors whose iron-fisted grip over finances determined the direction, 
destination and speed of the journey. In other words, unchallengeable financial dominance of 
(chief) directors secured domination over the content and trajectory of policy in an 
organisation whose culture is predominantly self-serving and internally focused. The 
authoring of policy codification in legislation and regulation by those whose skills, 
knowledge and expertise derives from decades of service to the authoritarian apartheid state 
is close to unchallengeable and incontestable. By fault of history, their monopoly of expertise 
in codification and enforcement strips praxis (in its form and content) of any progressive hue 
and colour. When history, culture and organisation in resource-constrained work and task 
environments is mixed with abnormally configured reporting and accounting lines – for 
example, chief directors encouraged and supported by the DG to bypass their immediate 
superiors and/or the DG assigning work to chief directors without the knowledge of the 
Deputy Director-General policy programme head (see DOH, 2007:49), who shoulders 
enormous responsibility but has little money to disburse or authority - the power and empire 
of programme directors is both boosted and bolstered by fiscal austerity and organisational 
realpolitik.  
 - to effect both housing programme amendments and internal 
restructuring - further reinforced the prevailing ‘doing more with less’ financial mantra and 
its associated system maintenance tendencies.  
Bureaucratic mistrust, stonewalling and warfare present progressive reformers with a 
veritable minefield of obstacles that slows down and hampers timely and responsive 
introduction and adaptation of policy, legislation and regulation. Indeed, at a recent meeting 
of the Department, provinces and cities to discuss the implementation of BNG, a common 
refrain was about the ‘huge policy and instruments gap at national level’, which coupled to 
Department’s ‘little communication and consultation’ with municipalities and provincial 
administration produces ‘discrepanc[ies] in the messages coming out [from the Department] 
which create…inconsistency’ (DOH, 2006a:4). Thus, if realpolitik, resource scarcity and the 
in-the-box and out-of-the-box prohibit robust retooling, historically unresolved institutional 
alignment, integration and co-operation dilemmas are presently being papered over by 
‘[a]greements and MOUs [memoranda of understanding]’ that are ‘now driving development, 
instead of policies from national department’ (Ibid:4–5). Almost twelve years into 
implementation of the housing programme, provinces, the recipients and allocators of the 
housing subsidy are still ‘not always clear about [their] legislative roles’ in housing 
production with concerns presently being expressed about ‘them acting as super developers’ 
                                                 
289 This is despite strong countervailing arguments related to the economic and social multiplier effects of 
housing as pointed out by the Minister, the Director-General and the Chief Financial Officer of Housing (DOH, 
2003d). 
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(Ibid:5). Local government, on the other hand, still ‘questions’ whether ‘housing is also their 
core function’ and/or ‘do not see housing as their primary role’ (Ibid).  
Instruments, Institutions and Impurity  
Historical and present compromises in the inter-related, yet disarticulated, rhythms, 
sequencing and patterning of political transition, democratic consolidation and post-
stabilisation constitutes the primary reason for confused and contradictory institutional 
(shelter delivery) mandates. The ‘practicalities’’ of rapid shelter delivery in the early phases 
of political liberalisation, the ‘pragmatic’ orientation of the pre-election NHF negotiation 
process and the conservative (predominantly Urban Foundation) discourse coalition that 
powered the form and content of ‘solutions’ witnessed the adoption of a housing policy that 
Huchzermeyer (2003:604) asserts ‘coincided with the ANC’s interpretation of democracy’, 
i.e. a centralised state as ‘essential to the amelioration of apartheid-induced inequalities’. By 
extension, ‘considered appropriate’ was a ‘strongly centralized housing policy orchestrating 
efficient delivery’. Secondly, a once-off IDT-styled capital subsidy (plus rudimentary shelter) 
was not incompatible with a rights-based post-apartheid development project fashioned 
though in the apartheid ‘image of a township house’ that the existing state and bureaucracy 
was experienced in delivering. Lastly, rapidity and ease of implementation of a repressive 
‘orderly urbanisation’ instrument by a centralised state served well the target of delivering 
one million houses in five years. The material patterning, packaging and delivery of the 
housing intervention and its instruments, coupled to the imparted and demonstrated 
centralised generation of norms and standards spans transition, consolidation and post-
stabilisation phases, and thereby bedevilling attempts to effect an institutional re-division of 
labour.  
Instrument Impurity 
In the period between 1994 and the early 2000s, the Department embarked on a ‘process of 
fundamental restructuring’ of the delivery apparatus with a view to installing a ‘coherent 
institutional structure to execute policy’. With ‘very little of the old [institutional] 
dispensation’
Institutional Impurity, [Mis]Alignment, [Dis]Integration  
290
The delivery of the one million houses
 deemed ‘worthy of being salvaged’ (legislatively undergirded as it was by an 
‘inequitable’, ‘poorly targeted and unevenly resourced’ distribution and range of benefits) 
‘fundamental restructuring’, in the shadow of GEAR, was indeed a mammoth task.  
291
                                                 
290 Comprising ‘no fewer than nineteen policy and executive institutions, each with its own agencies, at the 
national and provincial levels of government, under the former “Homelands and Own Affairs” 
dispensations’(DOH, nd:4). 
 had not only to contend with the pressures and 
strains of ‘fundamental restructuring’ and an inadequate budget, but also with the ‘withering 
of state capacity in the fields as diverse as construction, building materials management, 
291 Which the Department claims would ‘have been achieved in the 1998/99 financial year’ if ‘sufficient funds 
had been available’. 
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public works delivery, retail financing, and management’ (Bond, 2006:11). In the shadow of 
GEAR, the ‘ability’ of both provinces and municipalities to discharge the ‘additional 
responsibilities’ conferred on them by the 1996 Ministerial Task Team were ‘severely 
limited’ (Ibid).  
Fundamental restructuring also had to contend with the [1993] Interim Constitution’s 
structuring of the housing function as a ‘concurrent competence’ (S126 of the Constitution of 
South Africa Amendment Act No. 2 of 1994). In the words of the ex-Deputy Director 
General of the Department of Housing, this was a ‘surprise’ as the ‘initial expectation was 
that housing would be structured as a national competence’ (Narsoo, 2000:3). Twelve years 
later, the ‘management of the concurrency of the housing function’, the Minister remarks, is 
‘[o]ur biggest challenge’ (Minister of Housing, 2006a).  
Yet, with provinces ‘not always clear about their legislative roles’ (see above), ‘overlooking’ 
policies to accelerate service delivery (see below), and, their ‘weak capacity…to implement 
integrated programmes’ (with respect to ‘leadership at management level, community 
involvement and poor vertical integration’(President Mbeki, 2005a)), it is indeed most 
puzzling how the June 2005 Housing MINMEC resolved to assign provinces a ‘greater role’ 
in direct delivery and municipal support:  
Provincial governments, will in future play a greater role in the planning, co-
ordination, prioritization, facilitation and supporting and monitoring of municipalities 
to ensure that they succeed in the execution of their housing functions. We are 
working on a phased approach to accreditation of municipalities. For the meantime, 
MINMEC has resolved that until that process is done and municipalities have the 
necessary capacity, they would like to remain fully in charge of the provision of 
housing, assisted by municipalities (DOH, 2005c:3).  
The ‘inherent contradictions’, remarks Napier and Vawda (2006:2), ‘in attempting to devolve 
housing responsibilities to the local level while mandates remain in place to strengthen [and 
currently reinforce] provincial and national government driven delivery’ are unlikely to be 
resolved. Indeed, if statements by the Minister are anything to go by, both the ‘feet of 
delivery’ (local government) (Minister of Housing, 2005a), and provincial government292
Returning to the theme about the problems plaguing restructuring and the institutional 
division of labour, it will be recalled that local government under apartheid was ‘totally 
discredited and had lost the ability to play to fulfil a meaningful role in housing delivery’ 
(DOH, nd:4). The Interim Constitution and the Local Government Transition Act came to 
define local government as an ‘autonomous tier of government’ but this was one of 
‘operational independence’, i.e. ‘synonymous with management autonomy with regard to the 
mechanics of decision-making, organisational structure and …mode of implementation’ 
(Chipkin, 2002:65). Little attention was paid to local government in this Constitution to 
 
could possibly see their existing autonomy being whittled away by a centralising national 
department.  
                                                 
292 In the context of managing the ‘biggest challenge’ of ‘concurrency’, ‘development planning, project 
management, and alignments of funding sources’ (Minister of Housing, 2006a). 
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housing ‘but this omission’ was ‘later corrected in the final [1996] constitution’ (Narsoo, 
2000:4).  
While the final Constitution awarded more powers and autonomy to local government 
(Chipkin, 2002), the introduction of GEAR in 1996 (‘further’) reduced the powers of all tiers 
of government (Chipkin 1997 cited in Huchzermeyer, 2001:321), which played itself out in 
the White Paper on Local Government, with some warning of the ‘demobilisation of labour 
and communities’ arising from the citizens having to invest in largely ‘technocratic 
processes’ of delivery ( Bond & Mayekiso, 1998 cited in Huchzermeyer, 2001:321).  
Chipkin (1997) identifies in the South African definition of local government the assumption 
that ‘delivery is in fact uncontroversial, that it was simply an administrative/managerial 
experience and that there is no contestation in the mode, level, coverage and/or financing of 
such services’ (cited in Huchzermeyer, 2001:321). With this assumption, the ‘schizophrenia 
of early policy documents prepared within the NHF and government’ (Narsoo, 2000:7) 
related to the total compatibility between meeting targets and integrated settlement; failure to 
acknowledge the ‘fiscal and institutional constraints’ to follow either of the (‘compatible’) 
approaches (Ibid); the historical exclusion of local government to ‘input’ in ‘national 
[housing] policy formulation’ (DOH, 2004c:164); ‘the absence of effective planning 
frameworks’ (Narsoo, 2000:7) to guide and direct spatial interventions293
Although greater clarity on the autonomy, duties and competencies of local government was 
delivered via the 1996 Constitution, the Local Government White Paper and the 1997 
Housing Act (and subsequent amendments), the dramatic expansion of the overall 
developmental responsibilities (not powers) of local government in the late 1990s in both 
scale and scope but with only marginal increases in revenue, 
 or, as the 
Department puts it, ‘no clear stance on spatial intervention’(DOH, 2004c:164); and the 
dominance of the private sector in housing delivery (through the project-linked delivery 
route), housing projects in the period 1994–1996 were mired in ‘confusions and 
misunderstandings’ of the role of local government in shelter delivery, procedures and 
processes to access subsidies, and ‘municipalities were often found to allocate numbers of 
beneficiaries that exceeded the allocation figures for houses and subsidies’ (DOH, 
2004c:159).  
294
                                                 
293 E.g. the Development Facilitation Act (67 of 1995), the Local Government Transition Act (209 of 1993) and 
the Local Government Transition Act Second Amendment Act (97 of 1996). 
 the (continued) non-
resolution of problems related to the issues of the subsidy shortfall to deliver on nationally 
determined norms and standards, and the operational expenditure to support their housing 
function, has prevented more ex-/intensive municipal engagement with the housing 
programme. On balance then, the above-mentioned constraints, ‘institutional upheaval’ 
(DOH, 2004c:162) wrought by a lengthy and messy local government restructuring process, 
and chasing targets, have not presented conducive circumstances for local government 
involvement in the 1990s. The Department comments as follows:  
294 Local government at the end of the 1990s was providing services to five times more people than was the case 
in the past – notably in the formerly disadvantaged areas – with only marginal increases in revenue (Financial 
and Fiscal Commission cited in Mail & Guardian, 5 March 1999). 
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... [m]ost of the projects in the 1990s gave little opportunity for the involvement of 
local authorities in co-ordinating and directing an overall programme of housing 
delivery in which development occurred in agreed locations, in a sequence that 
allowed for integration with related service providers, in a manner that responded to 
the most urgent needs and priorities… The resultant programme implementation was 
piecemeal and uncoordinated (DOH, 2004c:164).  
Notwithstanding the fundamental restructuring process; the improved role definition and 
responsibilities of the various spheres of government elaborated in the 1997 Housing Act and 
revisions, the Housing MINMEC295
Some policy prescripts, says local government officials - the ‘eradication of informal 
settlements’ being a case in point - are simply ‘not achievable’ flowing from a disjuncture 
between the ‘needs of communities of the communities and what government can 
“realistically” afford to provide’ (Ibid). Moreover, with no funding provided to local 
government to finance the devolved housing function (Ibid:46), many of them have ‘sought 
to finance the shortfall by borrowing from other sources, including the private banking 
sector… [which] has reportedly plunged some municipalities into a debt cycle’ (Ibid). A case 
in point mentioned by the mouthpiece of the senior management of the public service, the 
Service Delivery Review, is the N2 Gateway Project, which is estimated to cost 
‘approximately R2 billion per annum’. Against the backdrop of an ‘annual national housing 
budget of R4.5 billion, and medium trends, it clear that the national department allocates 
insufficient funds for this project’, which may force the City of Cape Town to ‘source 
additional funding, most probably through loans’ (Ibid).  
, the joint forum of the heads of the provincial and 
national department that support MINMEC, and the housing institutions, vertical and 
horizontal co-ordination and integration dilemmas still loom large as recorded in the SMM 
Report, the Turnaround Strategy and BNG. In a study by the Department of Public Service 
and Administration on the capacity of government to implement integrated development 
programmes, BNG being one of them, the report notes that the complicated and ‘difficult to 
implement’ policies result in provincial and local government ‘overlook[ing]’ them in ‘order 
to accelerate’ delivery (Moss, 2006:46).  
High-level, political and administrative intergovernmental structures comprising top 
politicians and officials may facilitate some degree of co-ordination, integration and 
alignment but most of the intergovernmental structures at sectoral and cross-sectoral levels 
have ‘ineffective structures’ at ‘operational levels’ (Ibid). It is perhaps too early to pronounce 
on the effectiveness of the Interministerial Committee to align and integrate policies and 
programmes of the various sectors to deliver on sustainable (integrated) human settlement 
development, important to bear in mind is that the ‘bulk of the policy [for housing] was 
completed by the time of the first elections’ (Narsoo, 2000:7). Hence, housing policy had a 
‘two to three year policy lead time over other sectors’ (Ibid).  
Negotiations in the various sectors over the division of labour between the spheres of 
government and their subsequent finalisation and/or refinement after the adoption of the 
Constitution, excluded the housing department. It comes as no surprise then that there was 
                                                 
295 Comprising the Minister of Housing, the nine members of the provincial executive councils responsible for 
housing and the Chairperson of SALGA. This non-statutory forum meets at least quarterly.  
 237 
 
and still is ‘no coherent system of planning for housing across all spheres of government’ 
(DOH, 2004c:164). The delivery of sustainable human settlement is further compromised, 
notes the Department of Public Service and Administration study, by ‘conflicting mandates 
between various government programmes’ (e.g. eradication of informal settlements by 2014 
requires the use of a delivery machinery that may not accord with the strictures of the 
Expanded Public Works Programme) and the ‘absence of alignment between budgets of the 
departments’ and spheres of government that ‘participate in the delivery of integrated 
programmes’ (Moss, 2006:48). The charge of Pieterse and von Donk (forthcoming) related to 
the institutional, programmatic and financial un-readiness of the state and Department to 
execute a programme implicating multiple departments (BNG) is a historical problem, 
hardwired into successive episodes of policy reformulation and instrument redesign.  
In the post-stabilisation period, public administration reform is ‘now strongly focused on 
building local government capacity, training and organisational reforms’ (Treasury, 
2006:104). In the housing sector, the ‘enhancement of institutional capacity at local 
government level’ is perceived as central to respond to the ‘rapid pace of urbanisation’ 
(Ibid:109) and the linked programmes of social housing, informal settlement upgrade and 
emergency housing. Minister Sisulu, in support of BNG’s effective implementation, 
reportedly tabled draft legislation before Cabinet in 2005 that confers on municipalities a 
‘substantial role in the delivery of well-constructed houses; as well as engineering the 
integration of communities through mixed-income residential areas’; and the ‘planning and 
construction of housing’ (paraphrased cited in SACN, 3 November 2005).296
The South African Local Government Association has come to endorse the pivotal role of 
local government in BNG subject to ‘appropriate levels of capacity’ being developed in 
municipalities; the ‘adoption of negotiated accelerated intervention mechanisms to resolve 
backlogs and challenges’ confronting municipalities; ‘securing a stable funding protocol’ for 
the provision of amenities and facilities; ‘introduction of a framework for the provision of 
temporary basic services in informal settlements’; introduction of a ‘housing peer support 
knowledge sharing programme’; and the conclusion of a ‘compact to ensure appropriate 
prioritisation of publicly owned land in favour of housing’ (SALGA Chairperson, Amos 
Masondo, 31 October 2006).
  
297
... [m]unicipalities need to be adequately capacitated, equipped and funded to take 
over the administration of national housing programmes; they need to comply with 
national housing and financial management legislation; and they need to drive 
delivery from integrated development planning through to the management of rental 
housing stock (Treasury, 2006:78).  
 Whether the Department will meet these conditions through 
delivery of their envisaged ‘comprehensive capacity building programme’ aimed at 
‘progressive accreditation’ of municipalities (DOH, Statement of the June 2005 MINMEC:3) 
is unsure. The statements of the Finance Ministry provides little source of hope stating 
blandly that  
                                                 
296 See http://www.sacities.net/2005/nov4_housing.stm (accessed 24 October 2006). 
297 See http://www.housing.gov.za/Content/Municipal%20Housing%20I/31%20October%202005(SALGA).htm 
(National Housing Indaba – 31 October 2005) (accessed 29 November 2005). 
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The Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (Treasury, 2005:6) speaks only of ‘[t]argeted 
support for municipalities under stress, and for critical infrastructure development capacity in 
identified provincial departments and local authorities’ and Treasury’s 2006 Local 
Government Budgets and Expenditure Review: 2001/02–2007/08 mentions an increase in the 
transfers to local government (equitable share) (expected to ‘rise 7 per cent over the medium 
term’ (Treasury, 2006a:4)), but says nothing explicit about capacity-building and/or the 
matters alluded to above. In the interim, there are conflicting statements emanating from the 
Department on local government’s role in the BNG. Rhetorical flourishes about the 
indispensable role of local government in BNG’s successful execution (the ‘feet of delivery’, 
in the words of the Minister) and the spirited support for accreditation, in the context of 
‘increasing anger about from beneficiaries about the pace of delivery’ (SACN, 3 November 
2005)298 and the centrality of service delivery to freedom (President Mbeki paraphrased, 27 
April 2006)299
The simple reality that faces all of us is that – rightly so – our communities are 
interested in the ultimate delivery of housing to them. They are less interested in 
knowing which sphere of government is responsible for delivering housing; nor are 
they interested in hearing about the convoluted processes within government that 
seem to fail in realizing housing opportunities for all. 
 induces confused responses from the Minister on local government and 
housing. In response to the service delivery and housing protests in June 2005, the 
Department issued a statement that the ‘protests are aimed at the local government spheres 
apparent lack of delivery’ over which the ‘National Department has no jurisdiction’ (DOH, 
2005f). ‘Absolving itself [Department] of blame over community protests against the slow 
pace of delivery’ (Cape Times, 2 June 2005), despite the constitutional injunction of national 
and provincial government being obliged to strengthen the capacity of municipalities to 
manage their own affairs (S154(1)) and the charge of Chairman of SALGA Chairperson that 
municipalities are being blamed unfairly for the lack of/poor delivery of housing when this 
responsibility belonged to national and provincial government (cited in Business Day, 3 
November 2005), the Minister conceded that ‘municipalities have not been given a clear 
mandate for housing delivery’. She further said:  
The recent protests across the municipalities have highlighted these realities. 
Situations arose where because of failures to perform in respect of housing delivery 
communities then decide to simply march to the municipality and knock on the 
Mayor’s door demanding speedy delivery. Invariably the Mayors were then placed in 
some very awkward positions where they were required to account for responsibilities 
that did not belong to their spheres of governance. In other cases, the delivery failures 
of municipalities were blamed on both the national and provincial governments. And 
worse still, frustrations boiled over on account of some lengthy processes that needed 
to be followed in all three spheres of governments to address certain complaints and 
grievances (Minister of Housing, 2005d). 
Recognising that municipalities had ‘not been given a clear mandate for housing’ and that 
insufficient capacity exists/ed in local government to ‘carry housing delivery’ owing to the 
capacity not specifically being built nor funded, accreditation, she said, would proceed on the 
                                                 
298 See http://www.sacities.net/2005/nov4_housing.stm (accessed 24 October 2006). 
299 See http://www.sacities.net/2006/apr27_freedom.stm (accessed 12 May 2006).  
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basis of ‘sound funding arrangements and accountability, appropriate governance 
arrangements, as well as systematic capacity development of the provinces and 
municipalities’ (Ibid). Underscoring the indispensability of effective inter-governmental 
relations for the delivery of sustainable human settlements, thick in her speech was the need 
for government to move towards being a ‘seamless entity whose local face and presence 
within communities comes through municipalities’ (Ibid). On the back of this, the Minister 
pitched for the establishment of an institutional ‘compact’ to ‘guarantee’, amongst others, ‘a 
three-tier intervention…whenever necessary’ allowing ‘us to govern co-operatively across 
spheres of government, recognising that in effect we are a single government, albeit, being 
constituted as…spheres, which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated’ (Ibid).  
Clearly, these statements are in sharp contrast to the previous ones absolving the national 
Department of any blame over community protests and demonstrations. With the ‘feet of 
delivery’ as the ‘local face and presence’ of state, one would imagine a local government set 
to be empowered in ways that elevates its historically junior status in the ‘housing delivery 
value chain’ (Minister of Housing, 2006a:2), i.e. locating and focusing capacity in accord 
with DOH’s commitment to the principle of subsidiarity. Sadly, the extent to which this may 
potentially be developmentally-driven (given BNG’s demand-driven, supply-negotiated 
thrust which is predicated to a considerable degree on placing ‘local government at the centre 
of action’ (Pieterse & van Donk, 2006:4) in localised assemblies of market, hierarchy and 
network is debatable as it bumps up against a ‘politicised technocratic’ approach adopted by 
the Department in a project showcasing BNG. In mind here is the N2 Gateway Project.  
N2 Pilot/Gateway Project  
Predating the announcement of SA as host to the 2010 World Cup, the N2 Gateway was 
championed and driven by an ANC Housing Minister, MEC and Mayor. The project – the 
first endorsed by MINMEC under the new strategy and mentioned in BNG (DOH, 2004a:12) 
and approved by Cabinet – was premised inter-alia on targeted alleviation of the housing 
crisis in one of the City’s deepest pockets of poverty;300 strategic deployment and investment 
of public resources to build the social and public economy;301
                                                 
300 Through this intervention, the three spheres of government will collectively contribute to dramatically 
reducing the shelter poverty of over 10 000 households, 97% of whom reside in shacks. The dent that the project 
makes in addressing the housing needs of the inadequately housed families in the Western Cape is in the order 
of 7%. 
 and most importantly, robust 
re-engineering of co-operative governance relationships around a new housing strategy 
through a project/area-based approach that could potentially yield valuable insights into how 
to improve resource and programmatic realignments. A critical consideration motivating the 
intervention resided in a recognition that the capabilities and capacities of the metropolitan 
301 It is envisaged that the largest percentage of the dwellings will be social housing with tenure types ranging 
from rental to group ownership to co-operative. This is in line with the new strategy of diversifying tenure 
options and citizen choice. More importantly, though, with respect to efficient and effective deployment of 
public resources as this relates to building the social economy, the medium density housing component of the 
new strategy, according to the Minister, witnesses a return to state-owned rental accommodation – a key part of 
the new approach. Government will build walk-up apartment blocks of five storeys at a cost of R60 000 per unit 
and will rent these at fixed subsidised rates. In the words of the Minister: ‘We will have to anticipate the rate of 
urbanisation and the maturation of society. That is why we are going full steam ahead into rental housing. We 
hope that will absorb a great number of the people we would like to accommodate’ (cited in Khan, 2004b).  
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authority to cope with the housing challenge was seriously impaired owing to local 
government, in the words of the Minister, being a ‘poorly defined actor in the shelter sector’. 
A further complication, the Minister remarked, was the ‘under-developed’ nature of the co-
operative governance regime in ‘specific policy/programmatic areas’ compared to its ‘well-
developed’ nature in the ‘political and financial’ realm (Minister of Housing, 2006e). Against 
this backdrop, a Memorandum of Understanding/Operational Agreement enshrined the 
division of labour as one wherein local government would be the main implementation 
agency, with provincial and national Departments of Housing providing support via (inter 
alia) facilitating access to land; unlocking and mobilising funding; streamlining regulations 
and fast tracking applications; and fostering an enabling and empowering implementation 
environment.  
The achievements and failures of the project aside. At very grave risk of over-simplification 
of a complex tale, provincial government, partly in response to extremely poor project 
management and alleged corruption in tender processes and, conscious of the ANC’s 
impending defeat in the March local government elections, transferred, in February 2006, 
responsibility for the project from the City to the provincial housing department. The City 
however was the entity that signed project management and construction contracts and was 
thus financially liable. Shortly after the defeat of the ANC in the municipal elections, the 
Democratic Alliance Mayor refused to carry the (over-run) costs of the N2 Gateway on the 
grounds of the project being ‘an unfunded mandate’, generated at the ‘directive’ of the 
national housing department, not in accordance with ‘existing [housing] policies’/‘without a 
proper policy [and funding] framework’, and thus bereft of project ‘protocols’ (Helen Zille, 
cited in Cape Times, 6 June 2006). Detailing these concerns in a letter directed at the other 
‘partners’ in this project, and poised to launching a forensic audit into the project,302
It would perhaps be not too wayward to question the Minister’s assertion on the stellar 
performance of the ‘well-developed’ political and financial relationships of the co-operative 
governance regime. It would perhaps be a tad wayward to suggest that money and politics are 
not strange bedfellows as all spheres now have to carry the financial can. If this is the case, 
then most unsettling are the following words of the Minister, lifted directly from the 
newspaper article, which speaks not only to a (politicised)/technocratic interpretation of co-
operative governance, especially given the nature and orientation of the N2 Gateway Project 
(massive and rapid delivery of state-defined ‘good as it get’ solutions), and/or centralising 
project, but also the importance of local government from the guardian of the Plan: 
 the 
Minister reportedly ‘booted the City of Cape Town out of the N2 Gateway housing project’ 
(Cape Argus, 13 June 2006). The many acrimonious and bitter exchanges preceding this 
‘booting out’ and the Mayor’s concerns recorded in the letter are of some importance. More 
significant though is the leaking of the letter to the press prior to the Minister reading it. The 
Minister’s response: ‘It’s so unprofessional, so unethical’ (original words) (Ibid). She 
reportedly added that government ‘refused to accept this break with protocol’ (paraphrased) 
and ‘[w]e now want to cut our losses, cut our relationship with the city. We will do this one 
alone’ (original words). Welcoming the audit, she proceeded to commit all spheres to 
payment of outstanding costs.  
                                                 
302 Reportedly on the grounds of non-compliance to basic procedures of contracts, financial sloth and project 
mismanagement (Cape Argus, 13 June 2006). 
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Describing her move as a “constitutional dispute”, Sisulu said that the city was 
“recused of all responsibilities to the project”.  
Housing was a national and provincial competence, and they alone would be 
responsible for the project. 
The City’s role would from on, be “nothing”, other than the provision of 
infrastructure and services…(Ibid). 
Trite the claim is that constitutionally grounded developmental state construction is insulated 
from the fortunes and vagaries of money and politics. Indeed, the whittling away of 
provincial autonomy, for example, by the Minister of Finance, attests to the selective 
appropriation of those clauses of the Constitution that enhance Treasury’s control. Provincial 
fiscal autonomy and general regional policy autonomy (a potential outcome of 
implementation of all constitutional provisions) ‘plays second fiddle to macroeconomic 
policy’. Fiscal decentralisation, contends Van Zyl, is ‘limited and, essentially reduced to an 
administrative tool’ (2003:35–6). In housing, one observes an increasing shift to mega-
projects, or the supposedly ‘collectively prioritise[d] key development projects that can be 
determined, funded and driven by the Minister, within the spirit of Co-operative Governance, 
so as to achieve maximum effectiveness in dealing with some of the monumental challenges’ 
(Minister of Housing, 2006:6). Then there is the talk of an institutional ‘compact’ entrenching 
the seamless and single government. And the political guardians of the compact are the 
Mayors, Premiers and MECs, hand chosen by the party bosses and beholden unto them. Then 
there is the ‘nothing’ status of local government and its questioning as a ‘viable’ delivery 
‘conduit’ (Ndumo, 2006:4), who awaiting accreditation and capacitation, are to assist 
provincial government (the super developers, whose bosses are handpicked by the party) to 
‘remain fully in charge of the provision of housing’ (DOH, 2005c).  
Further, there is the re-mandating and re-orientation of the housing institutions, which part of 
the initial fundamental restructuring initiative of the early 1990s were designed to fill 
capacity gaps with respect to the implementation of specific programmes/projects/initiatives 
(1994–2003). With the view to improving their performance and functional re-alignment - 
these include NHFC, NURCHA, NHBRC and others - BNG’s intention to enhance oversight 
of their activities is indicative of trends in the wider systemic re-orientation of public entities. 
On top of all this, is the subordinate referencing of the human settlement development to 
ASGISA and NSDP imperatives (see Ndumo, 2006 for this line of thinking) to which the 
BNG also adds the Urban Development Strategy;303
Although not disassociated from neoliberal governmentalities of rule, centralisation is not 
necessarily inimical to the developmental objectives and outcomes that BNG strives towards. 
In the context of the global slaughtering of the many holy cows extolling the virtues of 
decentralisation (as a ‘composite policy answer’ (Ben-Alia, 1996:6) to state failure, deformed 
 the rightsizing of the IDPs (the 
foundational stones of BNG) to NSDP methodologies and imperatives; and the introduction 
of urban restructuring and neighbourhood development projects, devised and driven by 
Treasury (Treasury, 2006:110). Observed here is an unmistakable top-down and centralist 
project.  
                                                 
303 See DOH, 2004a:12–6.  
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development, illiberal democracy, and fiscal austerity),304
Evans (2005:30) argues that the ‘effectiveness of public institutions depends on ‘hybridity’’, 
‘an integrated balance among three different (sometimes contradictory) modes of guiding 
administrative action’, i.e. bureaucratic capacity, market signals and democratic engagement. 
Harnessing the power of the state requires a rebalancing of the ‘tripod’ which in the 
contemporary period is inordinately weighted towards the market. Positing the need for the 
reconstruction of the bureaucracy along lines not dissimilar to Weberian models (not least for 
its demonstrated superior performance in the administrative and poverty amelioration 
spheres) and the reading of ‘market signals’ in ways that build ‘institutional structures’ 
connecting the ‘delivery of collective goods with the preferences of citizens and users’ and 
the ‘relative scarcity’ of resources (citing here the private sector operated public transport 
systems in Curitiba and Porto Alegre), Evans asserts that without ‘effective bottom-up 
control’, neither responsive state reform nor market restructuring will deliver on citizen needs 
and priorities. While there are no easy ways/short-cuts to strengthen the ‘democratic leg of 
this tripod’, it is the ‘sine qua non’ (original emphasis:27) to effective state performance 
citing the examples of Kerala and Porto Alegre. On the other hand, where local conditions 
may not be conducive to official insemination of deliberative democracy, Tendler (1997) 
offers some clues into ways and means to break local resistance to progressive reform. Manor 
(2004) also identifies a range of ‘carrots’ (incentives) and ‘sticks’ (disincentives) that can be 
wielded by senior politicians and officials in combating resistance and securing local level 
compliance.  
 Tendler (1997) has demonstrated 
the pivotal role of central government, which took away power from local government, but 
‘ultimately contributed to strengthening the capacity of local government’ (147). The activist 
central state engaged in unconventional actions that democratised relations at local 
level/public sphere thereby facilitating more equitable planning outcomes, i.e. central state 
intervention and active citizenship are not antithetical.  
Steadily, government is beginning to utilise the techniques and strategies alluded to above. 
For instance, in the arena of land reform, those social movements calling for the speeding up 
                                                 
304 Democratisation of local institutions – usually in the decentralisation guise – is largely undertaken as ‘an act 
of faith’ (Smith, 1998:86); something which is considered to be a prerequisite of national democracy. It is 
commonly argued (McCarney, 1996) that it leads to improved service delivery; restrains the excesses of national 
governments and the anti-democratic tendencies of centralised power; and provides a better quality of 
participation than does national and regional government. Across the globe, the establishment of strong local 
government is perceived to be a necessary condition for successful democratisation; market-oriented economic 
policy frameworks; local economic development; effective management of urbanisation; and the establishment 
of environmentally sustainable planning and development systems (Swilling & Monteiro, 1994; World Bank, 
1997, 2000). Projected (incorrectly) as a ‘composite policy answer’ (Ben-Alia, 1996:6) to the decreasing 
effectiveness of central interventions, economic and fiscal constraints, and the growing claims for local 
democracy and citizen’s rights, decentralisation, in the context of unequal power structures and circuits, leads to 
bureaucratic dominance, deep-seated patronage networks, a weak civil society, etc. (Haque, 1997), and does not 
necessarily translate into facilitating planning from local areas upwards; developmental mobilisation of local 
level resources; or enhancing the performance of government institutions in alleviating poverty and assisting 
vulnerable groups (see amongst others, Manor, 1995, 1999). In fact, decentralisation in many developing 
countries has worsened the organisational crisis of the public sector as local and state governments are burdened 
with tasks that they are unable to properly execute (Gazaryan, & Kersytle, 1997). In numerous instances, 
decentralisation has sharpened inequality between localities, undermined economic stability, and institutions 
have been prone to capture by powerful local groups leading to the misuse of resources (World Bank, 1997). 
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of land reform, a re-evaluation of the ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ model and a Land 
Summit (as far back as 2003), namely the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), often 
confronted a hostile state that in early 2004 resorted to jailing protesters, intimidation, and the 
detention and torture of LPM members (see Greenberg, 2006:150). Rumours of the 
involvement of ex-Deputy Minister of Intelligence, now the Housing Minister, in the 
detention and torture of LPM members were thick in the air. 
With the spectre of Zimbabwe type land invasions in the horizon, intransigent sellers and a 
small budget, government eventually conceded to a Land Summit. The Summit’s resolution 
to re-evaluate the ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ model armed government with the necessary 
support base and mandate to announce shortly afterwards the scrapping of the model and 
resorting, in quite an emboldened and determined manner, to expropriation within a 
constitutional framework. In the case of farmworkers, their low levels of organisation and 
unionisation and the historical slave-master type employment relationships and patterns 
(lubricated by the devastatingly destructive dop system) precluded productive negotiation 
with a powerful white commercial agriculture sector around better wages. The state then 
stepped in on behalf of the farmworkers and legislated a minimum wage. Moreover, to 
improve their housing conditions, a farm worker housing policy is in the making and the 
subsidy scheme and the land restitution programme have recently been aligned (DOH, 
2005b).  
In the housing sector, a constant refrain of the Minister, in engagements with both other 
spheres of government and those outside the state, with reference to the causes of service 
delivery protests is ‘failure’ (Minister of Housing, 2005c) and the inability of those with 
power, influence and resources to ‘appropriately’ (Ibid) co-ordinate and integrate their work. 
Suspending commentary on the validity of this assertion, and standing accused of a 
superficial reading of Tendler (1997) and Manor (2004), partial confirmation of better 
programmatic performance deriving from political involvement and co-ordinated action is 
verified by the President’s comment in his media briefing on the July 2005 Cabinet Lekgotla:  
A study specifically on capacity in the area of housing, at national and provincial 
levels, has identified concrete challenges with regard to skills, staff turnover, 
discrepancies in conditions of service among spheres of government and public 
entities inhibiting staff mobility, an excessive vacancy rate and so on. The study also 
points to high rates of success in instances where political leaders play a visible role, 
and where communication with communities is optimal. The same applies to 
instances where officials across the three spheres agree on feasibility of targets, 
correctly interpret policies and translate executive decisions into concrete projects for 
implementation. Confirming the central importance of building partnerships across 
society, the study also found that [amongst others]…community involvement [is] 
critical to the success of projects (President Mbeki, 2005a). 
Intergovernmental political and operational co-operation in (lead and pilot) projects, driven 
and directed by central government, to address capacity constraints and/or break the back of 
resistance and/or facilitate innovation offers some promising opportunities/hope for improved 
performance and outcomes. From this vantage point, the supplemented mandate of the 
Department, i.e. policy generation, oversight and monitoring plus direct involvement in 
delivery, may be beneficial to unblocking stalled projects and constitutionalising a maximally 
enabling implementation regime via codification of flexible division of labour (between 
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market, state and community) at local (and other) level/s around chosen instruments. 
Moreover, the prospect exists of tilting the institutional balance in ways that better suit/meet 
the needs of communities via, for example, negotiated and rapid instrument adaptation and 
ensuring compliance to objectives and targets through enhanced improved reporting, 
accountability and monitoring technologies/techniques. The intended comprehensive review 
of housing legislation (Minister of Housing, 2006c), the revision of National Housing Code - 
depending on who the authors and drivers are - and the commitment by the Department to 
forge a social contract, with amongst others, non-governmental organisations (who could 
prove to be valuable allies in combating resistance to change from community level 
upwards)),305
BNG Evaluation: Fundamental Departure, Improvement, No Change  
 present opportunities for a national government to drive a developmental 
rightsizing of institutions, policies and programmes.  
The transformative potential of the existing inequitable development landscapes and 
ecologies through these variants of a (somewhat diluted-resembling) Latin American version 
of vertical and horizontal axes re-orientation is uncertain. Additional uncertainty derives from 
the complexity of the continuity in discontinuity and discontinuity in continuity reminiscent 
of the ‘staying/altering course’ policy reform dynamic. In this vein, BNG’s parents are an old 
and young couple – a marriage of the White Paper’s seven key thrusts (the ‘sound 
fundamentals’) and contemporary thinking in governance, tenure security and ‘hybridity’. 
After all, it is a mixture of the state-facilitated, market-driven approach of the White Paper 
and the demand-led, supply negotiated BNG orientation. The differences between the old and 
young coupling both unite and divide, exemplified, for example, in the movement from the 
‘exceptional patience [of the underclass] for its share of the promised better life for all’ 
(Allister Sparks, 2004 cited by Minister of Housing, 2004:2) to the ‘indignation and open 
revolt’ characterising the ‘impatience of those who do not have houses’ (Minister of Housing, 
2005c). Not to impute any correlation between strategy and patience/impatience, the mixture 
leaves analysts confused and perplexed about whether it constitutes a fundamental 
departure/change from praxis of the first decade or a continuation with some 
modification/revision.  
For M Tomlinson (forthcoming:1), the projection of BNG as ‘enhancement’ of existing 
policy is problematic. A ‘thorough reading’ of BNG, she states, ‘reveals’ introduction of 
‘some fundamental changes’/‘comes close to fundamentally changing policy’, including the 
movement from a supply- to demand-driven orientation; from quantity to quality; and the 
state shouldering ‘some of the risk’ entailed in the private sector’s involvement in low-
income housing delivery (Ibid). Undergirded by supposedly more recent thinking on 
enablement, the role of state and government investment is one that is strategically calibrated, 
‘contributing to economic growth and poverty alleviation by creating jobs and generating 
‘assets’, i.e. wealth. Thus increases in the size of the subsidy effected through inflation 
rightsizing and the provision of a separate land subsidy; affording all households in the 
                                                 
305  
A savvy national state and an empowered civil society might enlarge democratic spaces and improve 
the quality of government. In terms of both democratic and functional outcomes, concurrent state and 
civil society activity is required (Lane, 2003:369). 
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income band up to R3 500 the ‘full subsidy amount’; the extension of financial support to 
those in the R3 500–R7 000 income bracket to purchase a dwelling in the primary or 
secondary market; and variations in subsidy amounts to reflect the cost of the diverse housing 
products both massage and work with the grain of the market while simultaneously 
strengthening the platform for capital accumulation/wealth creation.  
On the other hand, varying subsidy amounts and support to the entire residential property 
market through the introduction of another rung in the housing ladder (support to those in the 
R3 500–R7 000 income bracket) is suggestive of the abandonment of the principle of equity 
and privileging (which the original policy was premised on) the needs of the ‘poorest of the 
poor’.306
The movement to a demand-responsive regime whose components include a shift away from 
product uniformity, varying subsidy amounts, and diverse tenure choices coheres around the 
three linked programmes of emergency housing, informal settlement upgrade and social 
housing. This does however place an onerous burden on the state which to date has struggled 
to cope with its existing duties/responsibilities. It is not unreasonable though to imagine 
better performance in the future if capacity at local level to drive a more interventionist 
approach is supplemented via the intended establishment of housing departments at 
municipal level, provincial administrations working with and through municipalities, 
centralised decentralisation, and Thubelisha delivering on its mandate.  
  
Lastly, the relationship between the financial sector and the government is steadily beginning 
to mature with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in May 2005 (DOH, 2005d) 
that commits the banking sector to provide R42bn over the next three and a half years to 
finance households in the income categories R1 500–R7 500. In sum, the policy changes, 
shifts and re-orientations proposed are deemed ‘fundamental’. The capabilities, competencies 
and capacities to deliver on this mandate is, however, a different story.  
In the spectrum of the prevailing commentary on BNG’s ‘staying’/ altering’ the course 
credentials, the middle ground is one that characterises it as introducing ‘substantial 
improvements to housing policy’ (Dewar, 2005b:2); ‘positive steps to achieving a more 
sustainable urban outcome’ (Dewar, 2005a:2); and ‘step in the right direction’ (Dewar, 
2005b:15). Congratulating government for expanding choice, Dewar expresses considerable 
‘unease’ (Dewar, 2005a:2) over BNG’s continuity and discontinuity, drawing on and 
benchmarked to, amongst others, original versions of the enablement paradigm, traditional 
conceptions of citizenship and aided self-help. Positing the need for ‘substantial paradigm 
shifts’ (Dewar, 2005b:1), BNG is criticised for being ‘profoundly schizophrenic’ (Ibid:2), i.e. 
having a ‘rhetorical commitment’ to historically relayed best praxis versus real 
‘practice’/‘action’. In this binary, the ‘rhetoric associated with the policy’ commits the state 
to be a ‘facilitator’ (his preferred option) but in practice ‘assumes the responsibility of 
provider’ (Dewar, 2005b:2). The consequences flowing from this is the fostering of a ‘culture 
of entitlement’ and ‘passive citizenship’; politicisation of shelter provision; and 
reinforcement of the ‘quantitative’ (targets) underwritten by a ‘short term mentality to capital 
investment’ (Dewar, 2005b:2-4).  
                                                 
306 A claim denied by the Minister when she launched the N2 Gateway project on 18 July 2006 (Minister of 
Housing, 2006e).  
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Secondly, ‘[d]espite the rhetorical commitment’ (‘considerable lip-service’ (Dewar, 2005a:3) 
in policy to urban restructuring, ‘in practice it is not happening’. This is due to the absence of 
an urban development model that promotes densification via, for example ‘high density 
[housing] infill projects on strategically located land’ (Dewar, 2005b:5). Although BNG’s 
provisions relating to land are deemed ‘excellent’ (Dewar, 2005a:4) - ‘allow[ing] urban 
housing forms’ (Dewar, 2005b:5) (which the ‘single storey structure’ production subsidy 
systems renders ‘almost impossible to achieve’ (Dewar, 2005a:4) - ‘creating viable 
transportation systems’, a precondition being the intensification of housing ‘along and 
abutting public transportation channels and interchanges’, means re-directing the subsidy’s 
focus to ‘housing form’ (Dewar, 2005b:5); and settlement development that promote higher 
mixes of land-uses and activities. The institutional infrastructure required to power urban 
restructuring of this sort translates into more attention and thought being devoted to the 
shape, wiring and skin of the ‘single planning authority and/or instrument’ proposed by BNG 
to ‘support the development of sustainable human settlements’ (DOH, 2004a:13).  
Thirdly, the measure to which housing policy, situated in wider urban processes, furthers 
social and economic objectives is another area that is ensnared in the rhetoric/practice binary. 
Support to various forms of private rental, beneficial to wealth generation and accumulation 
and asset creation and consolidation, through, for example, access to land and loans, is not an 
area of policy that BNG pays sufficient attention to. In the employment generation sphere, 
the haste to ratchet up the speed and scale of delivery through megaprojects, utilising large 
construction firms, is in tension with BNG’s rhetorical commitment to labour-intensive 
construction and empowerment of emerging contractors.  
Fourthly, the ‘primary objective’ of housing policy whose ‘rhetoric’ about the ‘eradication of 
informal settlements’ (Dewar, 2005b:6) is out of kilter with ‘realities’ pertaining to informal 
settlements representing for the poor their ‘only option in terms of entering the housing 
market’(Ibid:6); is often the ‘preferred option’ (Ibid:7); and in many instances, informal 
settlements afford people ‘qualitatively much better living conditions than are found in many 
of the more formal townships’ (Ibid).  
Lastly, and cross-referenced to the urban development model, urban processes and wider 
socio-economic objectives, the ‘rhetorically widely accepted’ thrust or ‘focus on the quality 
of the total living environment’ demonstrates, if one ‘examines the outcomes of housing 
projects’, ‘absolutely no understanding of what this means’ (Ibid:9). The dominant ‘rational, 
comprehensive, highly-controlled’ (Ibid:10)) programmatic approach to planning and design, 
he asserts, produces sterile environments premised as it is on a faulty forecast/‘prediction’ 
orientation of intervention in demographic dynamics and ‘parts’-driven settlement assembly. 
In the context of limited financial resources, this resource-intensive approach results in levels 
of housing assistance being ‘continually cut back’; ‘a continually smaller proportion of 
households gain[ing]’; and ‘cuts in social services’ (due to inadequate funds to deliver and 
maintain infrastructure) (Ibid:11) generates differential and inequitable access to amenities 
and facilities, urban fragmentation and ‘dangerous, environmentally negative liabilities’ 
(Ibid:12). Deepening transactive urbanism, maximising choices related to urban living, and 
breaking with top-down parts-driven planning, all components of non-programmatic 
approach to design and planning, is recommended by Dewar (2005a; 2005b), in order to 
close the gap between rhetoric, intention and practice.  
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At the other end of the BNG evaluation spectrum is Charlton and Kihato (2006) who assert 
that ‘fundamental elements of the plan [do] not seem to have essentially departed from the 
original housing policy’.  
In addition, the plan appears not to fully address key weaknesses with the existing 
policy…It certainly does not offer clear direction with respect to the difficult political 
issues of land ownership, the land market and rights around property values… 
Although the programme strives for broader outcomes, key indicators of success 
appear to remain largely qualitative, focussed around numbers of houses produced 
and budgets spent. In addition, some of the weaknesses of the policy identified to date 
remain outside the power of the Department of Housing to remedy on its own… 
Seemingly, therefore there is no clear alignment between the current focus in 
government on the contribution of housing to poverty alleviation, and the ability of 
the policy to deliver on these objectives (Charlton & Kihato, 2006:259).  
Noting the objectives of BNG as directed towards housing delivery catalysing achievement 
of ‘broader socio-economic goals’ (poverty alleviation, economic growth, asset creation, 
improving the quality of life, and ‘ultimately sustainable human settlement development’ 
(Ibid:257)), they cannot in the Plan discern a ‘unifying conceptual foundation’ (Ibid:259), 
which may, in part, account for them remaining, at best, sceptical of assumptions in the Plan 
related to ‘direct link between the delivery of infrastructure and services’ and ‘poverty 
alleviation’ (Ibid:257); and the Plan’s ‘ambiguous discourse on informal settlements’ which 
appears to embrace both ‘integration’ (into the urban fabric) and ‘relocation’ but devoid of a 
‘clear understanding of the complexities of these highly visible manifestations of poverty, 
mobility and survival strategies’(Ibid:258). But then again, the White Paper (RSA, 1994), 
was not rooted in and/or framed by issues of poverty alleviation and coping strategies, and 
policy adjustments over the last decade ‘has not matched the rhetoric around addressing the 
negative impact of the programme on marginalised beneficiaries’ (Ibid:263).  
The spectrum of opinions on BNG from ‘fundamental change’ to ‘improvement’ to 
‘essentially no departure from the original policy’ is dependent on the main/key objective/s 
the commentators attach to housing praxis and the extent to which these objectives are 
achievable in the context of a statecraft and policy reform process that is contradictory, 
conflictual and ambiguous.  
At the base of these criticisms, however, is a set of intractable problems associated with a 
housing intervention founded on late apartheid/pre-democratic precepts; tension between 
‘government’s long term visionary approach to sustainable urban development and its 
demand for visible short-term delivery’ (Treasury, 2003a:4); a state that strives to increase 
the rate of delivery whilst simultaneously seeking to enhance the product and settlement 
pattern (Richards, 2001); and government acknowledgement of the need for a bottom-up 
development processes (implying the devolution of power and authority to communities) but 
at the same time seeking to determine the nature of the process usually configured around an 
already defined output (Ibid). Greater responsiveness to household’s need and priorities is 
advocated but the subsidy instrument is still deemed inflexible and the necessary socio-
institutional capability required to render it flexible is sorely lacking. Integrated human 
settlements are sought not through ‘structural intervention’ (Ibid:4) and deep democracy, but 
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reliance on urban governance regimes307
Section Two 
 that are unable to address the socially and spatially 
marginalising outcomes of land markets, escalating construction costs, and the political 
economy of urban construction (more generally). Lastly, market-embedding/market 
restoring/ market-construction interventions of state (social housing, for example) exclude the 
poor from housing in areas they deem most suitable (inner-city). This list could go on but the 
bottom line is not only a ‘reconsideration of the imperatives of housing delivery and how this 
structurally links with land availability, infrastructure, transport, economic opportunity, 
health care, social facilities, etc.’ (Ibid: 10). More importantly, is interrogating the nature and 
substance of the ‘structural power relationship between the homeless poor, public authorities 
and the private sector’ (BRCS, 2001:8). The reconfiguration of this relationship that to date 
has come to rest on administrative, technocratic and social compact fixes are now reaching 
their ceiling.  
 Charters, Accords, Memorandums of Understanding and Compacts  
And it is here that one records a most curious anomaly in developmental state construction 
and the inter-linked installation and consolidation of a developmental housing regime and 
praxis. Much has been said about the structural relationship between the (homeless) poor and 
the state including inappropriateness of government processes and outputs to match or meet 
the needs and priorities of citizens and communities;308 the unwillingness, hesitancy and 
neglect of government to strengthen the ‘political clout of the poor in civil society’ (versus 
focussing less on fixing the state)309
Much has also been said about the relationship between the state and the private sector and 
the reluctance of the former to countenance any change in the historically transcended and 
compromise-laden post apartheid relationship with the latter. Indeed surprising is that to date, 
there ‘appears to be no social consensus on the role capital ought to play in both the 
restructuring of the economy and the realisation of socio-economic rights’ (February, 
2005:57). The continuing lack of access of the majority to the economy and viable livelihood 
opportunities is commonly attributed, remarks Gelb (2003), to the ‘lack of political will and 
skill’ (cited in February, 2005:57). The need to transform the structural features of society, 
 to (at the very least) enhance developmental 
performance and outcomes (Grindle, 2002:14). Also singled out was the underfunding, 
institutional under-capacitation and marginalisation of those programmes of direct and 
immediate benefit to the poor; the vilification, criminalisation and persecution of the poor on 
the grounds of them both not wanting to help themselves (entitlement and passive 
citizenship) and celebrating or praising them when they exercise agency in formats 
considered appropriate by the authorities (e.g. the People’s Housing Process).  
                                                 
307 Which are based on consensus and co-operation and the more recent top-down rightsizing of local 
development plans. 
308 Big ‘D’ and small ‘d’ development and paternalistic (depoliticised) relegation of a weak developmental state 
to the second economy. 
309 A point returned to in the Conclusion with reference to the ‘good enough governance’ track of Grindle 
(2000; 2002a).    
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which the various industry-related charters aim are, at best, ‘sideshows’ if government fails to 
undertake radical reform, are under-emphasised (Gqubule in Sunday Times, 3 September 
2006).  
The tragedy of the present situation, then, is that after a decade of reconstruction, the 
stratagems and tactics employed by the state to restructure economy and polity are precisely 
those which it employed in the early years of the transition, i.e. accords/compacts/records of 
understanding. The tragedy is that if they thus far have failed to induce and/or cultivate a 
developmental geometry or assembly or architecture of state-economy social forces, why are 
the same strategies being employed today against the backdrop of a more assertive and 
confident state? In Polanyian ‘double movement’ (1944) speak, if the disembedding of the 
market from the stifling socio-political milieu of apartheid and its re-embedding in the 
(imperfect post-apartheid) rights-based socio-institutional milieu/ecology through the 
Botshabelo Accord (DOH, 1994a) and ROU (DOH, 1994b) failed to deliver any meaningful 
re-orientation in relations of power and financial systems; why is it that a now more 
sophisticated and interventionist state continues to deploy ineffective strategies, i.e. FSC and 
the Social Contract for Rapid Housing Delivery?  
If the weaknesses and failure, both here and globally, of state programmes and projects 
directed at the most vulnerable and the satisfaction of their immediate needs reside in them 
being relegated to ‘special programmes’ that ‘tend to be chronically underfunded, 
administered with considerable variation in quality and managed by special implementation 
vehicles’ (Grindle, 2002a:7), the key problem with BNG, and housing praxis, more generally, 
is the relegation of the resolution of the most intractable, and profoundly political, 
problems310
Not renowned for its stability and open to constant challenge from younger blondes and 
family members, the banking sector’s pledge to release R42bn into the ‘affordable housing 
market’ (Ibid) (R1 500–R7 500 income bracket) by 2008, is running into serious trouble due 
to non-resolution of precisely the very same political problems that are likely to sink BNG, 
i.e. the ‘lack of access to well located and reasonably priced land’; ‘ever increasing cost 
inputs in terms of land, material and unit labour costs’; and ‘limitations in [the] supply’ of 
housing in the (under) R200 000 price range (Access Housing, August 2006:3). So crippling 
are the cumulative impacts of these constraints that, with the number of homes produced in 
this price range averaging 18 000 per annum, it will take 45 years to meet the 850 000 
backlog (Melzer, 2006:47), which presumably does not deal with new household formation 
in this target market. To match the private sector finance available, and utilising Banking 
Association figures of a shortage of 661 000 houses in the R2 500 to R7 500 income bracket, 
the reduction of the shortage by 60% in five years (factoring additional demand generated by 
population growth) requires an annual delivery of 132 000 housing, compared to the current 
 to consensus and co-operation, discussion and negotiation versus coercion, 
compliance and regulation. And extremely problematic in this regard is the inter-relatedness 
of these problems. So, for example, the Minister, drawing parallels between herself and the 
‘young’, ‘dumb’ and ‘blonde’ woman who both stupid but wanting wealth, ‘open[ed] a joint 
account with someone with lots of money’ (Minister of Housing, 2005a:5) is a case in point.  
                                                 
310 These include land ownership, land and financial markets, ‘rights around property values’ (Charlton & 
Kihato, 2006:59), building material cost escalation.  
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yearly delivery of houses (in the R200 000 price range) of about 19 000 houses (Access 
Housing, August 2006:03).  
A remarkable feature of the present situation is the similarities with circumstances prevailing 
in mid 1990s. House prices started to ‘heat up’ in 1994 with property analysts warning of a 
20% hike in the 1995 (Business Day, 4 January 1995). Small houses were already showing an 
annualised percentage increase over two quarters of 10% (Ibid). High interest rates, rising 
building costs311
Commenting on the implications of the finding, Scott McRae, of First National Realty, 
remarked that if home cost construction increases continued to compound, doubling every 
four to five years, the ‘[a]ffordability of home ownership’ would increasingly become the 
prerogative of the rich and the subsidised poor, with the mid-priced home market becoming 
steadily smaller in its share of the overall property market’ (cited in Sunday Property, 7 May 
1995). In a context of shortages in physical stock, a ‘dramatic increase in the availability of 
housing finance in the absence of a concomitant increase in other underlying housing inputs 
may lead [and, potentially may have led] to an increase in the price of houses creating a 
binding affordability constraint for low income households’ (Melzer, 2006:49). And the 
solution proposed in the mid 1990s was construction of lower-cost homes, mostly flats 
(Financial Mail, 5 May 1995), presumably for rental and/or purchase. The solution proposed 
now is ‘the delivery of a range of affordable rental and ownership housing options, with some 
percentage being subsidised (Access Housing, August 2006:3).  
 – and, arguably, land price manipulation by private developers, who in 
‘expectation of a huge upsurge in delivery to the poor’ bought and banked peripheral urban 
land (Tomlinson, forthcoming:6) - made homes (or home-ownership) unaffordable. A study 
by the National Economic Forum on the economy (1995) demonstrated that the cost of a 
standardised house in South Africa was almost double that of other countries.  
With respect to building materials and construction costs, a 1995 report surveying black and 
white contractors conducted by the BMI Building Research Strategy Consulting Unit 
concluded: ‘there is a serious imbalance between the supply of housing and effective demand 
and that housing has been priced out of the reach of the majority’ with 75% of the total 
market, and 95% of the black market, in need of homes valued at R65 000 and less (cited in 
Financial Mail, 5 May 1995). According to the economist Hank Langehoven, attached to the 
South African Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors, if ‘left to the market without 
supply-side intervention, it is unlikely SA could provide more houses than it has produced in 
the past’ (cited in Financial Mail, 21 October 1994). With concerns about surging prices 
destabilising the housing programme, the then Director-General of Housing, Billy Corbett, 
called for a ‘voluntary price compact between building materials and construction 
companies’ resulting in major companies committing themselves to keep price inflation 
below inflation for a number of years (Sunday Times, 2 October 1994).  
The prices though continued to surge in spite of establishment of a Building Materials 
Suppliers’ Consortium to implement the compact. More than a decade later, the Minister at a 
                                                 
311 These were described as ‘correcting themselves faster than existing home prices, leading to a widening gap 
between the cost of retail homes and their replacements’ (Business Day, 19 October 1994). 
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conference noted the challenge of rising building materials and costs312
With the construction industry straining to meet demand manifested in, amongst other things, 
the depletion of engineering expertise (and possible importation of additional capacity as 
major projects come on line) and inadequate project management capacity, Treasury 
(2006:111) predicts ‘upward pressure on prices’ that the social contract will most likely be 
unable to moderate.  
 and the dangers 
presented to the housing programme (singling out social housing), proceeding thereafter to 
say that ‘I fully trust that the suppliers would be able to take the necessary steps to ensure an 
increase in supply and ensure that prices are accordingly moderated…in accordance with the 
Social Contract’ (Minister of Housing, 2006g). The contract, which calls on the construction 
industry and materials suppliers to ‘[s]trive to manage cost escalations in line with 
inflationary pressures’ and ‘ensure price fixing for a period…tied to agreed volumes and time 
frames for the delivery of projects’ (DOH, 2005e:8), is not legally binding, trading instead on 
‘goodwill’ (Ibid:2).  
Interesting also is the fact that while the financial sector fell way short of its pledged 
assistance313
The ‘reluctance on the part of banks to share such data’, which renders the ‘clear need for 
disclosure legislation to be implemented as soon as possible’ (highly unlikely with the recent 
deployment of the head of the unit to oversee the N2 Gateway Project) not only ‘serves to 
confirm suspicions that such lending remains limited’ (Ibid:50), non-disclosure 
simultaneously makes it unreasonable for banks to demand from government further 
guarantees and insurance schemes considering that the historical investment inhibiting factors 
such as ‘crime, politically motivated or housing quality related non payment’ are at this stage 
‘less significant’ (Melzer, 2006:47). If enforcement of the previous contract between the 
banks and state enshrined Code of Conduct ran into serious problems of affordability
 and tended to target the upper end of the income bracket of R1 500 to R3 500 
market in the 1990s, so too today R11bn of the R17bn disbursed in the target market (until 
March 2006) was concentrated in the R4 000 income bracket and upwards (Melzer, 2006:53) 
comprising less than 30% of the target market. Although the Home Loan and Mortgage 
Disclosure Act was passed in 2000 to, amongst other things, identify discriminatory lending 
practices, the Department in 2004 was still finalising regulations (DOH, nd:106), and office 
space for this function was only secured in early 2006. With redlining of inner city areas and 
traditional black townships continuing (DOH, 2004a:4), banks today remain ‘unwilling to 
disclose data on the percentage of applications that are rejected and the associated reasons for 
rejection’ and have not ‘disclosed their policies with regard to areas which are deemed to be 
unsuitable for mortgage finance’ (Melzer, 2006:5).  
314
                                                 
312 The doubling of the price of cement in the last seven years and the acceleration of building costs by 17.5% in 
2005 and 6.2% in the first half of 2006, which were likely to be aggravated by the FIFA World Cup and 
ASGISA lead projects. 
 and 
deficiencies of self-regulation, perhaps the MOU whose implementation is to be overseen by 
the Director-General of Housing and the Managing Director of the Banking Association, and 
313 As mentioned above, in 1994, the banks  undertook to deliver 50 000 loans in a year but, ten years later, they 
had delivered a total of only 49 116. 
314 Related to ‘historical problems [which were] primarily the result of the economic hardship of borrowers’ (see 
Termination of the Record of Understanding (DOH, 1998:1). 
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the envisaged drafting of a National Home Loan Code of Practice, with ‘appropriate sanction 
mechanisms’ (Minister of Housing, 2005b:4), will hopefully deliver different outcomes.  
On the question of spatial and socio-economic integration and planning/governance regimes, 
in the developmental states of China and Malaysia, for example, socio-spatial residential 
integration is regulated and enforced by legislation. In China, for instance, a 
‘homeownership-oriented public policy aimed at the development of affordable housing’ is 
directed at the lower-middle and middle-income urban residents. Government subsidises 
private sector provision of ‘affordable housing’ via the free allocation of state-owned land, 
reductions in development costs, and capping of developer profits. The units produced are 
smaller than the normal commercial apartments so as to bring them into the affordability 
range.  
In Malaysia, affordable housing is delivered within the broader social development 
framework. The state furnishes land for affordable housing development and provides 
assistance to developers in the technical and administrative realm. The market delivers and 
finances the unit. An inclusionary housing quota of 30% and a defined ceiling price is 
imposed on all private developers when a certain threshold size of development is reached. 
The 30% quota is imposed to further government’s objectives of promoting ethnic 
integration, eradicating poverty and deracialising the economic structure. Those seeking such 
housing are provided with special purchasing discounts that are borne by developers through 
project cross-subsidisation. The federal government, working through state and local 
government encourages developers to exceed the 30% quota via various incentives including 
rapid plan approval; lower land premiums; infrastructure cost subsidisation; relaxation in 
planning and housing standards; and concessions from financial contributions to utility 
authorities (extracted from Smit & Purchase, 2006:8-9). 
By contrast, one of the focuses of the Department over the next five years is on ‘improving 
the institutional and administrative environment in the housing sector through’, amongst 
others, ‘promoting urban efficiency and renewal, and racial integration, through sound spatial 
planning, support for medium-density residential development and increasing rental 
opportunities for the poor’ (Treasury, 2004:131). Accordingly, the Social Contract calls on 
the property sector to ‘promote integrated development of residential areas, including those 
of the inner city social and rental housing development what will contribute to the 
removal/improvement of informal settlements’ (DOH, 2005e:11). Notably, at the time of the 
negotiation of the Social Contract, the property sector balked at the following proposal:  
Ensure that commercially-driven housing developments above Rx (an amount to be 
determined), will spend y% (a percentage to be determined) of the total project value 
in the housing subsidy category, details of which will be further explored with the 
sectors concerned, taking cognizance of international best practices (Ibid).  
When government tried to force their hand on the amount and percentage, the South African 
Property Owner’s Association threatened a walkout of the negotiations. As of May 2006, 
these x/ y quantums have not been resolved but a pilot programme in KwaZulu-Natal is 
intended to ‘show…the limits and possibilities’ (Minister of Housing, 2006b:3).  
If regulation and legislation to compel the private sector to share with the rest of society the 
benefits accruing from the boom in the property market is not on the housing programme’s 
radar screen; if the mild version of the Community Reinvestment Act was shelved on the 
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grounds of raising the risk profile of South African banks and undermining public confidence 
in financial sector stability (Christo Wiese, Registrar of Banks cited in Business Day, 4 
September 2003); if our spatial planning and land-use management regimes has thus far not 
succeeded to curb land speculation, desegregate urban space, address the NIMBY syndrome’, 
and re-direct private sector investment patterns; and if the existing social housing 
intervention fails to reach income categories below R2 500 and/or the highly subsidised 
government directed ones (like the N2 Gateway) effecting upward redistribution to the 
R3 000 income category and/or the public-private social housing initiatives ruled 
unconstitutional and/or a violation of human rights; what is one to make of the Social 
Contract’s call for the private sector to ‘promote integrated development of residential 
areas’?  
With no sanctions, regulation and directives in place, what is to compel the private sector to 
alter its investment patterns and behaviour? What is meant by a Department focus that looks 
to defective, at best, and missing, at worst, instruments, programmes and projects (spatial 
planning, medium-density residential development, rental opportunities for the poor) to 
‘improve the institutional and administrative environment in the housing sector’?  
The question as to why the state is reluctant and/or ‘has not been…comfortable engaging the 
market’ (Napier & Ntombela, 2006) bears repeating. ‘Comfortable’ it is with ‘direct, and 
sizeable, physical infrastructure investment’ that have ‘not succeeded’ in restructuring the 
city ‘along equitable lines’, and ‘if anything has exacerbated urban sprawl and dislocation’ 
(Ibid:5–6). This particular outcome was repeatedly attributed to (amongst others) the 
‘impurity’ of intervention instruments; the dynamics of policy reform; ‘pragmatism’; the 
(mis)/perceptions and ideological orientations of the elite; democratic deficits; and the 
vicissitudes of statecraft.  
The failure of this socio-political and institutional ecology to induce the appropriate enabling 
conditions for the multiple programmes and interventions of state to achieve intended 
outcomes is not disconnected to its unwillingness or hesitancy to incubate and promote ‘thick 
democracy’ and ‘institutional thickening’,315
Redistributive programmes of the 1980s and 1990s, in Latin America for instance, that 
focused primarily on the poor were not very effective in reversing these perceptions as they 
were ‘often accompanied by a reduction in the quantity and quality of services available’ 
 relying instead on moral suasion within political 
economy parameters considered immutable, at worst, or slightly ‘tinkerable’, at best. In 
common with advanced economies in which ‘permanent safety nets and social insurance 
systems are part of a fiscally and politically sustainable social contract’, the development of 
social contracts and welfare systems in developing countries, ‘no matter how limited’, feature 
‘as a means to address the challenge posed by widespread insecurity and extensive 
inequality’ (Graham, 2002:1). With ‘sustained and broad-based public support for markets 
and democracy’ (Ibid:3) contingent on ameliorating and ‘protecting’ the population from the 
consequences and impacts of crisis and adjustment, public policy needs to pay particular 
attention to addressing the ‘negative perceptions’ and insecurities of the ‘near poor or middle 
strata’ of ‘globalisation and market policies’, which research suggests is more acute and 
tenuous in this stratum than among the poor (Ibid).  
                                                 
315 Returned to and elaborated further in the Conclusion 
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(Ibid:5) of the politically vocal middle strata (numbering among them the ‘frustrated 
achievers’ - ‘those with upward mobility but negative perceptions’ (Ibid:4) of the market). By 
the late 1990s, market restructuring, without the benefit of safety nets, resulted in a dramatic 
fall in the living standards of the significant numbers of the middle strata, near or below 
poverty levels. In other words, firmly connected to the First Economy, the middle strata, in 
the absence of social insurance systems and safety nets akin to those directed at the poor, are 
frequently worse affected by market downturns and liberalisation than those languishing in 
the Second Economy.  
Periodic market crises and/or external shocks render the socially un-insured and safety 
netless ‘First Economy’ politically vocal and influential not-so-poor sector more susceptible 
and vulnerable than the ‘Second Economy’ socially insured, safety netted and politically 
voiceless and emasculated poor to fall right through the livelihood floor. It is for this reason 
that social compacts and associated welfare and redistributive programmes have now come to 
include the middle strata and the poor, which in common with developed economies are the 
‘critical underpinnings of both markets and democracies’ (Ibid:3). Accordingly, the political 
feasibility of protective and redistributive programmes, codified in social contracts, pivots on 
assuaging the negative perceptions of the middle strata via the extension of real material 
benefits that reduces their vulnerability to economic shocks. In the longer run, both the 
feasibility and sustainability of the programmes is determined by the degree of ‘affinity’/ 
‘proximity’/‘similarity’ (Ibid:12) between the poor and (lower-)/ middle-income categories 
(Ibid), i.e. the ‘congruence of interests between the poor and the middle’ (Ibid:24) . 
Within existing political economy parameters, housing policy’s prioritisation of the needs of 
the poorest of the poor was not unaccompanied by, at best, a reduction in the accessibility, 
quantity and quality of those in the not-so-poor category (the ‘market enablement zone’316
As commented before, the effort and time dedicated to expanding the housing opportunities 
of the not-so-poor overshadows that devoted to those in the ‘market redistribution zone’, with 
many criticising the government for relegating the needs of the poorest to a subordinate 
concern and tipping the financial and instructional scales away from the equity thrust of 
stated policy. For some, the efforts over the last several years of government and a host of 
other organisations to secure mortgage finance, despite the evidence of this type of funding 
 
(see Melzer, 2006)) or, at worst, no access to housing opportunities. Against this backdrop, 
and given the White Paper’s conceptualisation of government’s housing programme as a 
temporary intervention until such time as the market normalises and incomes increase, a great 
deal of the market-embedding, market extension and market expansion praxis of the 
Department hinges on inducing financial and institutional conditions to support the not-so-
poor and frustrated achievers through, for example, enticing banks to extend credit to the 
bankable, formally employed, relatively better enumerated working poor; pension-fund 
backed lending via the NHFC; social housing; and, more recently, the FSC and inclusionary 
housing initiative; the collapsing of the subsidy bands; and the addition of new subsidy bands 
in the income categories exceeding R3 500.  
                                                 
316 Those who lie within the reach of the market or, more loosely, those in the FSC income target zone. The 
market redistribution zone’ is that segment of the population who lie beyond the reach of the market, i.e. they 
‘require non-market interventions such as subsidies to enable them to meet their household needs’ (Melzer, 
2006:3).  
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not being wanted by the poor for reasons of its perceived riskiness – ‘inability to pay means 
sudden homelessness’ (Friedman, 2004a:42) – is symptomatic of government’s limited 
understanding of the ‘prevailing circumstances of the poor’ and the ‘needs at grassroots level’ 
(Ibid:40–2).  
There is no doubt some validity in this assertion, accounting for government’s consistent 
failure to ‘successfully implement anti-poverty policies’ (Ibid). On the other hand, and in 
spite of the questionable utility of mortgage finance and the accessing and leveraging of this 
funding through compacts, they are, within existing political economy parameters, arguably 
fundamental to continual maintenance of the feasibility and sustainability of the overall 
housing programme. This is because of its potential to ‘universalise’ the benefits of the 
programme to include the poor and near poor (which the state will increasingly be unable to 
fund out of the existing finances), whilst simultaneously meeting the needs of the poorest and 
the challenges posed by declining household size, ‘stubborn growth’ of informal settlements 
and their eradication, migration and population growth. 
If, however, further engagement with the financial sector precludes re-engineering of this 
‘complex duopoly’(Treasury & South African Reserve Bank, 2004) (discussed below), 
critical becomes refinement of the MOU to ‘incorporate more specific targets, based on 
subsegment size, to ensure that the poorest households in the target market get their share of 
allocated capital’ (Melzer, 2006:29); the introduction of FSC ‘initiated home loan products’ 
(similar to the not unproblematic Mzansi account); and the inclusion of those within the FSC 
income band in receipt of informal and irregular incomes. Without this, upward redistribution 
through the exclusionary subsidised social housing intervention and/or state-private sector 
inner city partnered projects, targeting the top-end of the FSC market, will probably spark 
new and fuel existing protest and unrest (illustrated by the Latin American cases around 
issues of the social wage). 
Interventions in the supply side of the societal shelter production process and regime – the 
property-developer-banking complex - can no longer be postponed because without them, 
increases in demand via subsidies and improved access to finance will push up prices of 
existing and new stock (Hoek-Smit, 2006) thereby styming movement towards equitable and 
redistributive housing delivery at sustainable and feasible pace, scope and scale in both 
market and state production/delivery incarnation(s). Accords, being of a voluntary nature, 
will not meet with great success in arresting the socio-exclusionary forces of bloated property 
prices, soaring construction costs, and unabated redlining in its multiple guises and forms. 
Difficulties in marrying and linking the objectives and outputs of different Charters present 
more obstacles; e.g. the Construction Sector Charter, for example, makes no mention of low 
income housing production. Moreover, although microfinance is variously touted as a more 
suitable instrument for financing the housing needs of the poor, this ‘alternative’, remarks the 
World Development Report (WDR) (World Bank, 2005:14) is ‘no substitute for the overall 
broadening of access’ to SA’s captured, concentrated, narrow and (globally exceptional) 
super-profit making financial sector. ‘Gradual deepening and broadening’ of the formal 
financial markets, the WDR states (Ibid), should be ‘combined with stronger horizontal 
accountability (in regulatory structures) [and] greater openness to societal accountability’.  
 256 
 
Synthesis: Present Pasts and Present Futures – Prospects and Prospecting  
Pragmatism and the ‘immutable rule of economics’ has thus far shored up the treacherous 
limitations of ‘tinkering’. More deceiving though has been its societal intelligence 
disarmament project that conceals the successful, not internationally unacceptable, 
competently executed political economy interventions of past, e.g. land expropriation, 
prescribed asset ratios, systemic affirmative action programmes. Mining the present pasts in 
the more recent memories of democratic transition and consolidation awakens our senses to 
how a weak new state disciplined capital when it threatened intervention in extractive cum 
regulatory modes. The effectiveness of the ‘threat of intervention’ and the pro-poor 
orientation and efficacy of the subsequent settlements/agreements/deals struck with the 
powerful is not here germane. At issue here is pragmatism’s manipulated portrayal of context 
and power as beyond the realm of state-orchestrated change/reform when the evidence points 
to alternatives that even a weak un-assertive early post-apartheid state was able to mount. So 
for example, before the ANC assumed power, it threatened nationalisation. In response, local 
business leaders quickly started programmes ‘aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past’ 
(Gumede, 2002:216). The insurance industry, for instance, began mooting an idea of an 
investment development unit to finance the creation of employment and infrastructure 
amongst lower-income groups.  
In 1994, it was reported that the ANC was drafting USA Community Reinvestment 
legislation to discourage banks from discriminating on the basis of race and locality (Business 
Day, 14 June 2004). With growing government frustration over the poor performance of the 
banks in delivering on their commitments through the ROU, the standoff with the recalcitrant 
and unreasonably excessive guarantee-demanding and insurance-addicted banking sector was 
ended when the state threatened implementing Community Reinvestment Act-type 
legislation. The threat of compelling lending to low income households, amongst other 
factors, then led banks in 2003 to propose a Financial Sector Charter through which they 
would ‘unlock’ (albeit ‘voluntarily’) lending in the low-income market (Tomlinson, 
forthcoming:9–10).  
Again, with the spectre of inflation and hyper-inflation in the building sector imperilling the 
housing programme, major companies in late 1994 ‘reacted favourably and committed 
themselves to keeping price increases below inflation for a number of years’, only after 
government threatened intervention via ‘price controls or other measures’ (Sunday Times, 2 
October 1994). And once again, when in early 1995, with assurances demanded by state and 
the banks (as precondition to (re)-entrying the market) from the building industry around 
standards and quality of housing construction not forthcoming, the deadlock around the 
replacement of the builder’s warranty scheme with a new interim scheme was only broken 
when state threatened to ‘force the construction industry, through legislation, to adhere to the 
[new] mechanism’ (Business Day, 3 March 1995).  
There are many other examples within and beyond the housing sector. Suffice to say that 
context and power are not always or universally beyond the sphere and reach of influence. 
The sad reality though of all the initiatives above and those wherein the ANC could have 
pressed for greater advantage when the business community found itself on the back foot, 
were scuppered and/or voluntarily bargained away and alienated. This weakness and 
treachery could perhaps be forgivable on account of the uncertainty amongst the ANC NHF 
negotiators about the role of state in the early and mid-1990s (Charlton & Kihato, 2006:272), 
but unforgivable from 1996 onwards what with the findings and recommendations of Second 
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Task Team, the 1997 Urban Development Framework, the 2000 Draft Strategy, and the 2003 
Sustainable Human Settlements Framework. Indeed, with the pressure to up the ante on all 
fronts, structurally altering body politic surgery (versus MOUs, compacts and agreements) is 
necessitated to break with the existing shelter delivery and production mode of running to 
simply stand still (growing backlog and informal settlement growth).  
Crafting productive synergies between the agenda and thrust of the revamped ‘big D’ (BNG) 
with the complex non-linear dynamics of statecraft necessarily (and squarely) implicates 
instrument and imperative recalibration attuned to livelihood strategies and interventions in 
the spheres of both demand and supply side with a view to structurally linking shelter 
production and delivery with land availability, infrastructure, transport, economic 
opportunity, health care, and social facilities. Imperative and instrument (re)-invention and 
innovation that interfaces/links intervention and innovation in both progressive present past 
and developmental present future formats strikes at the heart of unresolved historical 
dilemmas of state formation and statecraft (i.e. societal exclusion of the poor majority) and 
the subsequent difficulties in contemporary tripod balancing.  
  
 258 
 
Conclusion: Mendacity, Mumbo-Jumbo and the Masses 
Introduction 
From the mid-1990s to date, a distinguishing and abiding feature of the ideals, principles and 
ideas framing reconstruction was the belief in the remaking of South African society via the 
state and planning. This was in spite of the global disillusionment with and dismissal record 
of the countless past, present and proposed schemes to change the world, society, economy 
and polity, particularly to the benefit of the poor. We swam against this grim tide of will and 
intellect because, unlike many emerging democracies, our country was endowed with 
impressive resources to design and implement an alternative development path. How then 
and why did we come to settle on a liberal market consensus state that historically and with 
few exceptions, here and elsewhere, ‘fatally damages the possibility’ (M Khan, 2004:188) of 
changing our inherited growth path towards more egalitarian, equitable and empowering 
futures, ends and outcomes?  
The disjuncture between intent and outcome is at base a function of history, habitus and doxa, 
and unintended consequences. The choice of words above is deliberate, weaving together a 
storyline about our past, the ‘objectification of social structure at individual subjective level’ 
(of the powerful decision makers), elite imposition of their ‘self-evident universals’,317 the 
resulting social meltdown and decay, and remedial and ameliorative interventions. This is the 
rough and rugged terrain of ‘mediocrity’ (Lecourt, 2001), ‘rhetoric of reaction’ and its 
progressive counter (a la Hirschman in Mulgan, 2007),318
This Conclusion is structured in four parts. The first part comprises an elaboration of the 
storyline. The next part focuses on some core thematic conclusions in order to classify and 
locate our state, employing the two approaches/schools of developmental state literature and 
scholarship. These classifications assist in surfacing the key problems with which a re-
energised developmental state reconstruction agenda will have to grapple with. Attuned to 
South African specificities and rooted in new conceptions and (emerging) practices of the 
transformative statecraft, this section introduces the core attributes of our new(ish) shelter 
governance agenda and regime. It spotlights the limitations of the agenda and regime 
associated with its structural de-linkages from the productive circuit of the economy and the 
inter-related exclusionary functioning of the land, financial and property markets. The last 
 ‘mumbo-jumbo’ (Wheen, 2004), 
and ‘mendacity’ (Leys, 2005) that this study has navigated and charted. And it is on this 
terrain that we attempt in the closing pages of this thesis to rethink and (more ambitiously) 
resuscitate South African developmentalism grounded in a mixture of experimentation, 
empirics and experience. This re-thinking is about intellectual, philosophical and practical re-
armament, which must of necessity be mindful of history, habitus and doxa, and unintended 
consequences. Without these considerations, we risk, once again, a map-less exodus that 
could potentially render us vulnerable to newfangled but profoundly disempowering 
redemptions.  
                                                 
317 Definition of ‘habitus’ and ‘doxa’ from Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habitus_(sociology) 
(accessed 15 December 2007). 
318 In New Statesman, 11 October 2007 (available at http://www.newstatesman.com/print/200710110015) 
(accessed 12 December 2007). 
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section offers a few ‘notes’ to string together a developmental state reconstruction melody in 
an attempt to make hope and history rhyme. 
Section One 
 Summary of Argument: The Storyline  
The storyline distributed unevenly across the six Chapters, addresses in various ways and 
speaks at different levels to the problem statement. The opening Chapter focuses on the 
dynamics of the negotiation process that informed and shaped the post-apartheid housing 
policy. This ‘agential’ analysis spotlighted how the discourse and processes permitted the 
existing ‘distribution of privilege to be modified rather than overthrown’ (Lester et al., 
2000:135–6). Chapter Two drilled deeper, exposing the structural, institutional and social 
dynamics powering the incoming government’s embrace of a housing policy that conformed 
to World Bank strictures and paradigms. This discussion was largely about the Realpolitik of 
state construction and housing policy (as component and expression of these dynamics). 
After a truncated discussion of the debilitating impacts and consequences of the technocratic 
market developmentalist shelter production regime on citizens, communities, institutions and 
long-run sustainability, the study turned to an analysis of the rise and fall of the alternative to 
the technocratic market developmentalism route. Drawing from the experience and informed 
by contemporary experimentation in developmentalism and transformative statecraft, it was  
argued, that without dynamic reconnection of economics and politics, and state and society, 
our society will continue to be trapped in a socio-political ecology characterised by praxis 
schizophrenia. Freeing ourselves from this low-equilibrium growth and development trap is 
contingent on structurally rewiring inherited and contemporary contacts and circuits of 
power, influence and money in order to tilt resources and institutional balances in favour of 
the poor. This rewiring is the guts of the ensuing discussion on experimentation, empirics and 
experience.  
Framed by contextual constructivism, journeying from critical realism and powered by 
critical theory and historical record, the remainder of this Chapter directs itself to re-
dreaming, re-thinking, and resuscitating developmental statehood and statecraft. 
Commencing with a series of broad questions in the realm of political economy, we reflect 
further on the main findings of this study, combining developmental state theory and 
empirics. We interrogate transformative state construction in South Africa using the two 
dominant, ‘non-overlapping’ (see Fine, 2006b:106), schools of developmental state 
scholarship.319
                                                 
319  
 The ‘economic school’ (drawing from the economics discipline) focuses on 
identifying the appropriate ‘economic policies that should be adopted in order to promote 
development’ (Fine, 2006b:102, original emphasis), ‘without examining the politics of 
whether they will or can be’ (Fine, 2007a:2) implemented. This leads to the categorisation of 
Each [school] has progressed within the confines of its own territory: the political school by refinement 
with an expanding range of case studies and evidence; the economic school by widening the scope of 
what constitutes market imperfections, and how they have or have not been appropriately handled 
(Fine, 2006b:106). 
 260 
 
the South African state as being a weak or soft developmental state. The analysis then turns 
to a ‘political school’ analysis of South Africa’s developmental state construction. The 
political school (drawing from the disciplines of sociology and politics) focuses on the 
‘political or other conditions that enable appropriate policies to be adopted, whatever they 
might be’ (Fine, 2006b:102, original emphasis). This school is ‘almost entirely concerned’ 
with matters of state autonomy to execute policies when confronted by establishment forces 
(‘vested interests’) intent on capturing or derailing the state and its policies (Fine, 2007a:2). 
Worded differently, the ‘political school’ pays ‘[l]ittle to no attention to what the right 
policies’ are versus the ‘political conditions under which they might, in principle, be 
identified and adopted’ (Ibid). When deploying this approach to South Africa’s state 
construction and statecraft, the state emerges as ‘intermediate’, i.e. located midway between 
developmentalism and predation.  
This categorisation helps to comprehend ‘where we are’ and foregrounds discussions 
pertaining to international experience of developmental state construction, South African 
political and social specificities and the limits of manoeuvre and adaptation referenced to 
matters of the bureaucratic and social coherence of the South African state. The lean 
discussion is largely about prospecting for developmental state futures. The narrative then 
turns to the state construction-housing nexus, with a focus on the progressive and 
conservative impulses of BNG. Through highlighting BNG’s main weaknesses, the 
discussion provides some clues towards rethinking shelter governance regimes and 
developmental state construction. The concluding pages furnish a few notes around which we 
could possibly string a new developmental state tune and melody. 
Section Two 
 Thematic Conclusions 
Economic School: Dependence and the Soft Developmental State  
Why has the state, mindful of the weaknesses and betrayals of the existing development path, 
not mobilised and deployed its various capacities and capabilities to direct and drive the 
economy and capital towards a more inclusive or shared path? Why does the ANC appear to 
be reluctant to craft and implement an aggressive asset and income redistribution strategy  
that is supported and underpinned by a pro-growth (versus a strictly pro-market) and pro-poor 
development path? For Fine (2007a), this would require the simultaneous construction of 
modalities and mechanics of state intervention and societal engagement that challenges and 
mobilises the underlying economic and political interests (that to date have precluded the 
adoption of an economically empowering and socially inclusive development strategy). For 
Bodibe (2007), the core components of the patterns and patterning of this type of state 
construction and intervention would include changing the structure of the economy, directing 
and deploying capital in its control and under the control of the private sector, and mobilising 
the social forces to support and sustain these deep interventions. ‘Such ideas’, write Habib 
and Padayachee (2000:261), ‘were proposed by ANC-supporting think tanks such as MERG, 
ISP [Industrial Strategy Project] (to some extent) and was supported in large measure in the 
RDP’. 
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Why then does the state hesitate to travel this path, especially given the many articles, books 
and research reports (co-)funded, actively supported and endorsed by the party and 
government prior to and subsequent to its assuming the reins of power?320 Is it because the 
South African developmental state model is ‘a superficial one’ wherein the ‘deep social 
interventions typical of the Taiwans and the South Koreas but also the Israels and the 
Turkeys, [are] so far missing’ (Freund, 2006:5, original emphasis)? Is it because the ‘ANC 
does [not] really know how to meet [its] promises’ related to its vision and thinking on the 
developmental state ‘remaining far too narrowly based and its implications have barely begun 
to be thought out by our governors’ (Ibid:7)?321 Is it because the state weakened by the 
resistance pressures of the late 1980s (among others), lacks the ‘transformative capacity’ to 
co-ordinate structural economic change in response to external pressures’ (Weiss, 2006 cited 
in Gelb, 2006a:04)? Is it perhaps for this reason that in the context of the rampant and very 
advanced internationalisation of domestic capital (still to be recognised), that a 
developmental state is ‘only likely to emerge out of a sustained broad-based growth process’ 
(Ibid) hinging on the ‘construction of a co-operative relationship between the state and 
business’, i.e. a case of ‘if you can’t beat them [capital], you have to join them’ (Ibid:8)? Is it 
because the establishment of a developmental state – as per revisionist readings of this 
model322 and supported by the ANC is perceived as a ‘process which accompanies growth, 
rather than a pre-condition for growth’ (Ibid, original emphasis), which further reduces its 
transformative capacity by increasing its survival and dependence on a capitalist class more 
interested in protecting and deepening the inherited and unreformed super-exploitative 
growth path (Malikane, 2007), i.e. minerals-energy-financial complex and offshore 
speculation? Is it because the state, rendered vulnerable and disempowered by its 
‘dependence on the very capital it mistrusts’ (Malikane cited in The Times, 10 July 2007),323 
the ‘unpatriotic bourgeoisie’ (Davies, 2005), is incapable of structurally altering the economy 
from its financial sector324
                                                 
320 See, for example: the ANC’s 1990 Harare Document; Gelb, 1990 1991; Alec Erwin in Southern Africa 
Report, 5 June 1992; Kaplinsky, 1993, 1994; MERG, 1993; ANC, 1994; Chang, 1996; Edwards, 1998; 
Adelzadeh et al., 1998; May, 1998; Davies, 2003, 2005, 2007; Sachs, 2006; Turok, 2006; Evans, 2007; Ben 
Turok in Business Day, 10 July 2007; and ANC, 2007e.  
 to a real economy orientation?  
321 In personal correspondence with the author, Bill Freund makes the following point:  
I just don’t see the ANC wanting to do, let alone actually doing, the kind of things that would make 
deep intervention at a social level possible... Look at the nonsense said and money spent on this stupid 
football tournament by a country that has never even shown any ability at the sport! We will ever be in 
debt and for absolutely nothing useful in 2010! Look at the basic disinterest in our abominable 
education system and look at the failure to register AIDS as a disease or intervene forcefully around it 
(E-mail 30 July 2007).  
322 See Wade, 1996; Fine, 2003; Chang & Grabel, 2004–5, 
323 Available at http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/Business/Article.aspx?id=510779 (accessed 10 July 2007).  
324 The Economic Transformation document tabled at the ANC’s 2007 Conference ‘excludes the financial 
sector’ (Malikane, 2007:72) as one that should be restructured. Policy making in this sector for almost a decade 
has been ‘neither transparent, accountable, nor participatory’ (COSATU, 2001:7). Recall here, for example, the 
exclusion of civil society in the bank and government negotiation of end-user finance for housing in 1994. This 
is indeed extremely worrying given that financial institutions have ‘encouraged the capital outflow by 
facilitating the export of personal savings; and generally have avoided lending to innovative, relatively labour 
intensive activities such as agriculture, housing, infrastructure construction, and small and micro enterprise in 
general’ (Ibid:3). Moreover, this sector is ‘oligopolistic’ and its regulatory system is insufficiently transparent 
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The answer to these questions seems to lie less in the lack of a harnessing will and/or ‘lack of 
ideas’ (Freund, 2007:8) but more in the constraints to manoeuvre that are arguably spawned 
by the intertwining of state-orchestrated ‘outside in’ and state-facilitated conglomerate 
‘inside out’ globalisation (see Carmody, 2002). The former refers to the ‘hyper-liberal’ state-
driven economic globalisation strategy coalescing around tight fiscal and monetary policy 
and accelerated trade liberalisation, i.e. ‘industrialisation by invitation’ as opposed to internal 
resource mobilisation and redistribution (Ibid:258, 260). This ‘outside in’ globalisation, 
predated GEAR (see Gelb, 2006b) - but thereafter accelerated - created the space and 
opportunity for the restructuring and internationalisation of South African conglomerates 
‘substantially beyond the MEC’ (Carmody, 2002:267). The result is that these conglomerates 
are now ‘absorbed into a broader transnational capitalist class project where global financial 
capital, given its greater fungibility and mobility, and hence structural power, sets the 
agenda’ (Ibid:266). A progressive compromise between this two-fold interlinked global 
integration strategy and an inclusive socio-development programme and project is frustrated 
by a host of factors associated in the main with the Treasury’s and Reserve Bank’s self-styled 
‘doctrinaire abstractions’325
This dependence is manifested in ‘negative autonomy’ from domestic social forces. 
Negative autonomy is where the state appears autonomous from domestic social 
forces, but that autonomy is the obverse of dependence on global forces, and therefore 
reflective of their priorities. Thus, the state liberalises the economy to maintain the 
‘confidence’ of international investors and uses the global market forces to discipline 
productive capital and labour rather than being able to discipline them on its own to 
achieve developmental goals... In this way, the state uses its power to constrain its 
power... As the state globalises, the success of government’s development strategy 
depends on private sector actions and investment (Carmody, 2002:263). 
 of ‘economic pragmatism’, ‘sound fundamentals’, ‘investor 
confidence’, ‘macroeconomic balance’, and ‘good governance’. This gives rise to a state that 
can be characterised as ‘embedded or institutionalised dependence [sic] on global forces’. 
If the failure of ‘industrialisation by invitation’ of this ‘class compromised non-
developmental democratic state’ (Leftwich, 2000:176) is now acknowledged by 
government,326
                                                                                                                                                       
and accountable’ (Ibid:7). A 2004 study commissioned by the Treasury and the Reserve Bank titled Competition 
in South African Banking points to the existence of a ‘complex monopoly’ (versus duopoly) in the banking 
sector wherein 25% of the market is ‘supplied by members of a group of persons (which are not interconnected 
companies), who either voluntarily or not, and with or without agreement between them, so conduct their 
business that prevents, restricts, or distorts competition’ (Treasury & South African Reserve Bank, 2004:11). 
 the success of the present drive to harness and mobilise internal resources and 
social forces depends to a great deal on the construction of a ‘well-organised state work[ing] 
closely with producing classes’ (Kohli, 2004:21). Under these circumstances, the ‘coercive, 
325 A phrase borrowed from Easterly (Foreign Policy, July–August 2007:2) (available at 
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/07/william-easterl.html) (accessed 2 August 2007). 
326 See amongst others, Seidman & van Meelis, 2006; Rob Davies in Business Day, 3 August 2007; Floyd 
Shivambu in Mail & Guardian, 15 July 2007; (ex-) Deputy Director (Lionel October) and Chief Director 
(Nimrod Zalk) of the Department of Trade and Industry in Afrikaner Handelsinstituut (nd) (available at 
http://www.ahi.co.za/current/nipfupdate.html) (accessed 31 July 2007); and Simon Roberts, Chief Economist of 
the Competition Commission in Amandla, 2007 (available at 
http://www.amandla.org.za/Site/developmental_state_debate.htm) (accessed 22 October 2007). 
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organisational, and economic powers of a society are aggregated... to propel economic 
change’ (Ibid) which in turn hinges on a) the existence of a ‘social class with an interest in 
state building as well as sufficient political power to undertake it’, and b) the nurturing of 
‘domestic alliance sufficiently strong to build an effective state’ (Ibid). 
The intertwining of ‘inside out’ and ‘outside in’ globalisation undermines both of Kohli’s 
(2004) conditions, which frustrates developmental state formation and transformative state 
intervention. On the one side, the ‘very sections of society’ (working class, informal 
economy, rural poor, etc.) that the ANC needs to align themselves to for the purposes of 
building an assertive state have very little or nothing to gain from GEAR (and subsequent 
modifications). On the other side, there is ‘no reason for them [the privileged] to support 
efforts seeking the establishment of [a stronger] state’ (Eriksen, 2005:407). Even if 
government was/is able to ‘overcome the great obstacles’ (Ibid) confronted by resistance 
from privileged groups, messy subaltern politics, the 1990s (neoconservative) 
‘disqualification of developmental state model’ (Sindzingre, 2002:19), and deformed post-
apartheid governance rationalities, it has ‘undercut[s] the social foundations of a project of 
[developmental] state building by making it impossible to…pursue policies that could create 
a political alliance composed of actors with an interest in it’ (Eriksen, 2005:407). 
The historical record demonstrates that changing the social distribution of power between 
social classes, disciplining and regulating capital and the establishment and sustaining of a 
developmental state are inter-related. In Mustapha’s (2006) magisterial survey of the 
contemporary intellectual thought related to rewiring the nexus between state-market and 
civil society, he writes: 
[H]istorically, success in service delivery has depended on the state’s success in 
pushing through rapid social transformation…The social distribution of power 
between social classes is one key to achieving a transformation state. Within this 
transformative state context, civil society and community should be actively involved 
in coalitions and ‘action networks’…based on consensus seeking and the building of 
trust. This is the way to scale-up local civil society initiatives whilst protecting them 
from capture by more powerful local and international interests (Mustapha, 2006:8). 
Grabowski (1994), making a similar point, draws a distinction between a ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
developmental state. The former is an interventionist and autonomous state that is ‘able to 
discipline firms’, i.e. state-led economic development that of necessity engineers and effects 
‘massive social dislocation’ that ‘destroys the small interest groups, thus allowing the state to 
pursue broad developmental goals’ (415, 420). 
The success of East Asia is often attributed to the existence of such hard states. 
Alternatively, the failure of state-led economic development in much of the rest of the 
developing world is the result of the existence of soft states… [i.e. ‘subordinate 
(weak) state’, wherein ‘government follows the private sector’] (Grabowski, 
1994:415). 
The dominance of the transnational capitalist ‘business model’ of state embeddedness 
(alluded to earlier), the intertwining of ‘inside out’ and ‘outside in’ globalisation, the 
devaluation and alienation of the labour movement and the segments of organised and 
unorganised civil society that could potentially lend assistance and support to developmental 
state construction, and a state that ‘uses its own power to constrain its power’ (Carmody, 
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2002:263), explains in large part why there is still not in place a development strategy that is 
sensitive and responsive to domestic needs and priorities, rather than those of the financial 
sector. It also explains why South African business is quite pleased with post-apartheid style 
‘developmental state’ interventions that focuses largely on creating a more friendly and 
supportive business environment, i.e. ‘a pragmatic, market-oriented developmental state’ 
(Esterhuyse, 2007:3–4), ‘whose principal mission is to remove market constraints, [and] 
lower the cost of doing business’ (Cronin in Mail & Guardian Online, 3 June 2007).  
Any ‘noise’ from within the governing party that might suggest a departure from this regime 
of developmental statecraft is quickly muffled by senior party members. Indeed, when 
delegates at the recent ANC conference called for a more interventionist state to direct the 
economy, party leaders, it is reported, ‘went out of their way not to makes noises that would 
upset the markets’ (Business Day, 29 June 2007). Closely watched by international rating 
agencies, who warned that any ‘shift to the left could undermine SA’s attractiveness as an 
investment destination’, Joel Netshitenzhe assured the agencies that they had ‘nothing’ to 
worry about (Ibid). President Mbeki in a television interview provided more assurance, 
remarking that the ‘building of a developmental state is not about developing new policy, but 
looking at how well the country has succeeded in building that developmental state’ 
(paraphrased). Pictured against the backdrop of the World Economic Forum logo, the 
President in this interview spoke of the focus of the developmental state as one that ‘should 
be on the functioning, re-sourcing and positioning of the finance institutions of the country’. 
All of it is intended to ensure that we have the capacity to speed up implementation of 
policies that have got to do with the reduction of poverty, underdevelopment… But as 
I say, it’s an attempt to make sure that we do indeed build such a developmental state 
to address these challenges. So the poor can only benefit from the stronger 
developmental state which is able to answer them (President Thabo Mbeki, 2007).327
In sum, the transnational capitalist ‘business model’ embeddedness and the intertwining of 
globalisations potentially rules out any drastic interference in property rights, financial 
markets and the socio-political distribution of power. This is a view endorsed by the ANC’s 
key ideologue when he was quizzed about the role of developmental state and its relationship 
to capital: 
  
A developmental state is about using state capacity to mitigate unregulated 
capitalism… In other words, the challenge in my view is not so much – as an 
ideological standpoint – to ‘challenge the power and interests of capital’... but to 
develop a social compact in which all social partners play a role in bringing about 
economic growth and social inclusion, including job creation. It is about a 
developmental state with the strategic capacity to lead all of society in pursuing these 
objectives (Netshitenzhe, 2007).328
The task of the state, Netshitenzhe said, was to ‘use its various capacities – the budget, state-
owned enterprises, regulation and so on – to develop the economy in a particular direction’ 
  
                                                 
327 Available at http://www.sabcnews.com/politics/the_parties /0,2172,151802,00.html (accessed 10 July 2007). 
328 Available at http://www.amandla.org.za/Site/Nethshitenzhe/htm (accessed 23 July 2007). 
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(Ibid). The adoption and acceptance by the ANC of this weak developmental state model 
arguably safeguards the integrity and longevity of the status quo. But it also frustrates the 
forging of a ‘social compact’, not least because the ‘model’ does not register any problems 
with the existing economic development trajectory. In short, social compact formation and 
assembly, as pointed out earlier, is ‘only possible when government acknowledges there is an 
economic crisis’ (Friedman, 2005a:18). 
If the one leg of the explanation for poor development performance in the spheres of 
economic growth and robust transformation is located in the class compromised nature of the 
state, business model embeddedness and resultant failure to reconfigure the state-capital 
relationship, the other leg relates to the bureaucratic and corporate coherence of the state. 
And it is at this point that we record serious problems with the modalities and mechanics of 
state intervention in governance and service delivery regimes. It is here where the political 
school of developmental state scholarship provides deeper insights into (horizontal) axis 
(state-society) recalibration. 
Political School: State, Society and Politics - The Intermediate State 
The historical legacy and outcome bequeathed by ‘fragile stability’, ‘negative autonomy’ and 
the zigzagging between innovation and continuity has, for some, produced an ‘intermediate 
state’. This is a state displaying features of ‘predation and development[alism]’ (Pillay, 
2007:182), dysfunctionality and partial functionality (see Table 7.1 below). 
 266 
 
Table 7.1: Typology of Predatory and Developmental States  
 Predatory Developmental (state-capitalist) 
South Africa – Intermediate 
(Displays features of Predation and Developmentalism)  
State 
Bureaucracy 
Dysfunctional, based on 
patron-client relations 
(corruption)  
Functional  
Serves general interest, meritocratic 
recruitment, rules-driven, efficient 
Close synergy with political leadership: 
Shared development vision 
State-society 
relations 
State captured by 
particular sets of urban 
elites 
Embedded autonomy: state acts 
autonomously, but embedded in dense 
networks with rising industrial capitalist class 
(state centric) 
Development 
vision 
None High economic growth, diversified economy, 
redistribution subordinate to growth 
System of 
government 
Personalised dictatorship  Authoritarian (military rule or multi-party) 
Key agents of 
development 
None Dominant leaders 
  
Examples Zaire South Korea, Taiwan 
(Source: Adapted from Pillay, 2007:185). 
With the SA state being both soft and intermediate, additional insights are furnished into why 
the state has thus far failed to ‘build a consensus on a national development strategy’ (Hassen 
in Mail & Guardian Online, 18 November 2007). On the one hand, its ‘institutionalised 
dependence’ (Carmody, 2002:266) on the ‘very capital it mistrusts’ (Malikane cited in The 
Times, 10 July 2007) and on whose largesse it depends for its survival precludes honest 
engagement and mobilisation around a redistributive and socially inclusive growth path, i.e. a 
shared vision with advanced and emerging fractions of capital. On the other hand, citizens 
and poor communities encounter a state that is ‘rather divorced from [their] daily struggles 
concerning itself with the technical management of capitalist economy and ensuring the 
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steady flow of investment capital for the benefit of national and international capital’ 
(Simutyani, 2006:5). 
This encounter is aggravated by ‘authoritarian management styles inherited from the past’ 
(Pillay, 2007:186) and those related to fiscal conservatism. With respect to the ‘styles’, the 
mechanistic distinction between policy making and implementation broaches no questioning 
of the ‘correctness’ of this service and infrastructure delivery approach. There is thus a 
continuation of the top down, anti-democratic, ‘technocratic ideology’ (Ocampo, 2007:19), 
‘Fordist factory model’ (McLennan, 2007:6) of depoliticised service delivery that privileges 
distribution rather than (co-)production and redress. With the ‘economy and social 
organisation…not part of the agenda’ (Ocampo, 2007:19), the social distance, as remarked 
earlier,  between the poor and state widens daily. 
The dominant model for understanding delivery is the Fordist factory model, which 
assumes that given a number of inputs (resources, decisions, plans and capacity), a 
specific output can be expected… If this output is not achieved, the problem lies with 
the quality or the quantity of the input or with the process of production, according to 
this model. Implicit to this approach is an understanding of power and social 
relationships premised on a politics of distribution: haves and have-nots, the powerful 
and marginalised. Focusing on distribution alone leads to strategies and interventions 
that entail a shifting of resources, tinkering with dualisms, but not necessarily to any 
significant shift in the control of social resources or improved delivery (McLennan, 
2007:6). 
Present state reform stratagems reinforce this, focusing on maintaining internal/corporate 
coherence rather than effectiveness and outcomes. These are executed through the ‘good 
governance’ and ‘good institutional design’ tracks and regimes as opposed to ‘bad’/‘good 
enough governance’ (Grindle, 2002, 2002a)329 and ‘bad institutional design’ (Evans et al., 
2005:31).330 The depoliticisation of the ‘economy’, the non-recognition/acknowledgment of a 
‘social crisis’ (discursively severed from the economy), and the confinement of the 
developmental state to modest and ineffective second economy interventions331
                                                 
329 The ‘good enough governance’ tract, and here also being mindful of Evans (1995), redirects the conventional 
institutional-reform mindset away from ‘state failure’, and proposals on how to fix the state, to one that 
concentrates on identifying state success – the little pockets or islands of excellence (few though they may be) 
within the state, what makes them work, what drives these officials, and so forth (see Grindle 2002; 2002a). Key 
also in this tract is strengthening the ‘political clout of the poor in civil society to keep the state on its toes’ 
(Grindle, 2002:14). Lastly, this tract alerts us to the uncertainties or there being no neat 
correlations/correspondence between growth and inequality, redistribution and growth (Freund, 1992); 
democracy and growth (Bardhan, 1993), regime type and growth (Przeworski & Limogni, 1993), governance 
and poverty alleviation (Grindle, 2002), decentralisation and poverty eradication. 
 and first 
330 Lowndes and Wilson (2001) note that ‘‘good’ institutional design does not always go alongside high levels 
of social capital’ (cited in Evans et al., 2005:31). Bad institutional design can potentially positively impact on 
social capital via, for example, the mobilisation of marginalised groups around a specific issue  
331 The ASGISA Review of 2006 notes that the ‘targets for second economy interventions remain too modest’, 
they do not reach the marginalised youth (‘the majority of the unemployed’) in an efficient and effective 
manner, and that more work was required in linking the second economy to a comprehensive anti-poverty 
strategy (Coverage of the Review is contained in Engineering News, 22 March 2007) (see 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article.php?a_id=106198, accessed 10 September 2007). 
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economy-costs of doing business reduction (Seidman & Meelis, forthcoming, np)332
At municipal level, the subordination of the ‘content-agenda’ of developmental local 
government to the ‘institutional reform’ one, often introduces, in the short to medium term, 
intractable tensions between ‘top-down directives and bottom-up initiatives’; ‘technical and 
political accountability’; ‘prescription and experimentalism’; ‘horizontal and vertical 
integration of development plans and institutional priorities’ (see Pieterse & van Donk, 
forthcoming). With the second agenda presented as the ‘precondition of the former’ or, more 
generously, both agendas being ‘pursued in tandem’ (Ibid), and these tensions exacerbated by 
the ‘general lack of accountability’ of municipalities to the voting public (related to an 
electoral system that strengthens upward accountability to party bosses (Atkinson, 2007:64), 
the substance of Second Decade, and particularly second economy, developmentalism is 
opined by some as constituting an infrastructure-service delivery regime resembling the ‘Poor 
Laws in early 19
 further 
diminishes the probabilities of dynamic transformation via the installation of the ‘right 
politics’, particularly at the coalface of delivery. 
th century England’.333
The new poor laws hinge crucially on sorting out the ‘can’t pays’ from the ‘won’t 
pays’ so as to limit the consumption of the former and force the latter to pay up – or 
have their water and electricity cut to the minimum. Accordingly, there is a powerful 
inbuilt logic to maintain the Free Basic Services as low as possible precisely to use 
them as a threat to enforce payment for the services by the ‘won’t pays’ (Hart, 
2007a:5). 
 
Two conditions are crucial for the new poor laws to work as intended: municipal officials 
must be able to enforce restrictions on water and electricity, and the smallest possible number 
of the ‘deserving poor’ must be carefully identified and labelled. While municipalities have 
some discretion in defining the qualifications for indigence, they are required by the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government to maintain an accurate Indigent Register. 
                                                 
332 The words of Jeremy Cronin are most apposite here:  
We run the risk of building a two-faced developmental state. On the one hand, a “first world” state, 
with relatively well-resourced departments and state-owned enterprises... On the other hand, a “caring” 
but woefully under-resourced and overwhelmed “third world” state, focused on delivery to the poor... 
This way we end up with an aspirant first-world developmental state that frees the market, while a 
third-world “caring” state does its best to ameliorate the very underdevelopment that the market 
constantly reproduces (see Cronin in Mail & Guardian Online, 3 June 2007). 
333  
What Second Economy policies like FBS [free basic services] do, in effect, is to construct a category of 
second-class citizens who are seemingly more amenable to being transformed into ‘responsible’ 
members of society – or, at least, are more subject to neo-liberal discipline. Yet it is possible that 
policies designed to contain popular discontent might actually be feeding into it…While…moves 
[increasing minimum allocations calibrated to household size] might go part of the way towards 
calming popular discontent, the structural contradictions of the new ‘poor laws’ remain. Free Basic 
Services are tightly connected to credit control and to growing surveillance by central government over 
municipal finances. The majority of municipalities have massive debts, and are under heavy pressure 
from Trevor Manuel to get people to pay up. The Municipal Financial Management Act…provides for 
much tighter central monitoring of municipal finances. At the same time many municipal officials and 
mayors have been placed on performance contracts (Hart, 2007a:5). 
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Ward councillors, elected by their constituents and supposed to represent them, are turned 
into shock troops in the campaign to identify and cordon off the deserving poor, and ensure 
that the rest of the population is exposed to the whip of market discipline (Hart, 2007a:5), 
often unmindful of the human consequences and at the expense of democratic societal 
penetration. 
The strongest blow dealt against developmental/transformative state societal penetration, 
though, resides in the exclusion from our programmes and policies of the core concerns of 
the poor majority, i.e. their grinding, alienating and dehumanising poverty. Grand statements 
about the developmental state, human solidarity and people-centred transformation aside; the 
critical issues of affordability, unemployment, migration, demographic changes (at household 
and intra/inter-settlement levels), HIV/AIDS, urbanisation of poverty are variously projected 
in our policies and programmes as ‘challenges’/‘problems’/‘constraints’/‘limitations’ rather 
than as starting points and key informants of the policy problem. So the authoritative DBSA 
report remarks: 
Ridding the country of services backlogs by 2014 requires many interventions. A host 
of social limitations remains. These include a) the rapid increase in the number of 
households requiring infrastructure services, b) the increase in the number of low-
income households that qualify for housing and service subsidies, c) the rate of 
increase of low-income households in specific areas, d) the consequences of HIV and 
AIDS, and e) the relationships between consumers, levels of service and affordability 
(DBSA, 2006:185). 
It is precisely these ‘limitations’ (realities) that destabilise the model and modelling of the 
‘wise men’ of the policy elite (discussed further below) witnessed, for example, in the 
Human Rights Commission’s recent report on progress towards the progressive realisation of 
socio-economic rights. The report mentions the shortcomings of the state’s shelter 
programme as not having ‘proper regard’ to the high unemployment rate, the housing 
affordability ratio, rapid urbanisation processes, and capacity constraints (SAHRC, 2006:27). 
What to think of transformation and the developmental state when our policies are not rooted 
in these realities but in ‘theories’, ‘technical solutions’ and ‘baseless policies and frameworks 
that barely reflect the[se] factual and observable situations’ (Franks in Editorial, 2004:99)? 
The net effect of this exogenisation is that the poorest and most vulnerable members of 
society, that is, the indigents, the add-ons, the special cases, as mentioned before, are ‘treated 
as a special case in service delivery initiatives’ (Grindle, 2002:11). Surely this policy gaze is 
highly problematic when ‘indigents’, for example, constitute over half of South Africa’s 46 
million people (and are therefore eligible for free basic services) (cited in Cape Times, 22 
June 2005). The relegation of majority to a special category, whose basic needs are to be met 
via a miniscule central grant transfer (equitable share)  - not infrequently used to fund 
recurrent expenditure and ‘often insufficient to cover all the hidden administration costs of 
the indigent policy’ (Atkinson, 2007:72) - casts a long shadow over the existing service and 
infrastructure delivery models and developmental state construction. 
Having now interrogated the problems and pitfalls of South African developmental state 
construction and statecraft from the state-economy and state-society angles, how do we move 
from the soft and intermediate, but bearing in mind South African specificities? The next 
part, prefacing a discussion of the Second Decade’s shelter-governance agenda and regime, 
furnishes some pointers in this direction. This is in line with the ethos of the document, 
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wherein housing is framed as expression and component of a society’s wider development 
strategy and transformative statecraft. 
Section Three  
Moving Beyond the Soft and Intermediate State - Lessons from the East Asian and 
Latin American Examples and SA Specificity 
It would be futile to ‘look at developmental states in Asia, for example, pull out their key 
characteristics and use them to assess whether the South African state is developmental’ 
(Saloojee in Business Day, 20 August 2007). This is because the developmental state in 
South Africa ‘does not and cannot seek to emulate developmental states in other parts of the 
world’ due to their ‘specificity and degrees of autonomy’. 
Developmental states in any one socioeconomic, historical or political context are not 
easily transportable to other contexts. In a free SA, the developmental state is 
characterised by its democratic content, the role of the state in socioeconomic 
transformation and its role in dealing with conflict over the use and distribution of 
valued goods and resources in society. The principal challenges facing SA include 
dealing with poverty and inequality, unemployment and underdevelopment. And the 
vision of the developmental state is the creation of a nonracial [sic], nonsexist [sic], 
democratic and prosperous country (Ibid).
Only the foolhardy then would disagree with the Public Service Commission (PSC, 2007a:9) 
when it says that ‘[w]hat gives rise to and shapes the nature of the developmental state 
depends on the context and the history of a country’; or in the words of Zola Skweyiya, 
Minister of Social Development, ‘the specific historical conjuncture being considered…and 
the particular ideological perspective adopted’ (Skweyiya, 2004:19). Hence, among the 
factors considered important in contemporary South Africa, but not seen as ‘critical factors in 
East Asia’, include ‘addressing problems of unbalanced regional development and harnessing 
local development activities for the benefit of national priorities’; attending to ‘problems of 
social inequality and the need for redistribution’ whilst simultaneously ‘avoiding negative 
impacts on overall economic growth’; and ‘balancing the needs of local democracy against 
the need for long term central planning’ (Thompson, 2007:2–3). 
  
Relevant here are the differences in the contribution of political parties to the project of a 
‘democratic developmental state’ (past and present). Political parties have ‘frequently, though 
by no means necessarily, played a major role in establishing or sustaining developmental 
states’ (Randall, 2007:635). They employed nationalism to integrate their societies and 
‘maintain legitimacy’; supplied vision and leadership by ‘allowing a technocratic elite - either 
bureaucratic or one straddling the party-state divide’ (Ibid); and supplied degrees of 
autonomy via furnishing them with ‘an institutional framework for political and 
organisational co-ordination, and/or by increasing state legitimacy and maintaining political 
stability’ (Ibid). A common feature of such parties though has ‘been their dominant position 
within the prevailing party system, either as hegemonic parties within a nominally 
competitive system, as in Mexico or Botswana, or as ruling parties within single-party 
systems’ (Ibid). In the present context of ‘third-wave democratisation and neo-liberal 
ascendancy’, their contribution ‘in terms of shaping and elaborating the guiding policy 
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discourse, political recruitment, ensuring accountability, monitoring implementation or 
providing legitimacy’ is ‘likely to be extremely limited’ (Op cit, 2007:649).334
And here we arrive at the nub of the matter. The ‘developmental orientation of a state’, write 
Fritz and Menocal (2007:534), ‘is not a permanent condition but rather a dynamic feature 
with a limited time horizon’ conditioned by historical conjuncture, social structures, 
ideology, societal norms and practices. It is for this reason that developmental states are not 
associated ‘with specific policies; at different times and in different places, very different 
policies have ushered in social and economic transformations’ (Ibid). It is accordingly 
appropriate to ‘caution against any attempts to suggest that there is a prototype of a 
developmental state that can be constructed on the basis of what worked in other countries’ 
(PSC, 2007a:9). On the other hand, the ‘meaning’ and materiality of a developmental state is 
derived from the ‘primary social forces and imperatives shaping public policy’ (Skweyiya, 
2004:19). Broadening the question posed by Minister for Public Service and Administration, 
Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, to public servants, how then 
 Partial 
exceptions do, however, prevail ‘but in both cases these imply some limitation on the 
prevailing norms of liberal democracy’ (Ibid). 
…do we adjust our repertoires of collective action now that we have a full democracy, 
compared to the militancy we could show when we fought an illegitimate system that 
did not protect the rights of our people? We need to engage with one another on 
exactly what it means to orient our public administration in the direction of 
development…This discourse obviously has to take place against the backdrop of our 
concept of the developmental state. Amongst other things this requires the mediation 
of class conflict in such a way that the gains of the National Democratic Revolution 
are safe, secure and advanced. We need to protect our initial democratic gains from 
counter-revolutionary forces through domination by former economic elites nationally 
and globally. Continuing to build a transformed, people-centred public service that is 
responsive, agile and participatory is central to protecting the interest of the vast 
majority of the oppressed people…From the citizen’s perspective, the State is 
constitutionally bound to ensure that services are in fact delivered to them and, that 
these services are of a high quality and delivered to their convenience. This 
challenges the State to find the most effective methods and channels to deliver these 
services within the system of government, but also in creative associations with the 
private sector, the NPO [non-profit organisation] sector and the community (Minister 
for Public Service and Administration, 2007:3–8, original emphasis). 
Notwithstanding the finding of ‘democratic developmental states’ historically being ‘a 
relatively rare sub-species of a wider set of successful developmental states’ (Fritz & 
Menocal, 2007:549, original emphasis), those that are now emerging (see Table 7.2 below), 
elevate the ‘authentic empowerment of the poor’, revolving around the state nurturing and 
fostering ‘dense networks of people working together across institutional boundaries 
unconstrained by accepted norms’ (Swilling, 2007:np). Fundamental here is a society-centric 
state-civil society relational field perspective, wherein the state is ‘embedded in dense 
networks with mobilised and organised subordinate classes’ (Pillay, 2007:185), i.e. 
                                                 
334 This is a consequence of their ‘weak institutionalisation’, fashioned as it is by the context and evolution of 
party formation and the dynamics of democratic consolidation in the globalising economy. 
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‘partnering’, conjectures Swilling (2007:np), ‘more with networks of civil society formations 
than the business elites’. The developmental orientation of this state is one that subordinates 
economic growth to human development via deep interventions in the political economy 
rooted in deep democracy, and buttressed by unconventional socio-institutional ensembles. 
Table 7.2: Features/Attributes of the Emerging ‘Developmental’ State 
 Developmental (substantive-democratic) 
State bureaucracy Functional, serves general interest, meritocratic recruitment, rules-
driven, efficient; Close synergy with political leadership: shared 
development vision 
State-society 
relations 
Embedded autonomy: state acts autonomously, but embedded in dense 
networks with mobilised and organised subordinate classes (society-
centric) 
Development 
vision 
Balanced, sustainable development, economic growth subordinate to 
human development, protection of natural environment 
System of 
government 
Participatory multi-party democracy 
Key agents of 
development 
Working class party and a mobilised civil society 
Examples Kerala (India), Porto Alegre (Brazil), Venezuela? 
(Source: Pillay, 2007:185). 
The tragedy of South Africa’s transformation project resides both in the illberal elements of 
state developmentalism and the consequently weak(er) (re-) institutionalisation of state-civil 
society relations, especially at municipal level (as discussed above). When referenced to 
intentions to construct a developmental state that draws on and combines the ‘best traditions 
of democracy’ and the developmental state (‘as in East Asian countries’) (Financial Mail, 23 
February 2007),335
                                                 
335 Electronic version (see 
 our development project/policies fail(s) both to enhance democracy (in 
http://free.financialmail.co.za/budget2007/overview/bud3.htm) (accessed 10 July 
2007). 
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substantive and participatory senses) and improve the developmental orientation of the 
state.336
BNG, Markets and Social Cohesion 
 
Alternative scenarios suggest that the triggering of virtuous cycles between economic and 
human development and the sustainability of the cycle is associated with (amongst others) 
guaranteeing the ‘proper functioning of markets and the consistency between the latter and 
social cohesion’ (Ocampo, 2007:11). This implies a re-conceptualisation of ‘public policy’, 
which is now ‘understood as all forms of collective action in pursuit of the common interest 
rather than as action exclusively by the state’. The ‘public domain’ in this instance ‘must be 
conceived as the meeting point of collective interests’, not ‘synonymous with state activities’; 
‘belong[ing] to society, and not the state’ (Ibid, original emphasis). Although ‘natural 
leadership falls on the state’, in the context of state and market failure this approach 
…underscores the importance of creating a strong institutional framework – a high 
institutional density – with active participation of multiple social actors and adequate 
accountability to the citizenry – i.e. a high democratic density. It creates room both 
for state institutions and civil society, and, in each case, for local as well as national, 
international and supranational institutions, as a result of the profound restructuring of 
the domain of “the public” that has taken place in recent decades. It means, in other 
words, that all sectors of society must participate more actively in democratic public 
institutions, while at the same time developing multiple institutions of their own, 
which may strengthen the relation of solidarity and social responsibility, thus 
consolidating a culture of mutual understanding and collective development (Ibid:11–
2, original emphasis). 
A comparison of the theoretical roots and governance regime of the first decade shelter 
programme and second decade BNG (see Table 7.3), attests to the latter’s attempt to engage 
purposefully with the contemporary restructuring of the public domain. BNG’s demand-
driven supply negotiated delivery shelter regime337
                                                 
336 This is contrary to the view of Fritz and Menocal (2006:12) when they state that South Africa ‘has truly 
achieved an encompassing and sustained developmental orientation’. 
 is to be embedded in localised 
democratically deliberative contestation and negotiation of the social wage animated via 
market regulation (in the inter-linked land, financial and property markets) and greater 
demand-side factor calibration (attuned to coping strategies and life chances). The 
effectiveness and sustainability of the intervention underpinning the BNG delivery regime  
(measured, for example, by the extent to which it enhances asset accumulation, wealth 
creation and activates socio-economic citizenship) rests squarely on re-orientation of 
horizontal (and vertical) governance axis/(es) that change(s) the process and output. In other 
words, the BNG delivery regime demands ‘mobilised civil society participation plus 
extensive redistribution’ (Pillay, 2007:181), with the latter, either of the ‘current income or 
337 In which the state must engage communities to establish ‘individual housing needs and then engage with the 
private sector to partner with it to provide a variety of housing options and amenities to meet the revealed need’ 
(Tomlinson & Narsoo in Business Day, 28 August 2007). 
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the growth increment’, proven to be ‘more effective in reducing poverty for a majority of 
countries than growth alone’ (Dagdeviran et al., 2001:3). 
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Table 7.3: Key Elements of the First and Second Decade Shelter-Governance Agenda and Regime 
Elements  Theoretical 
roots  
Nature of state Focus and emphasis  Product and 
citizenship 
Relationship to 
external non-
public partners 
Governance 
mechanism  
Value base  
First 
Decade  
New Public 
Management  
Disaggregated, managerialist and 
technocratic  
Housing powers and functions, duties and 
obligations of the spheres of government 
are defined by the Constitution, legislation 
and regulation. Working within 
untransformed land, financial and property 
markets is the delivery of a state-packaged 
and government-defined output to subjects 
(no active participation by beneficiaries)  
Intra- and inter-
organisational management  
State as key driver of 
development with an 
emphasis on service inputs 
and outputs (efficiency and 
targets) focussed on income 
graded width  
Standardised, 
passive citizenship 
Independent 
contractors within a 
competitive 
marketplace  
State-facilitated, 
market- driven 
housing 
programme. 
Delivery by the 
private sector  
The market and 
commercial 
contracting 
Efficacy of 
competition 
and the 
market place  
Second 
Decade  
Organisational 
sociology, 
network theory, 
human capability 
development  
Plural and pluralist state, organisational 
flexibility with greater collaboration within 
and between spheres  
National and provincial government not 
only overseeing and monitoring 
development, but also involved in 
implementation via partnerships (MOUs, 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework 
Act). Delivery of locally (collaboratively) 
defined and customised products within 
transformed land, property and financial 
markets wherein people are no longer 
objects (active participation of 
beneficiaries and their integration into 
restructured land, financial and property 
markets) 
Inter-organisational/multi-
agency governance 
focussed on width (as entry 
point) and depth  
Development driven in 
partnership but community-
centred frameworks with an 
added emphasis on service 
processes and outcomes  
Differentiated 
responses to need, 
active citizenship 
(community 
empowerment) 
Preferred suppliers, 
and often inter-
dependent 
organisations with 
ongoing 
relationships (does 
not preclude direct 
delivery by the 
state)  
Trust and 
relational 
contracting with 
state as guarantor 
of developmental 
distribution 
outcomes 
Neo-
corporatist  
(Source: Adapted and supplemented from Osborne, 2006:383).
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Notable by their absence in BNG’s shelter-governance and agenda regime are the modalities 
and mechanics related to the thickening of institutions and democracy; the most crucial being 
the authentic empowerment of the poor. This empowerment is arguably most optimally 
effected through the decentralisation of power, authority and resources to communities and 
households, and democratically and locally defined notions of progressive realisation of 
socio-economic rights, i.e. community/ household versus technocratically finance-derived 
‘reasonableness’. 
Regrettably, beneath the authoritarian trends of government, undergirded by the technocratic 
Fordist delivery model and its class project ‘lies a deeply pessimistic vision of democracy’ as 
one of competition for rents, patronage and spoils. Intrinsic to insulation of institutions from 
messy politics is an ‘oligarchic tendency’; ‘government by the wise’ (Ocampo, 2007:19), 
which inevitably pits ‘public sector generalists against community activists’ (Tomlinson & 
Narsoo in Business Day, 28 August 2007) and the poor (more generally). With the exclusion 
of the economy and social organisation from this model; its shallow conception of citizen 
participation,338
If on the other hand, communities have money (‘savings’), like the Federation of the Urban 
Poor (FEDUP), the engagement, arguably, seems to be less fraught or complicated. One 
ponders whether the relationship with FEDUP as opposed to interactions with other 
organisations of the poor or those representing them is less problematic because the former 
(as intimated in Chapter Four) behave in ways encouraged by state, namely modernist and 
workfarist recreation of citizens and communities. 
 the emphasis on ‘ty[ing] government more closely to policies formulated by 
the party [in state]’ (Deputy Finance Minister cited Sunday Times, 9 September 2007) and, 
‘implementing ANC policy [in state] with more energy and speed’ (Ibid), there is little place 
and space for community participation. Indeed, the Department of Housing in its strategic 
and performance plan records the ‘complexity’ of community participation and dynamics as 
‘challenges’ hampering expedited implementation (‘slows down delivery’) and complicating 
‘housing development issues’ (DOH, 2007:16).  
[W]e have not developed a broader view of the kind of relationship we would like to 
have with civil society... whilst the emphasis by FEDUP on community savings has 
facilitated our relationship with that organisation (Minister of Housing, 2007b). 
The complications and complexities alluded to here cut to the heart of the political economy 
of housing processes, programmes and policies not unrelated to what the ‘wise’ see, value, 
                                                 
338 Relevant here, for example, are the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) ‘recommendations’ 
pertaining to ‘mechanisms that will optimise the use of existing resources, and ensure maximum benefits’ 
thereby contributing ‘immensely towards’ the realisation of the housing right:  
Public participation is aimed primarily at informing the public about the activities of government. It 
should be aimed at ensuring that the public adds value to activities of the government. The guiding 
principle should be that the public knows better – community members may be poor or uneducated, but 
they are not stupid. 
However, there should be a balance between giving in to the demands of the public and the strategic 
considerations needed to ensure the maximum realisation of socio-economic rights with limited 
resources. Therefore public participation should entail the detailed provision of different options and 
their implications. This will ensure that the public makes informed decisions without jeopardising the 
necessity of strategic thinking (SAHRC, 2006:28). 
 277 
 
prioritise in the reconstruction of our human settlements and the (‘free’, effective) remedies 
that all enjoy should their ‘rights’ be ‘threatened or violated’.  
Reflect for a moment on the recent Human Rights Commission reports, which over the past 
few years have criticised the housing programme and policy on the grounds that it does not 
pass ‘constitutional muster’ (see SAHRC, 2003:62) and ‘needs refining’ (SAHRC, 2004:57). 
While on the whole endorsing the policy and programmatic amendments as ‘reasonable’ with 
respect to the progressive realisation of housing rights, it is forthright in its criticism of the 
‘measures’ not extending protection to evicted farm workers (numbering 950 000 since 
1994); the ‘poor residents within the city centre of Johannesburg’ (estimated at 25 000); and 
‘bond defaulters (due to social problems such as retrenchments)’ (SAHRC, 2006:26). 
Suspending discussion about exogenisation, how is one to square this view of the Human 
Rights Commission report on inner-city evictions when the head of the Commission, Jody 
Kollapen, raises questions about the ‘methods used in the evictions’, which, he reportedly 
argues, should be executed within ‘humane parameters’. But the Inner City Regeneration 
Strategy makes ‘no provision for people living in the Johannesburg inner city who are unable 
to access housing through the market’ (Wilson, 2006:8), i.e. a strategy - as pointed out earlier 
- that has turned a welfare and poverty problem into a property one. Indeed, the City’s 
programmes to house the inner city poor ‘have been limited to arms-length support for a few 
homeless and [low cost] transitional shelters’ (Ibid). The great majority ‘unable to afford 
market rentals are not accommodated at all’ (Ibid) in the city’s grander vision to ‘increase 
property values, raise private-sector investment[,] transform Johannesburg into a world-class 
African city’, and project a worthy tourist-friendly image of itself ahead of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup (Mail & Guardian, 31 July 2005). Exacerbating matters is the more recent Inner 
City Regeneration Strategy – from which city residents were excluded from contributing – 
that restricts provision for housing subsidies to developers rather than residents themselves 
(Business Day, 9 May 2007). It is this context of the exclusion of the poor from the inner city 
via the market and development programmes (contra the spirit, if not letter, of the Grootboom 
ruling) that Jody Kollapen’s comments restricted to ‘methods’ of eviction are so short-sighted 
and insensitive.  
In light of state subsidisation of developer-driven housing solutions (versus provision of 
housing for those in desperate need and their subsequent eviction using apartheid-era 
legislation (the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act (1977)),  
Kollapen’s even more insensitive assertion is that state provision of alternative 
accommodation for evicted households,339
The prejudices, conservatism and status-quo preservation orientation of the SAHRC is an 
abiding theme of its short existence. In 2001, this very same institution advised the 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council in the Bredell matter to pay ‘urgent attention’ to those who 
had been on the ‘waiting list for an unreasonably long time’ against the ‘illegal occupants’ 
who, among others, can have ‘no justification... for the violation of rights of others to 
property guaranteed by our Constitution’. In the same Statement on Eviction in Bredell, 
Barney Pityana, then Chairperson of the Commission, wrote:  
 would send a presumably wrong ‘message for 
those who have waited a long time for housing’ (cited in Mail & Guardian, 31 July 2005).  
                                                 
339 Who arguably may not be illegally occupying the premises and are in desperate need. 
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The Commission holds the view that the rights of all the people of South Africa must 
be respected. We consider homelessness and the poverty that are prevalent in our 
society, as a negation of the values of human dignity and social justice enshrined in 
our Constitution... [W]e wish to point out that all South Africans... are aware that 
there are options which they all enjoy whenever the enjoyment of their rights are 
threatened or violated. At no cost they can approach, for example, the South African 
Human Rights Commission and the Public Protector. In the final instance they can 
petition the courts to adjudicate on their rights. The courts in South Africa have been 
very sympathetic to the plight of the poor and needy… We appeal to political parties 
and other agents of civil society in general, to have regard to our constitutional values 
when they confront the challenges we face in our society. Among these are respect for 
the law, reverence for the Constitution, and the observance of human rights.340
State and academic portrayal of the ‘counter-redistributive activities’ (Huchzermeyer, 
2001a:97) and developmentally destabilising thrust of illegal occupations and land invasions 
(dubbed ‘queue-jumping’) is reportedly attributed to a ‘culture of entitlement’ (Ibid:98) rather 
than acknowledging the exclusion of the poor from housing opportunities
 
341 and/or 
imposition of official ‘deterministic interventions’ (Ibid). This overlooks the institutional 
context (costly, ineffective and unresponsive courts and commissions that have not, contra 
Pityana342
South Africa’s legacy of massive landlessness created by colonialist dispossession 
and racist Group Areas legislation sets the context for the position of many inner city 
dwellers. Allowing private property rights to be transferred on a free market, without 
any semblance of an attempt to redress the unjust distribution of property bequeathed 
by our history simply perpetuates this legacy. The state’s policies, up until now, have 
been largely restricted to the provision of land in rural areas or housing in the urban 
periphery. No serious attempt has been made by the state, especially the local state, to 
integrate those most disadvantaged by apartheid back into South Africa’s cities, even 
though that is where many of them currently live (Wilson, 2006:08). 
, ‘been very sympathetic to the plight of the poor and needy’), the instrumentalist 
avenues and channels of public participation and state civil society engagement (‘aimed 
primarily at informing the public about the activities of government’ (SAHRC, 2006:28)), 
and the ‘position of many inner city dwellers’. 
The present-day architects of the developmental state are at pains to remind us of South 
Africa eschewing ‘market fundamentalism’ and its dedication to serving the most vulnerable. 
But in addition to violating the Constitution and various Constitutional Court rulings, 
excluding the most disadvantaged is ‘unreasonable’ if the ‘hierarchy of disadvantage suffered 
under apartheid’ is intended to ‘naturally inform the magnitude of the impact of the 
programmes of change and the attention paid particularly to those who occupied the lowest 
                                                 
340 Pityana, B. 2001. SAHRC Statement on the evictions in Bredell, 13 July (available at 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc_cms/publish/article_110.shtml) (accessed 22 June 2007).  
341 Johannesburg’s Inner City Regeneration Strategy could lead to the forced eviction of a minimum of 25 000 
people, or as many as 70 000 people (cited in COHRE, 2006, np). 
342 Pityana, B. 2001. SAHRC Statement on the evictions in Bredell, 13 July (available at 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc_cms/publish/article_110.shtml) (accessed 22 June 2007).  
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rungs on the apartheid social order’ (ANC, 2007b:4). If the supposedly entitlement-addicted 
queue-jumpers, many of whom constitute the most disadvantaged, are deemed to be 
undeserving of state largesse on the grounds of destabilising state programmes, it is difficult 
to justify the undoubtedly deserving most vulnerable sectors, i.e. infants and children.343
It is also difficult to justify, in the words of the United Nation’s Special Rapporteur for 
Adequate Housing, Miloon Kothari, after visiting poor peripheral communities and residents 
of the derelict inner city, the state spending enormous sums of money on the 2010 World Cup 
and tourism when the ‘most poor people’, whose conditions of living constitute an 
‘emergency’, ‘should be the first priority’ (cited in Mail & Guardian, 19 April 2007). He 
slated government for spending huge sums of money on staging the 2010 World Cup when it 
was struggling to provide adequate housing, and when the municipality was in possession of 
funds for providing for the poor (Mail & Guardian, 19 April 2007). ‘It is very odd that 
countries with high levels of poverty allocate huge sums of money to sporting events’ 
(paraphrased and direct words, News24.com, 25 April 2007).
  
344
With recent Ministerial acknowledgement of the government not ‘giv[ing] the development 
of rental stock the priority it should have’ (Minister of Housing (paraphrased), 2007:1-2)
  
345 
coupled to the fact that the large majority of people residing in the inner city of Johannesburg 
- 82 000 residents ‘living in overcrowded and unsafe conditions that are [close/]closer to their 
places of work’ (Urban LandMark, 2007:02)346 - not earning enough to qualify for social 
housing, the Department of Housing, via the instruments of the revamped Social Housing and 
Inclusionary Housing policies (although not limited to these), is intent on ‘counter[ing] 
segregation or exclusionary outcomes of our built environment processes’ (Minister of 
Housing, 2007a:04). It comes as no surprise that despite the decade-long recognition of the 
failure of the government’s rental programme to house the poorest,347 government continues 
countering ‘counter-redistribution’ with eviction and upward redistribution, with the present 
Minister speaking in glowing terms of Cape Town and Johannesburg developers converting 
and refurbishing existing buildings for those in income brackets who can afford social 
housing (see comments of Minister of Housing, 2007:1-2).348
In other instances, when the state is not subsidising private developers to construct rental 
accommodation, settled communities and households earning less than R1 000 per month, are 
 Why, asks the Special 
Rapporteur, in the case of Johannesburg, is the ‘municipality not upgrading the buildings and 
making them safe? Why [after renovation] do the buildings not go to those living there for so 
long?’ (cited in Mail & Guardian, 19 April 2007). 
                                                 
343 Utilising a poverty line of R430 a month, 74% of children between 0–17 years are poor (Coetzee & Streek, 
2004 cited in Desai, 2005:6). This amounts to more than 13 million children. If the poverty line of R215 per 
month is used, ‘54.24% of children in the same category are ultra-poor; translating into 9.7 million children’ 
(Ibid). 
344 Available at http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Politics/0,,2-7-12_2104048,00.html (accessed 8 
May 2007). 
345 Paraphrased in The Southern African Housing Foundation News, 3, 9, 2007 
346 Housing Market Bulletin, 2007 cited in Urban LandMark, 2, 2, April (02) 
347 See Mpumi Nxumalo-Nhlapo’s comments - the ex-Director-General – in Business Day, 1 June 1998 
348 Paraphrased in The Southern African Housing Foundation News, 3, 9, 2007 
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being moved to temporary residence areas with the Department undertaking to re-house them 
in the new rental units in the same location. Escalating construction costs, poor project 
management, and delays in construction resulted in the ballooning of the rents for the N2 
Gateway dwellings. The income threshold for these rental units shifted from R0-1 000 to 
R3 000 per month. The response of the Minister at the launch of the N2 Gateway on 18 July 
2006 was: 
...some of the beneficiaries might not be able to afford the minimal rental required for 
the units. In this regard, I need to affirm our commitment once again that our poorest 
of the poor are our priority, they are to benefit as part of phase two (Minister of 
Housing, 2006e). 
In reality, ‘very few people’, writes Legassick (2007) of the original residents, ‘could be 
found who were economically eligible. Instead, advertisements were placed in police stations 
to attract new applicants’ (in Sunday Argus, 16 September 2007). 
A further problem is that the new residents were struggling to pay rents which they were 
initially told would be R650 but ended up being R1 100 (News24.com, 16 April 2007).349 
More recently, residents of Joe Slovo, who previously were promised priority in the 
allocation of Phase I housing,350
The Minister is now reportedly looking to ‘legal solutions to clearing the land’ (DOH, 2007b) 
and ‘investigating legal avenues to compel residents of informal settlements to make way for 
housing developments’ (Minister of Housing cited in Cape Times, 13 September 2007). Not 
unrelated to the allocation of units to other ‘not-so-poor’ people, the major grievance of 6 000 
residents who are to be moved to Delft is not only the removal (which some in the media 
have termed ‘forced removal’)
 refused to move to temporary locations to make way for the 
construction of new housing units. Reportedly numbering ‘thousands’ (Cape Times, 13 
September 2007), the residents blockaded the N2 national road ‘demanding the construction 
of one-size-fits-all RDP homes’ (DOH, 2007a) rather than dwellings to be ‘sold to those who 
could afford to pay the R150 000 to R250 000 for the house’ (Cape Times, 13 September 
2007).  
351 - much to the consternation of the Minister who ‘abhors’ its 
‘apartheid connotations’ (cited in Cape Times, 13 September 2007) - but that the removal will 
not be temporary. This is not unfounded considering that many of the victims of the 2005 
fires and those who were relocated to make way for Phase One previously resided in Joe 
Slovo. Their relocation to Delft has not been temporary and has impacted extremely 
negatively on their livelihood networks and coping strategies.352
                                                 
349 Available at 
 In a statement released by 
the civil society Joe Slovo Task Team (whose leader was arrested shortly after securing 
http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_2099356,00.html (accessed 8 
May 2007). 
350 This housing was promised after the devastating fire of January 2005, which destroyed 3 000 shacks and left 
12 000 people homeless (Legassick in Sunday Argus, 16 September 2007). 
351 Cape Times, 12 September 2007. 
352 The state, via Thubelisha, is trying to reduce the impacts through the ‘provision of transport for children to 
and from school, pay points for pensioners and transport for the elderly and ill people to clinics’ (Minister of 
Housing, 2007 cited in Cape Argus, 14 September 2007). The effectiveness and duration of this ameliorative 
and compensatory support/assistance is unclear. 
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permission from the police for residents to meet to discuss the way forward), the following is 
recorded: 
The minister of housing keeps saying that this move will be temporary. This is a bald-
faced lie. Joe Slovo residents are going to be left in Delft for the rest of their lives. 
Only 1 000 people maximum can be accommodated in the new Joe Slovo houses,[353
The Minister’s directive to ‘remove people from the housing waiting lists if they undermine 
government delivery efforts’ (Minister of Housing cited in Cape Times, 13 September 2007),  
versus their demand for in situ upgrade, and encouraging the police and the National 
Prosecuting Authority to maintain law and order by bringing charges against perpetrators 
(DOH, 2007a) of violence - who, in the words of the Department, refuse to ‘move voluntarily 
to temporary accommodation in Delft’ despite the Department having ‘done everything 
necessary to communicate [their] policies and plans to residents’ (DOH, 2007a) - is 
suggestive of a state-orchestrated dispossession process of a historically disadvantaged 
community who are not ‘entitlement’ addicted. Confronting this community is a state and 
official development programme that is bent on imposing an exclusionary shelter ‘solution’ 
that by no stretch of the imagination can be justified as ‘reasonable’ or developmental; 
marginalising those who surely comprise the most vulnerable, i.e. ‘moving out the poor to 
make way for the better off’ (Legassick in Sunday Argus, 16 September 2007). 
] 
which leaves 5 000 unaccounted for (cited in Cape Times, 13 September 2007). 
In short, this Phase Two of the N2 Gateway Project that, in the words of the Minister was 
supposedly to have benefited the ‘poorest of the poor’ (those excluded from Phase One and 
those now confronting relocation/‘removal’) is, in its recent format – GAP housing for those 
earning between R3 500 and R7 500 (Ibid) - a developmental state-orchestrated, a 
developmental state-managed and a developmental state-administered ‘downward raiding’ 
project, whose outcomes are celebrated by both government354 and the private sector.355 
There are also concerns expressed by Thubelisha staff that the present high level of consumer 
indebtedness and the stringent application of the new National Credit Act may well push the 
affordability beyond the target threshold of the GAP market and the not-so-poor.356
                                                 
353 On account of the plot sizes and related product. 
 Over and 
above the technical specifications, only catering for 1 000 out of the 6 600 affected 
community members, it is most likely that only a miniscule number of the relocated original 
354 ‘A gift to the poor of the Western Cape’ said Minister Sisulu (cited in Cape Argus, 14 September 2007). 
355 Regarded as a ‘deviati[on] from previous government policies designed to provide low-cost housing to the 
poor’, the private sector’s attraction to the project is not unrelated to enhanced profit margins, given that the 
‘current product is costing the national housing department almost double the sum allocated to the traditional 
RDP units’. 
The concept makes economic sense for medium-sized construction companies... The gap mass-housing 
concept is now manifestly recognised by all relevant role players as the route to solving the plight of 
the homeless (Kruger, CEO of Sea Kay Holdings, SA’s largest affordable-housing construction group, 
soon to be listed on the JSE’s main board, in Business Day, 14 September 2007). 
356 This view is supported by none other than Leon Louw of the Free Market Foundation: ‘With the new credit 
legislation millions of people who were creditworthy before will be barred from the credit markets. The policy’s 
achievement will be 180 degrees off its intention’ (cited in Business Day, 23 July 2007). 
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beneficiaries will be in a position to afford the new houses, and the majority will accordingly 
be displaced and dispossessed. 
The de-linking of the distribution of housing opportunities from waiting lists and the power 
of the Minister to change the position of people on the waiting lists (both legally and as 
punishment against those protesting; its constitutionality aside) is cold comfort for these 
6 600 households. The intended top-slicing of provincial budgets for future lead projects of 
this nature, coupled to greater national and provincial government activism in housing 
programmes and an aggressive private sector looking to re-enter the low-income housing 
market (ostensibly through GAP housing), does not paint a rosy picture for those who earn 
R2 500 a month and who are searching for housing opportunities on well-situated state land. 
The recasting by the private sector of the N2 Gateway Project as ‘national government gap 
mass-housing flagship project’ (see Kruger in Business Day, 14 September 2007) (contra the 
original project intentions and plans), the not unsubtle ministerial endorsement and 
baptisement of this recasting (‘a gift to the poor’), points to the further entrenchment and 
consolidation of market-embedding and market expansion formats envisaged by Billy 
Corbett in the early 1990s. 
At the base of these many exclusions, discriminations and inequities is a shelter strategy 
wherein housing, unlike in many developmental states, is not viewed as a productive 
investment and/or part of the social wage (e.g. Malaysia,357 Hong Kong and Singapore).358
This regime effectively residualises shelter provision for the poor and unemployed majority. 
A residualised shelter production regime for the majority can only be described as a 
contradiction in terms. The best public sector efforts to reconcile a residualised housing 
 
Worded differently, the new ‘big D’ (BNG), derives from macroeconomic outlooks that 
continue to treat ‘housing as one of many consumption goods, or neglects it all together’ 
(Leung, 2004:2). Encountered is a subsidy regime whose basic premise is founded on formal 
employment, rising incomes and graduation into the market: a dualistic housing production 
regime that reduces the public sector housing intervention to a welfare function/instrument. 
This is evidenced by its structural de-linkage from the wider inter-linked (exclusionary) 
workings of the land, financial and property markets.  
                                                 
357 According to Mat Noor, Director of the Distribution Sector at the Malaysian government’s Economic 
Planning Unit, the country was almost able to wipe out poverty between 1971 and 2004 through ‘a sustained 
commitment by the government, manifested in providing pro-poor services and infrastructure, such as schools, 
hospitals, and the like – and in affirmative action to avoid racial strife’. Malaysia, he added, ‘was able to reach 
high economic growth rates during this period and at the same time reduce poverty and provide for social 
security’.  
To reduce poverty, the Malaysian government implemented programmes that included the provision of 
improved services in agricultural areas, the absorption of poor households into modern agriculture and 
other sectors through accelerated creation of employment opportunities – and the provision of social 
services and amenities such as housing, water and electricity. ‘With these programmes and a well co-
ordinated delivery mechanism, the poor were able to increase their productivity and income through a 
fuller utilisation of their productive assets and skills’ (See Inter Press Service Agency, Helsinki 
Process: Consensus Against Neoliberal Washington Consensus, 3 December 2007) (Available at 
http://www.ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=40257) (accessed 3 December 2007). 
358 It is regrettable that education, health and housing percentage of total spending has decreased between 1997 
and 2007. For housing, it decreased from 2.8% in 1997/98 to 2.3% in 2007/08. During this period, health 
witnessed a 1.4% decline and education a significant 5.9% decrease (Hassen, 2007:6). 
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intervention for the majority with poverty alleviation, equity and redistribution is bound to 
fail, especially when, firstly, that which is delivered is unaffordable (albeit not universally), 
and, secondly, still remains oblivious to the livelihood and coping strategies of approximately 
70% of the inadequately housed. On the other hand, and here read through a political 
economy lens and the intentions of the architects of the housing policy (from Slovo to 
Sisulu), the market embedding of the public sector housing function, working with the grain 
of the market, was never about making markets work for the very poor and poorest of the 
poor; rather, its was and still is about making it work for the not-so-poor with crumbs for the 
rest. 
In Lieu of a Conclusion: Hope and History 
Armed we are with the most progressive Constitution in the world, policies informed by 
cutting edge international experience and expertise, a commitment to developmentalism and 
developmental state construction. Yet from ‘national democratic revolution’ to ‘national 
democratic society’, from developmental to dysfunctional state, from potholes to sinkholes, 
and from keyholes to peepholes; deferred are our dreams, distracted are our prophets, and 
distressed is our society. But ‘the conjuncture’, remarks the public intellectual Ashwin Desai 
(2007), is ‘fluid’ and so he cautions against our inherited and present ‘lazy, self-gratifying 
and frankly rank stupid’ analysis of our politics, politicians, projects, policies and 
programmes. We ‘need to be on the look-out’, he writes, and ‘scan the map of possibilities, to 
be able to take our chances’ but grounded in a ‘concrete analysis of a concrete situation’. 
Hark Lenin: “We do not and cannot know which spark…will rekindle 
conflagration…; we must therefore…set to work up all and sundry, even the oldest, 
mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres, for otherwise we shall not be able to cope 
with our tasks, shall not be comprehensively prepared, shall not be in possession of all 
our weapons” (Lenin, 1960) (cited in Desai 2007:8–9). 
Limitations there are these days to search for our weapons in philosophy because, as we all 
know from Hegel, the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk. 
Limitations there are these days to search for weapons by combing the revolutionary texts 
because we all know that revolutionaries ‘learned history and not action’, and consequently 
acquired the skill to play whatever part was assigned them by the great drama of history, even 
if it meant the ‘devouring of the children of the revolution’ (Farhi, 2003:34). The best we can 
do these days to arm ourselves is to listen carefully to Benjamin’s angel of history; be wary 
of any courtship between the angel of history and the gate keepers of action; to root action in 
a ‘concrete analysis of the concrete situations’ and, in a slight subversion of Brynard 
(2007:66), to rewrite the score and the music in the ‘act of playing it’. 
In the spirit of debunking the impossibility thesis and rethinking developmentalism, there are 
three notes that present themselves to string a new melody. 
The first note: South Africa squandered the opportunity to restructure its political economy in 
democratic and developmental formats. Indeed, ‘if there was any country that could have 
bucked the Washington Consensus it was South Africa’ (Fine, 2007b:4). 
In the early period South Africa had the political clout, the moral standing and the 
economic power to define a different path. It could have been very symbolic at a 
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global level and for countries of the South as the developmental state in the 1980s was 
very strong and was used to critique the Washington Consensus (Ibid). 
Fast forward, and a decade later those looking for evidence to corroborate or negate this 
claim of squandering the opportunity, are clueless when trying to fathom the nature and 
identity of South African developmentalism. It ranges from a ‘class compromised non-
developmental democratic state’ (Leftwich, 2000:176); a “proto” developmental 
state’(Leftwich, 2002:57); a potentially ‘cohesive-capitalist state’ (Kohli, 2004:383);359 a 
‘developmental state’ (Swilling & Breda, 2005c:88);360
These diverse characterisations of the SA developmental state alert to the dangers of models, 
model imposition and replication. They often tend to overlook that development is a ‘process 
of self-discovery involving learning by trial and error, and by selective borrowing to fit the 
context and specificities of particular country situations’ (Mkandawire, 2006:8). Applying 
these insights to developmental state construction, a distinguished scholar on the 
developmental state remarks: 
 an ‘elusive’ developmental state 
(Swilling et al., 2005:6); an Mbeki ‘self-styled “developmental” state that might be 
characterised as “technocratic vanguardist”’ (SACP, 2006b:23); an ‘intermediate state’ 
(predatory and developmental) (Pillay, 2007:182); an ‘aspiring developmental state’ (Pieterse 
& van Donk, forthcoming); and an ‘aspirant first-world developmental state’/‘caring [second 
economy/] third world state’ (Cronin in Mail & Guardian Online, 10 July 2007). 
[T]he definition of the ‘developmental state’ runs the risk of being tautological, since 
evidence that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from the 
performance of the economy. This produces a definition of a state as developmental if 
the economy is developing, and equates economic success to state strength, while 
measuring the latter by the presumed outcome of its policies. It has led to myopic 
concentration of analysis around success to the neglect of the ‘trial and error’ nature 
of policy-making even in the most successful cases. If a developmental state is not to 
be deified into some kind of omnipotent and omniscient leviathan that always gets 
what it wants, then the definition must include situations in which exogenous 
structural dynamic [sic] and unforeseen factors can torpedo genuine developmental 
                                                 
359 A cohesive capitalist state – regarded as the ‘conceptual cousin’ of the developmental state (Kohli, 2004:383) 
– is an ‘economistic’ state that ‘concentrate[s] power at the apex and uses state power to discipline their 
societies’. 
Generally, right-wing authoritarian states, they prioritise rapid industrialisation as a national goal, are 
staffed competently, work closely with industrialists, systematically discipline and repress labor, 
penetrate and control the rural society, and use economic nationalism as a tool for political 
mobilisation. The rulers of these states are able to generate purposive power that can be used to 
accomplish narrowly defined state purposes. State power in such instances has been used to undertake 
industrialization directly under public auspices and to channel private initiative into prioritized sectors, 
especially rapid industrial growth (Op cit.:381). 
360 Swilling, van Breda et al. (2005b) categorise the SA state as a ‘developmental state’ (their inverted commas) 
that was seen to be in operation in the first post-apartheid decade witnessed in the proliferation of ‘innovative 
institutional experiments aimed at capturing and directing funds into development and anti-poverty 
programmes’. The most important lesson of these experiments, they write, resides in ‘institutional learning 
about what it takes to build institutions that can make a lasting developmental impact’ at ground level (Op 
cit.:88). 
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commitments and efforts by the state, as happened recently in some of the most 
successful Asian developmental states. This allows room for poor performance due to 
exogenous factors, miscalculation or plain bad luck…Recognition of episodes and 
possibilities of failure leads us to a definition of a developmental state as one whose 
ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to 
deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic 
development…It is essential to stress these ideological underpinnings of state policies 
for it is these that provide the rationale for some of the ‘policies’ and give legitimacy 
to otherwise unpalatable ‘sacrifices’, not only because they serve as the ‘opium of the 
masses’, but also because they knit together the ruling class (Mkandawire, 2001:290–
1, original emphasis). 
Nit-picking aside, the ideological underpinnings of our state policies are in the main broadly 
developmental from 1994 (ANC, 1994) to 2007 (ANC, 2007a). Secondly, notwithstanding 
the many perils of substantive certainty (namely, the ‘Alliance will live forever’ (Mbeki, 
2007) or the ANC ‘will rule until Jesus comes back’ (Jacob Zuma cited in Weekend Argus, 7 
October 2006)) and the limitations of the Polokwane resolutions, the ‘[n]ew-look ANC’, 
opines the influential Business Day, ‘gives “developmental state” a boost’ (20 December 
2007). 
Firstly, there is, in the words of Jeremy Cronin, a ‘deepening and consolidation’ (cited in 
Business Day, 20 December 2007) of the shift, initiated three years ago, ‘towards greater 
state intervention, active industrial policy, SOE [state-owned enterprise] activism, and so 
forth’ (Ibid; see ANC, 2005 for its political entrenchment). Secondly, compared to the past 
when macroeconomic policies and ‘issues’ were ‘cast in stone’361 and economic policy 
portrayed as ‘constraint on social development’,362 there is a ‘reclaiming of the democratic 
debate’ (Cronin),363 and ‘now the social issues have come to the fore’.364 Thirdly, and here 
different from the past, albeit measured and problematic, is that the deepening and 
consolidation resides less in the technical and technocratic manoeuvres (of the Mbeki 
administration). It pivots now to a greater extent on a ‘fundamental change in politics’365
In a slight modification of Ben Fine (2007b – in italics) and peppered with the statements 
above: We could ‘give one cheer for the developmental state’ for the ‘deepening and 
consolidation’ of shifts in policy; ‘another cheer’ that it could potentially lead to ‘more 
progressive and interventionist policies’ (‘greater state intervention’/‘active industrial 
policy’/‘SOE activism’/recasting linkages and redrawing lines of casualty between economic 
development and human development); ‘and the third and loudest cheer if it appropriately 
identifies, challenges and mobilises the underlying economic and political interests that have 
precluded such policies in the past’ (‘fundamental change in politics’/less reliance on 
 
rooted in ‘openness and respect’ (Vavi in Business Day, 20 December 2007) and ‘shar[ing] 
perspectives’ (Cronin in Business Day, 20 December 2007). 
                                                 
361 Cited in Business Day, 20 December 2007. 
362 Unnamed party official quoted in Business Day, 20 December 2007. 
363 Cited in Business Day, 20 December 2007. 
364 Unnamed party official quoted in Business Day, 20 December 2007. 
365 Unnamed party official quoted in Business Day, 20 December 2007. 
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technical and technocratic manoeuvres/openness, respect and sharing perspectives). We could 
be accused of clutching at straws on the third matter/cheer, but let us here not forget ‘trial and 
error’ and the future not arriving all at once (Chavez’s millimetre and Lula’s centimetre). 
The second note: While some argue that we are shoe-laced by the power and strength of 
capital that renders it well-nigh impossible to cajole, discipline and direct them - particularly 
in formats reminiscent of yesteryear’s authoritarian developmentalism,366
…is particularly weak at present. It is politically inchoate, indecisive and its new 
black entrants too weak to play a decisive role. Indeed, it would be unwise in the 
extreme to leave the strategic choices for our future in the political hands of the 
national bourgeoisie… [I]t would be no wiser to place sole political power in the 
hands of a weak and organisationally fragmented working class. The strength of the 
union movement has not grown as one would have expected in the period of 
democracy and socialist principles are far from hegemonic. A weak working class 
power base in an economy of the size of South Africa is very vulnerable to isolation 
by global capital and the effects of this are plain to see in the world. It is a salutary 
thought that where powerful communist parties are firmly in power they are not 
seeking to isolate themselves from global forces but to rather manage them to their 
advantage… The conclusion that we have to come to in South Africa is that there 
remains only one politically effective mobilising strategy… the Alliance… Residing 
in the policies and, more important, the history of the Alliance, we find the only basis 
for mobilising a multi-class political force capable of designing a strong state that can 
harness the positives in globalisation and develop defences against its dangers… A 
united political movement with its roots firmly in mass participation and involvement 
is the only basis for the decisive, determined and yet patient transformation of our 
society and economy into a prosperous, stable and tolerant democracy (Erwin, 
2007:9). 
 others caution 
against this ‘wrong’ and self-defeating’ position. The ‘national bourgeoisie’, Alec Erwin, the 
Minister of Public Enterprises, in his personal capacity writes, 
The central dilemma, spotlighted in 1992 by Erwin and still relevant today, is to engineer a 
growth path that does not ‘antagonise the... numerically smaller but economically powerful 
interests’ while at the same time not ‘losing the support of its [the ANC’s] numerically larger 
worker and rural constituency’ (Erwin cited in Southern African Report, 5 June 1992). This 
would entail a combination of ‘redistribution and restructuring’ (Ibid) so as ‘to unlock and 
mobilise resources in the hands of private capital to support increased investment of a 
developmental nature’ benefitting the widest cross-section of our society versus that which is 
‘driven by narrow considerations of profit maximisation alone’ (Davies, 2003:39), i.e. a pro-
growth versus pro-market development orientation. In concrete terms, this would mean 
                                                 
366 Jeremy Cronin speaks of a South African capitalist class that is more powerful than was the case in the Asian 
Tiger model (paraphrased in Mail & Guardian, 29 June 2007). Bill Freund makes the following point on this 
score: 
…[W]e have a very capacious, determined and intelligent capitalist class which does not need the state 
to make a buck or to discipline the workers; it is in a far stronger position than India 1948 or Korea 
1950s and will not shift easily from what it knows. And it is backed by a financial sector that probably 
really controls the economy for the most part (E-mail, 30 July 2007). 
 287 
 
addressing very directly the conditions that presently undercut the social foundations of 
developmental state building. Ensuring that society supports and is part of the growth ‘ride’ 
requires the ANC to break with its ‘existing conception of society as comprising business and 
sections of the ANC’ (see Friedman in Business Day, 6 July 2005). 
Centrally implicated in this project is institutional building and institutional re-orientation 
related in the main to their configuration determining and disbursing ‘differential returns’ to 
different segments and portions of society (see Evans, 2002:101–2). Research demonstrates 
the importance of the ‘quality of institutions’ for dynamic economic growth – it ‘trumps 
everything else’ (see Rodrik et al., 2004) and there is evidence that causation proceeds 
primarily from institutions to growth, rather than the other way round (see Acemolgu et al., 
2001; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002; Kaufmann et al.; 2005). The conclusion, then, is that what 
is required in our context is quite invasive socio-institutional surgery, or, recalling Mafege, a 
renowned scholar in the area of poverty eradication and developmental state building, 
‘radical change and not cosmetic reformism’ (Mafege, 2001:18). To delay any further 
‘getting out from under [the] bad institutions’ (Evans, 2002:101–2) that are ostensibly geared 
to the doing the right things for the right people will continue to ‘undercut the social 
foundations of a project of [developmental] state building by making it impossible to...pursue 
policies that could create a political alliance composed of actors with an interest in it’ 
(Eriksen, 2005:407).  
Even if a ‘state that uses its power to constrain its own power’ (Carmody, 2002:36) can, by 
some quirk of history, harness and mobilise internal resources to articulate and champion 
mildly ‘growth-enhancing institutional transformations’, they are ‘likely to be rejected’ 
(Evans, 2002:101–2) and implementation frustrated by the ‘tightly-knit elite of black 
businessmen, ex-politicians and public servants, bureaucrats and ANC leaders’ (Freund, 
2006a:20). Without ‘massive social dislocation’ that ‘destroys the small interest groups, thus 
allowing the state to pursue broad developmental goals’ (Grabowski, 1994:414, 420), our 
society will remain locked in a development path, which in the medium to long term will 
deliver further body blows to the rapidly disintegrating structural integrity of our social and 
political fabric. In short, the installation of a redistributive and dynamic inclusive growth path 
delivered by what history repeatedly demonstrates are the institutional interventions of state 
that in ‘some senses corresponds to [the] model of a developmental state’ (Leftwich, 
2000:169), demands restructuring of the existing socio-political bloc. 
The third note: ‘[W]hile the dominant rhetoric [in South Africa] continues to be one of 
questioning the state’s role in these areas’,367
This ‘reality’ reminds us daily that it may be premature to relegate the state, or more 
appropriately, its transformative capacity, in its contemporary variegated and multiple 
mutations, to the margins of our imaginaries and ‘devscapes’. The fabrications and fantasia of 
our policy and academic eyes (the mumbo-jumbo and mendacity) that daily pervert and 
 the reality is that effective interventions are 
being implemented in many countries (Roberts, 2007:14) from Botswana to China and Chile, 
from Hong Kong to India and Ireland, from Latin America to Singapore and from Taiwan to 
Vietnam.  
                                                 
367 This is at some distance from the early 1990s economic policy debates when the issue was not about the 
‘centrality of state intervention’ but its ‘particularities’ (Gelb, 1990:37). 
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subvert our sensibilities and visions of an alternative future, cannot elide and eclipse a reality 
that is way more productive than our outdated theories and philosophies. Thus, in spite of the 
many obituaries penned about the demise of the developmental state and/or its decline in 
contemporary times, it has ‘refused to die’ (Fine, 2007b:113). Cases in point include the rise 
of the Celtic Tiger in the mid- to late 1990s (supposedly engineered by the ‘flexible 
developmental state’ (O’Rian, 2000);368 the Southern consensus (a combination of East Asian 
developmentalism and Latin American neostructuralism, presently being modified) (Gore, 
2000; Bresser-Pereira, 2003, 2006, 2006a, 2006b)); the strange cases of Chinese, Vietnamese 
and Indian capitalism (‘three important countries which have violated virtually all the rules in 
the neoliberal guidebook even while moving in a more market-oriented direction’ (Rodrik, 
2002a:01; also see Mukand & Rodrik, 2005; Broad & Cavanagh, 2006; Harvey 2007)); the 
developmentalism of the neoliberal poster child (Chile); and the recent UNCTAD report 
(2007), which contests the impossibility thesis and advances a powerful rationale and 
justification for the installation and construction of a developmental state in African 
countries.369
Moreover, the conventional wisdom about the financial crisis having destroyed the 
developmental state model is not entirely true. The words of the senior fellow at the S 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University), Tang 
Shiping, are here most apposite: 
  
And contrary to conventional wisdom, the 1997 crisis has not destroyed the Asian economic 
development model, the core of which is not crony capitalism, but state-guided economic 
development with [sic] a market economy. While today’s Asian economies believe in strong 
governance and transparency, they remain committed to the core principle of a developmental 
state… One can even argue that post-crisis, Asian states became more convinced of the 
necessity of a strong state in managing the road towards economic success (in Straits Times, 2 
July 2007).370
These notes excite and exasperate. Fuelled by different asymmetries and geometries of power 
and influence, they point to a world and future laced with anxiety, hope, promise and despair. 
It behoves us to mine the possibilities and opportunities of the present future (the 
reconnection of politics, economics and society; good enough governance; bad institutional 
design; etc.) and the present past (apartheid state developmentalism; getting the prices wrong; 
 
                                                 
368 The flexible developmental state ‘nurtures Post-Fordist networks and global technology and business 
networks’ (O’Rian, 2000:1). This is rendered possible via the ‘multiple embeddedness of state agencies in 
professional-led networks of innovation and in international capital and by the state’s flexible organizational 
structure’ (Ibid.). 
369 The report states that ‘increased domestic resources complemented by augmented aid flows are unlikely to 
provide an escape route from Africa’s underdevelopment without a fundamental shift in policy orientation away 
from the neoliberal stalemate’ (UNCTAD, 2007:57). The recommended policy orientation is that of the East 
Asian developmental state: ‘the report highlights the need for more policy space for African countries to design 
and implement policies that make [sic] optimal use of available resources in a way that leads to a virtuous circle 
of accumulation, investment, growth and poverty reduction drawing on the model of developmental States’ 
(Ibid:4–5). It further argues that the ‘necessary ingredients are in place for African countries to tackle their 
development challenges within the framework of a “developmental state”’ (Ibid:57). 
370 Available at http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,7614, (accessed 10 July 2007). 
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rent seeking; etc.) to recharge and re-invigorate our failed and failing statecraft. Hence the 
three notes are resources that could, invoking Lenin, ‘spark’ and ‘rekindle conflagration’.  
Firstly, developmental state precedents are fresh in our memories and there is our long 
abiding commitment to a developmental ideology, which arguably is daily deepening and 
consolidating, and now undergirded by mature and sober narratives and praxis of social 
transformation. Secondly, it is both ‘wrong’ and ‘self-defeating’ to portray ‘capital’ as 
omnipotent, i.e. beyond cajoling, disciplining and directing. The power of the national 
bourgeoisie is not unrelated to the structure and workings of our institutions, which are less 
subject to external diktat (endogenous) and hence not immutable. Thirdly, the ‘reality’ of 
effective developmental state interventions around the world alert us, in the words of 
UNCTAD (2007), not only to ‘fatalism’ being ‘unwarranted’ (Ibid:88), but, more 
importantly, that the ‘necessary ingredients are in place for African countries’ (and bearing 
here in mind that South Africa is relatively advanced compared to others) ‘to tackle their 
development challenges with the framework of a “developmental state”’ (Ibid:57). 
Stringing these three notes into a melody that makes hope and history rhyme, a tempo 
concordant with the life, aspirations and dreams of the majority, is the quintessential 
challenge of today and tomorrow. Refurbished rhetoric, mendacity, mass deception, and 
mumbo-jumbo obfuscation can no longer be the score if we are committed to deliver on the 
dreams and hopes of the socially, politically, economically and spatially excluded of 
yesterday, today and tomorrow. 
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